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HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
I will argue that the modern can be viewed as a stage of 
apprenticeship in an ethics of responsibility. The debates on racial 
slavery in the Americas reveal a fractured modernity, where a 
counter-discourse of domination coexists with a totaiising impulse. 
The complicity of humanism and oppression marks the 
consolidation of a racialised, autonomous and rational modern 
subject defined against its 'others'. However, I suggest that 
Derridean critiques of humanism, such as those presented in 
Robert Young's White Mythologies, perpetuate the links between 
humanism and colonialism. The 'game with Hegel' is kept in play 
through a rigid dichotomy between modernity and postmodernity. 
By reducing modern discourse to a synthesis between thesis and 
antithesis, they do not allow for the possibility of non-coincidence 
between two contraries. 
Fanon's emphasis on lived experience, Are n dt's enlarged 
mentality, and Levinas's non-ontological transcendence provide a 
break with the complicity between humanism and colonialism. 
While Fanon articulates the perplexities inherent in finding a path 
from the universal to the particular, Arendt and Levinas give two 
solutions, one political and the other ethical, to this 
problematisation. Arendt privileges the safeguarding of a space of 
plurality through law. Levinas emphasises the ethical relationship 
between same and Other, where the latter is transcendent and 
therefore unassimilable by the former. This thesis aims to open 
and reveal gaps, by pointing to ways of thinking humanism that 
problematise the common reduction of the humanist legacy to a 
totalising outlook. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ON HUMANISM: NEGOTIATING ALTERITY FROM WITHIN 
1. Introduction: The Post-Colonial Dilemma 
In Between Camps, Paul Gilroy posits a planetary humanism 
founded on an essence of 'human-ness' that would provide the 
basis for global solidarity between human beings, thus eliminating 
the Enlightenment tradition's need for categories, primordially that 
of race, destined to divide and classify the human. Celebrating the 
post-modern implosion of identities, Gilroy paradoxically seeks to 
restore a universalist conception of humanity, an ideal of totality 
composed of a myriad of differences. Different people, whose 
bodily existence - or being in the world - is conditioned according 
to the specificity of their social context, nevertheless share in the 
universal patrimony of 'human-ness' deriving from the similarity of 
sources for identification and empathy. 
The recurrence of pain, disease, humiliation and loss of 
dignity, grief, and care for those one loves can all contribute 
to an abstract sense of a human similarity powerful enough 
to make solidarities based on cultural particularity appear 
suddenly trivial. (Gilroy, 2000: 17) 
GiI roy's emphasis on the universality of 'species being' is 
conducive to a distancing from the experience of victimisation: 
since all human beings partake of a common humanity, they have 
the capacity to situate themselves 'in between' camps and thus 
empathise with situations of oppression that they themselves may 
not have been subject to. The experience of victimisation is not a 
precondition for speaking on behalf of alterity; in fact, the status of 
'in between -ness' allows for the transcendence of a strictly 
delimited camp mentality patent in what Said terms 'possessive 
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exclusivism', according to which only blacks can speak about 
racism, or women about feminism. 
The idea that possessing a particular identity should be a 
precondition or qualification for engaging in this kind of work 
is trivial. The intellectual challenge defined here is that 
histories of suffering should not be allocated exclusively to 
their victims. If they were, the memory of the trauma would 
disappear as the living memory of it died away. (Gilroy, 
2000: 114) 
The universality of species being that derives from a non-camp 
view of history would be inducive to the reassessment of a 
modernist tradition complicit with the European legacy of 
colonialism. The failure inherent in the universalist conception of 
Enlightenment humanism resided precisely in its operation within a 
historiographical scale defined by the hermetic parameters of the 
nation-state. Thus, while attempting to classify alterity within a 
unified narrative of civilisation, Enlightenment humanism 
nevertheless was predicated upon a hierarchy ranging from the 
primitive to the civilised. Gilroy's metaphor of 'in between-ness' 
introduces a new historiographical scale to reassess modernity. 
Universal humanism thus appears as a non-racial humanism 
concerned with 'the forms of human dignity that race-thinking 
strips away'. (2000: 17,114) 
Perhaps above all, this attempt to reconceptualise modernity 
so that it encompasses these possibilities is relevant to the 
majority who are unlikely to count themselves as affiliated 
with either of the principal groups: victims and perpetrators. 
This difficult stance challenges that unnamed group to 
witness sufferings that pass beyond the reach of words and, 
in so doing, to see how an understanding of one's own 
particularity or identity might be transformed as a result of a 
principled exposure to the claims of otherness. (Gilroy, 2000: 
115) 
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This change of scale involves an alteration in the temporal scheme 
used to judge events. According to Gilroy, modernity has been so 
profoundly ruptured by twentieth-century camps that the latter 
stand at a threshold demarcating a 'before' and 'after'. This rupture 
is conducive to a novel ethics which questions the universality 
allegedly espoused by the modernist legacy, as well as urging for 
the reconceptualisation of history and tradition according to the 
notion of a 'compound diaspora identity'. This diaspora, uniting the 
histories of sufferings wrought by modernity, politicises time, 
historicity and historicality in two ways: first, by opposing 'western' 
domination; second, by recognising history as a web, a complex 
plurality that cannot be unwound#ý to recover a point of origin. 
The will to archaism, with its emphasis on the search for 
authenticity, on one hand, and the will to utopia, with its 
concomitant estrangement from reality induced by an exclusively 
future-oriented outlook, on the other, are both transcended by the 
politicisation of time, the latter which occurs in the present. Linear 
temporality, or evolutionary teleology, gives way to the syncopated 
temporal codes of a diaspora whose identity surpasses the dualism 
of genealogy and geography. (Gilroy, 2000: 87,122,126,341-3, 
356) 
The diaspora idea encourages critical theory to proceed 
rigorously but cautiously in ways that do not privilege the 
modern nation-state and its institutional order over the 
subnational and supranational patterns of power, 
communication, and conflict that they work to discipline, 
regulate, and govern. The concept of space is itself 
transformed when it is seen in terms of the ex-centric 
communicative circuitry that has enabled dispersed 
populations to converse, interact, and more recently even to 
synchronise significant elements of their social and cultural 
lives. (Gilroy, 2000: 129) 
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Reconceptualising modernity from the point of view of the force of 
raciology in the Enlightenment tradition leads to the establishment 
of links between transnational histories of trauma. Any particularist 
considerations of the sufferings of colonial peoples on one hand, 
and European Jews on the other, are transcended by an optics that 
embraces their status as 'others' within the manicheistic logic of 
European imperialism. Residing in between camps entails a 
decentred comprehension of European history as well as a 
cosmopolitan ethics that provides the basis for a new, non-racial 
humanism. (Gilroy, 2000: 80,84) 
It may be better to welcome a change of scale and work 
toward a more complex picture in a longer time frame, 
perhaps also within a conceptual scheme that reorients our 
thinking away from the glamour of ethnos and redirects it to 
what used to be called "the problem of species being. " This 
could be presented as an exercise in strategic universalism. 
(Gilroy, 2000: 96) 
By resorting to strategic universalism, Gilroy is able to defend the 
post-modern implosion of essentialist categories such as race 
whilst paradoxically espousing the universality of 'species being', 
that is, the specificity of a human identity. According to Gilroy, the 
transethnic solidarity between human beings patent in the popular 
media frequently surfaces in the face of other-worldly danger. A 
new, non-racial humanism on a planetary scale -a planetary 
humanism -, divorced from the Enlightenment legacy, ought to 
bring this global solidarity from a utopian future into the present. 
(2000: 355) 
Gilroy is thus using postmodernism to write back against itself: a 
deconstruction of identities points towards a totality, an ultimate 
human identity, contrary to the habitual post-modern stance that 
opposes any form of universalism. Furthermore, despite his 
argument in favour of the implosion of race, Gilroy is ultimately 
acknowledging the force of raciology in the construction of reality; 
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thus, while claiming the inexistence of race on one hand, he 
simultaneously affirms its validity as a concept, albeit artificial, 
which nevertheless became reality in the process of constructing 
reality. Between Camps is premised on the existence of race; the 
will to universality, to a human identity, can only be understood as 
an attempt to embrace particularities, such as race, sex or class, 
under an all subsuming totality. Therefore, to simultaneously argue 
for post-modernism and universality can appear contradictory, if 
we are to restrict ourselves to the current terms of Gilroy's essay. 
Moreover, a post-modern perspective regarding the non-existence 
of race is an academic privilege. Adhering to this view may be 
dangerous, for if appearances, the manifestation of being in the 
world, are not taken into account, one risks alienation from the 
latter. This is not to deny that the boundaries of what it means to 
be human are artificial and the product of a constant negotiation 
(2000: 18); however, taking into account that the only reality we 
know is that which is negotiated, perhaps it is best to write back 
against this artifice from within rather than without the 'category' 
of race. This is the only form of being politically effective, for the 
political realm is a space of appearances, in which only 
appearances can be protected by law. Although ideally liberation 
from race would pave the way for a politics conducive to both 
individual and social development - by providing 'answers to the 
pathological problems represented by genomic racism, the glamour 
of sameness, and the eugenic projects currently nurtured by their 
confluence' (2000: 41) -, in reality the deconstruction of race 
within the political realm might leave human beings with no more 
than their mere humanity to appeal for the defence of their rights. 
Despite Gilroy's utopianism, he recognises the dilemma inherent in 
forsaking appearances in politics; his urge for strategic 
universalism is an attempt to come to terms with the loss of 
political agency that the post-modern decentring of the subject can 
easily lead to. 
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Gilroy's advocation of 'in between-ness' begs the question of 
whether it is really possible to situate oneself outside a camp: is 
not residing 'between camps' a camp in itself? And, similarly to the 
celebration of the elimination of race, the glamorisation of an 'in 
between' status may be considered to be a privilege of a 
cosmopolitan environment: it is debatable whether this concept can 
retain its celebratory character in contexts which have had little 
exposure to the commingling of cultures brought about by the fact 
of colonialism. The laudatory quality of 'in between-ness' risks 
obscuring the confusion and ambivalence that is often wrought by 
the existence of a double consciousness that finds itself in but is 
not of a particular culture. A concept of diaspora that unites 
histories of sufferings is, furthermore, essentially utopian in that 
time and again daily experience reveals the particularities that 
oppose each other within this traurnatised 'totality'. The West is 
, generally pointed 
to as the culprit in the histories of victimisation 
brought upon humanity; however, if one is to defend a universal 
humanism, then the universality of terror and sufferings in the non- 
Western world must also be accounted for. The camp mentality is 
not necessarily negative; in fact, it can even play in favour of a 
deconstruction of race. The concept of the nation-state, for 
example, can be posited as protecting citizens, independently of 
race, sex, or class, as long as the latter were born within its 
boundaries. It would thus be important to draw a distinction 
between the nation-state and nationalism, as well as between race 
and racism, or sex and sexism, or class and elitism. ' 
Gilroy's utopianism derives essentially from the use of strategic 
universalism to account for a human identity, a species being in 
opposition to ethnos, without problematising what this human 
identity consists of. Gilroy is asserting the possibility of defending 
a universal humanism whilst remaining 'post-modern'. Like Spivak, 
1 The above arguments against Gilroy's utopianism are drawn from 
Hannah Arendt's views on politics as a space of appearance, and the 
nation-state as a delimited area within which the rights of citizens can 
be protected. 
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he does not appear to be concerned with any incoherence deriving 
from the attempt to conciliate humanist and anti-humanist 
standpoints. (Spivak, 1990: 11) However, whereas he defends a 
strategic universalism, Spivak alludes to a strategic essentialism: 
whilst Gilroy seeks to eliminate categories such as race, class and 
sex in favour of a wider universalism inherent in human identity, 
Spivak seeks to hang on to those essentialisms so as to write back 
against them. 
... as anti-sexism is reactive, it seems to me that there one 
has to produce a reverse legitimisation of sexism itself. If 
you just define yourself as anti-sexist you are indeed 
legitimising sexism. I don't care; as I said, I am not 
interested in being pure even as I remain an anti- 
essentialist. It seems to me that that kind of contamination of 
my own possible theoretical excellence is how situational 
practice norms my theory. Because if I chose to be pure in 
that sense .... displacing the question of sexual 
difference 
rather than legitimising it by acting to confront the discourse 
of the sexist, it seems to me that all I would gain is 
theoretical purity, which in itself I question in every way. 
(Spivak, 1990: 12) 
Deconstructing race, sex or class would, according to Spivak, be a 
form of seeking to retain theoretical purity. This goal, however, is 
impossible, for deconstructivists are themselves 'run by a great 
narrative even as they are busy protecting their theoretical purity 
by repudiating essentialism'. (Spivak, 1990: 12) Whereas most 
anti-essentialists would be anti-universalists, Gilroy is an anti- 
essentialist universalist. Thus, the great narrative that guides his 
work - that of universalism - is clearly asserted; however, he 
distances this universalist humanism from that of the 
Enlightenment tradition. His is allegedly a purer' form of humanism 
than that of modernity. As such, Gilroy is still placing himself in an 
essentialist position by opposing modernity and the taxonomical 
categories that the latter gave rise to. 
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You pick up the universal that will give you the power to fight 
against the other side, and what you are throwing away by 
doing that is your theoretical purity. (Spivak, 1990: 12) 
Whereas the universal for Gilroy is that which subsumes race, 
class and sex, that is, the-totality that defines human identity, 
Spivak claims that the universal is 'what the other side gives us' 
(1990: 12), an essentialist category that one adopts in order to 
react against it. 
Bhabha's 'unsatisfied universals' make a concession to the 
impossibility of a utopian totality, a harmonious universality. 
Rather than positing a humanism synonymous with 'oneness', 
Bhabha speaks of the need to resort to universals in unsatisfied 
conditions, a strategy that results in 'unexpected transformations'. 
Totalisation of an event is unrealisable, for a past tradition 
acquires a different meaning the moment it is brought into the 
present. 
It is this contingent transformative moment in a citation of 
the universal which sets up a site which neither is nor is not 
universal, but which is a partial identification. (Bhabha, 
1996: 41 ) 
In essence, Gilroy's planetary humanism is similar to Sai d's 
attempt to rearticulate a new humanist outlook in Culture and 
Imperialism. The common experience of imperialism would allow 
human beings to transcend cultural particularities, thus distancing 
themselves from the dichotomy between Orient/Occident inherent 
in Orientalist thought, as well as from nativist discourses aimed at 
writing back at ex-colonial powers. 
Gilroy's utopianism may derive from his disavowal of the particular 
as something on the basis of which a totality can be constructed 
(Hall, 1996: 40): race, sex and class are to be deconstructed in 
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favour of a human identity, the latter which is never defined. We 
are told that Enlightenment thought distinguished itself by the 
attempt to constantly test the boundaries of the human; however, 
what are the foundations upon which Gilroy defends the 
universalism of a planetary humanism? Moreover, although he 
alludes to the reassessment of modernity as both an ethical and 
political project, the harmonious 'wholeness' of his humanism 
prevents him from analysing the ethical and political implications 
that may derive from any falling out from this unity. 
Strategic universalism begs for an analysis of the psychic, ethical 
and political components that make up species being; it thus 
consists in an acknowledgement of the tension between the 
existence of psychic and biological characteristics that determine 
the generality of human form on one hand, and, on the other, the 
social and cultural variations that condition the content of this 
form. The works of Frantz Fanon, Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel 
Levinas will be used in this thesis to address the possibility for 
negotiating the tension between essentialism and anti-essentialism 
within the human condition. By breaking with the complicity 
between the humanism tradition and colonialism, Fanon, Arendt 
and Levinas might provide a conceptual framework for a revised 
humanism. While Fanon's new humanism conveys the universality 
of the psychic process in identity formation vis cý vis an Other, 
Arendt and Levinas give two solutions, one political and the other 
ethical, to the problems ensuing from differing cultural expressions 
of human form. 
11. Species-Being: Between Conscious Activity and Nature 
Man confirms his real social life in his species- 
consciousness and in his thought he merely repeats his real 
existence just as conversely his species-being is confirmed 
in his species-consciousness and exists for itself in its 
universality as a thinking being. (Marx, 2000: 99) 
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Arguing against any differentiation between society and individual, 
Marx presents man, in his particularity, as part of a wider totality 
comprising all human manifestations of life. The individual 
embodies a subjective social existence, which corresponds to a 
mode of species-life. Although the particularity of subjective 
thought and the generality of species-being are indeed distinct, 
thought and being form a unity in that it is precisely through the 
free conscious activity that man becomes species-being. (Marx, 
2000: 99,90) 
Man makes his vital activity itself into an object of his will 
and consciousness. He has a conscious vital activity. He is 
not immediately identical to any of his characterisations. 
Conscious vital activity differentiates man immediately from 
animal vital activity. It is this and this alone that makes man 
a species-being. He is only a conscious being, that is, his 
own life is an object to him, precisely because he is a 
species-being. This is the only reason for his activity being 
free activity. (Marx, 2000: 90) 
Man's status as a conscious species-being - 'as a being that 
relates to the species as to himself and to himself as to the 
species' (Marx, 2000: 90) - is confirmed in the construction of an 
objective world, deriving from the refashioning of inorganic nature. 
Man's species-life consists in this reworking of nature, so that the 
latter becomes his product, or his reality. Species-life thus 
objectifies itself in the object of work: man 'duplicates' himself 
both in his mind, as well as in the world he has constructed. 
Therefore, when alienated labour tears from man the object 
of his production, it also tears from him his species-life, the 
real objectivity of his species and turns the advantage he 
has over animals into a disadvantage in that his inorganic 
body, nature, is torn from him. Similarly, in that alienated 
labour degrades man's own free activity to a means, it turns 
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the species-life of man into a means for his physical 
existence. (Marx, 2000: 91) 
The alienation of man from man ensues from alienated labour: by 
alienating himself from his species' objectivity in the world, the 
individual is opposing not only himself but other men. Thus, 
alienation from species-being reflects itself in alienation between 
human beings as a result of a general distancing from the human 
essence. Moreover, man's self-alienation from himself and nature 
is projected onto the relationship in which he situates himself and 
nature vis ýi vis other men. (Marx, 2000: 92) 
Through alienated labour, then, man creates not only his 
relationship to the object and act of production as to a lien 
and hostile men; he creates too the relationship in which 
other men stand to his production and his product and the 
relationship in which he stands to these other men. Jus t as 
he turns his production into his own loss of reality and 
punishment and his own product into a loss, a product that 
does not belong to him, so he creates the domination of the 
man who does not produce over the production and the 
product. As he alienates his activity from himself, so he 
hands over to an alien person an activity that does not 
belong to him. (Marx, 2000: 92-3) 
Through alienated, or externalised labour, the worker establishes 
the relationship to labour of a man who is alienated from it. 
Furthermore, the labourer's relationship to his work is ultimately 
responsible for the capitalist's relationship to it. The worker's 
alienation from himself and from nature thus results in the creation 
of private property. Communism seeks to re-establish man as a 
communal being by eliminating self -alienation. The return of man 
to himself is allegedly attained through the abolition of private 
property, the latter which would pave the way for the approximation 
between the individual and human essence. (Marx, 2000: 93,97) 
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This is communism as the complete and conscious return of 
man conserving all the riches of previous development for 
man himself as a social, i. e. human being. Communism as 
completed naturalism is humanism and as completed 
humanism is naturalism. It is the genuine solution of the 
antagonism between man and nature and between man and 
man. It is the true solution of the struggle between existence 
and essence, between objectification and self -affirmation, 
between freedom and necessity, between individual and 
species. (Marx, 2000: 97) 
The individual's reintegration into human life, ensuing from the 
abolition of private property - and, therefore, of all alienation -, 
takes the form of a distancing of man from institutions such as 
religion, family and state, corresponding to an appropriation of his 
species-being, that is, his human, or social, being. The movement 
of history is, according to Marx, the conscious process of man's 
becoming a communal being. Both man as creator and the product 
of his labour - the object which represents his own existence to 
fellow men as well as their existence for him - are simultaneously 
the outcome and the origin of the movement. (2000: 97-8) 
So the general character of the whole movement is a social 
one; as society produces man as man, so it is produced by 
man ... The 
human significance of nature is only available to 
social man; for only to social man is nature available as a 
bond with other men, as the basis of his own existence for 
others and theirs for him, and as the vital element in human 
reality; only to social man is nature the foundation of his own 
human existence. Only as such has his natural existence 
become a human existence and nature itself become human. 
Thus society completes the essential unity of man and 
nature, it is the genuine resurrection of nature, the 
accomplished naturalism of man and the accomplished 
humanism of nature. (Marx, 2000: 98) 
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The elimination of alienation entails the emancipation of the 
senses, allowing the latter to become human, in both objective and 
subjective terms. When the eye's object is humanised, due to its 
creation by and for man, the eye itself has become human. Rather 
than relating to an object as a means towards an end, that is, as a 
mere utility catering to need and enjoyment, the senses engage 
with the 'thing' directly, for its own sake. However, not only is man 
relating humanly to the object, but the thing itself is relating 
humanly to man. 
... the thing itself is an objective 
human relationship to itself 
and to man and vice versa ... Need and enjoyment 
have thus 
lost their egoistic nature and nature has lost its mere utility 
in that its utility has become human utility. (Marx, 2000: 100) 
Man's senses appropriate the object in their relation to it. All 
objects are the objectification of man himself, insofar as social 
reality is constituted by the exercise of man's own faculties. 
Because society takes form in the object, the individual confirms 
human reality in his relationship to this object: the objects that 
concretise his individuality become his own objects. However, the 
mode of object appropriation relies on the nature of the object as 
well as the sense-faculty that regulates it. 
The eye perceives an object differently from the ear and the 
object of the eye is different from that of the ear. What 
makes each faculty distinct is just its particular essence and 
thus also the particular mode of its objectification, of its 
objectively real, living being. Thus man is affirmed in the 
objective world not only in thought but through all his 
senses. (Marx, 2000: 101) 
Marx thus attempts to invert Hegelian subjective idealism by 
emphasising the importance of sense perception and the relation 
of man to man, in detriment to that of abstract speculative thought. 
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Although the alienation, or externalisation, of man is a feature of 
Hegelian philosophy, man takes the abstract form of mind and is 
thus a conceptual being. For Hegel, human essence is synonymous 
with self-consciousness. Any object which presents itself to 
consciousness is overcome through reappropriation into self- 
consciousness. Thus, the object of consciousness, produced as 
alien to man, corresponds ultimately to self-consciousness; in 
other words, the object is 'objectified self-consciousness'. The 
movement of return from the object to self-consciousness 
presupposes the transcendence of objectivity and alienation, so 
that man is posited as a 'spiritual, non-objective being'. (Marx, 
2000: 109-10) 
... sense perception, religion, state power, etc., are spiritual 
beings; for spirit alone is the true essence of man and the 
true form of spirit is thinking spirit, logical, speculative spirit. 
The human character of nature and of historically produced 
nature, the product of man, appears as such in that they are 
products of abstract mind, and thus phases of mind, 
conceptual beings. (Marx, 2000: 109) 
Considering that Marx regards all objects to be the objectification 
of man himself, one can argue that his ideas are not very different 
from Hegelian phenomenology, whereby all alienation of human 
essence consists in the externalisation of self-consciousness. 
However, whereas Hegel had presented the alienation of self- 
consciousness as real, Marx regards the latter as a mere 
'appearance', a reflection in thought and knowledge of the real 
alienation of human essence. (2000: 110-11) 
The real, active relationship of man to himself as a species- 
being or the manifestation of himself as a real species-being, 
i. e. as a human being, is only possible if he uses all his 
species powers to create .... if he relates 
himself to them as 
objects, which can only be done at first in the form of 
alienation. (Marx, 2000: 109) 
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In Hegelian phenomenology, the negativity of the object is 
superseded through the externalisation of self-consciousness: by 
positing itself as object or the object as itself, self-consciousness 
gains a positive meaning deriving from the 'indivisible unity of 
being for itself'. Self-consciousness is thus at home both in itself 
and in its other, to the extent that it has reappropriated the 
alienated other within itself and thus annihilated the object. (Marx, 
2000: 111) The totality of these phases corresponds to the 
movement of consciousness, in what is known as the Hegelian 
dialectic of negativity: man creates himself as a process that 
ranges from externalisation as loss of the object to transcendence 
of alienation by a return of the object to self-consciousness. 
Thus the different forms of alienation that occur are only 
different forms of consciousness and self-consciousness. 
Since the abstract consciousness that the object is regarded 
as being, is only in itself a phase in the differentiation of 
self-consciousness, the result of the process is the identity 
of consciousness and self-consciousness, absolute 
knowledge, the process of abstract thought that is no longer 
outward looking but only takes place inside itself. In other 
words, the result is the dialectic of pure thought. (Marx, 
2000: 109) 
For Hegel, the dialectical movement consists in a negation of the 
negation that is an affirmation: by relating itself to an object, 
knowing, or human consciousness, externalises or alienates itself, 
so that it appears to itself as an object (Marx, 2000: 114); 
however, this externalisation is subsequently transcended through 
a reappropriation of the object by self-consciousness, the latter 
which affirms itself positively through this circular movement 
comprising a double negation. 
... in so 
far as self-conscious man has recognised the 
spiritual world ... as self-externalisation and superseded 
it, 
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he nevertheless confirms it again in his externalised form 
and declares it to be his true being, restores it, pretends to 
be at home in his other being as such ... Here is the root of 
Hegel's false positivism ... (Marx, 2000: 115) 
Basing himself on Feuerbach, Marx argues that the negation of the 
negation is an 'internal contradiction of philosophy', resulting in a 
philosophy that ultimately validates its opposite - theology or 
transcendence - through the act of reappropriation of that which 
had previously been denied. (2000: 106) Thus, rather than claiming 
the negation of the negation as the absolute positive, Marx, like 
Feuerbach, conceives of a positive that is based on itself and that 
is confirmed by the senses. Because man and nature are 
considered to be the only true reality by Marx, the affirmation of 
self-consciousness no longer requires mediation through its 
opposite. 
... atheism is a 
denial of God and tries to assert through this 
negation the existence of man; but socialism as such no 
longer needs this mediation ... It is the positive self- 
consciousness of man no longer mediated through the 
negation of religion, just as real life is the positive reality of 
man no longer mediated through communism as the negation 
of private property. (Marx, 2000: 104) 
Both atheism and communism thus appear as the positive resulting 
from the negation of the negation: while atheism represents the 
supersession of theological transcendence in the form of 
theoretical humanism, communism as the supersession of private 
property symbolises practical humanism, that is, human life as 
man's property. Both atheism and communism can thus be seen as 
stages in the process culminating with human renewal, whereby 
man is independently affirmed as his own foundation and basis 
through the very fact of existence. (Marx, 2000: 104,106,117) 
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... atheism 
is humanism mediated with itself through the 
supersession of religion, and communism is humanism 
mediated with itself through the supersession of private 
property. Only through the supersession of this mediation, 
which is, however, a necessary pre-condition, does positive 
humanism that begins with itself come into being. (Marx, 
2000: 117) 
Hegel posits the dialectical movement as the principle of creation, 
whereby man produces himself through mental labour, or abstract 
thought. By nullifying the object, the gesture of eternal return unto 
self-consciousness converts the negative element within the 
dichotomy into the real 'self -affirmative act of all being'. Hegelian 
history can thus account for the act of creation, the origin of 
species-consciousness or species-life, but it cannot present the 
true history of man as a 'presupposed subject'. (Marx, 2000: 106) 
... 
for Hegel the process of self-creation and self- 
objectification as self -external isation and self-alienation is 
the absolute and therefore final manifestation of human life 
which has itself for aim, is at peace with itself and has 
attained its true nature. (Marx, 2000: 117) 
Self-consciousness as self coinciding with itself corresponds to the 
absolute spirit, God, the idea that is omniscient and reveals itself. 
Man and nature in their reality are thus mere manifestations of this 
obscure, 'unreal man and unreal nature'. (Marx, 2000: 117) 
The relationship of subject and predicate to each other is 
thus completely inverted: a mystical subject-object or 
subjectivity reaching beyond the object, absolute subject as 
a process (it externalises itself, returns to itself from its 
externalisation and at the same time re-absorbs its 
externalisation); a pure and unceasing circular movement 
within itself ... (Marx, 2000: 
117-18) 
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Marx critiques subjective idealism precisely for affirming 'apparent' 
or 'self -alienated' being, rather than true being, through the 
movement whereby self-consciousness returns to itself 
subsequently to having reappropriated its opposite within the 
same. Instead of allowing the object to be subject by 
acknowledging its status as a being that resides externally to and 
independent of man, Hegelian phenomenology allegedly merely 
confirms the omnipotence of self-consciousness. As such, the 
negation of the negation in speculative thought does not lead to 
the affirmation of true being as the absolute positive ensuing from 
the negativity of apparent being. (Marx, 2000: 115) 
For Marx, Hegelian man is an abstract, imaginary being, divorced 
from objective reality. Because man is a natural, living, sentient 
being, he can only manifest his being in empirical, sensuous 
objects. The objective existence of species-being requires that 
man both have and be an object external to himself: '... to be 
objective, natural and sentient and to have one's object, nature 
and sense outside oneself or oneself to be object, nature and 
sense for a third person are identical' (Marx, 2000: 112): 
A being that does not have its nature outside itself is not a 
natural being and has no part in the natural world. A being 
that has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A 
being that is not itself an object for a third being has no 
being for its object, i. e. has no objective relationships and 
no objective existence. A non-objective being is a non-being. 
(Marx, 2000: 113) 
The fact that man is a human natural being, a conscious being who 
takes his life as object, means that he exists for himself: as 
species-being, man must affirm himself both in his living being as 
well as in knowledge. Nature as it is immediately perceived is 
therefore inadequate to species-being, for man works nature by 
taking it as an object of consciousness and thus transcending its 
process of origin. Similarly, because man knows his own history, 
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he can, through conscious activity, transcend his origins. (Marx, 
2000: 113) 
Ill. Humanism and Anti-humanism: Between Kant and Hegel 
Distinct conceptions of the relationship between nature and human 
conscious activity lie at the basis of the humanism/anti-humanism 
debate. Where humanism allegedly privileges the attempt by self- 
consciousness to coincide with itself, reappropriating an opposite 
within the same so as to be at home both in itself and in its other, 
anti-humanism emphasises the independent status of the object in 
the real world, its capacity to be subject externally to the 
perceiver's gaze. Marxist thought can be interpreted both as 
humanist and anti-humanist, due to presenting man simultaneously 
as creator and product of his alienated condition in the world: 
while marxist humanism posits man's existence as an absolute 
affirmation of his own basis and foundation, marxist anti-humanism 
draws attention to man's objectivity as a natural, living being, who 
due to having his objects outside himself, is determined by them. 
This dilemma within marxism derives from the recognition that man 
is both an active being, the bearer of natural powers, and a 
passive, vulnerable being, in need of objects from which he is 
alienated. 
Man is a directly natural being. As a living natural being he 
is on the one hand equipped with natural vital powers and is 
an active, natural being. These powers of his are 
dispositions, capacities, instincts. On the other hand, man as 
a natural corporeal, sensuous, objective being is a passive, 
dependent, and limited being, like animals and plants, that 
is, the objects of his instincts are exterior to him and 
independent of him and yet they are objects of his need, 
essential objects that are indispensable for the exercise and 
confirmation of his faculties. (Marx, 2000: 112) 
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The issue prevalent in marxist debate regarding subject/object 
distinction can be traced back to the ideal ist/em pi ricist argument 
over the 'true' existence of objects outside the subject's perception 
of them. Kantian transcendental idealism set the framework for 
contemporary humanist and anti-humanist positions, having 
revolutionised the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley as well as the 
sceptical idealism of Descartes: by positing a dualism between the 
noumena the thing in itself - and the phenomena - the thing as it 
appears Kant overturned the traditional idealist conception of 
reality as fundamentally mental in nature. 
The dictum of all genuine idealists, from the Eleatic school to 
Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition 
through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer 
illusion, and only in the ideas of the pure understanding and 
reason is there truth. " 
The principle that throughout dominates and determines my 
idealism is, on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely 
from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer 
illusion, and only in experience is there truth. " (Kant, 1977: 
113) 
Kant, however, simultaneously distances himself from the 
empiricist position, developed by Hume, according to whom the 
ordering of cognition derived from experience. For Kant, 
experience is made possible due to the existence of a priori 
concepts of the understanding, the latter which, allied to the forms 
of intuition of space and time, empirically organise sense 
perception by means of the synthetic activity of the intellect. 
Whereas Hume had attributed causation entirely to sense 
experience, claiming that the connection between cause and effect 
derives essentially from an acquired habit of association, 'of 
accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective 
necessity for objective', Kant argued that the objective 
reorganisation of subjective cognitive experience precedes 
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experience itself: pure synthetic cognitions thus exist prior to any 
order of perception. (1977: xiii, 22) 
This is, therefore, the result of all our foregoing inquiries: 
"All synthetic principles, a priori are nothing more than 
principles of possible experience" and can never be referred 
to things in themselves, but only to appearances as objects 
of experience. (Kant, 1977: 56) 
By considering objects of perception as appearances, Kant is 
acknowledging that the latter are founded upon a thing in itself, 
which nevertheless remains unknown to the observer. The beings 
of the understanding - noumena - presumed by antiquity to 
constitute an intelligible world, make their appearance by affecting 
the sensibility. 
For sensuous perception represents things not at all as they 
are, but only the mode in which they affect our senses; and 
consequently by sensuous perception appearances only, and 
not things themselves, are given to the understanding for 
reflection. (Kant, 1977: 34) 
Because sense perception comes a posteriori to pure intuitions, or 
forms of sensibility, namely space and time, the latter constitute 
the basis of the empirical, that is, of 'all the actual impressions 
through which I am affected by objects'. (Kant, 1977: 27) Space 
and time thus constitute formal conditions of our sensibility which 
make possible the appearance of objects. If, however, space and 
time as modes of representation are considered to be 
determinations of things in themselves rather than proceeding from 
the subject, the conditions of possible experience, founded on 
universally valid a priori laws, will have been exceeded: illusion 
might ensue from the attempt to define as universally valid that 
which is merely a subjective form of sensibility applicable only to 
objects of perception, that is, to possible experience. By alluding 
to things in themselves rather than to appearances, the pure 
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concepts of the understanding would thereby lose their meaning. 
(Kant, 1977: 35,51,55) 
... as there 
is no intuition at all beyond the field of 
sensibility, these pure concepts, since they cannot possibly 
be exhibited in concreto, are void of all meaning; 
consequently all these noumena, together with their sum 
total, the intelligible world, are nothing but representations 
of a problem, the object of which in itself is quite possible 
but the solution, from the nature of our understanding, totally 
impossible. For our understanding is not a faculty of intuition 
but of the connection of given intuitions in an experience. 
Experience must therefore contain all the objects for our 
concepts; but beyond it no concepts have any meaning, since 
no intuition can be subsumed under them. (Kant, 1977: 59) 
By positing that things can never be known in themselves but only 
as appearances, that is, as 'representations of the sensibility', is 
Kant not advocating a blatantly idealist position according to which 
objects exist solely in the mind? Kant, however, claims that where 
traditional idealism reduces all sense intuitions to thought, 
refusing any correspondence between these and an external 
object, his transcendental idealism argues for the existence of 
things outside our senses, despite such objects revealing 
themselves merely as appearances rather than as what they are in 
themselves. 
Consequently, I grant by all means that there are bodies 
without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us 
as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the 
representations which their influence on our sensibility 
procures us, and which we call bodies. This word merely 
means the appearance of the thing, which is unknown to us 
but is not therefore less real. Can this be termed idealism? It 
is the very contrary. (Kant, 1977: 33) 
28 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
Whereas genuine idealism annihilates the existence of that which 
appears, Kant's transcendental idealism argues that our senses 
will never be able to intuit the thing as it is in itself. Unlike 
Cartesian empirical idealism which doubts the existence of 
corporeal things, Kant's idealism is constituted by the 'sensual 
representation of things, to which space and time belong'. It is 
therefore the faculty of cognition preceding any sensual intuition, 
rather than our cognition of things, that is transcendental. (1977: 
33,37) 
By positing an object that is subject, independent from the 
perceiver's gaze, Marx is perhaps revealing a greater indebtedness 
to Kant than to Hegel. However, while Kant argues that one may 
never know the object as it is in itself, outside the field of possible 
experience where the thing appears as a representation of the 
sensibility, Marx affirms 'true being', the absolute positive which is 
opposed to 'apparent', or self-alienated being. Moreover, where 
Kant equates the realm of possible experience with that which 
appears, rather than with the object as it is in itself, it would seem 
that Marx claims experience as the domain of the thing itself. 
Thus, although Kantian subject/object dualisms may surface in 
Marxian thought, the latter nevertheless professes greater faith in 
the capacity of consciousness to understand that which appears in 
experience as true being. Marxian thought therefore seems to 
hover between a Kantian separation of subject and object, and a 
Hegelian annihilation of this very separation. 
Hegel critiques the dualist position on the grounds of 
contradiction: because Kant excludes cognition from the thing in 
itself - the noumena, or in Hegelian terms, the Absolute, 
synonymous with truth -, truth remains unattainable, even in the 
realm of possible experience. While Kant wishes to limit knowledge 
to possible experience, the realm where the only possible 'truth' 
may be sought, he simultaneously characterises the thing in itself 
as the true 'truth', one which is impossible to capture. Kant's 'fear 
of falling into error', that is, of falling prey to illusion by applying 
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the principles of reason to that which exceeds possible experience, 
is for Hegel a 'fear of the truth'. (Hegel, 1977: 47) Hegel considers 
the divergent forms of knowledge to lead consciousness to the 
acquisition of true knowledge, the Absolute, where due to a 
complete experience of itself the soul becomes spirit, knowing 
itself as it is, coinciding with itself in complete unity. In the realm 
of the Absolute, consciousness returns to itself as self- 
consciousness, in a movement whereby it becomes truly spirit by 
reflecting itself into itself. 
it is in itself the movement which is cognition - the 
transforming of that in-itself into that which is for itself, of 
Substance into Subject, of the object of consciousness into 
an object of self-consciousness, i. e. into an object that is 
just as much superseded, or into the Notion. The movement 
is the circle that returns into itself, the circle that 
presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at the end. 
(Hegel, 1977: 488) 
The supersession of the alienation of the subject from its object of 
consciousness is achieved by the return to self-consciousness. In 
the movement whereby the identity of the self coincides with itself, 
the subject acknowledges the world as his own creation. Thought 
and being, or abstract essence and Self, or substance and subject, 
are thus united in the Absolute: consciousness defines existence. 
(Hegel, 1977: 488-9) 
Precisely because existence is defined as Species, it is a 
simple thought; NoCis, simplicity, is substance. On account of 
its simplicity or self-identity it appears fixed and enduring. 
But this self-identity is no less negativity; therefore its fixed 
existence passes over into its dissolution. The 
determinateness seems at first to be due entirely to the fact 
that it is related to an other, and its movement seems 
imposed on it by an alien power; but having its otherness 
within itself, and being self-moving, is just what is involved 
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in the simplicity of thinking itself; for this simple thinking is 
the self-moving and self -diff erentiati ng thought, it is its own 
inwardness, it is the pure Notion. Thus common 
understanding, too, is a becoming, and, as this becoming, it 
is reasonableness. (Hegel, 1977: 34) 
Because the '1' that returns to itself cannot be reduced to the 
'Self', consisting rather in the 'identity of the Self with itself', it 
contains its own otherness within itself. The process leading to the 
transformation of the in-itself to the for-itself, whereby the 
omnipotence of the 'idea' is affirmed, would not, however, be 
possible, were it not for prior dialectical preparation, the latter 
which is manifest in 'the unhappy consciousness', that is, 'the 
consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory 
being'. (Hegel, 1977: 126,130,489) 
This unhappy, inwardly disrupted consciousness, since its 
essentially contradictory nature is for it a single 
consciousness, must for ever have present in the one 
consciousness the other also; and thus it is driven out of 
each in turn in the very moment when it imagines it has 
successfully attained to a peaceful unity with the other. 
(Hegel, 1977: 126) 
For Kant, the dialectical process characterises the use of reason, 
by way of which man seeks to exceed the boundaries of possible 
experience, the latter which are defined by the principles of the 
understanding. If the objects of the world of appearance are taken 
for things in themselves, if the universally valid principles that 
define experience are applied to the thing in itself, the ensuing 
conflict may never be resolved due to the 'dialectical illusion of 
pure reason'. 
because the thesis, as well as the anti-thesis, can be 
shown by equally clear, evident, and irresistible proofs for I 
pledge myself as to the correctness of all these proofs and 
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reason therefore sees that it is divided against itself, a state 
at which the sceptic rejoices, but which must make the 
critical philosopher pause and feel ill at ease. (Kant, 1977: 
80-1) 
Due to the impossibility of proving its assertions by experience, 
Kant regards metaphysics as inherently dangerous. All 
propositions become acceptable as long as self-contradiction is 
avoided, the latter which is easily done because the concepts 
connected are solely ideas whose content is not to be found in 
experience. (Kant, 1977: 81) However, because by nature reason 
is impelled to exceed the limits of experience, having an innate 
disposition for metaphysics, it cannot stop inquiring into what 
things in themselves may be. 
Reason with all its concepts and laws of the understanding, 
which are adequate to it for empirical use, i. e., within the 
sensible world, finds for itself no satisfaction because ever- 
recurring questions deprive us of all hope of their complete 
solution. The transcendental ideas, which have that 
completion in view, are such problems of reason. But it sees 
clearly that the sensible world cannot contain this 
completion; neither, consequently, can all the concepts 
which serve merely for understanding the world of sense, 
e. g., space and time, and whatever we have adduced under 
the name of pure concepts of the understanding. (Kant, 
1977: 94) 
Reason's desire for completeness can only be satisfied by a 
cognition of things in themselves, an objective which is condemned 
to fail due to the impossibility of knowing that which transcends 
the world of appearances. Thus, the only solution to warding off 
the potential disadvantages to knowledge inherent in the 
metaphysical pursuit of reason is, for Kant, the setting up of limits 
deriving from a scientific critique that tames reason's dialectical 
inferences. These limits consist in the recognition of the 
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impossibility of reason ever cognising more than the objects of 
experience. However, reason simultaneously guides us to the 
objective boundary of experience, that is, to the indication of 
something that does not strictly belong to experience consisting 
rather in the 'highest ground of all experience'. The transcendent 
cognitions of reason - the psychological, the cosmological, and the 
theological ideas - serve precisely as indicators of the bounds of 
pure reason: by representing objects of experience in an extended 
series - the transcendental ideas - that exceeds experience, 
reason seeks to attach this chain to noumena, thus enabling 
practical principles to become universals from a moral standpoint. 
(Kant, 1977: 71,74,93-4,101-3) 
Natural theology is such a concept at the boundary of human 
reason, being constrained to look beyond this boundary to 
the idea of a Supreme Being .... not in order to determine 
anything relative to this mere being of the understanding, 
which lies beyond the world of sense, but in order to guide 
the use of reason within the world of sense according to 
principles of the greatest possible (theoretical as well as 
practical) unity. (Kant, 1977: 101) 
By resorting to the transcendental ideas, Kant opposes the 
materialist, naturalist or fatalist viewpoints, allowing for moral 
ideas beyond the speculative field. The natural disposition of 
human reason for metaphysics, that is, for inquiring beyond the 
realm of possible experience, is partly explained, according to 
Kant, by the search for moral universals. 
Where Kant regards the dialectical inferences inherent in any 
attempt to think beyond the realm of experience as prone to fallacy 
- due to the strong possibility of failing prey both to illusion as well 
as to self-contradiction -, Hegel argues that the 'absolute 
dialectical unrest' of consciousness leads ultimately to the 
Absolute, the eternal Unchangeable. However, to reach that stage, 
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the unhappy consciousness has to traverse a journey of sceptical 
disorder, in which a battle is waged against itself. 
... consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical unrest, this 
medley of sensuous and intellectual representations whose 
differences coincide, and whose identity is equally again 
dissolved, for it is itself determinateness as contrasted with 
the non-identical. But it is just in this process that this 
consciousness, instead of being self-identical, is in fact 
nothing but a purely casual, confused medley, the dizziness 
of a perpetually engendered disorder. It is itself aware of 
this; for itself maintains and creates this restless confusion. 
(Hegel, 1977: 124-5) 
Responsible for its own unrest, consciousness does not bring its 
antinomies together, thriving on the separation of the poles of its 
self-contradiction. However, by becoming aware of its own 
dichotomy, 'as self-liberating, unchangeable, and self-identical' on 
one hand and 'as self-bewildering and self -perve rti ng' on the other, 
consciousness unites with itself. 
Its true return into itself, or its reconciliation with itself will 
... display the Notion of Spirit that has become a living Spirit, 
and has achieved an actual existence, because it already 
possesses as a single undivided consciousness a dual 
nature. The Unhappy Consciousness itself is the gazing of 
one self-consciousness into another, and itself is both, and 
the unity of both is also its essential nature. (Hegel, 1977: 
126) 
The rupture, the middle of the two antinomies indicates novelty, 
the possibility of beginning. From the two poles of reason, the 
middle breaks and allows for creative growth. The difficulty, 
however, resides in starting from the middle rather than from either 
side of an established dichotomy, each of which is a harmonious 
unity in itself. According to Gillian Rose, most authorships attempt 
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to camouflage the broken middle, triune in nature, that exposes the 
tension between the 'universal, particular and singular, in 
individuals and institutions'. (1992: xii) This tension nevertheless 
surfaces in 'unconceptualised aporia' within any singular, in 
difficulties that the conceptual mending of the 'diremption' would 
prefer to ignore. (Rose, 1992: xiii-xv) Diremption is revealed as 
paradox, rather than as the resolution implied by contradiction 
where to A corresponds not-A, following the logic of political 
economy. Consisting in the 'torn halves of an integral freedom' that 
do not add up to each other, diremption posits the third as a 
'sundered unity' of what was not originally united. The structure of 
conjunctive 'ands' is that of the singular, the child for whom the 
parents' marriage appears as a transcendent, pre-existent unity. 
(Rose, 1992: 236) By mending the diremptions between law and 
ethics, totalising discourses refuse to suspend, or release, the 
broken middle which allows for the 'anxiety of beginning' and the 
'equivocation of the ethical'. 
The pathos of the concept, which is displaced yet emergent 
in all these attempts to transcend any comprehension of the 
diremption of law and ethics, shows its fate in the 
conceptuality and configuration devised in its stead. This is 
to challenge the prevailing intellectual resignation; to urge 
comprehension of diremption in all its anxiety and 
equivocation; to aim - scandalously - to return philosophy 
from her pathos to her logos. In this way, we may resume 
reflexively what we always do: to know, to misknow and yet 
to grow. The middle will then show: rended not mended, it 
continues to pulsate, ancient and broken heart of modernity, 
old and new, West and East. (Rose, 1992: 310) 
What would be the implication of analysing the humanism/anti- 
humanism debate in terms of the broken middle? The rupture 
between a Kantian dualist view advocating a difference between 
subject and object on one hand, and a Hegelian idealist conception 
whereby the subject embraces its other within itself has set the 
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framework for 'contradictory' Marxist accounts of this problematic. 
Marx's depiction of man as both an active participant in a world of 
his making and yet a victim of forces beyond his control 
constitutes the broken middle that informs subsequent 
human ist/anti-hu manist arguments, the latter being prone to 
subscribe to either one or other of those positions. The marxian 
problematisation of 'man' can thus be read as releasing the middle, 
for instead of mending diremptions it articulates the perplexity 
inherent in any attempt to find a path from law to ethics, that is, 
from the universal concept to the particularity of each instance. 
(Rose, 1997: 115) 
IV. Dialectical Humanism: Negotiating 'in-Between-ness' 
The hu man ist/anti-h u man ist debate within marxist thought 
primordially centred itself on the issue of man's potential to make 
history through intentional projects and actions: if historical results 
were human rather than natural processes, history would be 
equated with anthropocentrism; if, however, individuals were 
considered incapable of influencing social structures, acting as 
mere products of social relations, history would then correspond to 
a natural process. Whereas a humanist view might regard history 
as the outcome of an immanent human intentionality destined to 
realise humanity's essence, an anti-humanist outlook could read 
the historical event to be the manifestation of Spirit unfolding itself 
in accordance with the transcendental laws, or predetermined 
necessity, of nature. 
Thus, while there appears to be a conflation of the subject/object 
position in most humanist thought, anti-humanism characterises 
itself by the separation of subject/object unities, ultimately 
questioning the validity of any such categories. The trajectory of 
the debate between humanism and anti-humanism cannot, 
however, be reduced to simple terms. Subject and object are in 
fact united and divorced, separated and conflated, within both 
humanist and anti-humanist trends of thought. However, because 
36 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
humanism is often represented as embracing three subject/object 
positionings the naturalistic, the idealist and the dialectical 
conceptions does it truly make sense to speak of an anti- 
humanist tendency? Does the humanist outlook not already include 
anti-humanism within itself? 
By assuming a separation between human subjects as bearers of 
consciousness and an objective external world, a naturalistic 
humanism encourages an instrumentalist conception of nature, 
whereby the latter essentially caters to human ends. The subject, 
situated externally to the natural world, can master the non-human 
by acquiring knowledge regarding its workings. An idealist 
humanism, on the other hand, posits reality as a reflection of 
human thought. However, instead of attributing the world's 
constitution to individual minds, idealist anthropocentrism often 
regards the former as the manifestation of a transcendent 
consciousness - the Absolute Idea -, of which human beings are 
particular instantiations. Dialectical humanism consists in yet 
another form of anthropocentrism, whereby subject and object are 
fused into a totality; while the world is considered to be a product 
of humanity, humanity is defined by its experience in the world. 
Thus, while the object exists independently from the subject, the 
subject nevertheless plays an active role in its constitution through 
the transformative capacities inherent in human productivity and 
labour on one hand, and the meaning that human beings bring to 
their world on the other. Recognising the historicity of the human 
condition, dialectical humanism avoids the difficulties inherent in 
universalising narratives that posit the human on one side and the 
social on the other; however, despite their situatedness, 
individuals are considered to be autonomous agents constitutive of 
the social by creating and participating in structures and 
institutions. (Soper, 1986: 18,24-5) 
If consciousness is in the world, and the relationship is 
dialectical between that which thinks and that which is 
thought, then there is no transcendent place from which a 
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'pure' thought can contemplate the world and its own relation 
to it. Against the suggestion, therefore, that any humanist 
thought must rest on an essentialist appeal to an abstract, 
ahistoric 'being' of humanity, it would seem that dialectical 
thought is committed to anti-essentialism. (Soper, 1986: 25) 
Dialectical anthropocentrism is, nevertheless, liable to be pulled to 
either one of the diametrically opposite poles of the dichotomy it is 
sustaining: it encroaches upon idealism, by treating objective 
reality as deriving from consciousness; it verges on naturalism, on 
the negation of the reality of consciousness, by emphasising the 
existence of the external world, of that which is independent to the 
concept. The tension inherent in the fluctuation between the poles 
of consciousness on one hand and being on the other, between 
idealist and realist conceptions, is what the Marxist debates 
centring on the issue of alienation sought to negotiate. (Soper, 
1986: 25) 
From the standpoint of the Hegelian Absolute Idea, the Spirit or 
consciousness preserves each historical moment in its alienation 
so as to achieve complete self-knowledge. This process of self- 
transcendence, whereby the Spirit maintains each negation within 
itself, is essential to the realisation of the Absolute Idea. 
The brilliance and originality of this conception lies in the 
fact that the transcendent Absolute which is the subject of 
this process of self -real isation through successive 
'alienations' is also continuously its own object: it has to 
include its own 'thought-activity' as part of the process 
whereby it is established. (Soper, 1986: 29) 
Thus, although Hegel's phenomenology seeks to reveal the 
workings of consciousness, it nevertheless rejects an essentialist 
metaphysics, that is, a pre-given human essence. The implication 
of the coincidence of concept and being in the Absolute Idea is 
that the antagonisms that characterise human history ultimately 
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lead towards the goal of humanity's realisation. However, does this 
mean that history is a process without a subject, that human 
beings are mere instantiations of a transcendental consciousness 
manifesting itself in history? Or is history a process immanent to 
humanity, acquiring meaning through the intentions and actions of 
individuals? (Soper, 1986: 29-30) 
The denial of a pre-given human essence, as well as the question 
of history being transcendent or immanent to humanity, would exert 
great influence on the attempts by marxists and existentialists to 
draw up a humanist anti-essentialist conceptual framework. 
Rejecting metaphysical essentialism, Hegel argued that 
consciousness only affirms itself when recognised in its 
independence by another consciousness. Human alienation in 
labour is thus fundamentally positive, for it is considered to be a 
fundamental stage in the trajectory towards full human realisation: 
slave consciousness becomes aware of itself in its own 
exteriorisation by producing objects for an 'other' through forced 
labour, and is thus impelled to deny its lack of autonomy. (Soper, 
1986: 29) 
Rather than regard alienation as inherent in the thought process, 
Marx, following Feuerbach, preferred to concentrate on the 
alienation characterising ma n's materiality. Marx's 'positive 
humanism' would gradually come to identify the alienated human 
labour prevalent under the relations of capitalist production as 
fundamental to the realisation of a true human existence. (Soper, 
1986: 35-6) 
Hegel had therefore been correct, according to Marx, to 
insist upon the indispensability of concrete activity to the 
realisation of spirit; his mistake lay in his failure to take 
account of that activity in its 'real' or 'sensuous' aspect. His 
failure, that is, to differentiate finally between the 'sensuous' 
object and its concept. The implication of this accusation is 
that Hegel is only able to effect a reconciliation of humanity 
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and nature by 'spiritualising' nature - by neglecting nature in 
its 'brute' materiality. (Soper, 1986: 36) 
Considering that capitalism consists in a form of production in 
which property relations originate and are maintained by the 
economic exploitation of labour, the value of capital derives from 
its embodiment of labour power. By realising that capitalist forces 
are sustained by the exploitation of labour, the workers themselves 
can rationally choose a non-alienated existence, learning to 
dominate social processes so as to bring about a more humane 
way of life. Marx thus distances himself from an idealist conception 
of an ahistoric human essence realising itself in communist 
society. However, the theory of alienation may be interpreted as 
essentialist, to the extent that it is presented within the framework 
of species-being: alienation consists in a loss of freedom that can 
only affect those who have consciousness. 
Although Marx tells us that for alienated individuals 'what is 
animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal', 
no animal is liable to alienation - because no animal is 
capable of rationally choosing its mode of existence. The 
theory of alienation, in short, is rooted in humanist 
assumptions regarding the potential freedom and constitutive 
role of human beings in the creation and control of social 
processes. (Soper, 1986: 37-8) 
Alienated processes appear to human beings as natural 
phenomena operating beyond their control; however, by perceiving 
themselves as fundamentally responsible for originating and 
maintaining such processes, individuals become conscious of their 
capacity to oppose their roles in the reproduction of social life. 
Real human beings, in historically specific situations, thus 
substitute the abstract category of 'man' in the making of history: 
whereas Hegel had depicted history as an evolutionary process of 
consciousness consisting in the self -estrangement of man - the 
latter replacing individuals existing in the manifold phases of 
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history leading to the Absolute Idea -, Marx draws attention to the 
specificity of the experiential context which transforms 'man' into 
concrete individuals pertaining to definite historical stages that 
take place in the real world rather than in consciousness. (Soper, 
1986: 38-9) 
However, although Marx argues that individuals have the capacity 
to choose a non-alienated existence, he simultaneously 
emphasises that the products of their own creation only appear to 
be autonomous, for in reality 'authors and actors' are grouped in 
classes and dependent on forces with which they must comply. The 
fact is that social power originates with the cooperation between 
diverse individuals, rather than from individuals acting 
independently to each other; however, because such cooperation 
arises naturally rather than voluntarily, social power is 
experienced as an external alien force over which individuals 
cannot exert control: 
Marx and Engels imply that alien forces do in fact determine 
the will and action of individuals in bourgeois society; that 
people do become mere functionaries in a system of 
relations apparently possessed of its own dynamic and 
created independently of those who 'support' it. But it is, of 
course, precisely for that reason that they aspire to 
overthrow capitalist relations and speak of the need to 
replace 'the domination of circumstances and of chance over 
individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and 
circumstances'. (Soper, 1986: 39-40) 
A humanist reading of Marx would concentrate on his teleological 
view whereby the end of history coincides with the demise of 
bourgeois society and the foundation of communism represents an 
emancipated humanity. Consisting in direct, unmediated relations 
between individuals who do not depend either on State nor political 
institutions, communism embodies the abolition of class society as 
well as of conflictuous relations of production. The new epoch of 
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humanist consciousness that ensues from the abolition of 
bourgeois society is characterised by treating that which appears 
as natural phenomena, operating beyond the control of individuals, 
as humanly created processes. By eliminating the 'natural' quality 
of such constructs, communism would emphasise that social power 
resides in the form of united individuals, exemplified by the 
proletariat as 'world-historic' agent of universal emancipation. 
An anti-humanist Althusserian reading of Marx would focus on the 
dynamics inherent in the relations of the capitalist forces of 
production: reduced to the function of trager of capitalist relations, 
individuals are completely subordinate to the structures they 
involuntarily sustain. According to this view, the theory of 
alienation is inherently paradoxical, for while upholding an ideal, 
non -exploitative society which realises true human existence, it 
does not explain the precise form that social relations should 
undergo in order to obtain the latter objective. (Soper, 1986: 40, 
103) 
By projecting an ideal essence of humanity to be realised in an 
existing or future context, the philosophical anthropology 
represented in the theory of alienation has, according to Althusser, 
a purely ethical status. Its ideal of the 'truly human' betrays an a 
priori conception of the meaning of 'human', without theorising the 
conditions of existence of subjects. Because individuals as given 
biological entities only become subjects of experience in society, 
human subjects are inherently ideological: 'it is in 'ideology', says 
Althusser, that we become subjects, and since we cannot but think 
of ourselves as subjects, we cannot but live in ideology. ' (Soper, 
1986: 102) 
Thus, any humanist attempt to found knowledge on the subject's 
experience is fundamentally flawed, for, experien ce itself 
consisting in a social effect, s ubjects are incapable of achieving 
true knowledge. As long as the subject is taken to be the source of 
knowledge, the epistemological basis of any theory will inevitably 
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be ideological. According to Kate Soper, the problem inherent in 
this anti-humanist view is not the structured foundation of 
experience, but rather the representation of the individual as a 
social effect. 
For if we play no part in the formation of the structures that 
dominate us, what sense is there in trying to alter them? If, 
moreover, the experience of individual men and women is 
viewed as inessential to their existence, then the category of 
the 'concrete individual' ceases to have any reference to 
human beings; within the confines of such a theory, one can 
no longer speak of individuals as 'dominated' by social 
structures or in need of 'liberation' from them, since they are 
not thought of as beings with 'interests' to be affected. 
(Soper, 1986: 106) 
AI th u sse r's critiques of Marxist humanism are nevertheless 
important in that they indicate the necessity of negotiating between 
evaluative and non-evaluative positions. While it may be important 
to acknowledge the problems inherent in a depiction of non- 
alienated existence, Marx's normative account of capitalism as a 
natural phenomenon that appears to operate beyond the control of 
those who, through cooperation, are responsible for it remains 
essential to any view which would wish to challenge the prevalent 
social context that conditions experience. (Soper, 1986: 103-4) 
It is precisely such a view that Soper wishes to convey by arguing 
for the possibility of redefining human needs in both an 
ecologically sustainable and economically more just way. While 
Marx had recognised that the realisation of communism depended 
on the existence of capitalism's 'civilising influence', the utopian 
socialist critique was fundamentally nostalgic in its aspirations for 
an unsullied epoch prior to capitalist alienation. For Marx, the 
alienated labour embodied in property, or capital, consisted in a 
'positivity' that superseded the alienation - or negation - of 
capitalist relations of production. Many contemporary socialists 
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would, however, repudiate Marx's positive account of 
industrialisation in bringing about the demise of limited and fixed 
modes of division of labour on one hand, and allowing for the 
gratification of material needs on the other. For, according to 
Soper, capitalist productivity prevents the realisation of socialism 
in today's industrialised nations from taking place: while 
technological domination of nature stifles 'human emancipation', 
non-equitative generation of wealth does not cater to genuine 
human satisfaction and has dire consequences for the majority of 
human beings the world over. Thus, although Marxists have 
traditionally placed emphasis on changing relations of production, 
the necessity of transforming the whole mode of production - that 
is, the forces of production, the technostructure - has usually been 
ignored. Soper argues that the development of needs and their 
satisfaction should not be considered as natural 'givens', as 
natural phenomena dependent on fixed products supposed to 
ensure their fulfilment. (1986: 42) 
A redefinition of needs would entail a non-antagonistic relationship 
between humanity and nature. The view that posits unlimited 
human necessities on one hand, and a scarcity of planetary 
resources on the other, relies on an ontological dualism between 
human and non-human, whereby nature is presented as a 
menacing 'other'. The Sartrean account of lack as inherent in 
contemporary human society derives, according to Soper, from a 
conception of nature as inimical, as a rigid, unpenetrable 
materiality. 
Such a viewpoint, however, not only reproduces the 
imperialism of much classical humanism (which sees nature 
as an alien in need of civilisation rather than an ally we may 
need ourselves to learn to emulate in certain respects); it 
also conflicts with a vision of a socialist future based on a 
harmonisation of human needs with those of ecology, and it 
encourages the view that human relations, together with the 
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institutions and structures they generate, must be seen as 
oppressive. (Soper, 1986: 74) 
Although acknowledging the finitude of global resources, Soper 
urges for the repudiation of arguments which place the blame of 
scarcity on nature: if world consumption were to remain within the 
limits of what ought to be consumed, these very limits would allow 
for quite a reasonable living standard throughout the globe. The 
only solution to the existing tension between humanity and nature 
thus consists in a political negotiation catering to the interests of 
both. Such an agreement would entail the transformation of 
contemporary structures of production and consumption. For 
Soper, to argue that alienation is caused by scarcity is to 
unwittingly comply with the current definitions of human needs and 
their satisfaction. (1986: 73-4) 
V. Human Need: Between Nature and Culture 
Soper's position in favour of a redefinition of human needs borders 
on both a humanist and antihumanist conceptual framework: while 
the presupposition that needs can be redefined is anti-humanist, 
the idea that there may be such a thing as 'human needs' hinges 
on an essentialist notion of what it means to be human. The issue 
of needs as being either natural or historically induced lies at the 
basis of the question of whether or not it is possible to transform 
contemporary structures of consumption. Does the existence of a 
product create a corresponding need, or does the need determine 
the product? The tension between an anti-humanist perspective of 
need as redefinable according to production strategies and 
essentialist representations of need as innate is only resolvable by 
acknowledging a conceptual distinction between the form and 
content of human need. In effect, the human condition is 
characterised by a tension between the existence of psychic and 
biological needs that determine the generality of human form on 
one hand, and, on the other, social and cultural variations that 
condition the content of this form. 
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It is a distinction between a need viewed as content, where it 
is its specificity that counts, and whose explanation can 
never refer us to an anthropological history, but only to the 
nature of the individuals and socio-economic relations 
contemporaneous with its existence, and that same need 
viewed as a historical development -a conception in which it 
is the form of which the need is the development which 
counts, whose explanation will precisely refer us to the 
historical development of human beings, and therefore lead 
us into the consideration of the abstract biological and 
psychological needs that are the element common to all our 
specific needs, and by reference to which we are alone 
enabled to view them as particular developments. (Soper, 
19 81 : 122) 
Thus, while the psychological and biological characteristics that 
determine the form of human needs are 'natural' to the extent that 
they refer us to a common essence underlying their historical 
development, the specificity of the content of needs is historically 
created and therefore artificial. (1981: 113) According to Kate 
Soper, a theory of needs which attempts to achieve closure within 
any one of these two perspectives - essentialist or anti-essentialist 
- will necessarily remain one-sided: 
... the 'theory of needs' is doomed as a theory if by theory is 
meant conceptual resolution, homogeneity of concepts, 
coherent systernatisation. For this is a theory, if it deserves 
the name, whose theoretical statement is to the effect that 
all theorisation about needs must necessarily live in the field 
of forces created by the antithetical poles of relativism and 
essentialism. (1981: 123) 
The problem with any theory of needs is its reliance on a particular 
definition of needs which reflects the value system of the society 
that produced it. Economic or sociological definitions of need, or 
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facts that refer our needs to psychological or biological aspects of 
human constitution can only be interpreted in light of a pre-defined 
theory of needs. (Soper, 1981: 29) Thus, attempts to clear the 
criterion of needs of an evaluative-political perspective are 
doomed to fail, for there can be no 'neutral' or purely factual 
outlook on needs. 
It has, however, been in terms of a fact-value distinction that the 
debate between humanist and anti-humanist conceptions of need 
has polarised itself. Soper argues that Marxism is uniquely helpful 
in thinking about needs due to its allusion to biological and 
psychological traits inherent in human nature on one hand, and, on 
the other, to the transcendence of the natural restrictions of human 
nature afforded by capitalism's development of productive forces. 
While Marx's moral insurgences against capitalist relations of 
exploitation focus on the mental and physical degradation ensuing 
from the performance of certain tasks contrary to average levels of 
physiological and psychological endurance, his admiration for 
capitalist productivity emphasises its civilising influence in 
eliminating obstacles to consumption. According to Soper, the 
importance of Marxist theory resides in this aporia, or unresolved 
tension between the anti-humanist and humanist outlooks on need 
(1981 : 31 , 107,136) : 
For this value ... lies precisely in the extent to which it 
exposes, almost by way of its own internal inconsistencies, 
its aporia, the problems it conceals in the guise of its 
solutions, the inevitable involvement of questions concerned 
with the satisfaction of needs with questions concerned with 
their determination. (1981: 213) 
The negotiation of the tension between humanism and anti- 
humanism should acknowledge that because needs do not exist as 
factual demands, they can in part be determined by the forms of 
gratification found in any society. Thus, although general human 
needs share a common essence by virtue of certain 'natural' 
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biological and Psychological traits pertinent to the species, the 
content and fulfilment of these needs is conditioned by a politics 
involving the 'allocation of social labour time and the distribution 
of use-values' in any particular society. (Soper, 1981: 212) 
But to accept this is, of course, to be returned precisely to 
the question of 'true' need, and to be brought face to face 
with the impossibility of providing any answer to the 
question: 'what do human beings needT or 'what are human 
needsT in terms of some set of 'facts' whether about our 
'nature' or about what we in fact consume. We are forced, in 
other words, to recognise that if these questions are 
answerable, they are so only in the form of a series of 
political decisions-acts, in the form of a series of choosings- 
positings of values beyond which there can be no further 
appeal, and which themselves must reveal the 'truth' of our 
needs. (Soper, 1981: 18) 
Because there is no escaping the normative-evaluative dimension 
of needs, every definition of need is inherently political. As such, 
the very argument that represents need as irreducible to biological 
and psychological 'nature' as well as non-identifiable with its forms 
of satisfaction involves a value judgement on the human condition. 
The revelation of a suppressed politics of need leads to the 
recognition that the ends which justify the means are not neutral. 
(Soper, 1981: 18,216) A conscious evaluative choice of the ends 
will necessarily determine the means used to attain these ends. 
Thus, although experience is socially determined, human beings 
are not reducible to social effects; the fact that human 
consciousness can take life as its own object and thereby choose 
to challenge social structures that condition experience 
demonstrates that human beings are ultimately responsible for 
forces of necessity that supposedly operate beyond their control 
and, moreover, can act together to instigate change. 
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These initiatives 
... bring into prominence not only the 
interrelationship between means and ends and the 
oppressive nature of any politics that tries to deny it, but 
also the interrelationship between the exercise of individual 
political power and the exercise of State power. (Soper, 
1981 : 217) 
V1. Negotiating the Tension: Fanon, Arendt and Levinas 
By attempting to empty theory of any evaluative-normative content, 
anti-humanism suppresses the politics inherent in discourses 
concerning the human condition. In the name of relativism, or the 
will to implode the universal subject of Enlightenment humanism 
into a plurality of differences, anti-humanism relinquishes 
regulative ideas such as the appeal to 'truth' or a common essence 
as the foundation for moral or aesthetic response. The 
'hyperindividualism of proliferating "difference"' eliminates the 
recourse to transformative projects ensuing from the classification 
of societies as 'capitalist', 'patriarchal' or 'totalitarian'. Collective 
political cooperation or action is thus discouraged. (Soper, 1990: 
149-50) 
But even in this overdrive deconstruction retains its ethical 
gesture. For why want to disturb the tyranny of 'identity' 
thinking and its binary logic, if not in order to reclaim for 
attention - to have us identify - the 'difference' or 'otherness' 
it forecloses? Why, for example, hint at the 'utopias' of 
'difference' 
... if not because it is thought ... that a fuller 
identity can be found in a world that has broken free of the 
constraints of the 'constructed' subject? Who ... is enjoying 
the escape from the tyranny of binary straitjackets, if it is not 
the subject in the Enlightenment conception? (Soper, 1990: 
150) 
This ethical contradiction within postmodernism mirrors the 
traditional dilemma concerning morality in marxist theory: to what 
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extent is there a normative dimension in a conceptual framework 
that regards morality as an ideological discourse of bourgeois 
relations, and attributes 'immoral' actions to social and economic 
determination? This paradox is connected to the vaster question of 
whether human beings are free agents or socially determined: 
while an anti-humanist perspective usually favours an 
environmentalist response, a humanist outlook traditionally 
emphasises the responsibility of the autonomous moral subject in 
choosing a particular course of action. According to Soper, 
however, anti-humanist argument tends to 'secrete humanist 
rhetoric' (1986: 128; 1990: 151): 
For if it is true that subjects are entirely coopted by society, 
then where does one locate the emancipatory impulse to free 
people from the cultural forms which it is implied by the 
theory are 'responsible' for their cooption? (1990: 152) 
Thus, if contemporary post-modern critiques of dominant 
rationalities share with marxist anti-essentialism the desire to 
transcend social constructions of the subject by appealing to an 
element of moral autonomy, this recourse to essentialist strategy 
should be openly recognised. (Soper, 1990: 153) 
This does not mean denying the role played by environmental 
factors in determining behaviour, or the extent to which we 
acquire our selfhood in and through the complex grid of 
practices and discourses which constitute our society at any 
given moment. But it does mean recognising that selves are 
not automatically instituted, that there is a self which is in 
relationship to the world by which it is constructed, and that 
even as we acknowledge our own dependency on a social 
universe which always comes to us in conceptualised form, 
this conceptual isation is dependent on subjects who are 
reflecting upon and constantly renegotiating the forces of 
construction. (Soper, 1990: 153-4) 
50 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
Thus, although human beings are cultural products, they are 
nevertheless actively involved in their own production. The 
conscious subject of experience, or personality, allows for social 
progress, 'making more of the self than what we are made of'. The 
negotiation of the tension between nature and culture, between 
subject and environment, between individual autonomy and social 
conditioning, between anti-essentialism and essentialism lies in 
the interstices between these dichotomies: this middle ground 
allows for a recognition of aporia, of a permanent diremption within 
the dualistic conceptual framework that characterises reflection on 
the human condition. (Soper, 1981: 154) 
Taking into account the conflicting nature of human actions and 
search for happiness, any monist psychological conception of 
humanity is doomed to failure. Anti-humanism's focus on 
difference, alterity and cultural relativism aims at a holistic, non- 
oppositional comprehension of the human condition, where a 
myriad of pluralities can paradoxically join to form a universal 
totality, a human 'oneness' on Gilroy's planetary scale. Humanism, 
on the contrary, always already contains alterity within itself; 
consisting in a dichotomous structure composed of itself and its 
other, its inner diremption allows for 'process and pain' (Rose, 
1992: xiii), for evolution and growth to occur. 
No human being possesses sureness of self: this can only 
mean being bounded and unbounded, selved and unselved, 
'sure' only of this untiring exercise. Then, this sureness of 
self, which is ready to be unsure, makes the laughter at this 
mismatch between aim and achievement comic, not cynical; 
holy, not demonic. (Rose, 1997: 125) 
While anti-humanist thought both in its leftist and post-modern 
dimensions seeks to 'keep the mind out of hell', conveying an 
idealistic vision of humanity as freed from conflicts and tensions, 
the humanist tradition is much 'truer' to life in allowing for gaps, 
ruptures, discontinuities within the human condition. 
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The tradition is far kinder in its understanding that to live, to 
love, is to be failed, to forgive, to have failed, to be forgiven, 
for ever and ever. Keep your mind in hell, and despair not. 
(Rose, 1997: 98) 
The humanist dialectical tradition can contribute to contemporary 
post-colonial theory by teaching the latter to accept aporia, the 
existence of a permanent, irresolvable tension resulting from the 
clash of opposites and allowing for the possibility of growth and 
novelty. The singularity inherent in the anti-humanist aspirations 
for a non-conflictuous, peaceful, unreal world in which differences 
happily reside side by side thus gives way to an oppositional, 
dualistic conceptual framework that posits the forever incomplete 
negotiation between anti-essentialist and essentialist dichotomies. 
In line with the humanist tradition, the works of Fanon, Arendt and 
Levinas exemplify the attempt to negotiate the tension between 
essentialism and anti-essentialism. While Fanon can be read as 
problematising lived experience in terms of the psychic and 
biological needs pervading the human condition, Arendt gives 
primacy to the political, that is, the historically created and 
therefore artificial content that the form of needs acquires. 
Levinas, in turn, seeks to go beyond the nature vs. culture 
dichotomy by transcending the realm of ontology in a gesture of 
metaphysical transcendence, or ethics, whereby identity and 
alterity relate to each other as two separate, unequal entities that 
do not fuse into a totality. 
Each of these authors conveys a different understanding of the 
subject/object dichotomy: where Fanon appears to advocate the 
eradication of conflict in an emancipated future society, in which 
subject and object coincide, Arendt acknowledges the existence of 
permanent tensions between subject and object only controllable 
through the force of law in the public realm, the latter designed to 
preserve the freedom of 'naturally' unequal individuals on one 
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hand, and, on the other, to promote the connection between human 
beings and the world in which they live through word and action. 
Levinas wishes to escape the subject/object ontological opposition 
altogether, placing emphasis on the inequality inherent in the 
relationship between identity and alterity, where the Other, 
situated on an infinitely higher plane to oneself, exceeds any 
attempt to contain it within the same. This incapacity to subsume 
the Other is eth iCS. 2 
The similarity between these three authors, however, resides in 
their reliance on the autonomous moral subject. Although Fanon 
represents black identity formation as occurring through a 
displacement process whereby the black person judges himself 
through the eyes of 'white' colonial society, he nevertheless 
appeals to the conscious subject of experience to challenge the 
prevalent social and economic context that human beings are 
ultimately responsible for maintaining in existence. Thus, despite 
the possibility of interpreting Fanon as a Lacanian avant la lettre - 
due to his focus on identity constitution as a product of social and 
cultural forces -, he nevertheless remains committed to an 
existential humanism which functions as a philosophy of action 
providing the foundations for collective cooperation in 
transformative social processes. 
Influenced by Alexandre Koj6ve's interpretation of Hegel, Fanon's 
new humanism consists in an empirical anthropology which 
promotes the dualism between man and nature: on one hand he 
reduces the Spirit to the historical becoming of man, refusing to 
acknowledge the former as external to the human historical world, 
and, on the other, he recognises the specificity of the human 
condition as characterised by the desire for the other's desire. 
However, Fanon's adherence to an eschatological view positing a 
conflict free, emancipated future society can shed a 'provisional' 
light on his dualistic philosophy, converting the latter into a stage 
to be superseded on the trajectory towards a non -contradictory, 
The term 'Other' indicates the absoluteness of Levinasian alterity. 
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universal singularity. To what extent does Fanon's view of the split 
process of black identity formation betray a possible wish for a 
more perfected, non-divisive outlook regarding the psychic 
constitution of humanity? 
Arguing for the non-resolution of the Freudian dualistic structure of 
Id and Ego, Soper claims that the two parts are not engaged in a 
permanent attempt to annihilate each other but rather in a 
productive tension that seeks to promote genuine gratification: 
... we encounter two different lines of interpretation here: 
either the Id is taken to be the locus of our 'true' needs and 
it is thus supposed that the process of de-repression must 
correspond to a process of subordination of Ego to Id, of 
Reality Principle to Pleasure Principle, or else it is the Ego 
that is regarded as the locus of 'true' need and human 
happiness must therefore depend on the denial or 
eradication of the needs deriving from the Id. (1981: 166) 
The will to transcend Freud's dichotomous structure denies the 
dialectic of human happiness expressed in the relationship 
between Pleasure Principle and Reality Principle. Based on a false 
dualism between nature and culture, this argument interprets what 
are in fact different types of instinctual needs, both of which have 
'natural' origins and are subject to specific cultural conditionings, 
as a simple struggle between biology and society. 
... so far from regarding either Id and Ego as the privileged 
source of our potential happiness, Freud insists upon the 
idea that psychic well-being is itself only accomplished 
through the reconciliation of the two. It is therefore mistaken 
to interpret Freud's slogan as suggesting the annihilation of 
the Id (all Ego, no Id ... ), for it is on the contrary a slogan 
about the desirability of their effective synthesis - where 
synthesis means synthesis, and not an Hegelian identity in 
which all differences have disappeared. (Soper, 1981: 170-1) 
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Advocating that nothing in Freud's theory indicates that primacy is 
to be given either to Ego or Id, Soper claims that the only reason 
for believing the contrary resides in the pre-Marxian oppositions of 
I nature versus culture, biology versus society, head versus heart 
and reason versus passion'. According to Soper's reading of Freud, 
the secret to full gratification is the achievement of compromise 
between Ego and Id. While Ego represents the demands of reality, 
its rationality is nevertheless attentive to the 'passions' of the Id, 
seeking to gratify its wishes in the most realistic way possible. 
However, if Ego and Id are indeed complicit, and the Ego is not 
inherently repressive, why is it that the synthesis between 
Pleasure Principle and Reality Principle, which works in the 
interests of both, is so difficult to attain? The thwarting of the 
synthesis occurs due to the existence of a third mental region, the 
Super-Ego, which 'watches over' Ego and Id. 
... from the standpoint of its implications for the construction 
of any future and more humane society it is the essential 
dualism of the Freudian perspective that should be stressed, 
since the repression which Freud associates with the Super- 
Ego is the contingent effect of specific social circumstances 
that are in principle removable. (Soper, 1981: 173-4) 
However, this does not mean that the existence of the Super-Ego 
is negative, or that its elimination would further human 
emancipation or happiness. Like the Ego, it should be regarded as 
an agency conducive to 'harmonisation' and gratification due to its 
mitigation of the pitiless Ego-ld search for pleasure, allowing for 
the 'real other' to be taken into account. Through the Super-Ego, 
alterity is no longer regarded as a threat to immediate personal 
happiness but rather as a condition of genuine satisfaction. 
(Soper, 1981: 174-5) 
The Super-Ego in Freudian theory takes the place of law in 
Arendt's attempt to defend human plurality in the public realm. 
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Arguing that equality is one of the most uncertain aspects of the 
human condition, Arendt focuses on the differences inherent in 
human beings within the social realm so as to emphasise the 
necessity for the domain of law to defend human beings as equal 
in their inequalities. Although Arendt sponsors the Heideggerian 
view that humanity and the world form a totality, her 'being in the 
world', with the consequent fusion of subject and object, is 
founded on political participation in the community rather than on a 
primordial unity between Being and being. 
... Heidegger argued for an 'existentialist' philosophy which 
would register the 'in-the-worldness' of the human individual 
and refused primacy to the subject of that world. According 
to Heidegger, all dualisms of subject and object, 
consciousness and being, humanity and nature, are a 
secondary and 'inauthentic' derivation from the primary unity 
of Being (Sein) with human Being (Dasein). (Soper, 1986: 
57) 
Arendt argues that human beings take responsibility for the care of 
the world through a sensus communis, a 'sixth sense that fits our 
five senses into a common world' (Arendt, 1978: 81). This 
perception that we share with others regarding the reality of a 
common world in which we live is political in that it assumes an 
inter-human relativity. By adjusting the subjective perceptions of 
our private five senses to the reality of an objective world that we 
inhabit with others, the faculty of judgement draws us away from 
our 'natural givenness', our unique individuality, and confers upon 
us a sense of identity deriving from expression and action in a 
world that belongs to us all. For Arendt, it is because we appear to 
others that our identity is confirmed. Heidegger, likewise, had 
claimed that although Being manifests itself through the diversity 
of objects constituting the world, it only appears when 
acknowledged and understood by human beings. (Soper, 1986: 57) 
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This means that for Heidegger.... there can be no objective 
understanding of history, and to suppose otherwise is to 
succumb to 'inauthenticity' - to be oblivious to the true 
nature of Being, to approach it as 'thing-like', as 
meaningless factuality. (Soper, 1986: 58) 
Due to the inexistence of the 'thing-in-itself', the world appears to 
human beings as already meaningful. Heidegger rejects traditional 
humanism for presupposing what is 'truly human', that is, for 
assuming knowledge of Being. Claiming that humanist ontology 
derives from an already existing conceptual framework of beings 
as a whole, Heidegger opposes 'metaphysical evasions' that would 
define humanity by reference to the 'animal' or the 'natural'. 
... the essence of the human being is too little heeded and 
not thought in its origin, the essential provenance that is 
always the essential future for historical mankind. 
Metaphysics thinks of the human being on the basis of 
animalitas and does not think in the direction of his 
humanitas. (Heidegger, 1998: 246-7) 
Like all metaphysical definitions, naturalistic attempts to explain 
humanity completely misunderstand its essence, due to 
presupposing what this very essence is in the act of describing it. 
According to Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, the dignity of 
man is achieved once his condition as 'shepherd of being' is 
recognised. An authentic mode of existence therefore implies 
heeding the call to preserve the truth of Being through the 
rejection of subjectivising thought - the latter which judges events 
from the point of view of the subject - and simply allowing to 'let 
things be'. 
Heidegger argues that it is ultimately up to human beings to 
choose between an 'authentic' or 'inauthentic' mode of being. For 
Arendt, human beings are inherently autonomous subjects whose 
freedom is characterised by the capacity to initiate a new series in 
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time through action. However, it is precisely due to the 
unpredictability and irreversibility of the consequences of human 
action, completely free from any 'law of necessity', that primacy 
must be given to law as a vehicle to preserve the living space of 
freedom between men. 
By placing emphasis on 'being in the world', Heidegger wished to 
overcome the subject/object dichotomies inherent in metaphysics. 
Aiming to overthrow the categories of 'essentia' and 'existentia' 
altogether, Heidegger did not believe that the existentialist 
inversion of the concept according to which essence precedes 
existence would lead to 'authenticity'. Similarly, Levinas posited 
the dismantling of essence and existence by superseding the 
ontological realm of being and not-being. Opposing traditional 
metaphysics, Levinas aimed to establish a philosophy of 
metaphysical transcendence, or ethics. Confronting me from a 
dimension of height, the Other is absolute in that he can never be 
contained by the same. The possibility for ethics arises in the 
realisation of the separation between identity and alterity, in the 
infinite obligation towards the Other created by the inability to 
subsume him within any totality. 
Levinas's metaphysical transcendence thus affords an escape 
route both from Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian 
'being in the world': while Husserl had represented consciousness 
as 'intending' the object - thus closing himself within the subject -, 
Heidegger had focused on a world that appeared as 'already 
intended', indissociable from human purpose. (Soper, 1986: 57) 
Writing against the primacy of the One, of Totality, Levinas seeks 
to reconcile Western thought with the concept of rupture and 
diremption. While traditional ontology was founded on the idea of a 
return of the other to Unity, to the Eleatic being from which alterity 
had severed itself, Levinas claims that the human condition is 
inherently dualistic, for identity consists in 'being for the Other', an 
Other which always remains excessive to that very identity. 
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Nevertheless, in order for identity and alterity to engage in a 
relationship in which the two parts do not fuse into a totality, 
identity itself would already have to exist as a whole. Because 
identity does not lack, because it desires an Other which will not 
fulfil a satiable need, it exists for the Other due to not needing the 
latter to complete a totality. In other words, it bears a non- 
satiable, unquenchable desire for an alterity that is always 
excessive to itself. Levinas can, in this sense, be read as positing 
an autonomous moral subject who, conscious of its absolute 
conditionality on alterity, its complete dependence on otherness, 
nevertheless constitutes itself as a non-divisive whole before being 
able to engage in an ethical, dualistic relationship with the Other. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SLAVERY AND THE NEW WORLD: WHAT is HUMAN? 
1. Introduction 
The development of slavery in the Americas will be explored in this 
chapter to illustrate the redefinition of subject constitution that 
marked the emergence of modernity, whereby an increasingly 
consolidated notion of self -centredness in terms of the autonomous 
European subject was to gradually replace the medieval 
theological imagination which posited a fundamental similitude 
between the microcosm and the marcocosm, linking the terrestrial 
to the divine. The epistemological break between old and new 
brought about by modernity was incoherent, obeying no grand 
narrative of progress: the medieval and the modern co-existed with 
each other in the form of a tension between the religious and the 
secular as witnessed in the disruptions that the confrontation with 
alterity in the Americas brought to the conceptual framework that 
had prevailed in Europe from 'Judeo-Christian times to the 
Renaissance'. The New World, as a terrain that defied certainties, 
had to be mastered in the 'guise of the Old', so as to allow for a 
rebirth of a waning order. Responding to the violence of shattered 
beliefs, the violence of genocide, ownership, forced conversion, 
subjection, subjectification and knowledge characterised the 
conquest of the Americas. However, the birth of modernity contains 
within itself a 'counter-discourse of domination', a self-critical and 
self-reflexive conscience that questions modernity's totalising 
impulse. (Venn, 2000: 109,112-3,122,146,149) These two 
currents within a broken, incoherent, non-linear modernity are 
patent in the charting of the development of New World slavery, 
namely in the discussions centring on the definition of 'human- 
ness' and its association with the concepts of reason and freedom, 
the latter understood essentially as the exercise of self- 
determination and ownership. 
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Between the late fifteenth and early eighteenth centuries, the 
institution of slavery in the New World acquired distinctive 
characteristics, firstly under Iberian metropolitan tutelage and 
subsequently within the framework of a market-oriented plantation 
system, based on private initiative. The encounter between the 
inhabitants of the New World and the Spanish conquistadores, in 
1492, marks the cornerstone of the scission between the Middle 
Ages and Modernity, issuing in an epoch distinguished by the 
sedimentation of European, national and racial consciousness, 
fostered both by moral confrontation with alterity, as well as by the 
mechanisms of economic growth. The voracious European demand 
for New World produce would gradually convert a scholastically 
dominated, feudalistic world order revolving around the Pope into a 
bourgeois-centred, entrepreneurial order based on cooperation 
between states. 
This transformation would only be achieved with the takeoff of 
seventeenth-century plantation slavery in the Caribbean and North 
America, which catered to the needs of a new consumer culture on 
the basis of a regime of intensive exploitation, differing from 
earlier practices of slavery due not only to its entirely commercial 
character - thus anticipating some traits of capitalist industrialism - 
, but also to its highly racialised ideology. The emergent 'civil 
slavery', which nourished itself on networks spreading across and 
beyond the Atlantic, was the result, in the plantation colonies, of 
the colonists' emancipation from the metropolis. (Blackburn, 1999: 
8,10,335) 
The racial character of New World slavery was thus, according to 
Robin Blackburn, invented by European entrepreneurs working 
independently from state authority. Contrary to commonly held 
views attributing slavery in the Americas to the policies of 
metropolitan state initiative, based on a divorce between state and 
civil society, Blackburn argues that "the spontaneous dynamic of 
civil society is also pregnant with disaster and mayhem". (1999: 6) 
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Until shortly before 1600 American slavery was a relatively 
modest adjunct of feudal business and feudal imperialism. 
But following the rise of the slave plantation - first in Brazil 
around 1580, and then, in a more sustained way, in the 
British and French colonies from about 1650 - American 
slavery became an outgrowth and adjunct of the European 
transition to capitalism. ... The oxygen required by the 
European furnace of capitalist accumulation ... was supplied 
by the slave traffic and the plantation- related trades. (1999: 
376) 
During the period of expansion of 'civil slavery', the Atlantic traffic 
reached its peak, with West European ships, laden with slave 
cargoes and productive inputs from European manufacturers, 
sailing from trade posts on the African coast to the New World 
plantations, the latter yielding raw materials - namely sugar, 
cotton, tobacco, cacao and other agricultural products - that would 
return to Europe by sea. 
The clear signs of a new international order based on capitalistic 
market relations arising from the exploitation of New World 
resources provoked a struggle between modern and medieval 
conceptual frameworks in Spanish intellectual thought. Spain's 
preoccupation with justifying its colonisation of the Americas on a 
legal basis, emphasising the necessity of papal approbation for 
any step taken in the colonial enterprise, reflected an attempt to 
incorporate a new, market-oriented system into an existent 
medieval scholastic conceptual framework of alterity. The fact that 
no other nation felt subsequently compelled to justify either its bid 
to colonise or its reliance on slavery reveals a gradual 
naturalisation of the link between skin colour and slave status, 
which was to characterise seventeenth century racial ideology. 
Distinguished by the problematisation of issues regarding infidel 
status, Spanish imperialist policy sought to provide a legal basis 
for conquest, within a Catholic tradition dating from the thirteenth 
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century, already proving the infidel to possess dominium, that is, 
the right to property and self-government. 
One can thus trace the sedimentation of 'white' consciousness 
through the encounter with the radical alterity of the New World by 
outlining the various phases that marked the evolution of slavery in 
that continent, focusing namely on the attitudes of the different 
European nations vis A vis the practice of slavery, as well as on 
their respective justifications for indulging in the Atlantic traffic. In 
this chapter, I propose to analyse the link between the rise in 
racial consciousness and the arguments used to validate the 
increment of slavery in the New World, polarised around 
dichotomies of human/animal, savage/civilised, barbarism/culture, 
all of which operated within a hierarchical taxonomic structure 
allocating each entity a fixed place in a tree of origins. 
Furthermore, the conceptualisation of slavery, within the Western 
tradition, as a deprivation of dominium will be examined, so as to 
reveal the extent to which the concept of humanity itself is linked 
to the idea of the right to property and self-government. 
11. On Dominium as Absolute Property 
It is not the condition of slavery that must be defined in 
terms of absolute notions of property, as is so often 
attempted; rather, it is the notion of absolute property that 
must be explained in terms of ancient Roman slavery. (1982: 
32) 
According to Orlando Patterson, modern definitions of slavery in 
terms of the civil law notion of ownership or absolute property read 
the history of human thought in reverse. The habitual legalistic 
definition of slavery as 'the status or condition of a person over 
whom any or all the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised' is critiqued by this author precisely for failing to 
distinguish any particular category of persons: proprietary claims 
and powers can be applied to any 'free' human being. Moreover, 
63 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
Patterson considers that the conventional equation of slavery with 
a lack of legal personality - that is, the absence of the person as 
'bearer of rights and duties' - is a Western social fiction, attested 
to by the jurisprudence in slaveholding societies regarding the 
delicts of slaves: the primary characteristic of the institution of 
slavery lies in the absolute power of the slavernaster over his 
slave, entailed by the very fact that only slaves entered the 
relationship as a substitute for death, failing prey to alienation 
from natal ties, absence of honour and lack of public recognition. 
However, the total power of the slavemaster over the slave does 
not mean that slavery can be defined in terms of a deprivation of 
freedom. Pre-modern, nonslaveholding societies did not value 
freedom as an ideal: individuals longed to integrate themselves 
within a network of power and authority to achieve social 
recognition, but they did not aspire to be free. Likewise, most non- 
Western slaveholding communities were not acquainted with the 
concept of 'freedom' before contact with the West. (Patterson, 
1982: 21,22,26,27,32,340) 
In societies dominated by the 'personalistic' idiom of power, that 
is, where relations of subjection were transparent so that 
individuals directly depended on others and habitually had others 
dependent on them, the polarisation between slaves and non- 
slaves was reduced. Measured along a power continuum, the 
status of persons consisted in the potential claims exercised on 
others: social standing was determined by the extent to which 
individuals could elicit 'claims and privileges' from others, because 
all persons were regarded as objects of property. (Patterson, 
1982: 18,27) 
Property is, according to Patterson, important in defining the 
status of the slave; however, contrary to customary definitions, the 
slave's condition was not due to being the object of property, but 
rather to his not being the subject of property. The extent to which 
a person was a subject of property was gauged by the degree to 
which he could evoke protection from those surrounding him: the 
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powerlessness of the slave derived from his dependence on a 
single person - the slaveholder - for protection. Reliance upon a 
network of protective power was thus sought by slaves in detriment 
to freedom, understood in the "modern 'bourgeois' sense of 
isolation from the influence of others". (Patterson, 1982: 28) 
In the 'materialistic' idiom of power, coercion is concealed or 
denied, presented as a kind of freedom. Capitalist societies are 
paradigmatic of this negation of real power entailed by the 
mediation of property and commodity fetishism. The transition from 
the personalistic to the 'materialistic' idiom of power is 
characterised by a system of property in which "a right to things is 
realised through a hold on persons" to one in which "a hold on 
persons is realised through a right to things". The ancient Roman 
socio-economic context exemplifies this development toward a 
materialist idiom of power, where relations of subjection were 
mediated through land and slaves. The problems presented by the 
existence of large-scale slavery led the Romans to elaborate laws 
of property inspired on a new legal concept: the notion of 
dominium, defined as the absolute ownership of tangible things. 
(Patterson, 1982: 18,28) 
While ancient Greece thrived on a developed system of slavery in 
its urban and industrial sectors, the strictly defined social divisions 
between citizen and non-citizen dispensed with the need for legal 
specification: the clear distinction between Greek and non-Greek 
meant that despite the large number of slaves, there was no risk of 
confusing slaves with 'freeborn' Greek citizens. The Roman context 
differed from the Greek in that it was based on inclusion; 
manumitted slaves were awarded citizenship, and freeborn citizens 
could not resort to clearcut social divisions to defend their status. 
The Romans thus turned to the 'legal fiction' of dominium, or 
absolute ownership, for social clarification .3 (Patterson, 1982: 30- 
1) 
3 Slaves in Ancient Greece were nevertheless considered to be a kind of 
property, belonging to the private realm of the owner's household 
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The three constituent elements of the new legal paradigm - 
persona, res, and dominiurn - modelled directly the three 
constituent elements of the master-slave relationship - 
master, slave, and enslavement. (Patterson, 1982: 31) 
The specificity of Roman legal codification resided on one hand in 
its preoccupation in safeguarding private property, a category 
which included chattel slavery, and, on the other, in its disregard 
for the slave's ethnic origin. (Blackburn, 1999: 34-5) 
The connection between the appearance of large-scale slavery in 
Rome and the notion of absolute ownership is manifested in the 
very etymology of the word 'dominium'. Whereas in the third 
century B. C. the word 'dominus' meant slavernaster rather than 
owner, by the first century B. C. the term 'dominium' had shifted 
from slaveholding to absolute ownership of property. (Patterson, 
1982: 32) 
Patterson's argument regarding the influence of dominium on the 
Western juridical conception of slavery comes across as slightly 
problematic, however, in the New World context. The notion of 
dominium, defined by the ancient Romans as absolute ownership, 
was qualified by medieval canon lawyers as a right to property and 
self-government. The debates concerning infidel dominium that 
distinguished the Spanish colonial process point to a close 
relationship between being human and possessing dominium: 
however, the crucial issue lay in determining whether or not the 
infidels in question possessed rationality so as to be worthy of 
dominium. Thus, according to the basic premise of this line of 
argument, if man is to be fully human, he must possess dominium; 
alongside women and 
that the law of nature 
that is, to be used by 
obtaining property, b( 
1999: 35) 
domestic animals. Because Aristotle considered 
deemed all things to exist with an end in view - 
man -, war was a perfectly legitimate means for 
or natural slaves. (Blackburn, it wild animals 
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nevertheless, his humanity does not hinge on possessing 
dominium, but rather on being in the full capacity of reason. Men 
fit for slavery were defined by their limited rationality, and the 
slave condition was regarded by many as a transitional phase 
permitting the native to educate himself in the ways of civilisation, 
thus improving his reasoning potential. The concept of chattel 
slavery is thus perhaps not the most adequate to describe slavery 
in the Americas under an Iberian dominated, papally-centred world 
order. However, from the late sixteenth century onwards, with the 
demise of papal power and its gradual replacement by an order 
based on market-oriented state cooperation, the Roman notion of 
the slave as private property was revived, influencing the 
development of plantation slavery. 
Patterson's premise of an existing dichotomy between 
'personalistic' societies with transparent power relations on one 
hand, and 'materialistic' societies with camouflaged relations of 
subjection on the other, is, moreover, difficult to confirm on the 
basis of New World slavery. In fact, instead of camouflaging 
coercion, the incipient capitalistic relations of the plantation 
colonies had the effect of fomenting a clearly defined structure of 
domination between blacks and whites. 
Ill. On Dominium: Christendom and the Infidels 
The framework of the relationship between Christian and non- 
Christian societies was moulded by canon, or ecclesiastical, 
lawyers in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Abstract 
philosophical and theological concepts were thus incorporated into 
canon law, which sought to apply theory to practice by regulating 
Christian relations with the non-Christian world. (1994: 16) 
Because canonists tended to regard non-Christians as an 
undifferentiated mass grouped under the category extra ecclesiam, 
juridical principles and practices oriented towards one sector of 
people who did not belong to the Church could be equally applied 
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to any other sector, independently of being heretics, schismatics, 
Jews, or infidels. 
Thus, when canonists came to consider the situation of non- 
Christians who lived beyond the bounds of Christendom, they 
began by extending previous discussions of non-Christians 
living within Europe to fit the new peoples whom they 
encountered. (Muldoon, 1979: 3) 
The non-Christians living within Europe were, for the most part, 
Jews and Muslims. In the twelfth century, the canonists' interest in 
the latter was resumed to concern about the influence such people 
might have on Christians. Canonists did not develop a theory of 
relations with infidel societies, for they saw no reason why the 
Church, rather than autonomous Christian states, should attempt to 
establish contacts with non-Christian states. (1979: 4,5) In the 
mid-thirteenth century, however, Sinibaldo Fieschi, or Pope 
Innocent IV (1243-1254), a reputed canonist, established a 
juridical basis for a theory of Christian relations with infidel 
societies. This basis consisted in a commentary on a decretal -a 
papal judicial decision - of his predecessor, Innocent 111 (1198- 
1216). The decretal, Quod super his, concerned the problems 
posed by the impossibility of fulfilling a vow taken to go on 
crusade to the Holy Land. While Innocent III had centred the 
discussion on the settlement of the debt in question, Innocent IV 
preferred to focus on the justice of the crusade. 
In commenting on this decretal, Innocent IV raised the 
obvious question: "is it licit to invade the lands that infidels 
possess, and if it is licit, why is it licit? " By raising the 
question in such general terms, ... Innocent IV set the stage 
for a wide ranging discussion of papal relations with infidel 
societies. Furthermore, the very form of the question 
indicated that peaceful relations between Christians and 
infidels were possible, if not probable. (1979: 6) 
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The theory of the just war was, from then on, to provide the 
background to four centuries of debate in judicial contexts about 
the foundations upon which relations between Christians and non- 
Christian societies could arise. Rather that restricting himself to 
the notion of a just war of defence for the Holy Land, a theme 
which canonists had previously discussed, Innocent IV argued that 
because Muslims had seized the Holy Land in an unjust war, the 
Pope had the right to order an invasion so as to restore Christian 
control of that territory. (1994: 16; 1979: 6) The crux of the matter, 
however, lay in another issue: did Christians have the right to 
occupy territories, other than the Holy Land, under Muslim control? 
0 r, in other words, could Christians legitimately dispossess 
infidels the world over? 
Innocent IV sought answers to these questions in biblical examples 
as well as in Roman law, focusing on dominium as the right to hold 
private property on one hand, as well as the right to exercise self- 
government on the other hand. Quoting from Genesis, he argued 
that all property was held in common, when the world was first 
created. This phase corresponded, in Roman law, to that in which 
all men were free and slavery non-existent. However, the need for 
private ownership of property ensued from conflict amongst the 
descendants of Adam. In this context, it was legitimate to seize 
unoccupied territory but wrong to appropriate oneself of land 
belonging to another, thus giving rise to clear distinctions between 
'mine and thine'. Roman law would subscribe to the evolution of 
mankind according to laws of property, from common to private, by 
insisting that the natural law which dictated relations between free 
men in the beginning of time was gradually replaced by the law of 
nations, allowing for the sedimentation of private property, slavery, 
and war. (1979: 8) 
According to Innocent IV, the bearer of legitimate authority in any 
society possessed the power to enforce justice on those who were 
recalcitrant in following the laws that governed the relationship 
between people. Lawful authority, deriving from God, was 
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exercised, in primitive societies, by the power of the patriarchs. 
However, as society became more complex, the prince replaced 
the patriarchal figure as bearer of legitimate authority. The 
beginning of political society, as opposed to patriarchal rule, was 
marked by the election of Saul as king of the Israelites. For 
Innocent IV, this biblical event proved that "all rational creatures" 
could legitimately exercise the right to self-government. (1979: 8) 
By the laws that were common to all men, private property 
and self-government were the right of all men. Even in the 
contemporary world, infidels continued to enjoy these rights 
without interference because these rights were as common to 
all men as the sunshine that warmed all men, Christian and 
infidel alike. As a consequence, it was not licit for the Pope 
or anyone else to wage a campaign to deprive infidels of 
their property or their lordship simply because they were 
infidels. (1979: 9) 
In this manner, Innocent destroyed the argument authorising 
Christians to wage war against infidels on the basis of the 
Church's responsibility for the souls of all men. According to 
Muldoon, had Innocent IV terminated his discussion on the rights 
of infidels at this point, he would not have played a role in the 
evolution of international law and relations. (1994: 17) However, 
he developed his argument further, by arguing that the right all 
rational creatures had to private property and to self-government 
was not absolute: the legitimate exercise of dominium did not 
exempt those who possessed it from being judged by a higher 
authority, that is, the Pope. Because the Pope had the 
responsibility of ensuring the spiritual well-being of mankind, he 
ought to guide all human beings towards salvation, not only those 
who were members of the Church. As God's agent on earth, the 
Pope therefore had the obligation of exercising judgement of all 
people, according to the law to which they were subject - 
Christians by Christian law, Jews by Jewish law and infidels by 
natural law -, anywhere rulers failed to implement sanctions 
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against infractors of the law prevalent in their respective societies. 
In other words, Innocent IV defended that papal jurisdiction over 
infidels was de iure, becoming only de facto if natural law, the law 
known to all men, was violated. (1979: 22) Accordingly, only those 
non-Christian societies whose members did not unjustly occupy 
Christian territories or infringe upon natural law were safe from 
Christian attack. (1994: 17) The problem, however, was that 
despite the clear definition of Jewish law in the Pentateuch, 
natural law, allegedly known to all human beings, remained 
ambiguous in content. As such, violations of natural law that would 
permit the conquest of an infidel society were vaguely described 
as 'sexual perversion or the worship of idols'. (1994: 17) 
What this means, of course, was that when the Pope was 
evaluating the actions of an infidel who was acting in accord 
with his own legal tradition, he had to evaluate the actions in 
question not according to the laws of the individual's society 
but according to natural law as the Pope defined it. (1994: 
19) 
The Pope's emphasis on the legitimacy of infidel dominium, the 
'natural right of all men', thus revealed itself as qualified to the 
extent that it required submission to papal consideration. Innocent 
IV's argument illustrates his desire to simultaneously defend both 
the independence of infidel societies, as well as the Pope's 
responsibility for the souls of all people everywhere. This 
contradictory objective mirrors the earlier canonist intent to defend 
the autonomy of secular Christian power, whilst justifying papal 
intervention in the secular sphere in certain contexts. At issue was 
the question whether all legitimate authority within Christendom 
ought to be mediated by the Church. While the dualists defended 
the independence of the secular from the temporal, due to the ruler 
receiving power from God through the people, the hierocrats 
refused to recognise the legitimacy of secular power that was not 
mediated through the Church. 
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The dualist position recognised the secular power as an 
autonomous sphere of jurisdiction not under the regular and 
direct control of the Church. In the dualist view, the Pope 
possessed an indirect power over secular rulers, however, 
because as members of the Church they were subject to 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. (1979: 9) 
At stake in the debate between dualists and hierocrats were 
opposite views favouring direct or indirect papal intervention in 
secular affairs. In formulating the foundations of a framework to 
deal with relations between Christians and infidels, Innocent IV 
was sponsoring the dualist line of argument; he claimed an indirect 
power over infidels based on spiritual preoccupations. On the other 
side of the divide, representing the hierocratic position, was 
Innocent IV's student, Henry of Segusio, or Hostiensis (d. 1270), 
who rejected the notion that infidels possessed dominium, that is, 
the right to property and self-government. According to Hostiensis, 
the right to dominium solely belonged to Christians, since the 
coming of Christ. 
Infidels, by the very fact of not being Christians, were 
sinners, so that when Christ became incarnate, infidels 
automatically lost their right to hold property and lordship 
legitimately. As Peter and his successors were the vicars of 
Christ, they too had the power to deprive infidels of office 
and lands. (1979: 17) 
Because infidel rulers occupied territories and power that now 
legitimately belonged to Christians, the Pope could intervene 
directly in infidel societies to establish the suzerainty of 
Christians. As such, Hostiensis defended the subjection of infidels 
to Christian rulers de iure. (1979: 17) Although one might be 
induced into thinking that the Hostiensian view regarding the lack 
of dominium in infidel societies would be favourable to the Papacy, 
it was fiercely rejected on the grounds of potentially paving the 
way to the heresy of Donatism. By resting dominium on the state of 
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'I 
grace, Hostiensis was defending a position perilously close to that 
of the donatists, according to whom sinful priests could not 
exercise sacramental authority. (1994: 20) 
This theological opinion was rejected by the Church as 
heretical, in part, at least, because the donatist teaching 
involved the definition of the Church's nature: if the efficacy 
of a sacrament depended upon the personal qualities of the 
minister, the Church as an institution would dissolve into a 
series of sects led by those believed to be sinless. The 
orthodox position was that a validly ordained priest who 
administered the sacraments according to the prescribed 
ritual was legitimate minister of the sacrament even if he 
himself was in the state of sin. (1979: 16) 
Transposed to the civil realm, this argument was to be used to 
assert that only rulers in the state of grace held legitimate political 
power. By advocating the latter claim, Hostiensis could be accused 
of heresy for he was extrapolating arguments about the nature of 
the Church to the political order. 
Subsequent discussions centring on Christian relations with the 
non-Christian world were to base themselves on the Innocentian 
and Hostiensian positions. Despite the differences inherent in the 
two views, revolving principally around the indirect or direct nature 
of papal power, both Innocent and Hostiensis agreed that baptism 
should be a voluntary act and that the first phase of Christian entry 
into non-Christian territories should consist in the arrival of 
peaceful missionaries. (1979: 17) For Innocent IV, papal 
responsibility for the souls of all men justified war in instances 
where infidel rulers created obstacles to the free entry and 
movement of Christian missionaries. However, the Pope was 
careful to emphasise that secular Christian rulers could not take 
the matter into their own hands and declare war against infidels on 
the grounds that the latter were blocking missionary access into 
non-Christian territories. Waging war ultimately required papal 
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authorisation, for at stake was a spiritual objective (1994: 18,19): 
infidels who were targeted by a Christian invasion had to be guilty 
either of occupying previously Christian lands, or to have violated 
the terms of natural law. (1979: 16) Because it was in the nature 
of all human beings to praise God (1994: 18), any attempt to 
prevent the entry of missionaries in infidel territories could be 
considered to be a violation of natural law. Nevertheless, although 
the free exercise of Christian activities might necessitate, if 
opposed, the use of force, baptism required the voluntary consent 
of the individual. (1994: 18) The model which served to regulate 
Christian relations with Jews within Christendom came to serve as 
a guideline for Christian relations with infidels. Significantly, 
despite the possibility of Jews being compelled to attend Christian 
sermons and to burn the Talmud due to its presumable distortion of 
a genuine Jewish tradition - according to the Pope's definition of 
the latter -, they could not be coerced into baptism. (1994: 18) 
Here the Pope was distinguishing clearly between the kinds 
of behaviour in which non-Christians engaged that the Pope 
could regulate, by force if necessary, and baptism, an act 
that required voluntary acceptance. The Pope's responsibility 
for the salvation of infidels was restricted to ensuring that 
their rulers placed no obstacles in the way of preaching the 
Gospel. Once the freedom to preach existed, the papal role 
ended and responsibility for the salvation of these souls was 
theirs individually. (1994: 18) 
The Innocentian-Hostiensian discussions revolving around the 
infidel right to dominium had grown directly out of the crusades 
against the Muslims on one hand, and the threat of Mongol assault 
on the other. The decline of the Mongol empire during the 
fourteenth century brought an end to the relations between the 
Papacy and Asia; these contacts had sought to establish peace in 
Eurasia as well as to win allies to the anti-Muslim cause. (1994: 
21) During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, canon lawyers 
would continue to apply the notion of infidel dominiurn as their 
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thirteenth century predecessors had defined it, to a situation that 
was exceeding the boundaries of the debate between Innocent IV 
and Hostiensis. 
IV. On Dominium: The Iberian Experience 
i) The Canaries 
The discussion of dominium in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
continued to take place within the framework of Catholic thought 
laid down by Innocent IV's commentary on the decretal Quod super 
his. The role the Papacy was to play in the legitimation of the 
conquest of the New World was foreshadowed by events 
concerning conflicting claims between Portugal and Castile over 
the Canary Islands in the fifteenth century. In 1434, Pope 
Eugenius IV (1431 - 47) forbid further Christian occupation of the 
Canary Islands on the grounds that European explorers had 
terrorised a number of Christian converts among the native 
population, thus giving priority to territorial over spiritual 
objectives. However, two years later, in 1436, Eugenius issued the 
bull, Romanus Pontifex, offering the islands permanently to 
Portugal. 
The discussion on the rights of infidels in the papal court ensued 
from King Duarte (1433-38) of Portugal's request that the ban on 
Christian activities in the Canaries be lifted so that the Portuguese 
could continue to convert the Canarians. Because the islanders 
lacked common religion, law, or organised government, the 
Portuguese claimed that their proselytising work would bring 
civilisation to a people who lived a wild and primitive existence, 
'little better than that of animals'. (1979: 121) Although Duarte 
avoided a clear allusion to the issue of infidel dominium, he 
nevertheless broached it indirectly by assuring the Pope that the 
Portuguese sought to protect the islanders from oppression and 
exploitation, thus always keeping in mind the moral necessity of 
the spiritual and physical well-being of the native population. He 
justified the attack that had caused the original papal ban on 
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expansion in the Canaries on the grounds that the natives' had 
presented ferocious resistance. 
Thus, although Eugenius might not have agreed with Duarte's 
interpretation of the rights of infidels, the Kin g's letter had 
nevertheless provided other motives for permitting the conquest. 
Because the islanders were fierce, they would presumably not 
allow the peaceful entry of missionaries in their territories. On the 
basis of Innocent IV's arguments, the Pope would be fully justified 
in allowing the use of military force so as to enable the free 
exercise of Christian activities. Furthermore, Duarte's claim in 
favour of the Christian responsibility to civilise and baptise 
primitive man could be justified under Innocent IV's assumption 
that the violation of natural law required subjection to papally 
authorised judgement. (1974: 124) Eugenius thus gave permission 
to the continuation of Portuguese expansion in the Canaries, by 
resorting to the legal framework concerning infidel dominium. 
In Romanus Pontifex, Eugenius authorised the Portuguese to 
oversee the conversion of the remaining infidels in the 
Canary Islands, regardless of where they lived. Taking his 
theme from Duarte's letter, Eugenius stressed his role as 
Christ's vicar on earth. Because the earth and its fullness 
belonged to Christ, the Pope, His vicar, could exercise 
Christ's authority over all and everything on earth. (1979: 
129) 
ii) The New World 
The necessity for papal approbation that marked Iberian expansion 
in the Atlantic and the west coast of Africa in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries was to influence the Castilian colonial 
enterprise in the New World during the sixteenth century. 
Preoccupation with the legitimation of the conquests made in the 
Americas was of primary importance in Spanish intellectual life of 
the time, which inspired itself on canon law to elaborate a theory 
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of peaceful relations between Castile and the native inhabitants of 
the Americas. (1994: 21) 
Castilian and Portuguese expansion had been regulated by a long 
series of papal bulls, which allocated lands free from Christian rule 
to either Portuguese or Castilian ecclesiastical responsibility: 
Castile and Portugal were granted a monopoly of trade with 
regions their agents 'discovered', in exchange for ensuring the 
conversion of infidels. Columbus's discovery of the New World 
presented the same dilemma as had previous explorations: the 
prevalent question was under what circumstances could Queen 
Isabella of Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon lay claim to the 
Americas. The Papacy was once again called in to resolve the 
matter, issuing three bulls in 1493 - the most famous entitled Inter 
caetera -, which continued the fifteenth century tradition of 
dividing ecclesiastical responsibility of the newly discovered land 
between Castile and Portugal. 
Inter caetera integrated Castile's acquisition of the New World into 
the history of the reconquest which had terminated with Muslim 
defeat in Granada, in precisely 1492, the year of Columbus's 
arrival in the Americas. After seven centuries of crusading activity 
dedicated to ridding Spain of the Saracens, the Catholic monarchs, 
Ferdinand and Isabella, were at last free to extend the boundaries 
of Christendom by divulging the Gospel to infidels beyond 
Christendom. Alexander VI (1492-1503) was careful to avoid any 
direct allusion to infidel dominium, focusing instead on the 
necessity to convert, civilise, and protect the inhabitants of the 
Americas, a mission which would be accomplished through 
Castilian ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Papal responsibility for the 
salvation of all men's souls would thus be fulfilled. (1979: 137-8) 
The publication of Inter caetera, and several related bulls, marked 
the change from medieval to sixteenth century relations with the 
infidels. The encounter with the New World raised questions, 
already tackled by medieval scholasticism, concerning the nature 
of secular and temporal power, as well as Christian relations with 
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non-Christian societies, within a new context. (1994: 22-3) The 
novel circumstances in which the colonisation of the Americas 
occurred were characterised by a rift between the Castilian 
government's perception of the conquest and the conquistadores' 
actions in the New World. 
The royal goal was to prevent the creation of a noble class 
capable of flouting the monarchy. As a result, the Castilian 
government's protestations about the abuses of the 
conquistadores and its assertion of interest in the spiritual 
well-being of the Indians were related to its own interests. 
(1979: 140) 
The Spanish concern with the legitimation of the conquest also 
reflected the monarchy's customary policy of securing an orderly 
integration of new territorial acquisitions into the system of royal 
government. Ultimately, Castile sought to maintain the right order 
of the world on the basis of the legal tradition that had begun with 
the Innocentian-Hostiensian debate in the thirteenth century, an 
objective which countered the solely profit-oriented initiatives of 
the conquistadores. The Requerimiento, issued in 1512, reflects 
the extent to which Castile wished to earn papal approbation of the 
conquest, by seeking to justify the latter in terms of the existing 
legal framework concerning infidel dominium. Basically, the 
Requerimiento consisted in a legal statement that the Spanish read 
out to the native inhabitants of the Americas before attacking 
them, in which they explained both the reasons for their presence 
as well as the motives of the conquest. 
Critics from Las Casas to the present have been scandalised 
by the vision of a friar reading this statement to an audience 
composed of trees or empty huts, or hurling its words at the 
backs of fleeing, uncomprehending Indians, terrified by the 
sight of armed strangers. There is no evidence that the text 
was ever translated into any American tongue so that the 
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natives might have some opportunity to understand it. (1979: 
140) 
Muldoon claims that the Requerimiento nevertheless made sense 
within the context of the medieval legal framework that 
characterised the Castilian system of government. Upon hearing 
the statement of Christian beliefs - in which it was stated that the 
Church was responsible for the spiritual well-being of all human 
beings -, the Indians were expected to allow the peaceful entry of 
missionaries into their territories. The refusal of the infidels to 
admit the conquistadores would justify the use of coercion against 
them to protect the missionaries who preached the Gospel, thus 
ensuring the free exercise of Christian activities in non-Christian 
societies. According to Muldoon, the Requerimiento allowed the 
Spanish to conquer the New World on the basis of a legal ritual, 
only superficially in keeping with Innocent IV's views on infidel 
dominium. (Muldoon, 1979: 140; 1994: 27; Las Casas, 1992: 32-3) 
The Dominican friar, Bartholom6 de Las Casas (1474-1566), a 
former colonist in the New World, had become an ardent defender 
of Indians' rights after undergoing conversion. Seeking to expose 
the cruelty of the conquistadores to Ferdinand of Aragon and to his 
successor, Charles V, Las Casas's works emphasise that the 
Requerimiento deprived the Indians of their natural right to 
property and self-government. In other words, he considered the 
Spanish legal statement to espouse the Hostiensian view that 
infidels, usurpers of land and lordship that rightfully belonged to 
Christians, did not possess dominium. The Requerimiento, 
however, had been drawn up by the lawyer Juan Lopez de Palacios 
Rubios, precisely because Innocent IV's opinion on the rights of 
infidels had been recognised by the Castilian court: infidel 
possession of dominium obliged the Spanish to legitimate their 
conquest on the basis of the alleged refusal of Indians to allow the 
peaceful entry of Christian missionaries into their lands. As such, 
Muldoon considers Las Casas to have missed the spirit of the 
Requerimiento. (1979: 141) 
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The problem lay with Las Casas ... not with Palacios Rubios. 
The friar did not appreciate that the Innocentian opinion 
about the rights of infidels did not absolutely forbid an 
invasion of an infidel society. Both Hostiensis and Innocent 
IV had concluded that Christians could lawfully invade and 
subdue an infidel society; they differed on the grounds that 
would justify the invasion. (1979: 141) 
Palacios Rubios would presumably have been only too aware of the 
dangers inherent in advocating a Hostiensian position, which might 
have paved the way to a charge of heresy by Castile's rivals. 
Having experienced a legal conflict with the Portuguese over the 
Canaries in the fifteenth century, the Castilians were anxious to 
avoid the accusation of illegal conquest before the Papacy by a 
rival Christian power. In that context, the Pope could withdraw the 
license from the Castilians and award another nation the 
responsibility for proselytising amongst the Indians. Thus, in line 
with Innocentian views that recognised infidel dominium, Palacios 
Rubios drew up the Requerimiento with the objective of 
legitimating the conquest of the Americas on the basis of what was 
regarded to be a just cause, papal responsibility for the spiritual 
well-being of all men. (1979: 142-3) 
The legitimacy of the Castilian conquest of the Americas became a 
predominant theme in the discussions held by theologians, 
scholastic philosophers, and lawyers in the flourishing sixteenth- 
century Spanish academy. In 1550, Las Casas and the theologian 
Juan Gin6s de Sepblveda (1490-1573) confronted each other in a 
debate before a royal commission organised by Charles V to 
assess the legitimacy of Spanish overseas expansion. SepOlveda, 
as a defender of the conquest, based himself on Aristotle's 
definition of natural slavery to argue that because the Indians were 
by nature inferior to Europeans, they were clearly destined to 
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slavery. 4 (1979: 143; 1994: 27) In opposing this argument, Las 
Casas inspired himself on previous canonistic discussion regarding 
infidel dominium. 
Another major contribution to the debate about the legitimacy of 
Spanish expansion was the theologian Francisco de Vitoria, 
Following in the line of Innocent IV, Vitoria argued that the 
legitimate conquest of the Americas had to be built upon a morally 
justifiable basis: because important moral and spiritual issues 
were at stake, Vitoria believed that priests, rather than lawyers, 
ought to settle the question. Drawing on a scholastic tradition that 
reached back to the thirteenth century, Vitoria represented the 
debate as essentially concerning a conflict between the infidel 
right to property and self-government on one hand, and the 
Christian right to invasion on the other. In this context, Vitoria 
asked whether the infidels possessed dominium, and if so, how 
could the Spanish justify depriving them of the latter. 
Vitoria began his discussion on dominium by opposing the 
Aristotelian notion of natural slavery: contrary to what defenders of 
the conquest habitually claimed, Vitoria argued that because all 
men shared a universal nature, 'some could not be natural slaves 
while others were natural masters'. (1979: 144) The Indians thus 
had as much right to dominium as the Spanish. Vitoria went on to 
analyse the fifteen claims habitually put forth to defend the 
conquest of the Americas, seven of which he judged invalid for 
presupposing that the Spanish could act unilaterally towards the 
Indians. (1994: 32) 
4 Aristotle's notion of natural slavery embraced class-like and racial 
characteristics, referring to the barbarian who tended to make 
concessions to others, and whose physical strength outweighed his 
rationality. Natural slaves thus needed the guidance of independent 
beings, endowed both with civilisation and the full use of reason. 
(Blackburn, 1999: 35) 
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Vitoria opposed claims regarding universal temporal jurisdiction by 
either the Holy Roman Emperor or the Pope. Because self- 
government was a natural right of all men, the Spanish could not 
allege the necessity of a single government, under the Holy Roman 
Emperor Charles V, that would embrace both Christians and non- 
Christians. Regarding universal papal authority, Vitoria claimed 
that the latter concerned the spiritual rather than the temporal 
sphere. Las Casas would come to support Vitoria's view, for he 
believed that the Pope could not issue licenses that would deprive 
the Indians of their temporal rights; while the legal tradition 
regarded the Pope as the ultimate judge of the primacy of rights - 
having the power to declare war in the event of hostility towards 
the free movement of missionaries in infidel lands, so as to 
preserve the spiritual well-being of non-Christians -, Las Casas 
considered this to be a violation of infidel temporal rights, and as 
such, an illegitimate basis for Spanish conquest of the Americas. 
Vitoria diverged from the traditional Innocentian approach by 
arguing that the Pope could not claim spiritual jurisdiction over 
non-Christians. The refusal of infidels to embrace the Christian 
faith in the sequence of having the Requerimiento read out to them 
could nowise provide a basis for their conquest by the Spanish, for 
baptism under such conditions would indicate either 'lightness of 
mind or fear of Spanish retribution', neither of which were suitable 
motives for conversion. (1979: 147) The same logic applied to the 
apparent acceptance of Spanish lordship by native inhabitants, 
who in most cases did so not voluntarily but out of fear. 
The legitimate titles defended by Vitoria alluded to the universal 
right, embracing both Christians and infidels, to take charge of 
their own political destiny. As such, everyone was entitled to 
freedom of travel for commercial or religious motives, or to 
protection from tyrannical rule. Thus, the universal right to travel 
where one wished without interference underscored the right of 
missionaries to preach in non-Christian territories. (1979: 148) 
This contrasts with the traditional Innocentian emphasis on papal 
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responsibility for all men's souls as justifying the right to secure 
the peaceful access of missionaries abroad. Vitoria, however, did 
agree with Innocent IV in that infidel hostility to missionaries would 
fully justify a declaration of war against them. However, the subtle 
difference between Vitoria's view and that of Innocent IV is that 
while the former argued that the Spanish could claim the New 
World on the basis of a papal license, conferring responsibility for 
the conversion of native inhabitants, the latter focused on papal 
responsibility for the spiritual well-being of all men. 
Vitoria advocated a contract theory of government, in which rulers 
held power on the basis of popular consent. Here, he was following 
Innocent IV's opinion that all human communities had the right to 
select their own rulers; Las Casas would later add the legal 
doctrine "what affects all must be approved by all" to Innocent's 
conclusion, in a gesture that may be reminiscent of Vitoria's 
position concerning this issue. (1979: 151) Although Vitoria 
considered voluntary submission of the ruled to the rulers to be a 
prerequisite of good government, any violation of the subjects' 
rights by the authorities could justify Christian intervention even 
against the will of the local population. Here, the higher good, the 
saving of lives, would win over the lesser good, infidel dominium. 
(1979: 149) The danger, however, was that the Spanish could be 
claiming control over the Indians for the latter's benefit, while in 
reality taking advantage of the situation for the sake of personal 
interest. The spiritual welfare of the Spaniards would thus be at 
stake, for they might lose their souls due to their hypocrisy 
towards the native inhabitants of the Americas. 
In 1609, Hugo Grotius published his first treatise on international 
law, Mare liberum, with the objective of negating the legitimacy of 
Castilian and Portuguese conquest of the Americas on the basis of 
Alexander's bull Inter caetera. Grotius argued that the Indians' 
right to property and self-government could not be challenged on 
the grounds of their status as non-Christians. Accordingly, papal 
grants awarding domination of the New World to Christian powers 
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were invalid, because the Pope had no jurisdiction over infidels. 
(1994: 30) 
It was in the context of the waning of papal power and the rise of a 
new world order that the scholar-bureaucrat Juan cle Sol6rzano 
Pereira (1575-1654) sought to defend the Spanish conquest of the 
Americas. His De Indiarum Jure, written in the seventeenth 
century, attempts to respond to debates originating in a medieval 
legal framework on one hand, and in contemporary Protestant 
circles on the other. The objective of De Indiarum Jure was first 
and foremost the attempt to firmly establish Spain and its colonies 
within a Catholic world order. As such, more than a humanitarian 
response to the detrimental effects of Spanish colonisation on the 
indigenous populations of the Americas, Sol6rzano's treatise 
consisted in a debate about the right order of the world. 
Dealing with various arguments that Vitoria had considered, 
Sol6rzano claimed that the only legitimate title to the Spanish 
possession of the New World was as the result of a papal license. 
Whereas Vitoria had discussed the legitimacy of the Castilian 
conquest in the initial stages of Spanish and Portuguese overseas 
expansion, when the two Catholic powers had no rivals in the 
colonial enterprise, Sol6rzano found himself justifying Spanish 
imperialist legitimacy in a context in which the papal right to 
restrict conquest to Spain and Portugal was clearly doubted. Thus, 
the defence of the papal jurisdiction upon which the Spanish 
justified the legitimacy of their overseas possessions had to be 
given priority in the wider debate over the validity of the conquest 
itself. 
In Catholic circles, while the existence of the Papacy was, of 
course, not in question, the nature and extent of its 
jurisdiction certainly was. Catholic rulers and their advisers 
could call upon a long tradition of opposition to papal 
involvement in temporal matters to reject the Castilian and 
Portuguese monopolies in the Indies. On the other hand, 
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Protestant reformers were now attacking the very existence 
of the Papacy itself. The Papacy and the clerically dominated 
Church structure that it headed was, in Protestant terms, a 
deformation of the true Christian Church that was now in the 
process of being reformed. (1994: 35) 
While Vitoria had engaged in a scholastic discussion concerning 
the possession of infidel dominium, Sol6rzano was forced to 
extend this debate by focusing on the evolution of papal authority 
within the Church and on the defence of its validity. According to 
Sol6rzano, the illegitimate claims entitling Spain to the possession 
of the Americas made no reference whatsoever to papal 
jurisdiction in conferring responsibility over newly discovered 
territories to a Christian power. Because lack of papal authority 
could lead to unruly expansion and the continuation of unmediated 
rival territorial claims, the New World risked becoming the site of a 
'land rush' the moment any Christian power was to claim the 
Americas on the grounds of either fulfilling divine will or 
accomplishing a civilising mission. Where the illegitimate titles to 
the Americas could potentially conduce to chaos in the world 
order, the title securing Spanish conquest of the Americas on a 
papal license would provide for an orderly and stable process of 
expansion. The right order of the world was thus ensured by the 
Papacy's regulation of relations between Catholic and non- 
Christian societies. (1994: 36) 
For the Spanish, this emphasis upon papal grant, not 
discovery and conquest or direct divine grant, meant that 
they had to defend their continued possession of the New 
World in the terms of Alexander VI's bulls, that is, in terms of 
papal responsibility for the salvation of the infidels. (1994: 
37) 
V. Confrontation with Alterity 
Columbus and the New World 
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The issue of infidel dominium only arose in the context of societies 
deemed to be primitive by the Castilians: while Christian 
Europeans had traditionally focused on trade rather than 
domination in their encounter with what they considered to be the 
relatively developed societies of China and Japan, populations who 
lacked trade, government, and other components of civil society 
were regarded as their inferiors. (Muldoon, 1994: 23) 
When at the end of the Spanish Reconquest Columbus set forth on 
his first voyage of discovery, he planned to head for the lands of 
the Great Khan to initiate commercial links, opening a sea route 
permitting access to the spice trade. Abiding by a long-standing 
European idea, he also wished to spread the Catholic faith, in a 
religious alliance with the Far East oriented against Islam. Instead 
of the sophisticated subjects of the Great Khan that he had 
expected to encounter, however, Columbus found the naked, 
innocent and child-like inhabitants of a previously unknown land. 
(Ife, 1990: xvii, xix) 
By perceiving the inhabitants of the Caribbean islands in the 
same terms as they had perceived, for example, the Canary 
Islanders, the advisers of Ferdinand and Isabella shaped the 
way in which Columbus and those who followed him dealt 
with the inhabitants of the Americas. (Muldoon, 1994: 23-4) 
As matters stood, the basis for peaceful relations between 
Christian and infidel societies based on trade did not apply to 
American Indians. What role, then, were these non-Christians to be 
allocated within the framework of European thought? How were 
they to be envisaged by Christians? (1994: 24) In the debates 
regarding the legitimacy of the Spanish conquest of the New 
World, there were those who argued that infidels could be 
temporarily deprived of dominium as part of the process of 
acculturation and Christianisation. According to Sol6rzano, authors 
such as Sepblveda whom Las Casas confronted in the 1550 
debate at Valladolid considered the Indians to be 
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wild, barbarians, disorderly, and rustic, as is commonly 
noted, so that they scarcely seem worthy of the name human; 
and consequently they can and ought to be subjected to our 
kings and to be deprived of supreme imperium, jurisdiction 
and control of their lands and their persons, so that, finally 
being brought to a humane and civilised level of existence ... 
they might become worthy to be rendered capable of the 
Christian faith and religion. (Sol6rzano in Muldoon, 1994: 40) 
The relation between the conversion of the native inhabitants and 
a wider civilising process had already been expounded on by the 
Church, which based itself on the picture drawn up by Columbus's 
description of the Indians. 
... he described the people whom he encountered as simple, 
timid folk who went about naked, had no metal except some 
gold, and who apparently did not hold private property. 
These people did not even seem to have any form of 
government. Columbus described a society of childlike 
individuals, where simple people lived simple lives in an 
environment like that of the Garden of Eden. (1994: 39) 
This dream-like paradise was marred, however, by periodic fights 
between tribes, with episodes of looting and cannibalism. 
Columbus justified the subjugation of these people to the Spanish 
on the basis that they would embrace the true God, know greater 
social development, and gain greater protection in their combats 
against each other. (Muldoon, 1994: 39-40) Some authors note, 
however, that despite living in an epoch wrought with medieval 
religious superstition, Columbus revealed a surprising degree of 
tolerance in his representation of ethnological phenomena. 
The more significant of his contributions to the history of 
ethnological ideas were his ... simple descriptions of the 
customs and the appearance of the island peoples ... so far 
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as he knew, there were "no human monstrosities" such as 
thronged the pages of medieval cosmographies and travel 
5 tales ... 
(Hodgen, 1964: 20) 
Boon remarks that in Columbus's time, geographical distance from 
Europe bore little determination on ideas of monstrosity. Citing L. 
E. Huddleston, Boon argues that neither the ideas of 'Europe' nor 
of the 'New World' played a role in Columbus's description of his 
encounter with the Americas. 
Columbus did not question the existence of men in the New 
World because he did not know it was a New World. The 
realisation of this fact was a gradual one not fully made until 
the reports of the Magellan Expedition of 1519-1521 became 
available. There was, therefore, no reason to marvel at a 
New World filled with New Men because neither phenomenon 
was recognised as such. 6 (Huddleston in Boon, 1982: 35) 
Later, however, Columbus would fall prey to fabricating native 
stereotypes of the Americas by mixing the biblical innocence of 
Paradise with images of degradation and the fall of man, in a 
gesture paralleling both the primitivistic convention of the noble 
5 The medieval anthropological tradition inspired itself not only on the 
biblical account of the origin of mankind, but also on the writings of 
Herodotus of Halicarnassus, as transmitted by Pliny, Pomponius Mela, 
Solinus, Isidore, Vincent, Bartholomew, and Sir John Mandeville. 
Herodotus's vivid descriptions of human cultures were, according to 
Hodgen, to be deformed by his followers, who revealed a morbid 
fascination for the 'unnatural' or the 'abnormally human'. (Hodgen, 
1964: 20-1,29,38,40) 
6 Magellan's chronicler Pigafetta gave birth to a famous ethnological 
legend, in 1520, by describing the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego as 
Patagonians, or "big feet". According to Boon, these diabolical giants 
consisted in a blend of myths from the Old Testament, ancient 
Cacotopian legends, and medieval satanic hybrids. Although the 
gigantism myth had been empirically dispelled by 1670, it nevertheless 
was revived by Enlightenment scientific taxonomy. (Boon, 1982: 37-41) 
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savage living in a prelapsarian Golden Age, and the anti-primitivist 
theological conception of the Indian as the symbol of a degraded 
humanity distinguished by corruption and lawlessness. (Boon, 
1982: 35; Hodgen, 1964: 370,378) 
However, according to Boon, the fact that the Caribs were 
described as well-formed, kind, clean, engaging in language, 
elaborate fishing technology and monogamy revealed that they 
could become members of the Church. Papal authorisation of the 
Spanish conquest of the Americas aimed precisely at converting 
those who had potential to become acculturated in European ways 
but were as of yet "going unclothed, and not eating flesh", living 
primitive but innocent lives. (Muldoon, 1994: 40) However, the lack 
of consensus regarding the problematic definition and 
classification of the Indians led Spanish intellectuals and royal 
bureaucrats to grapple with the following question within the 
debate about the legitimacy of the conquest: did the responsibility 
conferred by the Pope on the Castilians to convert the inhabitants 
of the New World also include a civilising mission? 
ii) On barbarism 
It was in the context of proving the validity of the Spanish invasion 
of the Americas that Sol6rzano discussed whether or not the 
Indians were barbarians. According to the author of De Indiarum 
Jure, the term barbarian originally referred to strangers, alluding 
to those who had no knowledge of the Greek language, and 
subsequently to persons not subject to Roman jurisdiction. In 
antiquity, a foreigner could easily lose barbarian status: the 
outsider who mastered Greek or who acquired Roman citizenship 
and adhered to Roman ways was reintegrated into the community 
with ease. Although originally only signifying 'foreigner', the term 
'barbarian' came to acquire a moral and cultural judgmental quality 
when applied to the Berbers of North Africa, who occupied a 
territory known as Barbaria which was later modified to Berberia. 
(Muldoon, 1994: 41) 
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More properly and more frequently ... it customarily refers to 
those who are rude and ignorant or dominated by a certain 
natural fierceness or (moral) blindness, those who deviate 
from the commonly accepted rule of human existence, those 
who do not use right reason, and those who do not employ 
the laws and practices consonant with natural reason ... 
(Sol6rzano in Muldoon, 1994: 41) 
Sol6rzano here reveals his acquiescence to an important change in 
the status of the barbarian: no longer does it allude to the person 
who cannot speak Greek or who is not subject to Roman rule, but 
rather to the non-rational individual. Defining the barbarian of the 
Greek and Roman tradition as someone lacking reason derives, 
according to Sol6rzano, from the Hebrew tradition's conception of 
the brutus, the savage, uncivilised creature, guided by natural 
impulse alone, ignorant of the political or social standards inherent 
in civilisation. The ancient Greeks, like the Hebrews, also 
acknowledged the existence of uncivilisable non-rational beings. 
Although these savage creatures bore the physical appearance of 
men, they were not fully human due to their lack of reason: the 
Socratic tradition considered reason, not external appearance, to 
be that which distinguished men from animals. 
The debate regarding the legitimacy of the conquest of the 
Americas thus revolved around the status of the Indians within the 
categories of mankind. 7 Did the native inhabitants of the New 
World correspond to the classical definition of the barbarians of 
antiquity, who simply indulged in ways of life different from those 
of the Europeans, or were they akin to beasts, an inferior species 
7 Confrontation with the indigenous peoples of the New World led 
Europeans to rethink the monogenic thesis according to which all human 
beings had a single origin: the cleavage between the civilised Old World 
and the savage New indicated that mankind was no longer a 'single 
homogeneous species or unit'. (Hodgen, 1964: 375-6,405) 
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lacking reason, human only in form? 8 The classification of the 
Indians in the hierarchical tree of humanity would thus determine 
the treatment meted out to them by the Spaniards. (1994: 42) 
The writings of Amerigo Vespucci (1451-1512) and Peter Martyr 
(1457-1526) described the Indians as wild, promiscuous, lawless, 
exhibiting animal-like behaviour and only in appearance resembling 
humanity. However, whereas Vespucci and Martyr judged the 
Indians behaviour according to moral and religious standards, the 
Jesuit missionary and defender of the Indians, Joseph Acosta 
(1539-1600), sought to prove the natives' status as barbarians on 
rational grounds: because, as Aristotle had foreseen, man was by 
nature a political animal, the criterion for civilised behaviour was 
determined by the capacity to live in organised communities. 
Acosta therefore read the current lack of stable political authority 
amongst the Indians of the Americas as a sign of barbarism 
inherent in the repudiation of organised society 
The question then was how could the Castilians proceed in their 
mission to convert the native inhabitants of the Americas if the 
latter lacked stable and disciplined political authority? Did the 
work of Christianisation require the prior acculturation of the 
Indians in the ways of a stable political community? If it was 
proved that the Indians belonged to a lower form of life, primitive 
and non-rational, then their right to dominium, to property and 
lordship, could be defied. However, if these people were not true 
human beings, they would offer no potential to being converted to 
Christianity either: understanding the Eucharist and other 
intricacies of the Christian religion would be beyond their 
capacities. (1994: 44-5) Once the barbarous nature of the Indians 
'3 The anti-primitivist view of the New World native was contemptuous of 
a common humanity; the role that had been allocated to human 
monsters in the Middle Ages was now transposed to the naked and 
menacing savage, who at most represented a degraded humanity seen 
through the teratological fantasies of classical mythology. (Hodgen, 
1964: 358-9,363,365) 
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had been fully established, their subjection to Spanish jurisdiction 
would be fully justified: because of their natural servility in 
Aristotelian terms, a barely human people would find it 
advantageous to be guided by 'those wiser than themselves'. 
If such people "cannot be led to the good and the right (way 
of life) by means of teaching and reason, they ought to be 
placed under a yoke as wild animals are placed under a 
yoke" and so coerced into behaving correctly. (1994: 46) 
Unlike Sep6lveda, who drew on the Aristotelian argument of the 
naturally servile to defend that the Indians were designed by 
nature to be slaves, Sol6rzano calls upon a paternalist duty of the 
conqueror to help his inferiors surpass their ancestors' ways of 
life. 
iii) On the Indians' humanity 
Because papal authority was extended only to human beings, 
demonstrating the humanity of the Indians was essential to the 
Spanish if they were to ground the legitimacy of the conquest of 
the New World on Alexander VI's Inter caetera, the bull which 
awarded the Castilians responsibility for the conversion of infidels. 
If the Indians were considered to be non-rational, beast-like 
creatures, human only in form, the terms of the Inter caetera would 
no longer be relevant, thus opening the occupation of the Americas 
to any power who wished to embark on the colonial enterprise. 
However, any argument in favour of the humanity of the Indian 
would have to account for the validity of Spanish jurisdiction over 
a people who, being rational, possessed dominium. This led 
Sol6rzano to distance himself from the discussion concerning the 
anthropological classification of the Indian, focusing instead on the 
historical experience of peoples who evolved from a primitive to a 
civilised state. According to Sol6rzano, because European peoples 
had themselves, in remote times, passed through a barbarous 
stage, living like savages unfamiliar with organised communities, 
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the Indians too could be expected to follow in European footsteps 
and eventually reach a state corresponding to that of civilisation. 9 
(Muldoon, 1994: 49) 
Thus, rather than considering barbarousness to be an innate 
characteristic that destined the Indian to eternal servility, 
Sol6rzano places emphasis on education and training as crucial in 
introducing the barbarian to civilisation. (1994: 50) It was therefore 
important to prove the Indians' rationality, for this would imply that 
they had the potential to achieve 'a better state of moral 
development' through acculturation, that is, that they could 
ultimately be taught to use their reason to the utmost. (1994: 51) 
If, as Acosta had argued, the standard of civilisation was to be 
gauged by the capacity to live in an organised community, then the 
Indians would, according to Sol6rzano, with the proper orientation, 
abandon their primitive way of life that permitted them to live 
outside a political community, and return to the level of existence 
from which their ancestors had fallen. 
This argument based itself on the Aristotelian tradition, which 
considered the city to allow for the concretisation of the highest 
human potential, an objective which would be achieved through the 
means of government. Although organised communities 
corresponded to the natural way of life dictated by reason, some 
peoples fell from this level of existence as they spread throughout 
the world, guided by the imperatives of physical force in their 
increasingly animal-like condition. 'O Despite their limited 
9 While the medieval conceptual isation of the universe considered the 
savage to have simply preceded European man in logical and spatial 
terms, the former was endowed, by the Moderns, with historical priority 
within a progressive sequence comprising savagery, barbarism, and 
civility, through which all cultures allegedly had passed. This gave rise 
to the pervasive notion that savages were identical regardless of 
cultural or temporal specificities. (Hodgen, 1964: 451,508,446) 
'0 Aristotle's view of organised communities as corresponding to a 
universal natural norm from which man may have fallen due to 
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rationality, however, these people could not be considered true 
barbarians for they were potentially civilisable human beings who 
could return to an organised community (politice) under the right 
guidance. In fact, Sol6rzano claimed that, if rightly taught, the 
Indians could be expected to follow in the footsteps of peoples 
such as the Greeks, Latins, Gauls, and the very ancestors of the 
Spanish, all of whom reached the very pinnacle of civilisation 
within a political framework, despite having once been considered 
barbarians. (1994: 61) 
iv) On the deprivation of dominium 
a) The political argument 
If the Indians shared a common humanity with the Spanish as 
rational beings, on what grounds could the Castilians justify 
depriving them of dominium? Taking into account that Spanish 
domination served the purpose of bringing the Indians to their full 
reason through acculturation, thus enabling the natives to climb 
from a primitive to a civilised level of existence, Sol6rzano argued 
that their loss of dominium could be justified on the grounds that it 
was a temporary necessity ultimately intended to benefit the 
Indians. Once the Indians had abandoned their uncivilised ways, 
adhering to European standards of behaviour, the period of 
Spanish 'tutelage', the duration of which remained unspecified, 
could end with the natives assuming self-government. 
Sol6rzano drew on Acosta's three categories designed to measure 
the development of non-European societies to explain the 
legitimacy of Spanish domination. The first category would be 
composed by organised communities, such as China and Japan, 
whose government, laws, literary skills, and economy manifested 
the right use of reason. The second category consisted of peoples, 
dispersion brings to mind the diffusionist biblical argument, according to 
which a rupture in the original Adamic culture leads to Cain's exile and 
to the wanderings of his progeny. (Hodgen, 1964: 258) 
94 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
such as the Incas and Aztecs, who despite living in organised 
communities, did not possess writing skills, thus living within a 
civilised context of stability but ignorant of the more sophisticated 
aspects of society. The third category comprised those unfamiliar 
with organised society, having no fixed abode, living in the 
wilderness, knowing neither law nor authority, except provisional 
war chiefs. (Muldoon, 1994: 67-8) 
Acosta's scale of social development is akin to an evolutionary 
schema ranging from the primitive to the civilised. Accordingly, 
human beings would have progressed from utter simplicity to 
political organisation, and finally to 'natural society' distinguished 
by trade and culture. European societies corresponded to the 
zenith of this evolutionary scale, for not only did they possess all 
of the characteristics corresponding to Acosta's first category, but 
they were Christian as well. This upward progression culminating 
in the polis could be regarded as conflicting with the Aristotelian 
notion according to which because human beings naturally live in 
organised communities, those who do not abide by this universal 
norm constitute a degenerated form of humanity. Acosta, however, 
defended that his categories of development applied only to the 
peoples of the New World, thereby indicating that they were not 
universal: in his attempt to avoid applying this evolutionary schema 
to the Old Word, he may have been evading a potential conflict 
with Biblical tradition which did not contemplate a state of 
'primeval savagery'. " By claiming that the descendants of Noah 
adopted savage ways in the process of their migrations by land to 
the Americas, Acosta was actually sponsoring a degenerationist 
view in line with the Biblical tradition according to which all human 
beings had a common origin, from which they degenerated in the 
course of their migrations motivated by original sin. (Rowe in 
Muldoon, 1994: 71) 
11 The theological tradition was degenerationist, holding the universal 
human condition to consist in postlapsarian corruption. As such, the 
savage would only be more corrupt than the rest of humanity. (Hodgen, 
1964: 378) 
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However, because it was the political, not moral, development of 
society that determined whether or not it could be the object of 
European occupation, the Indians could not be deprived of 
dominium on the grounds of being barbari ans or infidels. (1994: 
69) Thus, rather than suggesting conquest of the Indians, 
Sol6rzano argued for the creation of a single republic, under 
temporary Castilian tutelage, comprising both Spaniards and 
indigenous peoples. 
... in the respublica that would develop, 
Spaniards would not 
dominate Indians nor would Indians dominate Spaniards. 
Such a consummate equality lay in the future, however, 
because all the Indians, those of the second class as well as 
those of the third, "appear by far less intelligent and wise 
than the Spaniards. " (1994: 73) 
Thus, for the time being, the foundation of a Spanish and Indian 
political community would obey the rules of reciprocity inherent in 
hierarchical society, wherein weaker individuals followed the 
orientation of the more powerful, rather than those of egalitarian 
government, based on social contract, or voluntary consensus 
among equals. The fact that political authority was not built upon 
agreement but existed to 'advance the common good of all' led to 
the conclusion that the Spanish conquest of the Americas could 
indeed be validated on the grounds that the Spanish were assisting 
the Indians to move from the third class to the second, and from 
the second category to the first. 
So, even though the Indians were "free men and masters of 
their goods, " nevertheless "they were not sufficiently learned 
to govern themselves appropriately and in a political manner" 
... Thus, the Spanish kings had the responsibility for 
governing these people until they possessed the levels of 
civilised and Christian behaviour that Acosta identified with 
the first class of non-Christian societies. (Muldoon, 1994: 74) 
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Sol6rzano therefore grounded the legitimacy of the Spanish 
conquest on two bases: firstly, because the Spanish had 
themselves passed from a primitive to a civilised state, they 
comprehended this progressive process and could help the Indians 
achieve the same goals; secondly, bound by the 'precept of 
charity', Christian rulers had a particular duty in assisting the 
Indians attain a higher level of existence due to the requirements 
inherent in the papal grant which awarded the Castilians 
responsibility for the conversion of infidels. To leave unsocial men 
to follow a primitive, uncivilised existence would be as morally 
wrong as allowing someone to harm others: such unrestrained 
actions would constitute a breach of true human freedom, the 
exercise of which required, according to Sol6rzano, 'discretion and 
moderation'. The subjugation or enslavement of the Indians by the 
Spanish would thus not consist in a violation of their dominium, for 
the final objective of allowing them to ascend from a primitive to a 
civilised state would ultimately work to their advantage. (1994: 66, 
75-6) 
b) The legal argument 
Acosta's three categories of socio-political development, on the 
basis of which non-European societies were to be judged, 
presupposed a universal standard against which the behaviour of 
every community could be measured. Any attempt to 'help' the 
Indians evolve from the third class to the second, or from the 
second category to the first, would thus take place against the 
background of a set of universally applicable norms inherent in 
natural law. The medieval conception of the latter derived from 
Roman legal thought, giving it a slightly different slant. Whereas 
the Romans had defined natural law as a universal human norm 
partaking of the natural order, Thomas Aquinas considered that 
rationality and instinct would coincide in the gesture that led 
human beings to follow eternal law by means of the natural. 
(Muldoon, 1994: 77,79) 
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To the extent that natural law was a matter of instinct, it was 
something written on the hearts of human beings, all of 
whom shared it and were, therefore, subject to it. To the 
extent that natural law was rational participation in the 
eternal law, all rational creatures possessed the capacity to 
comprehend it. (1994: 79) 
Isidore of Seville (560-636), whose ideas so heavily influenced 
medieval thought, interpreted the Roman distinction between 
natural law (jus naturale) and the law of nations (jus gentium) as 
respectively allusive to the prelapsarian and postlapsarian levels 
of human existence. Corresponding to an ideal order where all 
people were free and all property was held in common, there being 
neither war nor slavery, natural law contrasted with the law of 
nations pertaining to the real world distinguished by competition, 
private property, war and enslavement. (1994: 78) 
One consequence of this conception of the origin of these 
two laws was the broad conclusion that by Adam's fall, "man 
passed out of the state of nature into the state in which the 
conventional institutions of society, " that is, the 
characteristic elements of the jus gentium, are necessary. 
Thus even slavery could be seen in a positive light, as part 
of a "disciplinary system by which the sinful tendencies of 
man may be corrected. " (1994: 78) 
While the scholars who debated the legitimacy of the Spanish 
conquest of the Americas accepted natural law as inscribed on the 
hearts of men, the precise definition of the latter was somewhat 
vague. As such, common accord on the content of natural law was 
achieved regarding marriage, freedom, and education; however, 
more than specifying the terms of natural law, the various 
intellectuals engaging in this discussion preferred to point to the 
behaviour potentially consisting in violations of it. If the Indians of 
the Americas were breaching natural law through barbaric 
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practices such as 'cannibalism, idolatry and human sacrifice', then 
the Spanish could legitimately withhold dominium from them 
'during a period of correction' which would end once the Indians 
had assimilated a civilised code of conduct. (1994: 79-80) 
Natural law would thus provide both guidelines against which 
the behaviour of the Indians could be measured and a set of 
goals toward which the Spanish would direct them. 
Underlying all these positions, however, was the assumption 
that the inhabitants of the New World possessed the capacity 
to know the universal norms of the natural law. Their failure 
to live up to them was, therefore, culpable. (1994: 80) 
The issue of the existence of a universal norm, embodied in 
natural law, put the Indians in an ambiguous position. While on the 
one hand, the natives were recognised as rational human beings, 
whose right to dominium could not be infringed upon, they were, on 
the other hand, subject to judgement and conquest by Christians 
on the grounds of violating natural law, precisely because, as 
rational beings, they ought to have been familiar with the terms of 
the latter. (1994: 80,94) In his commentary on the decretal Quod 
super his, Innocent IV had argued that when infidels were found to 
have violated the natural law, the Pope was fully justified in 
punishing them. Sol6rzano, however, stressed that 'men should not 
assume the role of God in their relations with other societies', and 
that the Pope, having no authority over non-Christians, could not 
permit the conquest of infidels on the grounds that they were 
violating natural law. The ultimate goal of bringing the Indians to a 
higher level of existence ought to be solely accomplished by the 
peaceful entry of missionaries into the New World. However, if 
infidels had been instructed in the Christian faith but still 
continued to indulge in their barbarous conduct, then Sol6rzano 
stated the Pope would indeed be fully justified in punishing them 
for violating the natural law. 
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Thus, the Church did have the right to punish infidels who 
violated natural law by employing the services of Christian 
rulers who would act under papal direction. The presumption 
was that the Spanish would not use force against the Indians 
until after the Spanish had peacefully instructed them in the 
errors of their ways. (1994: 93) 
VI. Slavery in the Spanish New World 
Spanish slavery in the Americas followed a feudalistic pattern, 
combining both tributary forced labour as well as outright 
enslavement of the native Indian population. If the Indians did not 
resist Spanish entry, readily accepting the terms of the 
Requerimiento, they would be subject to tribute exactions, whereby 
forced labour would be exchanged for silver earnings, the latter 
ending up in Royal coffers as part of the taxes levied on the 
community to which the Indian belonged. If, on the other hand, the 
Indians were hostile to Christianisation and Castilian domination, 
they would be submitted to a regime of enslavement, known as the 
encomienda system: conceded by the royal government to 
colonists who had rendered service to Spain, the encomienda 
consisted essentially in an estate containing Indian slaves bound 
to their master, the encomendero. (Blackburn, 1999: 129; Galeano, 
1997: 31) 
During the first forty years of Spanish conquest of the New World, 
the encomienda or repartimiento system prevailed with the 
objective of either food cultivation for the colonists or washing for 
alluvial gold. The site of the first Castilian landfall having been the 
Antilles, this region's population, mostly of a hunter-gatherer type, 
was unaccustomed to the rigours of the intensive work required 
both by the sugar-mill and gold-panning, the latter involving long 
periods of immersion in water and thus increasing susceptibility to 
disease. Slave-raiding expeditions into the American mainland 
brought back more labourers into Santo Domingo and Cuba. 
However, the death toll was unusually high, due to illness, 
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overwork and resettlement of the indigenous populations. 
Extrapolating from the Antillean example t0 the American 
mainland, the pattern of decline among the native Indians reached 
catastrophic dimensions within a century: totalling around 50 
million in 1500, the population of the New World counted a meagre 
8 million by 1600. 
Having confronted strong resistance on the part of the Indian 
peoples of the Antilles, the Spanish sought to avoid the threat of 
rebellion by employing leaders within the Indian communities to 
work with the encomenderos. Thus, by fusing pre-Columbian and 
Hispanic forms of domination and exploitation, the Castilians were 
able to divide the tasks of 'procurement and invigilation' with elite 
members of the indigenous population. (1999: 133) In the 
sequence of the uproar among Spanish clerics and intellectuals 
indignant at the mistreatment of Indians by the colonists - with 
special relevance to Las Casas' role in divulging this issue abroad 
-, the Royal Court was alarmed that whilst provoking further 
indigenous resistance, the rapacious actions of the conquistadores 
could lead rival Christian powers to take the matter to the Pope, 
accusing Spain of violating the terms of Inter caetera. Moreover, 
royal officials realised that the profits deriving from enslavement 
or the encomienda system were difficult to control, working to the 
advantage of the individual colonist. Thus, while the New Laws of 
1542 banned the practice of slavery as well as the encomienda 
regime, an attempt to control 'wayward' conquistadores took the 
form of a solid central administration consolidating an elaborate 
tribute system. (1999: 130,134) However, the enslavement of 
Indians did not entirely cease, and royal concern consisted in a 
cosmetic corrective device to cover up for the continuation of 
exploitative practices. 
Thus, although in 1601 Philip III had issued a decree abolishing 
forced labour in the mines, he simultaneously sent covert orders 
allowing for the continuation of the latter to ensure the stability of 
production levels. Similarly, according to a survey of labour 
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conditions in the Huancavelica mercury mines, conducted by 
Sol6rzano between 1616 and 1619, workers habitually died within 
four years due to the debilitating effects of bone marrow poison 
absorption. Nevertheless, both Philip IV and his successor Charles 
11 decided to maintain the status quo. (Galeano, 1997: 39) 
In addition to collecting tribute from the mita system of forced 
labour, the Spanish authorities taxed mine owners. The system 
essentially worked in a self-perpetuating manner, feeding any 
earnings paid to the Indians back into the colonial economy either 
through levies imposed upon wages or through the workers' 
purchase of victuals, clothing, tools and shelter, all of which were 
sold at high prices in the mining districts, thus permitting cash to 
return to the royal coffers. While the foodstuffs and clothing sold 
on the altiplano had themselves been obtained as tribute from 
native communities - whose low wages and payment in kind 
prevented the development of a cash economy, which in turn 
restricted the expansion of any potential domestic market -, other 
manufactured goods which could be bought by the mine labourers 
often had a European provenance. (Blackburn, 1999: 146) This 
curtailed the possibility of industrial development in the Americas 
while allowing the latter to become the market for an increasingly 
dynamic Western economy showing signs of an incipient capitalist 
mode of production. (Galeano, 1997: 30) 
The fact that demand for both gold and silver as well as 
agricultural products from the Americas remained unabated in 
Europe meant that the Spanish had to keep up production levels 
despite the decimation of great part of the indigenous population. 
African slavery originating from the Atlantic slave trade thus 
played an important role in the colonisation process due to a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the royal treasury earned a substantial 
amount of money by selling licences - the asientos - permitting the 
importation of slaves by a merchant - usually Portuguese - who 
would then proceed to sell his slaves to individual colonists. 
Secondly, African slaves were deemed to be physically more 
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resistant and hardy than their Indian counterparts: those who had 
survived the voyage from the African coast to the New World had 
created immunity to a variety of illnesses. Thirdly, because 
Africans had no ties to the New World, they would be less likely 
than the 'treacherous' Indians to either run away or to rise up in 
rebellion against their masters; it was widely held that, if treated 
correctly, African slaves could even strengthen the power of 
Madrid, for they were oblivious to Europe's political and religious 
rivalries. (Blackburn, 1999: 134,141-2) 
Massive African slave imports only became significant during the 
period ranging from 1595 to 1640, long after the New Laws had 
been issued forbidding the practice of slavery. Until 1596, there 
had been great preoccupation on the part of royal authorities to 
preserve the New World as a Castilian feud; other nationalities, as 
well as other Spanish subjects of non-pure lineage were thus 
banned from settling in the Americas. (1999: 141-2) 
VII. The formation of Spanish national identity 
The year 1492 had important repercussions on the consolidation of 
Spanish national identity. Not only did it mark the discovery of the 
New World, but it also signalled the completion of the Spanish 
Reconquista - thus consolidating Christian victory over Muslim 
culture in Spain, the repression of which would last until the 
seventeenth century -, as well as the expulsion of Jews from 
Spanish territory. The achievement of religious and political unity, 
constructed on the basis of an imperialist Castilian Catholic 
hegemony, would lay the foundations of Spanish national identity, 
firstly defined against the Jewish and Muslim others and 
subsequently against the Indians of the New World. It was, 
therefore, no coincidence that 'Jews, Moors, foreigners and 
heretics' were banned from settling in the Americas. This 
prohibition was a direct result of the climate of increasi ngly 
'intolerant homogenisation' that affected, throughout fifteenth and 
sixteenth century Spain, not only Jews and Arabs, but also the 
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New Christians, that is, those who converted to Christianity or who 
descended from such converts. The principle of limpieza de 
sangre, or untainted blood, was implemented to prevent conversos 
from obtaining royal or professional appointments. At the root of 
the promulgation of laws concerning pure lineage was the envy of 
plebeian Spaniards against what they considered to be an alliance 
between the aristocracy and the conversos, permitting many of the 
latter to hold office. Once limpieza de sangre had been instituted, 
conversos were regularly persecuted on the basis of clandestinely 
practising former religious rites. The situation worsened between 
1480 and 1520, when the Inquisition attempted to wipe the 
conversos off the map of an ethnically pure Spain through 
imprisonment, fines, exile, or burning at the stake. (Blackburn, 
1999: 48,135) 
Although the 'religious-racial stigmatisation' of New Christians had 
dire consequences in terms of obtaining employment, submission 
to tax exactions, persecution, and - in some cases - death at the 
hands of the Holy Office, it nevertheless did not contemplate 
enslavement of this segment of the population. According to 
Blackburn, this might have been due to the fact that because many 
of the conversos had the bearing of gentlemen (hidalgos), it might 
have appeared dishonourable to subject them to menial jobs. 
(1999: 49) Likewise, the Morisco New Christians who were 
ultimately expelled from Valencia between 1608 and 1612 were, for 
the most part, not enslaved for two plausible reasons: firstly, had 
they been enslaved and sent to the Americas, they might have 
constituted a substantial threat to Spanish authorities who 
continued to envisage the conquest of the New World as a 
crusading opportunity to form a Christian bulwark against Islam; 
secondly, the Spanish recoiled at the unseemly option of selling 
the Moriscos as slaves to Muslims, for the latter would only have 
bought them if completely convinced of their infidel status, that is, 
of their not practising the Islamic faith; although the Muslims did 
consider the Moriscos to have betrayed the Muslim faith, the 
Spanish authorities were unable to recognise this, for expulsion 
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occurred precisely on the grounds that these Moriscos continued to 
clandestinely practice Islamic rites. (1999: 54) 
Slavery was an institution which allowed for subordinate or 
correctional inclusion, not the total exclusion or suppression 
that was the eventual fate of the Jews and Moors. (1999: 53) 
VIII. Slavery in the Spanish context 
While slavery had declined in much of Europe during the thirteenth 
century, being replaced by serfdom, the Reconquest in Spain 
allowed the former to reappear despite its having been extinct in 
Northern Spain during the eleventh century. Significantly, the 
kingdoms of the North of Spain were precisely those that managed 
to resist Muslim occupation. There thus appears to be a correlation 
between confrontation with Islam and the revival of the Iberian 
practice of slavery, the latter playing a role both in expanding 
Christianity as well as in compulsory acculturation of the infidels. 
(Blackburn, 1999: 38,46,49) 
Koranic law prohibited the enslavement of Muslims. Christians and 
Jews under Islamic rule were also not to be subject to this 
practice, as long as they lived peaceably and paid tribute. Because 
only infidels were deemed fit for slavery, this practice was used as 
an instrument to convert 'outsiders into insiders'. Though not 
leading directly to manumission, the conversion of infidel slaves to 
Islam would improve their status in terms of acquisition of rights. 
Free persons who became Muslim would gain immunity against 
enslavement. 
According to Blackburn, Christendom was born out of a clash with 
Islam: the ideological and military threat represented by the Arab 
incursions into the Iberian peninsula and southern France dating 
from 711 allowed Christianity to define itself. Eager to ward off the 
Muslim menace, Charlemagne pressed for a new doctrine of 
enslavement forbidding traffic in Christian slaves. Similarly to the 
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Islamic Holy Law, Charlemagne's principles defended that 
conversion could lead to an increase in the rights of slaves, though 
not to their manumission. (1999: 39,50) Despite having been 
regarded as controversial in the Carolingian epoch, Christian 
enslavement by co-religionists was never effectively put to an end 
due to the conflictuous political events that were taking place in 
the eighth century, ultimately leading to the break-up of the 
Empire. 
Paradoxically, the absence of a strong central power both 
discouraged rural slavery and ruled out regulation of the 
slave trade. It also permitted new Saracen incursions into 
Southern France and Italy, accompanied by deliberate 
attempts to incite slaves against their masters. (1999: 43) 
This situation ultimately led to a decline in enslavement, for 
Christians sought to prevent further Muslim exploitation of the 
prevailing social tensions between the servile classes and their 
masters. The gradual diminution of slavery was accompanied by 
the social ascent of a local landholding nobility, upon whom 
hitherto free peasant villages would grow increasingly dependent. 
Thus, the consolidation of the feudal order in Europe occurred 
alongside the completion of the conversion of the population to 
Christianity. With the growing success of Arab military might in 
Spain, the Carolingian ban on Christian slave traffic was 
reawakened. (1999: 38,43,44) 
The foundation of religious orders dedicated to securing the 
freedom of Christians enslaved by Muslims, as well as the 
formulation of new colonial projects accompanied the revival of the 
Carolingian abolition of traffic in Christian slaves. 12 The Spanish 
urge to promote Christian solidarity against the Arab invader led to 
oppositional modes of thought, in terms of 'insider/outsider' status: 
12 Feudal colonisation consisted in 'Christianising' conquered territory, 
by repopulating the latter both through settlement of free Christians as 
well as through forced assimilation of infidels. (Blackburn, 1999: 51-2) 
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advantages deriving from socio-religious community membership 
encouraged an increment in prejudices regarding difference. 
(1999: 44) 
Spanish slave doctrine, though following Carolingian lines, was 
nevertheless moulded both by Isidore of Seville's ideas as well as 
Alfonso the Wise's codification known as the Siete Partidas. Drawn 
up in the thirteenth century, the Partidas did not forbid 
enslavement of Christians; instead, emphasis was placed on the 
amelioration of the slave condition, as well as on the necessity to 
protect the slaves' Christian faith. 13 Prior to the Muslim occupation 
of Spain, Isidore of Seville had defended slave subordination on 
the grounds that slavery was a punishment for ubiquitous sin; the 
divine purpose of enslavement revealed itself through the physical 
flaws of certain monstrous races, whose genetic perversity 
corresponded to moral defects which could only be redeemed 
through servitude. 14 Isidore's ideas thus consist in a m6lange of 
both classical myths, drawn from authorities such as Herodotus, 
Pliny, Mela, and Solinus, as well as doctrine from the early 
Christian Church: by basing slavery on genetic defects, he 
distances himself from the Augustinian tradition of the early 
Christian Church, which claimed that due to original sin, all men 
were fit for slavery; however, by regarding slavery as a form of 
penitence, he concurs with the Church's view regarding the 
providential character of enslavement as a spiritual advantage in 
the path towards salvation. (1999: 36,38,70) 
13 Although in theory the Siete Partidas allowed mistreated slaves to 
appeal to change masters, in practice the registration of a complaint 
required the mediation of either a powerful person or organisation, a 
requirement which severely limited the recourse to such rights. 
(Blackburn, 1999: 51,147,237) 
14 Isidore believed that to the existence of abnormal individuals within 
nations there corresponded abnormal nations within the universality of 
mankind. The giants, pigmies, anthropophagi, cynocephali and cyclops 
were only a few of the many teratological examples from classical 
antiquity that haunted the medieval imagination. (Hodgen, 1964: 57) 
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Written at a time when Spain was defining itself through 
Christianity against Islam, the Partidas reawakened Isidore's 
Christian ideas regarding sin and redemption so as to emphasise 
the need for religious conformity during the Reconquest. (1999: 
50-1) 
Notwithstanding the attempts to restrain masters, it was still 
baldly stated in the Partidas that slavery was 'the basest and 
most wretched condition into which anyone could fall 
because man, who is the most free and noble of all God's 
creatures, becomes thereby in the power of another, who can 
do with him what he wishes as with any property, whether 
living or dead'. (1999: 51) 
Thus, whereas the early Christian Church had considered slavery 
as a means through which Christian freedom could be realised - 
'for the true Christian was a slave to Christ' - (1999: 36), Alfonso 
the Wise, following in the wake of Isidore of Seville, regarded the 
deprivation of dominium as punishment for lack of conformity, 
religious rather than physical, unlike his predecessor had believed. 
IX. Slavery and Colour 
In the Siete Partidas, vulnerability to enslavement was thus 
determined by cultural rather than racial difference. (Blackburn, 
1999: 51) Extrapolating from Alfonso the Wise's ideas on slavery 
to general papal and legal medieval reactions to the non-European 
world, emphasis appears to have been placed on the cultural 
rather than biological inferiority of the barbarian: because 
Christianity was equated with civilisation, acculturating the infidel 
necessarily meant introducing him to the Church; the end of 
conversion would therefore justify the means - namely a 
deprivation of dominium - through which this spiritual and cultural 
well-being could be achieved. (Muldoon, 1979: 159-160) The 
completion of the Reconquest and the encounter with the 
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indigenous peoples of the Americas signal the introduction of an 
element of racial thinking in the Spanish emphasis on religious 
conformity from the late fifteenth century onwards: thus, despite 
having converted to Christianity, the conversos, either Jews or 
Muslims, suffered expulsion, were prevented from holding royal 
and clerical offices, and were barred from the New World; 
similarly, baptised Indians were frequently banned from the clerical 
profession. However, although Jews and Muslims were formally 
excluded from the Spanish context, Indians were included in the 
latter through the practices of enslavement or forced labour. 
Tracing the rise of Spanish national identity, one can say that 
while Catholic solidarity was consolidated as a reaction against the 
Islamic threat, serving to unite the various Spanish kingdoms 
against a common enemy, its intensification throughout the 
Reconquista led to the stigmatisation of any group who did not 
adhere to the Catholic faith: Jews and heretics were thus placed 
alongside Muslims in the category of outsiders to Catholicism, and, 
by extension, marginal to Spanish national identity. The Spanish 
nation thus grew out of a strict identification with Catholicism, 
against an 'enemy' culture which despite its infidel status was 
regarded as socially developed. The crusading spirit of the 
Reconquista found fertile grounds in the Americas upon which to 
continue a proselytising mission destined to strengthen Christian 
power; however, the native peoples encountered in the New World 
constituted a class of infidels different from those of the Muslim 
world; the utter simplicity of the Indians' lives, which in Spanish 
eyes justified the conquest of their lands, left them vulnerable to 
civilising projects that aimed to raise the natives' code of conduct 
to a European standard. Thusl although the Spanish practice of 
enslavement was originally effected as a reaction against lack of 
religious conformity, as demonstrated in medieval Spain, where 
slavery served the purpose of combating the Islamic threat, in the 
Americas the 'temporary' loss of dominium of the Indians was an 
important component inherent in a more extensive civilising 
mission that surpassed conversion to Catholicism. 
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As the fifteenth century progressed, debates concerning the ethical 
consequences of enslavement intensified amongst theologians, 
philosophers and lawyers in the Spanish academy. Concerned with 
its reputation as well as with the economic repercussions ensuing 
from the decimation of great part of the American indigenous 
populations, the royal authorities made a superficial attempt at 
curbing slavery and controlling the reckless actions of the 
colonists in the New World. Thus, at a time when slavery was 
becoming increasingly contested, the substitution of Indian labour 
by that of Africans was especially appealing: not only had the 
Africans' right to dominium not been much problematised in the 
intellectual milieu, but due to the Spaniards not undertaking direct 
enslavement of Africans, they could always distance themselves 
from the moral consequences of the process. The Atlantic trade 
permitted the evasion of responsibilities, to the extent that 
Europeans usually bought African slaves from Portuguese 
merchants, who in turn had previously purchased them from chiefs 
on the African coast. (Blackburn, 1999: 54) While the Canarians 
had been initially accused of living like 'wildmen' in an animal-like 
condition, Africans were introduced into the New World as slaves 
for the opposite reason: 
They were found living in societies organised in states, with 
their own laws, and participating in commerce. The captive 
purchased on the African coast was legitimately a slave, 
some argued, because he or she had been produced as such 
by the coastal slave trading or slave-raiding complex. (1999: 
63) 
The Portuguese had been trading in African slaves since the 
middle of the fifteenth century, selling them either in the Peninsula 
or the Atlantic islands. It is probable that around this time a few 
black slaves, acquired from Saracens, were already to be found in 
Castile and Aragon. The connection in Christian European minds 
between slavery and blackness was gradually consolidated during 
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the period 1450-1500, when tens of thousands of African slaves 
were imported into the Peninsula whilst white enslavement was 
declining. (1999: 72) The link between skin colour and slavery was 
further bolstered by biblical reference to the Noachid curse, which 
could be read as providing a genealogy of humanity, sanctioning 
the enslavement of particular lineages. (1999: 65-6) According to 
the story recounted in Genesis, after the great flood, Noah and his 
three sons - Ham, Shem and Japheth - left the ark and populated 
the earth. One day, Ham chanced upon his father lying drunk and 
naked, in his tent. Having informed Shem and Japheth of the 
patriarch's state, these two proceeded to cover Noah with a robe 
while averting their eyes from his nakedness. Upon awakening and 
learning what had happened, Noah cursed the descendants of one 
of Ham's son, Canaan: 
"A curse upon the Canaanites, " he swore. "May they be the 
lowest of slaves to the descendants of Shern and Japheth. " 
Then he said, "God bless Shem, and may Canaan be his 
slave. God bless Japheth, And let him share the prosperity of 
Shem, and let Canaan be his slave. " (Genesis, 9: 25-28) 
In accordance with patriarchal logic, Noah is punishing an offence 
committed against his virility by condemning Ham's descendance 
to slavery. This passage thus contributed to propagate the idea 
amongst early Christians of a 'hereditary inferiority' that would 
justify enslavement of certain peoples. Moreover, this idea was 
emphasised by Leviticus, where a different mode of enslavement is 
prescribed for those inside and outside the community of Israel. 
... you may purchase slaves from the foreign nations living 
around you, and you may purchase the children of the 
foreigners living among you, even though they have been 
born in your land. They will be permanent slaves for you to 
pass on to your children after you, but your brothers, the 
people of Israel, shall not be treated so. (Leviticus, 25: 44- 
46) 
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Having most slave systems since antiquity habitually targeted 
aliens, slavery was nevertheless not considered a hereditary 
condition: the descendants of slaves were thought to acquire 
'insider' traits, thereby securing an improvement in their status. 
The combination of the Noachid malediction with the instructions of 
Leviticus, however, perpetuated slavery down through the 
generations. Furthermore, this biblical combination appeared to 
validate a form of ethnic enslavement, despite not pointing directly 
either to skin colour or 'Africa'. 
The biblical genealogies indicate that the sons of Ham 
peopled the area we know as North Africa and the Horn, 
notably Egypt, Libya, the land of Cush - as Ethiopia was 
called by biblical writers - and parts of Arabia and Palestine. 
'Cush' means black in Hebrew; 'Ham' is close to the word for 
hot. Many of the Canaanites subsequently expelled from 
Israel settled in North Africa at Carthage. (Blackburn, 1999: 
67) 
Although it is unclear whether or not all Ham's progeny are 
affected by the Noachid curse, the allusion to Canaan is definitely 
representative of metonymy, referring to all Canaanites if not to all 
Ham's descendants. In any case, the thesis that many of Ham's 
sons are evil can be supported by biblical examples of their 
attempts to exploit or hinder the children of Israel. (1999: 67) 
Between the fourth and the eleventh centuries, a number of Judaic, 
Muslim and Christian scholars mainly from North Africa or the 
Middle East - where the incidence of African slavery was high -, 
were to propagate the idea that all Ham's sons shared in the 
Noachid malediction, and that black people were Ha m's 
descendants. Talmudic speculations dating from the sixth century 
AD ascribed the 'blackness' of some of Ham's progeny to a curse 
prior to the biblical Noachid malediction, although not associating 
skin colour directly to slavery. According to Sanhedrin 108B of the 
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Babylonian Talmud, Ham and his issue were 'smitten in the skin' 
due to having breached Noah's order of sexual abstinence on the 
Ark. Both the Jerusalem Talmud and the Genesis Rabbah are more 
explicit concerning the repercussions of Ham's actions: while the 
first states that Ham becomes 'charcoal coloured', the second 
claims that Ham's seed darkens upon leaving the Ark. However, 
although punishment for sins clearly occurs as a blackening of the 
skin, there is yet no explicit link between 'blackness' and slavery. 
(1999: 67-8) 
Despite the fact that the Noachid curse was not originally to be 
found in the Koran, this myth was subsequently adopted by various 
Muslim teachers and writers basing themselves on Talmudic and 
biblical sources. Due to the significant presence of black slaves in 
the Muslim world, it is no surprise that the Islamic version of 
Noah's malediction would come to emphasise, by the tenth century, 
a connection between Ham, blackness and enslavement. (1999: 
69,79) 
Because the Islamic faith restricted enslavement to infidels, 
conversion represented a form of evading the slave traffic to many 
African peoples. This strategy was to fail, however, for Arab 
raiders frequently took black Muslims as captives, regardless of 
religion. Thus, although in Muhammad's time unity of faith imposed 
itself over racial distinctions - enslavement being circumscribed to 
infidels -, as the slave trade between West Africa and the Arab 
world consolidated itself, blackness became a signifier of menial 
slavery regardless of the religion professed by the peoples in 
question. Thus, despite the pluralism inherent in the foundations of 
Islam, the African slave trade introduced a racial component in the 
Muslim practice of enslavement, inspiring itself upon the Noachid 
curse to validate the equivalence between blackness and servility, 
as well as the imposition of colour awareness over religious 
conformity. (1999: 69,80) 
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Although medieval Christians were familiar with the Noachid curse, 
whereby blackness was attributed to Ha m's lineage, they 
nevertheless tended to associate black Africans with positive and 
non-servile biblical images: 
The Bible describes Moses' wife, Zipporah, as a Cushite or 
black African; when Moses' sister Miriam objected to the 
union, Yahweh punished her: 'Behold Miriam became 
leprous, white as snow' (Numbers 12: 10). The Queen of 
Sheba, ruler of a kingdom friendly to Israel, was held to be 
black as well as beautiful. The Christian belief that one of 
the three wise kings, or Magi, paying homage to the infant 
Jesus was a black African was a symbol of universalism. 
(1999: 69) 
The fact that Christians were searching for allies against the 
Muslim threat, rather than validations of black enslavement, 
certainly influenced the positive universalist evaluations of blacks 
they chose to dwell on within the biblical tradition. (1999: 69) 
However, theology had often associated blackness with sin, and 
Origen, an early Christian father, adopted the Noachid curse but 
chose to mitigate it by contrasting the virtuous nature of many 
blacks with the sinful character - the 'inward blackness' - of many 
whites. (1999: 68) The correspondence between the colour black 
and sin still prevailed in medieval times, paradoxically operating 
alongside positive biblical images of blacks. 
At any rate, in political terms, Latin Europeans regarded blacks as 
valuable strategic assets against the Islamic threat, due to their 
potential to convert to Christianity. The policy of Portugal and the 
Papacy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was to be 
heavily influenced by this idea: the Noachid curse was thus 
relegated to the side, for the sake of both establishing amicable 
trade links as well as ensuring the conversion of the inhabitants of 
the African kingdoms. Curiously, Portugal's active role in fostering 
the Atlantic slave traffic relied on friendly relations with the African 
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nobility, which in turn led to a minimisation of racial issues. (1999: 
70,72) 
Portugal was especially aware of the importance of being on 
cordial terms with African rulers, because it was through slave- 
raiding expeditions by local suppliers that Portuguese merchants 
purchased captives. The people of West Africa were regarded as 
desirable slaves, not only because of their agricultural and 
metalworking skills, but also due to slavery being a deeply 
entrenched practice in this region for two reasons: first, because 
land was so plentiful, the social relations of West Africa were 
determined by securing labour to work the land rather than 
possessing land itself; second, the infrastructures of slave trade 
networks were already in place due to long established trans- 
Sahara routes between that region and the Arab world, allowing 
Europeans to rely on local slave-raiders for captives. Moreover, 
the high degree of political disintegration, internal warfare and 
lack of regional solidarity facilitated enslavement, increasing both 
the availability and vulnerability of captives to be purchased by 
Portuguese traders. (1999: 81-2,102) 
Throughout sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, the link 
between slavery and Noah's curse was to become profoundly 
consolidated, partly due to greater diffusion of the Bible. The 
Noachid myth was confirmed even by clerics who denounced the 
cruel treatment of black slaves. Thus, despite believing that all 
human beings had immortal souls, the Spanish Jesuit Alonso de 
Sandoval, whose life was dedicated to rendering service to the 
African captives arriving in Cartagena, advocated the theory, in his 
treatise entitled De instauranda Aethiopum salute (1647), that 
blacks had inherited Noah's curse because their lineage derived 
from Ham and Canaan. Similarly, the Portuguese Jesuit Ant6nio 
Vieira, whose sermons often took up the issue of the inhumane 
treatment of slaves in Brazil, considered that 'God's fire' had left 
the 'mark of slavery' on blacks, an allusion to the Noachid curse 
which was to single out the descendants of Ham and Canaan for a 
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special fate in 'imitation of Christ's patience', from martyrdom and 
oppression in this world to eternal salvation in the next. 
(Blackburn, 1999: 74,154-5,185,210) 
With the gradual demise of the power of Catholicism and the rise 
of Protestantism during the seventeenth century, the myth of the 
Noachid curse played an increasingly important role in justifying 
slavery to States which, due to the celebration of civil liberties, 
considered enslavement to be an abhorrent practice infringing 
upon individual freedom. Furthermore, the legend of the curse 
validated racialising practices in a context which firmly believed in 
a common origin of mankind deriving from Adam and Eve. '5 
The new slave regime on the plantations required intensive labour: 
the Noachid curse provided an ideal justification for a system that 
regarded slavery as an inherited condition, rather than the 
traditional views which focused on enslavement as an integral part 
of a civilising mission, thus affording a number of possibilities that 
facilitated manumission. The English author Samuel Purchas 
reflected the attitudes of his contemporaries in his rearticulation of 
the Noachid curse, allowing for a defence of enslavement as a 
hereditary practice that simultaneously permitted the conversion of 
heathens to Christianity: according to this version of the myth, 
combining both traditional and modern assumptions of slavery, 
'Ham was the first Author, after the Flood, of irreligion', giving rise 
to an issue of pagans characterised by their renouncement of 
Noah's knowledge of God. Another version of the legend, 
advocated by both Spanish and English writers, such as 
15 While the monogenic thesis could lend itself to the defence of 
civilising missions on the basis that humanity differed according to 
distinct stages of development and could be taught to reach a higher 
level, as demonstrated in the hispanic case, the rise of the Protestant 
plantation colonies appeared to anticipate polygenic theory, which 
regarded humanity as divided into a myriad of different racial species, 
each of which had been allocated a fixed place in a racialised hierarchy. 
(Young, 1996: 48) 
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Buenaventura de Salinas and William Strachey, extended the curse 
to the indigenous peoples of the Americas, considered to be 
descendants of Canaan alongside black Africans; this racialised 
view argued for the classification of the world's inhabitants within 
genealogical groups originating in the Bible. Nevertheless, 
allusions to the 'sons of Ham' were sometimes paradoxically 
employed to emphasise the humanity of African slaves - urging for 
an improvement in the treatment meted out to the latter - and to 
dispel ulta-racist ideas, that were to become widespread in the 
plantation colonies, reducing black slaves to beasts of burden. 
(1999: 73-5) 
The specificity of the legend of the Noachid curse lies in its direct 
linkage between skin colour and an inherited slave status, 
regardless of being born Christian. In an epoch characterised by 
the 'free air doctrine', not only did the Noachid legend justify the 
employment of human beings, who were regarded neither as 
cannibals nor savages, as slaves, but it also served the purpose of 
determining, in plantation societies, the black population's 
relationship with the free. 16 (1999: 75) While the plantation system 
initially thrived upon a mixed labour force comprising both blacks 
as well as free and unfree whites or non-African peoples, the 
ensuring labour shortage arising from a voracious demand for 
plantation products led to the purchase of increasing numbers of 
black slaves. The Noachid myth was particularly useful in justifying 
the reasons for an almost entirely black work force on the 
plantations. Despite the anti-slavery aspirations of early modern 
Europe, the context of the Americas was to batten on religious 
discourse specially selected to further the interests of a civil 
society standing to gain economically from an institutionalised 
racial hierarchy which allowed for bondage of the descendants of 
Africans even when born Christian. (1999: 76) 
16 In the context of thirteenth century medieval Europe, freedom was 
thought to be man's natural condition; any form of enslavement 
depriving man from breathing 'free air' represented a degeneration of 
the human condition. (Blackburn, 1999: 60) 
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X. The rise of modern capitalism 
Although the Iberian colonies were supplying the gold, silver and 
precious metals necessary to Europe's economic expansion, 
neither Spain nor Portugal were benefiting from capitalist 
mercantilism. (1997: 29) This was due to the existence of a 
feudalistic type socie ty, living in a 'belated and contra-historical 
Middle Age', where the nobility's wealth cont rasted with the 
Crown's bankruptcy. During the sixteenth century, public 
expenditure increased dramatically, causing trade deficits and high 
inflation, due not only to the consumer needs of the Empire, but 
also to the war that was being waged against Protestantism in 
Europe. 
Galloping unemployment, inflation, sterile latifundia, undeveloped 
industry, seignorial jurisdiction of the aristocracy outside the 
Crown's control, costly manoeuvres of the Inquisition, and lost 
wars against 'centres of heresy' eventually led to the ruin of the 
Hapsburg regime in 1700. Invaded by products from other 
European countries with growing economies, Spain was prevented 
from developing local industry. This process culminated in the mid- 
sixteenth century, with authorisation of textile imports and a ban 
on Spanish fabric exports except to the Americas. (1997: 26-7) The 
relentless Iberian drive to defend Catholicism and the power of the 
Papacy consisted in a struggle to preserve a medieval world order 
amidst changing circumstances; through the continuation of their 
'crusading' activities during the Counter-Reformation, archaic 
social forces sought to protect themselves against incipient 
modern economies. 
Spanish officials started to complain 
corresponded to the Indians of Europe, 
provided Spain with foodstuffs and 
economically benefiting from the difficult 
carried out by the Castilians. (Blackburn, 1ý 
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only were other European rivals profiting indirectly from the Iberian 
powers' toil in the Americas, but they were actually directly 
involved, through the enterprise of adventurers and privateers, in 
claiming territory in the New World, regardless of the terms 
inherent in the Treaty of Tordes illas, signed under papal auspices 
between Spain and Portugal in 1494.17 While the French 
emphasised their role as allies of the natives, seeking to found 
colonies on the basis of consent, the Dutch affirmed the natural 
right of all men to navigate with the objective of establishing trade 
relations. The English, in turn, believed that they had a God given 
right to the land they occupied, due to their making better use of it 
than either the natives or other colonial powers. (1999: 9) 
Latin American gold and silver stimulated a European flow of 
capital that took off with the increment of the bourgeoisie. 
Products of the colonial economy, such as precious metals and 
sugar, catered to the necessities of the European market; the 
latter thus determined the economic structure of the Iberian 
colonies in the process of accumulating resources from the 
Americas. According to Galeano, this movement, based on plunder, 
illustrates the Marxian notion of primitive capital accumulation, a 
phase which marked a new epoch in world economic development 
subsequent to the Middle Ages. 
Marx wrote in Chapter 3 of the first volume of Capital: "The 
discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, 
enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal 
population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the 
East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the 
commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn 
of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings 
17 On the basis of a line of demarcation extending from 'pole to pole' 370 
leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, the Treaty of Tordesillas 
allocated spheres of colonisation in the world beyond Europe to Spain 
and Portugal. (Blackburn, 1999: 8,63; Muldoon, 1994; 130) 
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are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. " (Galeano, 
1997: 28) 
While the primitive accumulation process of capital from the 
Americas laid the foundations for industrial progress in Europe, the 
bulk of capital that stayed in the New World financed the 
construction of monumental churches and palaces, the purchase of 
luxury items or any show of display and abundance associated with 
the baroque. (Blackburn, 1999: 21; Galeano, 1997: 31) 
... While the baroque as spectacle retained a link to the 
world of colonial slavery, it exhibited a public 
entrepreneurship, the positive face of mercantilism, which 
contrasted with the private enterprise that was the driving 
force behind the New World's civil slavery. (1999: 21) 
Thus, while Spanish imperial ideology relied heavily on state 
initiative and control, the English approach emphasised the role of 
private enterprise in the hands of individual colonists. This 
difference was to be crucial in the development of modern 
plantation slavery in the seventeenth century, distinguished by its 
thoroughly commercial and racialised character. (1999: 10) 
XI. Plantation Slavery 
Plantations originated due to the economic imperative of satisfying 
an insatiable European appetite for products from the New World. 
Although sugar plantations had existed, prior to the seventeenth 
century, in the Levant, the Atlantic islands, the Canaries, S. Tom6 
e Prfncipe, and Brazil, all of which depended on both indentured 
and slave labour, the plantation regime that the French and 
English developed in the Caribbean and North America, under 
Dutch guidance, was to be distinguished by several novel 
components. No longer solely referring to sugar cultivation, the 
word plantation, by 1700, embraced estates producing any tropical 
cash crop with tied labour. Whereas the Brazilian engenhos had 
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separated the diverse facets of sugar production - cane cultivation, 
processing and transportation the Caribbean plantations 
consisted in an integrated unit. Moreover, while the Brazilian 
estate had a mixed labour force comprising Portuguese indentured 
servants, Indian day labourers and black slaves, being the latter in 
minority, the Caribbean plantations were almost entirely dependent 
on African slaves by the late seventeenth century. (Blackburn, 
1999: 309,332) 
The Caribbean had already set the stage for plantation agriculture 
in the early days of Spanish conquest of the New World. Although 
by the mid-fifteenth century there were many ingenios throughout 
the Spanish Americas, their success was hindered by the threat of 
Indian rebellions and pirate raids on one hand, and the high 
charges of slaves, sugar-making equipment, and Spanish fleets on 
the other. Aware of the risks inherent in running an ingenio, the 
Spanish authorities sought to offer loans and tax exemptions to 
stimulate enterprise. However, the expensive sugar plantations 
were to be replaced, in the 1570's, by the much more lucrative 
silver trade. 
The takeoff of the Brazilian sugar plantations, which occurred 
around the time the Spanish American ingenios were in decline, 
encouraged a gradual substitution of Indian slaves for African 
captives. When King Sebasti5o I restricted the enslavement of 
Indians, in 1570, to those engaging either in rebellion or 
cannibalism, the Jesuits, who owned mills to maintain their 
educational and proselytising activities, supported this official 
approach by purchasing African instead of native slaves. As early 
as 1516, the Dominican Las Casas had defended the enslavement 
of Africans in place of the Indians, in the Spanish Americas, a 
position which he would later regret having taken. (1999: 135-36) 
The crux of the matter lay in the necessity of the senhores de 
engenho to have a stable labour force, working during a nine- 
month harvest cycle and performing other tasks the rest of the 
time: African slaves proved much more suitable to the 
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requirements of the engenho, both in terms of endurance and 
knowledge of agricultural skills than Indian captives. (1999: 167- 
68) 
The Spanish and Portuguese legal precept of formally limiting 
enslavement to Africans had thus created a precedent which the 
Dutch, English and French would radicalise. Although French and 
English planting originally operated along the lines of small 
estates with a mixed labour force, economic imperatives linked to a 
voracious European demand for agricultural products from the New 
World led planters and merchants to opt for large-scale production 
through the mobilisation of black slaves. A system based on racial 
exploitation was thus determined by the growing competitiveness 
of a market economy whereby planters sought to maximise profit 
by increasing both the intensity and the capacity of their 
plantations, so as to cater, in the swiftest way possible, to the 
requirements of a new culture of consumption. (1999: 351,353) 
Planters' realisation of the economic benefits inherent in tied 
labour preceded the logic of racial enslavement and the formation 
of identities deriving from the latter that were to distinguish 
modern plantation slavery. (1999: 314) 
Highly dependent on economic and social factors, the availability 
of indentured servants or engagds declined precisely around the 
time of French and English plantation growth. Civic liberties were 
held to be an inalienable right of national citizens both in France 
and England throughout the seventeenth century: forced labour 
was regarded not only as a violation of the freedom of 'every true 
Christian and loyal subject', but also as a form of depriving 
national landholders of necessary labour. Recruitment for 
indentured service would thus have to be voluntary, eventually 
leading to the workers' fortune and liberty. Due to the shortage of 
candidates, penal servitude was thought a likely source of labour; 
however, planters were cautious about employing servants from 
the criminal stratum, and authorities were reluctant to allow a 
concentration of political and religious opponents in the 
122 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
plantations, due to their possible alliance with rival powers. (1999: 
316-18) 
While from the 1660's onwards the Caribbean suffered a decrease 
in voluntary indentures, the English North American colonies 
maintained a steady level of servant recruitment until the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. Because the plantations in the 
latter region consisted mainly in tobacco, they were particularly 
suited to indentured contracts due to the time horizon for 
cultivation being much shorter than in the sugar estates. While 
there was a mixed labour force on plantations, a certain amount of 
solidarity existed between both indentured white servants and 
slaves. Nevertheless, the conditions they were subject to differed 
greatly, for while the servant could appeal to rights and nurtured a 
prospect of liberty, turning to free whites within the larger 
community for added support, black slaves were regarded as little 
more than beasts of burden. 
In the Caribbean, as the purchase of black slaves gradually 
replaced indentured labour, the link between skin colour and status 
became increasingly sedimented: both black and white became 
signifiers of slavery and freedom respectively. The most acute 
polarisation between free whites and black slaves was to occur in 
the English colonies, where almost every route to manumission 
was hampered. The situation in the North American colonies was 
slightly different, for here many colonists regarded the territory as 
destined to be occupied by themselves. Thus, while racial 
animosity was exploited by some wealthy colonists who wished to 
defend slavery, it also motivated large sectors of the populations 
to oppose slaveholding so as to prevent the entry of blacks into 
the colonies. Mobilisation of racial antipathy led to a strengthening 
of white solidarity, between large and small landholders, which 
enabled the slaveowner to guarantee the possession of his estate. 
White privilege was thus defined against a growing fear of black 
people, leading whites to judge themselves, through the eyes of 
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blacks, as belonging to a racial 6lite. The discriminatory practices 
hitherto exercised against outsiders of the moral or social 
community in Europe were thus transferred to the black labourers 
in the plantation colonies, while the racial category of whiteness 
subsumed differences amongst European settlers by providing the 
latter with a reinforced social identity. (1999: 314,324) 
The new slave system, founded upon a racial ideology which 
responded well to the imperatives of catering to consumer needs in 
the swiftest way possible, owed its high degree of economic 
success partly to the non-interference of the metropolitan states in 
the activities of the planters and merchants. (1999: 310) Whereas 
the Spanish Empire based itself on centralised state initiative, 
whereby the metropolis sought to enrich royal coffers by 
coordinating production through mining and encomienda 
concessions, thus curtailing the colonists' power by replacing 
outright enslavement for tribute exactions, the English and French 
metropolitan states, neither of which had encouraged plantation 
development, allowed the planters and merchants to proceed in 
autonomous fashion as long as taxes could be imposed on estate 
produce. The customs and excise levied on cash crops thus 
permitted England and France to dispense with the Spanish 
necessity to collect revenue in the colony. 
Plantation slavery was the result of novel capitalist relations 
inherent in an incipient consumer culture that was thriving in the 
metropolis; slavery in the Spanish case had, on the contrary, been 
regulated by an absolutist imperial state with the purpose of 
achieving an economic surplus, in what was an extensive, rather 
than intensive, non-capitalist regime of oppression. (1999: 310-11) 
Although the baroque empires of Spain and Portugal, with their 
characteristic complexity, produced an ethno-social hierarchy, they 
nevertheless sought to 'tame the wilful slaveowner rather than 
yield him all the power he craved'. (1999: 21) The fact that the 
condition of slavery had itself been problematised by Spanish 
theologians, philosophers and lawyers meant than, even if only for 
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political and economic reasons, there was a certain awareness of 
the ethical issues involved. The religious and cultural heritage of 
the Protestant and Anglo-Saxon plantation colonies was less 
permeable to cultural syncretism than that of their Iberian 
counterparts. (1999: 21,237) 
The fact that the Portuguese and the Dutch were directly involved 
in the slave trade confirmed the acceptability, to the English, of 
taking part in the latter; however, the intellectual discussions that 
revolved around the foundation of Iberian slave laws were 
disregarded in favour of the objective existence of the Iberian 
practice of slavery. (1999: 236) Although the legend of the Noachid 
curse provided justification for the inheritable enslavement of 
blacks, irrespective of religion or behaviour, the new system of 
plantation slavery, being secular and utilitarian, had to find 
expression in juridical codification rather than biblical injunction. 
(1999: 312,324) The English tradition of common law thus began 
to adapt itself to the plantation system, by recognising slaves and 
their progeny as private property, in much the same manner as 
cattle or other domesticated animals. 
Essentially regarded as beasts of burden, black slaves were often 
given names habitually reserved for animals, and were frequently 
listed in inventories side by side with animals. When the English 
cleric Morgan Godwyn encouraged slave conversion, the planters 
replied that blacks 'were beasts and had no more souls than 
beasts'. (1999: 325) Indian baptisms were also not urged, for the 
indigenous peoples' way of life was deemed to be inextricably 
heathen. (1999: 237) 
The Puritans, who constituted an important force in the English 
colonial enterprise, sanctioned servitude on the basis of biblical 
teachings: the gospel's injunction to 'bring forth the fruits of the 
earth' corresponded to the economic impetus behind plantation 
labour, and the hard-working planter regarded himself as an 
instrument of divine will. (1999: 237,312) In a Lockeian view, 
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possessive individualism and the necessity to make oneself useful 
to England, ultimately to one's own advantage, justified the 
existence of plantation slavery. Because the planter brought 
previously empty land into agricultural use, he substantiated the 
English right to occupy this territory. Locke claimed that the man 
guided by reason had the right to use any living creature as a 
means to guarantee satisfaction. While rational man should 
repudiate subjection to royal power, he nevertheless could own 
slaves, as long as the latter had developed neither reason nor 
industry. 
Thomas More's Utopia (1516) laid the utilitarian foundations of the 
English colonial project, by defending that those who cultivated the 
soil were to have precedence over the actual inhabitants of that 
territory: slavery would thus be a perfectly valid means to obtain 
an optimisation of land resources. (1999: 58-9) Contrary to Locke, 
however, Thomas More had defended a different type of 
enslavement from that which was to develop in the plantation 
colonies, for he regarded slavery to be useful as a correctional 
instrument commanded by the state rather than the subject. 
In the French case, an attempt was made to draw up slave laws 
which reconciled both religion and the institution of slavery in the 
plantation colonies: the result was the Code Noir, issued by Louis 
XIV in 1685, urging for both the baptism of slaves and the 
expulsion of Jews from the French empire. Although in practice 
slaves were regarded as pertaining to a realm beyond the law, 
within the sovereignty of the slaveholder, French absolutism 
nevertheless aimed to regulate and guide the institution at home. 
This situation reflected the existing dichotomy between a baroque, 
feudalistic, absolutist French state in Europe and the decentred 
nature of metropolitan power in the colonies, where civil society 
remained relatively autonomous and unwilling to accept state 
interference. (1999: 291,300-01) 
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X11. Conclusion 
Natural rights theory, which influenced intellectual thought from 
the late middle ages to the end of the seventeenth century, played 
an important role in validating slavery to Europeans in an epoch 
characterised by the flourishing of civil liberties. The 'free air 
doctrine', holding servitude to be opposed to man's natural 
condition - freedom -, thus ran counter to rights theory, which 
inspired itself on Thomas Aquinas's critique of Franciscan 
apostolic poverty. According to Aquinas, 'possessions and slavery 
were not the product of nature, but were made by human reason 
for the advantage of human life'; the Franciscan vow of poverty - 
that is, their evasion of property possession - thus contradicted the 
empirical fact of their own personal consumption. (Blackburn, 
1999: 60,61,63) Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of 
Paris, was to elaborate on Aquinas by arguing that a person had 
the right to give up his natural liberty and, in particular contexts, 
might be presumed to have acted accordingly. Because liberty was 
regarded as a property, it could be exchanged like any other 
possession. 
Gersonian theory was to become highly influential in the course of 
the sixteenth century, with direct repercussions in justifying the 
Atlantic slave trade. European conscience was alleviated on the 
basis of rights theory, for slavery appeared to be permissible once 
Africans were found to be engaging in the practice themselves: 
because blacks purchased by Europeans on the African coast had 
already been traded as slaves, the commercial and judicial logic of 
African processes could lend itself to supporting a rights theory 
advocating a deprivation of dominium based on the consent of the 
individual from whom the right to property and self-government 
were being withheld. Luis cle Molina, Fransico Sudrez, Hugo 
Grotius, John Selden and Thomas Hobbes would all adhere to 
Gersonian theory in their endorsement of the institution of slavery 
on the grounds of the individual's right to forgo liberty rather than 
on racial or cultural stigmatisation. 
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In his De Justicia et lure (1592), the Jesuit theologian Luis de 
Molina would introduce Gersonian theory into Spanish debates on 
the rights of infidels to dominium, by opposing Vitoria's stance on 
deprivation of dominium as solely justifiable on the basis of infidel 
hostility to the peaceful entry of missionaries who sought to 
implement the terms of a papal licence conferring on them 
responsibility for the conversion of native inhabitants. Adopting an 
anti-humanist approach, Molina argued that there was no reason to 
believe that black slavery was not voluntary: 
'Man is dominus not only of his external goods, but also of 
his own honour and fame; he is also dominus of his own 
liberty, and in the context of the natural law can alienate it 
and enslave himself ... It follows ... that if a man who is not 
subject to that law sells himself unconditionally in some 
place where the relevant laws allow him, then that sale is 
valid. ' (Molina in Blackburn, 1999: 179) 
Although Molina opposed the inhumanity of the slave trade, his 
primary emphasis on free will lent itself to the defence of 
mercantile capitalism: as a free and autonomous being, man was 
responsible for his own decisions concerning material and spiritual 
welfare. Nevertheless, because human beings owed their lives to 
their parents and their faculties to society, they could be enslaved 
as a form of chastising an entire community, even if individually 
innocent. Thus, despite being dominus of his own liberty, man 
often alienates the latter in favour of his community. The Molinian 
doctrine of free will would later complement the ideological 
justification of plantation slavery: by arguing that beings lacking 
reason could suffer no injury, Molina invited future recourse to the 
notion of slaves as chattel, existing, like animals or any form of 
living property, merely for the masters' convenience. (1999: 179, 
180) 
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Rights theory was introduced in Protestant Europe by Hugo 
Grotius's De lure Belli et Pacis (1625), in which slavery was 
defended on the basis of two premises: first, in accordance with a 
Hobbesian approach, sovereigns and heads of family must hold 
absolute power so as to ensure peaceful relations in their 
community; second, the inalienable right of liberty presupposed 
that man might willingly subject himself to slavery. (1999: 193-4) 
Urging for the establishment of free commerce in a mare liberum, a 
sea open to all, Grotius's work lay the foundations of a new world 
order no longer based on the mare clausum of the Iberian colonial 
monopolies. (1999: 187,191) Writing in favour of a commercial 
society, characterised by free travel and trade, Grotius reveals 
the links between rights theory and the birth of modern capitalist 
relations (Muldoon, 1994: 174): the notion that the individual has 
the right to voluntarily deprive himself of dominium - the emphasis 
on individual consent in detriment to the ethical repercussions of 
the act itself, or the idea of individual free will as subsuming the 
possibility of its very negation - would thus influence the new 
culture of consumerism that fostered the plantation system during 
the seventeenth century. 
In this new world order, cooperation between states for clearly 
established economic ends replaced the Innocentian view of 
humanity as a metaphysical unity, over whom the Pope had 
spiritual responsibility. (1994: 164) Although the latter idea 
catered to the economic interests of Christian powers, it 
nevertheless had the merit of problematising the relationship 
between politics and morality, associated with Machiavelli's (1469- 
1527) Prince. While the anti-Machiavellian theme adopted by Juan 
de Sol6rzano Pereira urged for the establishment of a 'Christian 
reason of state', that is, the centralisation of a powerful state on 
the basis of Christian principles, the Machiavellians would have 
argued for a divorce between morality and politics, for the latter 
was deemed to rely on the breaching of principles. (1994: 166) 
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In the case of the development of slavery in the New World, the 
Machiavellian debate concerning the connection between morality 
and politics could manifest itself in the dichotomy between 
metropolitan centralisation on one hand, and the complete 
autonomy of civil society on the other: whereas the strong 
regulation by the Spanish state helped curb the outright predatory 
behaviour of the colonists on the indigenous population - namely 
through the legal codification of slave rights -, the high degree of 
metropolitan decentralisation and planter autonomy in the 
Caribbean and North America paved the way for a thoroughly 
racialised system of chattel slavery. If, in Weberian terms, the 
selection of a particular route to historical development, amongst a 
number of alternative paths, is determined by ideas, or, according 
to Gramsci, ideas can become a material force, then racial 
ideology can be regarded, in the context of a nascent capitalist 
market, as having influenced both the formation of plantation 
slavery as well as the social classifications deriving from the 
latter. (Blackburn, 1999: 357) 
The invention of racial slavery in the New World reveals the extent 
to which modernity is complicit with violence, both ontologic and 
epistemic. The question that arises then concerns the viability of 
salvaging a project which, despite containing a voice of counter- 
domination, is nevertheless branded by a totalising impulse. This 
issue, however, betrays the idea of modernity as a linear, 
progressive, homogeneous narrative. Modern discourse can 
instead be viewed as a stage of apprenticeship in an ethics of 
responsibility, as a site of diremption in which contesting outlooks, 
traditional on one hand and modern on the other, attempt to 
negotiate confrontation with alterity. The 'telling of the suppressed 
tales' of this period may open a disjunctive space which, in the 
process of alerting us to the continuity between past and present, 
allows for the figuration of a future grounded on a 'becoming- 
ethical' rather than on a rejection of the modern. (Venn, 2000: 51 , 
110 -11 , 115,235) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ON WHITE MYTHOLOGIES: THE ANTI-HUMANIST ARGUMENT 
1. Introduction 
Robert Young's White Mythologies argues for the rewriting of 
History from a post-structuralist perspective, where a non- 
coherent, ambivalent and polyvocal theory would challenge the 
prevalent Western model of historicist narrative. The latter is, 
according to Young, characterised by a rational and linear unity, 
with no room for dissonance. The urge to totalisation of Western 
historicism mirrors, on an intellectual level, the will to power of the 
West over its 'other' on a practical level. History as divulged by 
the dominant Western paradigm is reduced to one more attempt at 
appropriation of difference by a European colonial legacy that 
leaves nothing outside its vast 'economy of inclusion': 
The appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge within 
a totalising system can thus be set alongside the history (if 
not the project) of European imperialism, and the constitution 
of the other as 'other' alongside racism and sexism. The 
reaction against this structure has produced forms of politics 
that do not fit into traditional political categories. (Young, 
1995: 4) 
Young traces Western totalisation back to Hegelian dialectics, 
which allegedly only permits knowledge of alterity through its 
subsumption within the same. East/West, black/white are 
diametrically opposed, for the West has revealed itself only able to 
think alterity in terms of a totalising discourse which seeks to 
articulate knowledge of the antagonistic and subordinate element 
within the dichotomy, so as to be able to master it. The magnitude 
of European thought, stemming from the Enlightenment, 
contaminated by Hegelian dialectics, ranges from liberal Humanism 
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to Marxism. The humanist outlook is, in Young's view, the major 
culprit in the violence of the European colonial legacy, for it 
'necessarily produces the non-human in setting up its problematic 
boundaries'. (1995: 125) Marxism, as a humanism, attempts to 
subsume all struggles under a working class category that, to 
Young, no longer makes sense: 
The straightforward oppositional structure of capital and 
class does not necessarily work any more: if we think in 
terms of Hegel's master/slave dialectic, then rather than the 
working class being the obvious universal subject-victim, 
many others are also oppressed: particularly women, black 
people, and all other so-called ethnic and minority groups. 
Any single individual may belong to several of these, but the 
forms of oppression, as of resistance or change, may not 
only overlap but may also differ or even conflict. (1995: 5) 
Contemporary politics, says Young, operate on the micro level, 
with a hoard of minority groups battling for rights that sometimes 
conflict with each other. The task, therefore, is to think difference 
without absorption into the same. Only Post-Structuralism, argues 
Young, permits the latter, by producing a knowledge that respects 
difference through the singular or contingent event as opposed to 
universality. 
History is the realm of violence and war; it constitutes 
another form by which the other is appropriated into the 
same. For the other to remain other it must not derive its 
meaning from History but must instead have a separate time 
which differs from historical time. (1995: 15) 
Young proceeds to analyse various authors' attempts to consider 
History from the perspective of alterity, giving emphasis to the 
paradoxical conclusion that despite the immense difficulty inherent 
in escaping the grasp of totalisation, there are always fissures that 
resist closure. The resulting questions, stemming from this 
132 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
argument, are twofold. Firstly, how can we think any form of 
alterity without subsumption under a universalising difference that 
risks eliminating that very 'otherness'? Secondly, how can we think 
alterity without the risk of fragmentation inherent in conflicting 
discourses of difference? 
In the first half of this chapter, the overarching arguments of White 
Mythologies will be presented as an instance of a strong anti- 
humanist position. By looking at a number of issues that White 
Mythologies sidelines too quickly it will then be claimed that 
Young's militant anti-humanism does not adequately allow for 
complexity due to an incessant search for theoretical purity. 
Young's stance will be critiqued by exploring both Gayatri Spivak 
and Homi Bhabha's attempt to engage with the notion of 'aporia' 
within a deconstructive framework. 
i) Searching for a Way Out of Marxist Historicism 
Sartre's Humanist Existentialism and Althusser's decentred modes 
of production provide two of the most important responses to the 
search for a way out of classical Marxist Historicism. According to 
Young, the Sartrean objective consisted in the totalisation of 
History without a Lukcicsian totaliser, dispensing the dialectic as 
the basis for a structure of closure. Sartre points to individual 
agency, whereby man can change the course of events through his 
own free will, as a form of totalising without a totaliser. Due to 
man being the centre of History, the law of the dialectic of History 
ceases to be that of a metaphysical transcendence, operating from 
the individual level. The truth of humanity would thus arise from 
the subsumption of "the plurality of the meanings of individual 
histories" (1995: 32) into one History. Young paraphrases Sartre's 
pre-emption of his critics: 
If History is a history of conflict, how could it be both one 
and internally diversified without the inner moving principle 
of the dialectic? How can History be a unity if it is also 
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conflictual, if each action is aimed at destroying the other 
and results in a double negation in which the original aims of 
each action have been destroyed by the other? If each action 
negates the aim of the other, where is the 'unity' totalised in 
the conflict? How does History constantly totalise itself? 
(1995: 33) 
According to Sartre, although the products of conflict may differ 
from the original motivation of the participants, they nevertheless 
form the ground for future History. This is what is meant by the 
willingness to demonstrate that 'the negation of a negation can be 
an affirmation'. (1995: 34) Guarding himself against the possibility 
that the negation of a negation could produce a detotalisation, 
whereby human History would disintegrate into a multitude of 
specific histories, Sartre invents the singular universal, whereby 
the isolated event, the part, incarnates the whole. The Sartrean 
singular universal is reminiscent of the Hegelian essential section, 
that is, "a break in the present such that all the elements of the 
whole revealed by this section are in an immediate relationship 
with one another, a relationship that immediately expresses their 
internal essence" (1995: 55) in a continuous and homogeneous 
spatio-temporality. 
On the contrary, an Althusserian cross-section in the present 
would reveal a "heterogeneous array of presences and absences", 
where different histories have their own specific temporalities, 
being each history articulated with other histories "according to the 
overall but decentred totality of the particular mode of production". 
(1995: 56) In Althusser, the unity of the whole is a product of 
overdete rm i nation, with the coexistence of a number of separate 
and relatively autonomous levels connected to each other by the 
economic structure, the latter which never operates alone. 
Whereas the Sartrean notion of totalisation is infinitely open to 
other totalisations, such that History effects the continuous 
totalisation of totalisations without a prospective closure, 
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Althusser's totalisation is "decentred and displaced in time" (1995: 
58) due to the coexistence of different instances that do not have 
the same historical temporality. According to Young, both Sartre 
and Althusser thus fail to prove the existence of totalisation, the 
first due to a totalisation always in process, the second because of 
a non-totalisable structure. 
Young questions how any History can simultaneously think 
partiality, discontinuity and teleology at the same time. This 
problematic pervades his analysis of both Western Historicism and 
the attempts to write back at the latter. Young accepts Hindess 
and Hirst's defence of teleology as inherent in any philosophy of 
History. However, whereas the latter contend that essentialism and 
teleology work together in making the past a coherent object within 
a historical continuum that is governed by the realisation of the 
Idea, Young would argue that History cannot be both essentialist 
and teleological, as revealed by Hegel, Marx and Sartre. For 
essentialism presupposes the existence of a Hegelian essential 
section, whereby the part incarnates the whole and the whole is 
present in each part. But if totalisation is an impossible aim, 
teleology becomes the only indispensable element in a philosophy 
of History. 
Young counters Hindess and Hirst's claim that the Althusserian 
decentred totality is "still expressive and therefore essentialist", by 
affirming that "each element cannot express the whole because the 
whole is only accessible as a concept, which is precisely not 
expressed at all". (1995: 61) According to Young, Althusser 
revolutionised the concept of History, through the problematisation 
of temporality. By converting History into a radically different mode 
of time, where differential histories intersect with each other 
against the background of a particular mode of production, 
Althusser advocated a concept of temporality that is construed by 
the analyst, rather than given a priori. 
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The Foucauldian notion of genealogy presumably recuperates the 
Althusserian concept of temporality, whereby the analyst employs 
an x-ray technique to artificially isolate elements of the past as 
objective preconditions defined in terms of any full-blown system 
in the present: 
Foucault's genealogy means that by asking a question, 
posing a problem, you set up a generality against which you 
constitute events and arrange them in a series. The 
construction of that generality does not pretend to be the 
only possible one - the same event could operate in all sorts 
of different ways in different series, temporalities, which 
would mean that, strictly speaking, it was no longer the same 
event, for it would have been dispersed in their different 
rarefactions. (1995: 81) 
Young here broaches a theme that underlies his critique of 
Western historicism: the event, as excessive, as superseding, as 
incommensurable, to the concept, will never be able to be 
captured, tamed, understood in its entirety by the latter. Foucault's 
genealogy, as a self-conscious method of historical reconstruction, 
appeals particularly to Young due to its respect for the singularity 
of the event. 
... the event as event is only constituted through its 
repetition in thought as a 'phantasm': 'it makes the event 
indefinite so that it repeats itself as a singular universal'. 
(1995: 82) 
Due to the lack of absolute coincidence between the real event and 
its future conceptions, any effort to reconstitute the original will 
only be a "bad copy": 
... 
because the bad copy by definition cannot claim to be 
copying anything but itself, it creates its 'original' 
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retroactively, so that the copy precedes the original in a 
ghostly originary repetition. (1995: 82) 
The original as a primordial event ceases thus to exist, when 
subjected to any mechanism of representation: 
This is not supposed to suggest that events cannot be said 
to occur straightforwardly in the real but rather that when set 
up in any series, narrative, or history they are constructed as 
such events retrospectively by the historian. (1995: 81) 
What are the implications of the disruption of the "adequation 
between copy and model, appearance and essence, event and 
Idea"? (1995: 82) Idea and Truth are no longer compatible, due to 
the pulverisation of a plurality of truths constituted, in retrospect, 
by the analyst. History thus becomes an impossibility, with a 
constant tension between the ideological notion of History and the 
differential relations of the mode of production. The subject 
experiences History as a "purposive continuum" at the ideological 
level of historicist interpellation in what is a closed totality. The 
differential relations of the various histories that compose the 
decentred totality, on the other hand, are set against a background 
of negative totalisation, where "each history's history is defined 
not through its identity with, or difference from, a general history 
but by being differentiated from every other history, on which it is 
necessarily also therefore dependent... ". (1995: 62) The gap 
between a hermetic totality and absolute differentiation of a 
plurality of histories can only be bridged, according to Althusser, 
by art, which Young interprets as "the telling of a story", enacted 
in the mediating relation between the two poles, "the process of 
writing itself". (1995: 62) 
Accessible only as a text, History becomes a hermeneutic problem 
of meaning and interpretation. The Derridean critique of 
logocentrism explores History as a metaphysical concept, whereby 
the representation of absence takes the form of "presence and 
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meaning determined as truth". (1995: 64) The 'truth' inherent in 
teleological History would correspond to an eternal transcendental 
signified. Although Derrida aims to deconstruct the authority of the 
latter, he nonetheless comes up with another form of 
transcendence, that of the process of writing, or diff6rance. The 
concept of diff6rance is simultaneously constituted by that of 
difference (non-identity) and deferral: whilst the possibility of 
History hinges on the existence of difference, History is 
simultaneously prevented from ever being concluded, or totalised, 
by the delay inherent in difference. 
It is only through difference, by which the same becomes 
other and produces a tissue of difference, that history could 
ever take place: for if full presence were possible, then there 
would be no difference, and therefore no time, space - or 
history. Diffdrance means precisely that you can never get 
out of - and therefore have no need to get back to - history. 
(1995: 66) 
History, in Derridean terms, becomes equivalent to transcendence 
over the totality, operating within a structure of supplementarity 
whereby the absence at the origin is supplemented by an 
overabundance, an excess, of the signifier. 
Insofar as it sets up such a process of necessary and 
constant supplementation, we could say that the impossibility 
of totalisation produces a writing-effect whose process of 
perpetual deferral unremittingly provokes more writing. 
(1995: 66) 
Rather than focusing on the threat of totalisation inherent in 
historicism, Derrida's deconstructive approach analyses the 
process by which historical texts tend to erase their own conditions 
of historicity, thereby producing closure. Any text, according to 
this view, has openings that must be covered for ideological 
reasons. It is the very existence of these textual interstices that 
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reveal History as totalisation to be an impossible target, whilst 
simultaneously inspiring the writing of differentiated histories of 
the 'departures from totality': 
History cannot be done away with any more than 
metaphysics: but its conditions of impossibility are also 
necessarily its conditions of possibility. (1995: 66) 
ii) The Return to Historicism 
Young characterises Fredric Jameson's attempt to rehabilitate the 
Marxian dialectical tradition as "omnivorous", due to the latter's 
urge to subsume antithetical theories under the all-embracing 
gesture of a single History or narrative. The basic argument of The 
Political Unconscious is that the decentring of the subject and the 
transcending of the ethical toward the political and the collective 
can only be achieved by way of the dialectic: 
Dialectical thinking can be characterised as historical 
reflexivity ... as the study of an object (here the romance 
texts) which also involves the study of the concepts and 
categories (themselves historical) that we necessarily bring 
to the object. (Jameson, 1996: 109) 
Only the dialectic would be capable of undermining the binary 
opposition that lies at the heart of Western thought, according to 
which positive and negative terms are equated with a distinction 
between good and evil. According to Young, the dialectic thus 
usurps the goal of post-structuralism, attempting simultaneously to 
go beyond it by presenting a theory of History that is lacking in 
post-structural analysis: 
His problem is that, while on the one hand he acknowledges 
the force of the recent arguments that question the status of 
history, he nevertheless attempts to retain the traditional 
truth-claims of historical materialism. (Young, 1995: 94) 
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Young accuses Jameson of proceeding to "con f late the 
unconflatable", namely the Marxist traditions of Althusser and 
Sartre. How can a decentred totality with differentiated histories 
connected by a common mode of production be brought together 
with a Sartrean totalisation, where a plurality of heterogeneous 
individual histories are enmeshed into a single narrative? The 
answer lies in the Jamesonian use of the dialectic, whereby 
radically opposite poles can be retotalised into a transcendental 
global History. 
Young considers Jameson to be a true Hegelian, for "assimilation 
rather than differentiation has always been his intellectual mode". 
(1995: 92) Thus, while Jameson subscribes to Althusser's History 
as an absent cause, accessible only in its effects, he nevertheless 
reveals a stronger affiliation to the Sartrean concept of 
totalisation. However, whereas for Sartre History as excessive to 
any attempt at totalisation prevents the latter from occurring, 
Jameson succeeds in inverting the structure "so that it becomes 
the totalising gesture itself". (1995: 98) 
The grand gesture that leads to transcendence is accomplished by 
appealing to a "History that is beyond the concept - the Real, 
Necessity, 'the primacy of History itself"'. (1995: 98) Young 
counters that The Political Unconscious simultaneously attempts to 
rewrite Marxism in terms of a hermeneutics, a form of literary 
interpretation that represents the base-superstructure relation as 
fundamentally allegorical, rather than a concrete History. How can 
a real, empirical History be posited in all immediacy, if History is 
at the same time granted the status of representation? 
Rather than a concrete object to which knowledge can aspire, 
Jameson thus considers History to be accessible only through 
texts which, in turn, must be subjected to interpretation. However, 
although the recent critiques of representation of reality find 
echoes in the Jamesonian notion of History, he resorts to invoking 
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an exterior, supratextual and transcendental History as the Real or 
Absent cause beyond representation, which can be apprehended 
only through its effects. 
Jameson can acknowledge the status of history as 
interpretation, as narrative, but still assert its ultimate 
transcendence beyond those as the 'real' itself. (1995: 101) 
In the Preface to The Political Unconscious, Jameson claims that 
History must choose between an 'objective structure' and 
'subjective interpretive categories'. (1995: 104) Jameson prefers to 
simultaneously adhere to and transcend the latter, due to the 
ability of Marxian hermeneutics to subsume all interpretive 
categories. However, Young considers Jameson to have 
subsequently contradicted himself, by following a third option 
where transcendence takes the form of a History as Real, 'beyond 
all historicisms and relativisms'. (1995: 107) 
What at first, then, looked like an abandonment of traditional 
Marxist notions of History and Truth was in fact only a first 
move in bringing them back via the meta-claim of interpretive 
absolutism and history as transcendence. (1995: 103) 
An instance of this 'interpretive absolutism' is revealed by 
Jameson's belief that Marxian hermeneutics are above the 
problems of representation that apply to other interpretive 
categories. He thus claims to stand outside both the 'realist' 
position that attempts to depict History as a 'thing-in-itself' without 
any form of interpretation, and the 'modernist' tendency to rewrite 
the past in terms of the present, namely "its own aesthetic and ... 
modernist conception of language". (1995: 106) By abstracting 
himself from the critiques on representation prevalent in his 
historical context, Young argues that Jameson cleared the way for 
the "meta- i nte rpretive claims of Marxism's transcendence as 'the 
absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation"'. (1995: 107) 
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Jameson wards off accusations that Marxian hermeneutics are just 
another attempt at theoretical totalisation, by invoking the 
capability of History as Real, standing outside theory, to "effect a 
leverage" upon the latter. (1995: 109) If, however, the Real is 
shown to be a discursive construction, then the totalisation will not 
be subject to external control. 
The subsumption is so complete that Jameson has lost the 
excess that enabled totalisation, for his own position of 
transcendence always depended on a supplementary point of 
enunciation outside. (1995: 109) 
iii) Writing back at Historicism 
The value of Edward Said's Orientalism resides, in Young's view, 
primarily in its exposure of the links between Eurocentrism and the 
problematics of colonialism. This work paved the way for the 
growing affirmation of a political criticism grounded in the world of 
which it is a part, thus enabling 'minorities' to root their work 
according to their particular standpoint and shy away from the 
dominant cultural discourse which allegedly carries inevitable 
traces of Western imperialism. It is precisely this Western will to 
power, in the form of Orientalist representation of a diametrically 
opposite 'other', that is analysed by Said as a successful attempt 
at totalisation. Young, however, counters that the totalisation of 
historicism in its Orientalist form is inherently ineffectual, due to 
two prevailing characteristics: first, although "resistant singularity" 
is made to conform to the totality, it nevertheless causes problems 
to the latter's closure; second, the Orientalist image of the other 
effects its own alienation from itself. 
The Orient, as a fabricated set of images which determined the 
West's apprehension of the East and subsequently aided in the 
former's colonial enterprise, is, in Said's terms, an instrumental 
misrepresentation of Europe's other. By constructing knowledge 
about 'Oriental' cultures and presenting expertise in the field, 
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Orientalist discourse sought to eliminate the threat of 'resistant 
singularity' by accommodating the latter under its totalising wing. 
However, this same 'resistant singularity', embodied in a powerful 
civilisation laid bare by Orientalist discourse of its other, is always 
excessive to any attempt at a totalising will to knowledge, thus 
preventing the closure of that very totality. Young affirms that 
totalisation is, furthermore, held at bay due not so much to the 
misrepresentation of an East that is always excessive to any 
description, but rather to the West's alienation from itself through 
Orientalist fantasies. An 'internal dislocation' of the West is thus 
accomplished, whereby Europe projects itself onto the unknown. 
If Orientalism involves a science of inclusion and 
incorporation of the East by the West, then that inclusion 
produces its own disruption: the creation of the Orient, if it 
does not really represent the East, signifies the West's own 
dislocation from itself, something inside that is presented, 
narrativised, as being outside. (1995: 139) 
Young critiques Said primarily for not allowing a concept of 
dissension within his analysis of Orientalist discourse, accusing 
him of being incapable of escaping from a dualistic structure of 
thought, whereby Orientalists are identified as being "for" or 
"against", and the East/West binary opposition is merely 
regurgitated in the form of an inside/outside conflict. Young 
considers the notion of contradiction as fundamental in any 
tattempt at the decolonisation of European thought': 
For whereas for a Western historicism the problem centres 
on the resistant singularity necessary for the integration of 
the totality but problematic for its closure, the Orientalist 
image of the Other is both a triumph of that historicist 
rationality but, in its antithetical value, also effects its own 
alienation from itself. (1995: 139) 
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Due to Said's refusal to consider the fissures inherent in the 
attempt at cultural domination involved in the 'Occident/Orient' 
duality, he is unable to refrain from repeating the same "theoretical 
contradictions and conflicts" that assail the Orientalists. Young 
emphasises that Said's flaws stem from both the theoretical and 
conceptual levels. At the theoretical level, Said bases his 
argument against the Western representation of the Orient on 
humanist values which, Young points out, have themselves 
colluded in the History of Western imperialism. 
To criticise humanism in this context therefore does not 
mean that you do not like human beings and have no ethics - 
the gist of certain attacks on 'anti-humanism' - but rather the 
reverse. It questions the use of the human as an explanatory 
category that purports to provide a rational understanding of 
'man' - an assumed universal predicated on the exclusion 
and marginalisation of his Others, such as 'woman' or 'the 
native'. (1995: 122) 
Young distinguishes between two types of Humanism, that of 
traditional European culture, stemming from the Enlightenment, 
and the 'New Humanism' of Fanon. Whereas the former is in itself 
already anti-humanist, due to its boundaries automatically 
producing the non-human, the latter allegedly consists in a 
reformulation of humanism as a 'non-conflictual concept' that 
ceases to be predicated on a sub-human other. 
That anti-humanist Orientalism was the product of a 
humanist culture suggests a complexity that Said seems 
unwilling to address. If humanism is a conflictual concept, as 
Fanon argues, to what extent will Said's humanism itself 
remain marked by anti-humanism? (1995: 131) 
At the conceptual level, Young considers Said's fundamental 
problem to be his belief in the capacity of the critic to work from an 
outside space, that of 'critical consciousness', 'between the 
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dominant culture and the totalising forms of critical systems'. 
(1995: 135) By positing a totalisation that the intellectual must 
oppose, Said is transforming the critic's particularity - which he 
endorses in the form of local, specific struggles - into another 
universal. Young thus accuses Said of merely regurgitating the 
dualistic structure 'Oriental ism/Occidental ism' that the latter's 
work set out to oppose: 
By assuming that any 'method' must be univocal and 
totalising, his own anti-method simply takes up the opposite 
pole of the antagonistic dialectic he has created. As we 
might expect, this means that he then inevitably acts out and 
repeats at a textual level the dualistic structures from which 
he is unable to free himself. (1995: 136) 
Furthermore, Said bases his argument for an independent 'critical 
consciousness' on a common human experience that transcends 
contextual variations: the great failing of Orientalist scholars was 
precisely that in establishing a rigid opposition between 
Orient/Occident, a blind eye was turned to a shared experience 
that allegedly pervades both sides of the duality. However, 
according to Young, 'experience' itself is 'always experienced, 
analysed and given meaning through forms of knowledge' that are 
necessarily ideological. (1995: 132) 
Young argues that the critic cannot choose to be positioned within 
or outside cultural or theoretical postulates, for any form of 
individualistic criticism is apt to service a political end. (1995: 136) 
Said's attempt to rehabilitate an individual agency posited against 
a dominating cultural totality falls, itself, into the trap of another 
monolithic and homogeneous totality. 
This non-conflictual totality should be contrasted to the 
Derriclean account which draws attention to the ways in 
which totalisations never succeed in producing a perfect 
structure of inclusions and exclusions, with the result that 
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the unassimilable elements determine (and disallow) any 
totality which seeks to constitute itself as a totality by 
excluding them. In other words, only by rejecting Derrida tout 
court can Said continue to entertain the very possibility of a 
closed structure, system or method. And only if it is closed 
does it require the intervention of the individual to open it. 
(1995: 137) 
According to Young, Orientalism articulates a closed structure, 
which, due to its repetition of the very dualistic structure of 
thought involved in the 'Orient/Occident' antinomy, is unable to 
escape the terms of its own critique. Young questions how any 
form of knowledge, including Orientalism - can 'escape the terms 
of Orientalism's critique'. (1995: 132) 
If Orientalism seeks to demonstrate the profound complicity 
between a set of representations fabricated by scholarly accounts 
to designate the Orient and the subsequent use of these very 
representations by institutions of power to justify the imperial 
enterprise, it does not offer alternatives for the production of 
knowledge that is independent from such links with power. By 
stipulating that the discursive field that constructs knowledge of 
the 'Orient' also created the latter as an object to start off with, 
Said argues that to provide an alternative to Orientalism would be 
to accept the very problematics that he wishes to deny. But how 
does Said intend to distance himself from the totalising forms of 
knowledge described in Orientalism? In effect, the absence of a 
method that enables Said to escape the terms of his own critique 
leads to Young's accusation of Orientalism's intrinsic repetition of 
the dualistic structure 'Orient/Occident' it intends to oppose. 
Said's fundamental methodological problem lies, according to 
Young, in two contradictory postulates concerning the discursive 
conditions of knowledge on one hand and a political claim on the 
other: If Orientalist texts are considered to be capable of creating 
both knowledge and the very reality described, they are 
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simultaneously seen to have laid the basis for imperialist 
ambitions, as well as subsequently promoting the latter's 
successful realisation. Thus, while Said affirms that Orientalism is 
reducible to a mere representation unrelated to a genuine 'Orient', 
he nevertheless insists on its knowledge having been put to use by 
the colonial occupiers and administrators. 
This means that at a certain moment Orientalism as 
representation did have to encounter the 'actual' conditions 
of what was there, and that it showed itself effective at a 
material level as a form of power and control. How then can 
Said argue that the 'Orient' is just a representation, if he 
also wants to claim that 'Orientalism' provided the necessary 
knowledge for actual colonial conquest? (1995: 129) 
Said seeks to resolve the issue of how representation intertwines 
with the real by inventing two distinct Orientalisms that slowly 
outgrew existing tension and converged towards each other: the 
first, denominated latent Orientalism, belongs to classical 
scholarship which construed its essentialising object of knowledge; 
the second, manifest Orientalism, alludes to the topical 
descriptions of 'travellers, pilgrims, statesmen' relating to an 
actual 'Orient'. While the latent content of Orientalism remains 
immutable and unalterable, the manifest is open to transformation. 
In this manner, Said attempts to explain the apparent contradiction 
inherent in an Orientalism that both evolved and stayed the same, 
repeating itself throughout the ages. 
However, Young declares that this strategy does not provide a 
solution to the original methodological problem concerning how a 
representation that has nothing to do with its real object can be 
put to use in the conquest of that object. Moreover, if the object 
'Orient' does not exist in actuality, then how can Said claim that its 
representation by Orientalism is false? Although Said argues that 
all Orientalist texts misrepresent their object, which eschews any 
form of representation, he nevertheless praises, in a movement 
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that counters the Foucauldian tradition, the capacity of the 
individual genius to stand up against ideology and tradition, 
contributing to the production of a few ambivalent Orientalist 
works. According to Young, in these latter cases, 
misrepresentation comes to bear a remarkable similarity to "the 
intervention of the individual against the system" (1995: 138), a 
postulate that Said advocates for the intellectual's 'critical 
consciousness'. Totalisation thus reaches a dialectical full circle, 
whereby each side of the equation mirrors the closure of the other, 
and free agency remains entrapped within the dualistic structure of 
thought it sought to open. 
iv) The Divorce from the Rationalist Project 
Homi Bhabha's psychoanalytic theories concerning colonial desire 
represent an attempt to detotalise a discourse polarised around a 
binary opposition between 'power and powerlessness'. (1995: 142) 
In contrast to Said's exterior critical consciousness, Bhabha 
argues that resistance lies within the very ambivalence of the 
colonial discursive structure, the latter consisting in an address to 
a multiplicity of conflictual subject-positions. 
Bhabha analyses the conditions of this process of address in 
order to show the occurrence of a slippage which 
problematises both the claim for a single political -ideological 
intention of the coloniser, as well as the straightforwardly 
instrumentalist relation of power and knowledge which Said 
assumes. (1995: 142) 
The profound ambivalence towards 'otherness' patent in colonial 
discourse is at once founded upon 'desire and derision', 'fantasy 
and disavowal'. Bhabha's category of the racial stereotype, or 
fetishism, exemplifies the coloniser's attempt to fix the identity of 
the colonial subject, which is both produced as 'other' and yet 
'entirely knowable and visible'. (1995: 143) However, as the site of 
both surveillance and fantasy, the colonial subject defies fixity. 
148 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
Colonial discourse does not merely represent the other, 
therefore, so much as simultaneously project and disavow its 
difference, a contradictory structure articulated according to 
fetishism's irreconcilable logic. Its mastery is always 
asserted, but is also always slipping, ceaselessly displaced, 
never complete. (1995: 143) 
Bhabha argues for a four-term structure of colonial discourse 
(metaphor/metonymy, narcissism/aggressivity) where the subject is 
constituted by a repertoire of contradictory positions, thereby 
avoiding the fixity inherent in any one position. The ambivalence 
that ensues from any attempt to fix the colonial subject as an 
object of knowledge leads to a growing uncertainty in the power- 
relation. Insofar as the colonised subject is instructed to mimic the 
coloniser, he will resemble the latter, in a partial representation 
that is more menacing than reassuring. By subverting the identity 
of that which is being represented, the imitation leads to the 
reversal of the roles between coloniser and colonised, with the 
look of surveillance returning as the dislocated gaze of the colonial 
subject. (1995: 147) 
Compared to ambivalence, which describes a process of 
identification and disavowal, mimicry implies an even greater 
loss of control for the coloniser, or inevitable processes of 
counter-domination produced by a miming of the very 
operation of domination, with the result that the identity of 
coloniser and colonised becomes curiously elided. (1995: 
148) 
The reversal of the relation of power between coloniser and 
colonised is produced by hybridisation, whereby other 'disavowed' 
knowledges challenge and intervene upon dominant discourse. The 
fact that a discursive transformation is actually brought about by 
hybridisation classifies the latter as a strategy of empowerment, 
capable of actively enabling native resistance. By advocating a 
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space for resistance, Young argues that Bhabha returns to the 
dilemma of agency in the form of a "native otherness ... constituted 
in a space outside the boundaries of colonial discourse", a claim 
that in part marks a retreat from the ambivalence that 
characterises the coloniser/colonised relation within colonial 
discourse. (1995: 149) Ambivalence now pervades the whole 
process of colonial experience, from the point of enunciation to the 
locus of address, where resistance may occur: 
Bhabha finds himself obliged to make two contradictory 
statements: while there is always ambivalence at work within 
the discourse of colonial instruction, that ambivalence is at 
the same time the effect of its hybridisation in the colonial 
context. (1995: 150) 
The ambivalence that prevails in Bhabha's own rhetoric, shifting 
from fetishism to mimicry to hybridity, doubles, in Young's terms, 
'his object's positivities'. By undermining his own authority, 
Bhabha presumably attempts to write himself out of Western 
historicisation, thereby maintaining the 'colonial supplementarity' 
of address permanently open to interpretation. 
Bhabha demonstrates how dissonant, non-syncretic theory 
can shift control away from the dominant Western paradigm 
of historicist narrative, temporality, and univocality - but also 
how any 'new history' must, necessarily, be almost 
unrecognisable as 'history'. (1995: 156) 
Bhabha's methodological divorce from the politico-theoretical 
rationalist project is mirrored by Gayatri Spivak's cleconstructive 
politics, aimed at challenging the dominant structures of 
knowledge and power in the Western academy. Rather than 
seeking to provide counter-histories, which Spivak considers liable 
to falling into the trap of 'reverse ethnocentrism', she seeks to 
contest the implications of the whole system of which Western 
History and Western Historicism are part. These very implications 
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are closely linked with neo-colonial practices in both pedagogy and 
epistemology. Spivak thus invites the researcher to examine his 
complicity with the structures of power that perpetuate neo- 
colonial forms of knowledge. This constant examination of one's 
relationship to the context of knowledge production is effected by 
deconstruction, rather than Said's categories of experience and 
critical consciousness. Spivak's deconstructive methodology aims 
primarily to "highlight the operations of neocolonialism in 
unexpected places", such as Western Feminism and Nativist or 
Western Reverse Ethnocentrism. (1995: 174) 
Young regards Spivak's project as consisting in an attempt to 
preserve the discontinuities between different disciplines which 
interrelate with each other. 
... Spivak's work offers no positions as such that can be 
quickly summarised: in the most sustained deconstructive 
mode, she resists critical taxonomies, avoids assuming 
master discourses. To read her work is not so much to 
confront a system as to encounter a series of events. (1995: 
157) 
Both Western Feminism and Reverse Ethnocentrism exemplify two 
forms of master discourses that Spivak seeks to deconstruct, by 
displacing the categories of universal womanhood and 'Third 
World' respectively. Her critique of totalising narratives is based 
on the concept of a subaltern history of supplementarity, where the 
subaltern embodies the limit of History, the moment of the latter's 
supplementary excess that resists containment within a totalising 
discourse. Because the subaltern, in the form of 'Third World' 
woman or colonised subject as signifier, escapes being pinned 
down to a single signified, it will refuse Western essentialist 
attempts to retrieve the 'truth' of a subaltern consciousness, which 
would serve as a self-consolidating other against which an. d 
through which the West defines itself. 
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In any attempt to turn the other into a self, the anti- 
imperialist perspective has to come to terms with the fact 
that the very project of imperialism was to do the very same 
thing, refracting 'what might have been the absolutely Other 
into a domesticated Other that consolidates the imperialist 
self'. (1995: 165) 
After the 'epistemic violence' of the colonial project, the search for 
an authentic subaltern voice is doomed to permanent failure, for 
the subject has only been constituted as such through the 
positions that have been permitted. 
... I those who evoke the 'nativist' position through a 
nostalgia for a lost or repressed culture idealise the 
possibility of that lost origin being recoverable in all its 
former plenitude without allowing for the fact that the figure 
of the lost origin, the 'other' that the coloniser has 
repressed, has itself been constructed in terms of the 
coloniser's own self-image. (1995: 168) 
Therefore, rather than point to the socio-historical specificities that 
distinguish 'Third World' contexts in the hope of retrieving the 
long-lost voice of the subaltern in the form of historical records, 
the critic should attempt to articulate the structure and allocation 
of a multiplicity of subject-positions, often contradictory, that may 
impose themselves upon individual subjects. The focus of Western 
Feminism on subject-constitution in terms of individuality and 
identity thus must give way to the heterogeneous production and 
constitution of a diversity of subject-positions that characterise the 
excessive supplementarity of the subaltern. 
Despite Spivak's attempt to accomplish a decolonisation of 
Western epistemology through the detotalising perspective of 
deconstruction, Young accuses her of being unable to escape from 
the Marxian transcendental gesture of closure. This is primarily 
due to her endorsement of 'strategic essentialism', whereby the 
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category of universals is deemed to be acceptable in certain 
situations. Young interprets 'strategic essentialism' as a 
rearticulation of Marxist collectivities such as class and the 
economic which Spivak considers to be determining in ideological 
formations. Pitted against the universals of economic determinism, 
the anti -i nd ividual ism and heterogeneity advocated earlier risk 
being subsumed by the Marxian master-code. This leads Young to 
conclude that Spivak's Marxism operates as an "overall syncretic 
frame" in much the same manner as Fredric Jameson's 
megalomaniac totalising History. 
II. White Mythologies: A Critique 
Young accuses both Sartrean Humanist Existentialism and the 
Althusserian decentred modes of production, two crucial responses 
to the search for a way out of Marxist historicism, of having been 
unable to prove the existence of totalisation. He therefore 
endorses the post-structuralist argument according to which the 
event is incommensurable to the concept, resulting in a History 
excessive to a single signified. However, Young simultaneously 
critiques Derrida's inability to escape totalisation: By attempting 
to undermine teleological History as an eternal transcendental 
signified, Derrida seeks refuge in another form of transcendence, 
that of the process of writing, or diffdrance. It would therefore 
seem that if, on the one hand, the critic comes up against a 
permanent inability to produce closure in the search for 
totalisation, on the other a process of transcendence informs any 
detotalising approach. 
Jameson and Said thus fall prey to the tautological temptation of 
an al I -encompassing narrative of closure, which risks subsuming 
the very points of leverage both advocate for controlling 
hegemonic discourse (in Jameson's case, the History as Real; in 
Said's, individual agency pitted against totalising Orientalist 
discourse). According to Young, the fissures inherent in the 
Jamesonian and Saidean arguments derive from the recognition of 
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contradiction but refusal to accept the latter without rearticulating 
it under the auspices of a master-code. Spivak's detotalising 
project is, too, doomed to failure, due to individuality and 
heterogeneity being subsumed within the economic deterministic 
framework of 'strategic essentialism'. 
Only Homi Bhabha, whose discourse refuses to be pinned down to 
any theoretical mode, escapes Young's scathing criticism. Young 
affirms that Bhabha's strategy doubles his 'object's positivities', 
thus mirroring the ambivalence inherent in colonial discourse. His 
argument here brings to mind the epistemological/ontological 
confusion inherent in the objection that '61ite' methodology is not 
applicable to subaltern studies. Referring to this category mistake, 
Spivak claims: 
The confusion is held in an unacknowledged analogy: just as 
the subaltern is not 61ite (ontology), so must the historian not 
know through 61ite method (epistemology). (Spivak, 1987: 
253) 
In Bhabha's case, just as the relationship between coloniser and 
colonised is ambivalent (ontology), so must the critic know through 
an ambivalent method that mirrors the positivities inherent in 
colonial discourse (epistemology). 
This argument, the logic of which Young considers to be related to 
Said's notion of 'possessive exclusivism', whereby only elements 
belonging to a particular 'minority' group are considered to be 
capable of legitimately speaking for the latter, assumes that the 
political is ontologically and epistemologically rooted in 
experience. But if Young is so vehemently opposed to the 
experiential category advocated, for instance, by Said's 'critical 
consciousness', how can he rearticulate this very concept in his 
defence of Bhabha? 
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Furthermore, the form of experiential politics presented in Young's 
version of Bhabha is that of a rhetorical aesthetics, insensitive to 
the consideration of 'new conceptions of selfhood or individuation' 
(Gilroy, 1996: 56) reclaimed from the standpoint of groups that 
have hitherto felt marginalised by the dominant linearity of the 
Enlightenment project. An ethics of freedom, which would 
complement modernity's ethics of law, is thus translated, in 
Young's perspective of Bhabha's work, into an aesthetics of 
freedom, where the signifier incessantly teases the signified away 
from a single, unified meaning. Although the latter concept may 
draw attention to the proliferation of a plurality of subject-position 
formations in the contemporary world, it nevertheless does not 
offer a constructive way of critiquing modernity's Enlightenment 
project from the point of view of alterity. 
With the exception of Bhabha, Young considers it almost 
impossible to think alterity without revealing the tendency to 
appropriate the 'other' into a totalising theory. He critiques the 
Hegelian dialectic for having structured Western thought in terms 
of binary oppositions, thus having permitted that we construct 
knowledge of the 'other' through appropriation within the same. 
However, Young simultaneously recognises the difficulty, if not the 
impossibility, of spurning the dialectic, due to the latter already 
including its negation. Only post-structuralism, according to 
Young, has had a degree of success in breaking away from the 
Hegelian dialectic, if not simply due to keeping "the game with 
Hegel in play". (Young, 1995: 6) 
But does not the Hegelian dialectical movement transcend the 
logic of subordination and domination? Consisting in an essentially 
relational allegory, the Hegelian master/slave encounter can be 
read as indicating that the condition for human emancipation relies 
essentially on those who have been enslaved. Applied to the 
colonial context, a dialectic of dependence and recognition reveals 
the complexity of the intertwining of histories between parts that 
are usually depicted as belonging to strict binary oppositions 
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categorised in terms of oppressor/oppressed. The implications, 
however, are not that both sides of the relationship are equally 
responsible for the resulting situation - due to the prevalent 
distorted inter-subjectivity -, but rather that there is an existing 
cumplicity between the two, which sheds light on the double 
consciousness that often characterises the marginal element of the 
binary opposition such that the latter finds itself both inside and 
outside the dominant culture. (Gilroy, 1996: 185-6) If Young 
reveals himself a staunch defender of Homi Bhabha, one cannot 
but wonder why he does not interpret the ambivalence patent in the 
latter's depiction of the colon ise r/colonised relationship in terms of 
a dialectic of dependence and recognition. 
Young's position that History reveals the will to power of Europe 
over the rest of the world, does not consider the possibility of the 
Gramscian notion of consent as underlying the cultural success of 
Imperialism. Thus, although he critiques Western thought for being 
structured according to the Hegelian dichotomy, he nevertheless 
reproduces this very binary opposition in setting up a West whose 
totalising discourse is all pervasive against an 'other' that has 
little room for resistance. Paradoxically, then, Young represents a 
position that is synonymous with the totalisation that he opposes 
on the ground of there always being a remnant that resists closure: 
Every time a literary critic claims a universal ethical, moral, 
or emotional instance in a piece of English literature, he or 
she colludes in the violence of the colonial legacy in which 
the European value or truth is defined as the universal one. 
(Said, 1994: 124) 
Contrary to Young's stance, Edward Said argues that consent is 
crucial in comprehending the essentially cultural manifestations of 
representation as a political instance. From this perspective, 
cultural leadership, or hegemony of certain cultural forms over 
others, works not through domination but consent by persuasive 
means. The logic inherent in this argument is that of a dialectic of 
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dependence and recognition where both sides participate as active 
agents, although on unequal levels, in the prevalent state of 
affairs. 
i) Post-Colonial Agency: Reinscribing Difference 
Said's Culture and Imperialism develops the notion of a 
quintessential hybridity inherent in every cultural form, due to the 
global network produced by Imperialist History that has led to an 
intertwining of experiences common to "men and women, whites 
and non-whites". To combat the detotalising effect of a myriad of 
'minority' groups in the contemporary World, each of which is 
interested in its own identity politics, Said defends a universalist 
approach that seeks to set particular histories against the 
backdrop of a dominant narrative of Imperialist History. The mutual 
implication of difference with a commonality of experience thus 
proves to Said that no identity can be thought in isolation from its 
historical context. The notion of hybridity espoused by Said 
conforms to the temporal linearity and spatial uniformity of the 
One, where the 'many' are subsumed within a homogeneous 'global 
network' in the present. The prevalent view here is that of Western 
Modernity's definition of time and space, permeating particular 
histories that might dissonate from the 'g ra nd narrative' of 
imperialist experience. 
Bhabha offers an escape route from the omnipotence of Western 
temporal and spatial homogeneity by introducing the concept of 
'time lag', as that aporetic moment in which a historic symbol, 
crystalised in time and space, is resuscitated into a sign through 
the act of enunciation in the present: individual agency lies within 
the sign's potential for performativity, for being uttered in a novel 
way that incessantly eludes textual, or symbolic, fixity. After the 
iterative, repetitive moment of enunciation the sign returns to itself 
without coinciding with itself as symbol. There is a permanent gap, 
a fissure between sign and symbol, event and enunciation. The 
present is disjunctive because it consists in a 'projective past', a 
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slowing down, or lagging, that breathes the life inherent in the sign 
of the present into 'dead' symbols of the past. 
The time-lag of postcolonial modernity moves forward, 
erasing that compliant past tethered to the myth of 
progress, ordered in the binarisms of its cultural logic: 
past/present, inside/outside. This forward is neither 
teleological nor is it an endless slippage. It is the function 
of the lag to slow down the linear, progressive time of 
modernity to reveal its 'gesture', its tempi, 'the pauses and 
stresses of the whole performance'. (Bhabha, 1995: 253) 
Thus, although Bhabha's concept of time-lag evades Said's 
historicist linearity, it nevertheless cannot be reduced to a 
Derridean infinite 'slippage' of the signified by the signifier as 
Young attempts to portray. Instead, the time-lag is a concept that 
engages with aporia, seeking to go beyond binary boundaries, 
'whether these be between past and present, inside and outside, 
subject and object, signifier and signified'. (Bhabha, 1995: 251) 
Aporia, for Bhabha, refers to the ambivalence inherent in the 
cultural history of modern nations where archaic and hierarchical 
traditions coexist with the homogeneous synchronicity of 
modernity. 
Such a privileging of ambivalence in the social imaginaries 
of nationness, and its forms of collective affiliation, would 
enable us to understand the coeval, often incommensurable 
tension between the influence of traditional 'ethnicist' 
identifications that coexist with contemporary secular, 
modernising aspirations. The enunciative 'present' of 
modernity, that I am proposing, would provide a political 
space to articulate and negotiate such culturally hybrid 
social identities. (Bhabha, 1995: 250) 
Bhabha thus distances himself from a Saidean notion of hybridity 
that seeks to 'contemporise cultural difference' by subsuming 
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particular histories under the commonality of the imperialist 
experience. The intertwining of divergent identity politics would 
consist in an attempt to articulate pluralism, or the 'diversity of the 
many', under the homogeneous temporal and spatial framework of 
a non-problematised Western modernity. 
The process I have described as the sign of the present - 
within modernity - erases and interrogates those 
ethnocentric forms of cultural modernity that 'contemporise' 
cultural difference: it opposes both cultural pluralism with 
its spurious egalitarianism - different cultures in the same 
time ... - or cultural relativism - different cultural 
temporalities in the same 'universal' space ... (Bhabha, 
1995: 245) 
Because cultural difference corresponds to the 'not-one, the minus 
in the origin and repetition of cultural signs in a doubling that will 
not be sublated into a similitude', it cannot be reduced either to a 
harmonious, non-aporetic Whole, nor to the infinite signification of 
difference inherent in heterogeneous notions such as 'multiplicities 
of subject positions', 'specificities', 'localities', or 'territories'. 
(Bhabha, 1995: 245) Cultural difference consists in a moment of 
aporia, of difficulty, of permanent irresolution, in which the 
acknowledgement of coexistence between opposites leads to an 
overcoming of binaries. If this is the case, however, then Bhabha's 
argument adheres to the Hegelian tradition, according to which the 
suture, or gap, or middle between two poles gives rise to a rended 
novelty. Young's contention that only post-structuralist thought 
allows for contradiction, for the 'excess' that constantly evades 
closure, paradoxically refuses to engage in aporia. The aporetic 
moment in theory is that in which ruptures are kept alive between 
binaries that coexist with but cannot coincide with each other. By 
setting up post-structuralism against the Hegelian dialectic to see 
which of the two is 'purer' Young is reducing the two theories to 
non-aporetic wholes which do not contain contradictions within 
each other. Perhaps this is because if Young were to recognise the 
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aporetic moment within post-structuralism he would realise that the 
latter can be read as stemming from the Hegelian tradition. 
I am persuaded that it is the catachrestic postcolonial 
agency of 'seizing the value-coding' - as Gayatri Spivak has 
argued - that opens up an interruptive time-lag in the 
'progressive' myth of modernity, and enables the diasporic 
and the postcolonial to be represented. (Bhabha, 1995: 240) 
Spivak aims to demonstrate the heterogeneous coding systems 
inherent in Western epistemology by tracing the 'foreclosed', or 
repressed, figure of the native informant in the works of three 
philosophers - Kant, Hegel and Marx - who represent the core of 
the modern Continental tradition. The value-coding is revealed 
through a deconstructive 'new politics of reading' which seeks to 
reverse and displace, in short to re-inscribe, existing narrative 
values. The latter thus consist in pharmakoi, 'poison that is 
medicinal when knowingly administered': catachresis, or the 
displacement and reinscription of signs in a novel context, allows 
for the representation of post-colonial agency. Because the latter 
is fundamentally catachrestic, difference lies at its core. Marxism, 
as a system essentially preoccupied in 'accounting for difference', 
may thus provide an orientation for postcolonial agency. 
Capitalism is ... the pharmakon of Marxism. It produces the 
possibility of the operation of the dialectic that will produce 
socialism, but left to its own resources it is also that which 
blocks that operation. (Spivak, 1999: 83) 
The catachrestic logic inherent in the postcolonial is thus 
anticipated within Marxism, which aims to abolish difference 
subsequently to engaging with it. Spivak's interest lies in the 
aporetic moment in which difference is accounted for. Her recourse 
to 'strategic essentialism', that is, to the strategic use of 
essentialisms such as Marxism, may be read as an attempt to 
reveal the coexistence of two poles - the coloniser and the 
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colonised, the repressed and the unrepressed, colonialism and 
nationalism - which although discontinuous appear as disjunctively 
linked through a deconstructive reading. 
if one assumes an "own-ness" ... of cultural ground ... 
everything gained through this classed access to the culture 
of imperialism was an estrangement ... This estrangement 
and foreclosure are now being re-played as varieties of 
"fundamentalism, " a return of the repressed. The current 
mood, in the radical fringe of humanistic Northern 
pedagogy, of uncritical enthusiasm for that Third World, 
makes a demand upon the inhabitant of that Third World to 
speak up as an authentic ethnic fully representative of his 
or her tradition. (Spivak, 1999: 60) 
Spivak considers any value-affirmation to legitimise its opposite by 
reversal: as such, the contemporary celebration of hybridity 
authorises purity, or nativism, in the form of an authentic ethnic 
voice that can recuperate its place in history. Spivak resorts to the 
figuration of the native informant in order to escape from the 
claims and counter-claims inherent in the dualistic structure of the 
Hegelian chronotypography. By invoking the native informant, 
Spivak attempts to 'undo' the subordination of lived timing into 
Time as Law. 
Are we still condemned to circle around "Idea, Logos, and 
Form, " or can the (ex)orbitant at least be invoked? (1999: 
67) 
For Spivak, the Hegelian graph of Time serves to manipulate 
history as timing with the purpose of catering to socio-cultural 
interests. Due to its perpetual movement towards the Absolute, 
Marx argued that the Hegelian system consisted in 'the effort of 
sublating' rather than in 'the accomplished sublation' itself. The 
effort of sublation corresponds to Being, or ontological Time, as 
being devoured by the present-in-time, or historical timing. The 
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graphic representation of Time as Law containing lived time allows 
for the 'fitting in' of all of reality on a diagram, that is, the 
explanation of how reality comes into being. (Spivak, 1999: 43,55, 
60) 
One common way of grasping life and ground-level history 
as events happening to and around many lives is by 
fleshing out "time" as sequential process. Let us call this 
"timing". This feeling for life and history is often 
disqualified, in a dominant interest, in the name of the real 
laws of motion of "time, " or rather, "Time. " It is my 
contention that Time often emerges as an implicit Graph 
only miscaught by those immersed in the process of timing. 
(Spivak, 1999: 38) 
Through the figure of the native informant, Spivak lays bare her 
own vested interest in adopting a deconstructive reading of 
Western philosophy so as to manifest lived timing in detriment to 
the Time that caters to dominant interest. Lived time reveals itself 
in the deconstruction of oppositions between binaries. By drawing 
attention to the structural complicities between texts of distinct 
cultural provenance 18 , 
Spivak distances herself from the easy 
temptation within postcolonial studies of polarisation between 
camps such as 'the West' and 'the Rest'. Camp thinking would, in 
Spivak's words, consist in 'a leg iti mation-by- reversal of the 
colonial attitude itself'. (1999: 39) 
The deconstructive approach thus converts Spivak's reading into a 
'mistake', in as much as any reading is always mistaken due to its 
inability to coincide with the written symbol or with the author's 
intent. 
'8 Spivak is specifically alluding to Hegel's Philosophy of History and to 
the Vedic Srimadbhagavadgita, both of which allegedly subordinate the 
lived timing of history to the graph of Time as Law so as to serve 
dominant socio-cultural interests. 
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,... although I am deeply interested in the usual 
deconstructive focus (not always shared by Derrida) on the 
"moments"... of "stalling" ... at beginning and end 
("diff6rance" and "aporia" are only two names for these 
moments), I am more interested in the generating of a shaky 
middle by way of an irreducible "mistake"... (Spivak, 1999: 
48, fn) 
It is this mistake, or catachrestic recourse to a word out of context 
- the figuration of the native informant - that allows Spivak to 
grasp the 'broken middle' between poles, the complicities that 
disrupt rigidified binaries and maintain contradiction alive in place 
of 'camp mentality'. 
Post-colonial agency, as translated by Bhabha and Spivak, 
fundamentally consists in a critical practice inscribed 
'inside/outside' modern discourse. Through 'rememoration', or the 
refiguration of existing narrative values, post-colonial practice 
attempts to resist Western humanism's epistemic and ontologic 
totalising impetus. However, both Bhabha and Spivak reveal an 
awareness of the tensions inherent in the ambivalences and 
fractures of modernity, stemming from the cohabitation of 
universalism and humanism on one hand, and oppressive and 
exploitative practices on the other. By setting up a clear dichotomy 
between modernity and postmodernity, whereby humanism is 
explicitly associated with rationality, Young demonstrates 
insensitivity to the fissures of modern discourse, while 
perpetuating logocentrism's totalising logic. Despite the undeniable 
complicity between Western humanism and violence, Young's 
critique does not allow for the 'refiguration' of the 'who' of action 
and the issue of agency. (Venn, 2000: 50,86,110,164) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FANONIAN HUMANISM: A DIALECTIC OF IRRESOLUTION 
1. Introduction 
At the core of Frantz Fan on's work lie three fundamental 
dichotomies: fi rst, an existentialist current emphasises the 
subjective autonomy of man while a sociogenic approach to 
psychopathology seeks to explain man as a product of his 
environment; second, a desire to affirm particularity in the form of 
black essentialism, or n6gritude, is countered by the will to 
embrace universal man; third, the opposition to a supposed 
universality of psychic structures is resisted by the insurgence 
against the particularity of ethnic psychology. These aporias, or 
difficulties, inherent in Fanon's thought reflect the tension he 
attempted to negotiate throughout his own life between his status 
as a black man living in a world defined by whites and his 
concurrent espousal of universalist values stemming from a 
Western tradition. The polarities that define Fanon's works make 
the latter permeable to hugely disparate readings ranging from the 
psychoanalytic to the 'Third Worldist'. According to David Macey, 
the problems inherent in many commentaries on Fanon reside in 
their refusal to consider the historical and social facts that 
constitute the background to his narratives. 
Fanon 'lived, fought and died Algerian', but he was also a 
product of French culture and French colonialism. He was 
also born a native son of Martinique. (2000: 30) 
As Edward Said argues in 'Travelling Theory', abstracting theories 
from the cultural context in which they are produced can lead to 
the loss of their original force and 'rebelliousness'. (1999: 197) 
Rehistoricising Fanon thus implies the contextual isation of his 
thought within the social, political and philosophical conceptual 
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framework of the time and place in which he was writing. 
Understanding Fanon means both privileging his psychiatric 
practice in detriment to psychoanalysis, as well as paying greater 
heed to Kojbve, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty than to Derrida or 
Lacan. However, the attempt to articulate the middle term, the 
rupture inherent in Fanon's dichotomies may lead to the conclusion 
that just as he cannot be reduced to the labels 'psychoanalyst' or 
'marxist', neither is he purely a psychiatrist, phenomenologist nor 
existentialist. Working 'i n between camps', Fanon's writings 
consists in bricolage, responding to concrete circumstances. 
Acknowledging that his anticipations have not been borne out by 
History is a challenge that ensues from the recontextualisation of 
Fanon's work. (Macey, 2000: 29) Despite their eclecticism, his 
dichotomies cohere in that they are fuelled by the emotion of 
an ger. 
The Third Worldist Fanon was an apocalyptic creature; the 
post-colonial Fanon worries about identity politics, and often 
about his own sexual identity, but he is no longer angry. And 
yet, if there is a truly Fanonian emotion, it is anger. His 
anger was a response to his experience of a black man in a 
world defined as white, but not to the 'fact' of his blackness. 
It was a response to the condition and situation of those he 
called the wretched of the earth. (Macey, 2000: 28) 
The post-colonial Fanon is ambivalent, articulating a Lacanian 
fissured self where the coloniser is inseparable from the shadow of 
its 'tethered other'. By placing emphasis on the psychic dimension 
of Desire (recognition and disavowal), Bhabha's post-modern 
reading of Fanon displaces identity away from a unitary conception 
of man. Where the Western tradition sought to think alterity by 
subsuming it within the same, Bhabha infuses sameness with 
difference, drawing attention to the other that exists within the 
self. The possibility for political demand and human agency, 
divorced from both a grand, unified narrative of history and from a 
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single, unitary self, arises from within the ambivalent 
interdependence of coloniser and colonised. 
The colonial subject is always 'overdetermined from without', 
Fanon writes. It is through image and fantasy - those orders 
that figure transgressively on the borders of history and the 
unconscious - that Fanon most profoundly evokes the 
colonial condition. (Bhabha, 1986: xiii) 
According to Bhabha, Fanon's colonial subject is historicised as it 
engages with the discourses of history, literature, science, myth. 
The colonial subject is a point of intersection where these various 
texts converge to produce a fragmented self, a subversive slippage 
of identity into a plurality of differences. If the colonial subject is 
no longer unitary but fragmented, it no longer makes sense to 
consider the implications of political oppression in light of a 
violation of human 'essence'. Bhabha argues that Fanon is 
therefore not preoccupied with universalist questions such as 'How 
does colonialism deny the Rights of Man? ' or 'Who is the alienated 
colonial Man? '. Rather, by allegedly privileging the psychic 
dimension, Fanon would be describing the problem of colonial 
cultural alienation in the psychoanalytic language of demand and 
Desire. 
Ato Sekyi-Otu writes back at Bhabha's psychoanalytic 
understanding of Fanon, arguing that the latter's clinical practice 
is essentially anti-psychologistic: 
... Fanon ultimately gives psychoanalytic language no more 
and no less than an analogical or metaphoric function, as 
distinct from a foundational or etiological one, in accounting 
for the condition of the colonised and their dreams ... (1996: 
8) 
Sekyi-Otu argues that post-modern readings of Fanon deprive one 
of the 'weapons with which to confront some of the urgent 
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questions of the postindependence world: questions of class, 
ethnicity, and gender of democracy and human rights, against 
assertions of cultural particularity and difference'. (1996: 3) 
Opposing the post-modern 'evisceration' of Fanon's texts, Sekyi- 
Otu counters that only a Fanonian normative vision can help 
rethink what has gone wrong in the post-colonial age. 
Fanon, however, does not present a normative vision of any kind: 
the value of his texts resides primordially in their lack of 
hermeticism deriving from unresolved aporias. The profoundly 
dialectical movement inherent in Fanon's narratives, operating 
within dichotomies, confers a tragic sense to his ultimate objective 
of attaining a totality in the form of an future, emancipated society: 
the mismatch between Fanon's aim of laying the groundwork for a 
non-conflictuous, universalist whole and his inability to escape 
from a permanent dialectic can ironically be read as a homage to 
the Western humanist tradition. Back and forth, from thesis to 
antithesis, Fanon's new humanism is in fact not too 'new'; 
however, it remains valuable for revealing the aporias, the 
difficulties inherent in a humanism distinguished by permanent 
irresolution. 
11. Master and Slave: From Hegel to Kojbve 
Although, as Macey argues, any contextual isation of Fanon would 
profit from examining the latter's influence by Sartre and Merleau- 
Ponty rather than Lacan and Derrida, the underlying conceptual 
framework that provides the basis for an existentialist, 
phenomenological or even psychoanalytic reading of Fanon 
consists in Alexandre Koj6ve's interpretation of Hegel's master- 
slave encounter. Hegel had originally sought to explain the 
constitution of self-consciousness as a movement dependent on 
the recognition by another self-consciousness through the master- 
slave allegory. For mutual recognition to occur, two self- 
consciousnesses, opposed to each other, desiring recognition on 
the part of the other, transcend themselves and temporarily reside 
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in their opposite only to return to their point of origin, having 
attained a consciousness that is in-itself-for-itself. This process of 
duplication whereby consciousness transcends itself in a 
movement towards the other and regresses by coinciding with itself 
is mirrored by the other self-consciousness. 
Each is for the other the middle term, through which each 
mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is 
for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own 
account, which at the same time is such only through this 
mediation. They recognise themselves as mutually 
recognising one another. (Hegel, 1977: 112) 
Pure being-for-self, or self-certainty thus can only derive from 
certainty of the other. However, in the beginning, self- 
consciousness exists only for itself as a unified T that excludes 
alterity from itself. Immersed in being, or Life, self confronts self in 
raw immediacy for the movement of abstraction, which infinitely 
negates the negation by incorporating the other into the self - 
allowing for the evisceration of immediate being and its 
replacement by the 'purely negative being of self-identical 
consciousness' - has not yet been accomplished. 
Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, 
and therefore its own self-certainty still has no truth. (Hegel, 
1977: 113) 
The desire to achieve the full abstraction of self-consciousness 
will lead the latter to negate its objective being, or mode of 
existence. Insofar as the Notion of recognition entails a 
reciprocity, whereby each side mirrors the other's movements, the 
attempt to attain pure being-for-self entails a 'twofold action' 
whereby each side attempts to annihilate the other. This will to kill 
the other, however, implies putting at risk one's own life. Because 
the objective being of each consciousness has transcended itself 
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by residing in its opposite, 'se If -extern aI ity' must now be 
eliminated for identity to coincide with itself once more. 
And it is only through staking one's life that freedom is won; 
only thus is it proved that for self-consciousness, its 
essential being is not (just) being, not the immediate form in 
which it appears, not its submergence in the expanse of life, 
but rather that there is nothing present in it which could not 
be regarded as a vanishing moment, that is only pure being- 
for-self. (Hegel, 1977: 114) 
Although an individual who has not placed his life at stake may be 
recognised as a person, he nevertheless has not achieved true 
self-certainty as an independent self-consciousness. However, the 
death of either one, or both, of the participants in the struggle 
would completely do away with the possibility of self-certainty, that 
is, with any potential fulfilment of the demand for recognition. 
... with this there vanishes from their interplay the essential 
moment of splitting into extremes with opposite 
characteristics; and the middle term collapses into a lifeless 
unity which is split into lifeless, merely immediate, 
unopposed extremes; and the two do not reciprocally give 
and receive one another back from each other consciously, 
but leave each other free only indifferently, like things. 
(Hegel, 1977: 114) 
Death would consist in an 'abstract negation', rather than a 
negation of a negation that results in self-identity. Life is thus a 
pre-condition for the dialectical movement inherent in self- 
consciousness to occur, a process superseding in a manner that 
allows for the preservation of each anterior phase, and thus 
withstanding its own supersession. The unified '1' that existed in 
the beginning is thus dissolved through the dialectical movement 
inherent in the life process, resulting in the constitution of two 
kinds of self-consciousness: on one hand, a being-for-self, on the 
169 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
other, an immediate consciousness that is for, or dependent on, 
another. In other words, because the struggle between the two 
self -consciousnesses cannot result in death, the survival of the 
two hinges on a relationship of dominance and subordination in 
which one is master and the other slave. Thus, while the 
constitution of self-consciousness reveals itself as unilateral and 
unequal, with one side being recognised and the other merely 
recognising, the two consciousnesses are nevertheless the same. 
Both moments are essential. Since to begin with they are 
unequal and opposed, and their reflection into a unity has 
not yet been achieved, they exist as two opposed shapes of 
consciousness; one is the independent consciousness whose 
essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent 
consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to 
be for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman. 
(Hegel, 1977: 115) 
Thus, while the consciousness represented by the bondsman is 
that of pure immediacy, the lord consists in a consciousness that 
is mediated in two ways: mediating with itself through an 'other' 
(the bondsman), the master simultaneously relates to the slave 
through the object of the slave's work, that is, the thing which 
keeps the slave in bondage to the lord. Although the lord has 
power over the thing, the latter is independent from the bondsman: 
while the lord negates or annihilates the thing through his own 
personal enjoyment of it, the slave's survival depends on the 
existence of the thing upon which he works. 
The (lord's) essential nature is to exist only for himself; he is 
the sheer negative power for whom the thing is nothing. Thus 
he is the pure, essential action in this relationship, while the 
action of the bondsman is impure and unessential. (Hegel, 
1977: 116) 
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Although the outcome of this logic would appear to be unequal, 
with the lord being recognised while the bondsman merely 
recognises, in reality the lord is unable to achieve pure being-for- 
self, or self-certainty, for the object through which the lord 
mediates himself is not an independent consciousness. The lord's 
truth thus becomes 't he unessential consciousness and its 
unessential action'. (Hegel, 1977: 117) 
But just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the 
reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its 
consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it 
immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, it 
will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly 
independent consciousness. (Hegel, 1977: 117) 
Because servitude has the master as object, pure being-for-self is 
implicit in its consciousness. Unaware of its implicit independent 
consciousness, servitude nevertheless has experienced pure 
negativity through the fear of death, the terror of the master, which 
destabilises everything solid. 
... this pure universal movement, the absolute melting-away 
of everything stable, is the simple, essential nature of self- 
consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, 
which consequently is implicit in this consciousness. (Hegel, 
1977: 117) 
This instability is, moreover, a result of the bondsman's service, 
allowing him to distance himself from natural existence through 
work and to consequently become aware of his pure being-for-self. 
While the lord's desire for the thing is a pure negating activity 
whereby he assimilates it through enjoyment, the slave's work, 
which gives form and shape to the thing, is 'Desire held in check, 
fleetingness staved of'. (Hegel, 1977: 118) 
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The negative middle term or the formative activity is at the 
same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of 
consciousness which now, in the work outside of it, acquires 
an element of permanence. (Hegel, 1977: 118) 
The independence of the thing thus comes to represent the 
independence of the bondsman. However, work has both a positive 
and negative significance: on one hand, it symbolises the means 
through which slave consciousness becomes aware of being-for- 
self; on the other, it represents fear, for, confronted with an alien 
shape which he must work upon, the slave relives his original 
fearful reaction to radical alterity when first confronted with the 
lord. The bondsman's self-certainty thus only becomes an objective 
truth through the mastery of materiality. 
The shape does not become something other than himself 
through being made external to him; for it is precisely this 
shape that is his pure being-for-self, which in this externality 
is seen by him to be the truth. Through this rediscovery of 
himself by himself, the bondsman realises that it is precisely 
in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated 
existence that he acquires a mind of his own. (Hegel, 1977: 
119) 
Kojbve's interpretation of Hegel's master-slave allegory in light of 
Marxist theory places emphasis on Desire as an impetus to action, 
on the historical becoming of man as the realisation of his full 
potential, and on the liberationary character of work as that which 
leads to the inversion of roles between lord and bondsman. 
Because man desires, he acts to satisfy Desire by negating, 
transforming and assimilating the desired object. However, this 
negating activity is not necessarily destructive, for it leads man to 
replace the objective reality of that which is desired for his own 
subjective reality. The original emptiness of the unsatisfied 'I' thus 
assumes a positive content through negation of the desired 'non-I', 
thus mirroring the positivity of the negated object. 
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... If, then, the Desire is directed toward a "natural" non-1, 
the 1, too, will be "natural. " The I created by the active 
satisfaction of such a Desire will have the same nature as 
the things toward which that Desire is directed ... (Koj6ve, 
1980: 4) 
For self-consciousness to occur, Desire must thus be directed 
towards a 'non-natural object', that is, an object which exceeds 
natural existence. Because Desire consists of nothingness, or 
emptiness, moulding itself to that which is desired, it differs from 
any given reality essentially present to itself. Thus, if only Desire 
goes beyond given existence, the constitution of self- 
consciousness relies on a Desire that is directed towards another 
Desire. 
Desire directed toward another Desire, taken as Desire, 
will create, by the negating and assimilating action that 
satisfies it, an I essentially different from the animal "l. " This 
1, which "feeds" on Desires, will itself be Desire in its very 
being, created in and by the satisfaction of its Desire. And 
since Desire is realised as action negating the given, the 
very being of this I will be action. (Koj6ve, 1980: 5) 
Whereas the animal T consists in absolute identity, or 'equality to 
itself', the human T, or self-consciousness, consists in a 
'negating-negativity' stretching over time. Self-consciousness is 
thus a historical becoming, a permanent striving to realise in the 
future 'what it is not' in the present. 
Thus, this I will be its own product: it will be (in the future) 
what it has become by negation (in the present) of what is 
was (in the past), this negation being accomplished with a 
view to what it will become. In its very being this I is 
intentional becoming ... conscious and voluntary progress; it 
is the act of transcending the given that is given to it and 
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that it itself is. This I is a (human) individual, free (with 
respect to the given real) and historical (in relation to itself). 
(Koj6ve, 1980: 5) 
The condition that humanity must transcend natural existence in 
order to fully realise itself implies that man must conquer his 
animal Desire. Because all Desire consists in a desire for value, 
human Desire must therefore win over the supreme animal value 
corresponding to self-preservation. It is only by risking his life to 
satisfy his own human Desire, that is, Desire for another's Desire, 
that man affirms his humanity and distances himself from 
animality. Self-consciousness thus derives from a fight for 'pure 
prestige' in which at least two Desires for recognition battle 
against each other. 
... to desire the Desire of another is in the 
final analysis to 
desire that the value that I am or that I "represent" be the 
value desired by the other: I want him to "recognise" my 
value as his value ... In other words, all human, 
anthropogenetic Desire - the Desire that generates Self- 
Consciousness, the human reality - is, finally, a function of 
the desire for "recognition. " (Kojbve, 1980: 7) 
Recognition by the other thus entails a struggle to the death 
between rivals, seeking to satisfy their Desire for the other's 
Desire. However, the loss of life of either participant prevents the 
survivor from being recognised as self-consciousness. The 
realisation of human reality thus depends on the survival of both 
adversaries, a condition which implies the acceptance of an 
inherent inequality between the two. 
... in his nascent state, man is never simply man. He is 
always ... either Master or Slave. If the human reality can 
come into being only as a social reality, society is human - at 
least in its origin - only on the basis of its implying an 
element of Mastery and an element of Slavery, of 
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II autonomous" existences and "dependent" existences. And 
that is why to speak of the origin of Self -Consciousness is 
necessarily to speak of "the autonomy and dependence of 
Self -Consciousness, of Mastery and Slavery. " (Kojbve, 1980: 
8-9) 
Because man is historical becoming, existing in space as time, 
human reality as universal history is embodied in the history of the 
master-slave encounter: 'the historical "dialectic" is the "dialectic" 
of Master and Slave. ' However, if the dichotomy between thesis 
and antithesis is to result in synthesis, the final outcome of the 
interaction between lord and bondsman must correspond to the 
'dialectical overcoming' of the latter. 
"To overcome dialectically" means to overcome while 
preserving what is overcome ... The dialectically overcome- 
entity is annulled in its contingent ... aspect of natural, given 
... entity, but it is preserved in its essential ... aspect; thus 
mediated by negation, it is sublimated or raised up to a more 
"comprehensive" and comprehensible mode of being than 
that of its immediate reality of ... static given, which is not 
the result of creative action (i. e., of action that negates the 
given). (Koj6ve, 1980: 15) 
According to Kojbve, there are three major moments of 'dialectical 
overcoming' in Hegel's allegory. First, the master must dialectically 
overcome the bondsman by preserving the latter's life but negating 
his autonomy. Second, the slave must dialectically supersede the 
thing by transforming it through work. Third, the bondsman must 
dialectically overcome the condition of enslavement so as to be 
recognised by the master. 
The complete, absolutely free man, definitely and completely 
satisfied by what he is ... will be the 
Salve who has 
"overcome" his Slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, 
laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, 
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social, historical progress. History is the history of the 
working Slave. (Kojbve, 1980: 20) 
Because the lord has reached the zenith of his potential in terms 
of mastery, his condition is fixed and cannot progress any further: 
either he preserves the place he has won through risking his life, 
or dies. The slave, on the contrary, in not bound to his condition of 
enslavement. Due to the terror experienced when first confronted 
with the master, he realises that the potential for human existence 
far exceeds the given stability of any fixed condition, be it that of 
the lord or that of the bondsman. 
... in his very being, he is change, transcendence, 
transformation, "education"; he is historical becoming at his 
origin, in his essence, in his very existence. On the one 
hand, he does not bind himself to what he is; he wants to 
transcend himself by negation of his given state. On the 
other hand, he has a positive ideal to attain; the ideal of 
autonomy, of Being-for-itself, of which he finds the 
incarnation, at the very origin of his Slavery, in the Master. 
(Koj6ve, 1980: 22) 
It is because the bondsman lives in servitude that he wishes to 
become free: the condition of slavery therefore paradoxically 
consists in a predisposition to progress. Work is the means 
through which the slave frees himself from natural existence 
whereby he is bound to the master. By transforming given reality 
through formative activity, the slave transforms himself. In this 
process, he transcends both his own condition of servitude as well 
as that of the master's, the latter who, not working, remains bound 
to the given as it is. 
In the raw, natural, given World, the Slave is slave of the 
Master, In the technical world transformed by his work, he 
rules - or, at least, will one day rule - as absolute Master. 
(Kojbve, 1980: 23) 
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For Kojbve, the creation of a real and objective product through 
work permits man to surpass natural existence and to become 
aware of his 'subjective human reality'. Formative activity thus 
allows the slave to become 'supernatural being', '"incarnated" 
Spirit', 'historical "World"' or '"objectivised" History'. (Koj6ve, 
1980: 25) The historical becoming of man is brought about by the 
master: had the bondsman not been enslaved, he would never have 
aspired to freedom. 
Man achieves his true autonomy ... only after passing 
through Slavery, after surmounting fear of death by work 
performed in the service of another (who, for him, is the 
incarnation of that fear). Work that frees man is hence 
necessarily, in the beginning, the forced work of a Slave who 
serves an all-powerful Master, the holder of all real power. 
(Koj6ve, 1980: 27) 
Work is revolutionary in that it permits the slave to negate the 
given world in its totality, a world in which he finds himself bound 
to his master. The bondsman is now free to dialectically overcome 
his master by engaging in the liberating struggle for recognition 
that he had originally refused for fear of death. Thus, in the long 
term, work concretises the slave's rather than the master's will, 
allowing the 'last to be first'. 
... it is indeed the originally dependent, serving, and slavish 
Consciousness that in the end realises and reveals the ideal 
of autonomous Self -Consciousness and is thus its "truth". 
(Kojbve, 1980: 30) 
Although Fanon clearly bases himself on Koj6ve's interpretation of 
the Hegelian master-slave allegory to explain a lack of black self- 
certainty, he nevertheless does not allude to this author in any of 
his texts. Fanon argues that it is due to the reciprocal nature of 
the Hegelian dialectic that the movement of recognition occurs in 
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two directions. If one of the paths is closed, the 'other' remains 
imprisoned within himself and is therefore deprived of full self- 
consciousness, a bei ng-f or-itse If -in -itself. Desire indicates that 
one pursues something greater than life, that one is not locked into 
'thingness', but rather that one aspires to a world of reciprocal 
recognitions. The realisation that self-consciousness is more than 
mere existence, more than just a life process can only, however, 
derive from the conflict through which life is placed at risk. 
Although one need not risk life to be recognised as a person, the 
truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness has 
not yet been achieved. In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon takes a 
passage directly from Kojbve without citing the latter. 
Man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose 
his existence on another man in order to be recognised by 
him. As long as he has not been effectively recognised by 
the other, that other will remain the theme of his actions. It 
is on that other being, on recognition by that other being, 
that his own human worth and reality depend. It is that other 
being in whom the meaning of his life is condensed. (Fanon, 
1986: 216-17)19 
Historically, the black slave has been denied recognition by the 
white master. He was set free by his master, not having to engage 
in conflict for the purpose of recognition. Thus, according to 
Fanon, the man of colour was never really able to achieve true 
self-consciousness in-itself-for-itself, due to these values having 
been imposed on him from outside. For recognition of true self- 
consciousness to occur, the black man must affirm his humanity 
through conflict and through the risk that conflict implies. 
19 This passage in Kojbve reads as follows: In the beginning, as long as 
he is not yet actually recognised by the other, it is the other that is the 
end of his action; it is on this other, it is on recognition by this other, 
that his human value and reality depend; it is in this other that the 
meaning of his life is condensed ... (19 8 0: 13) 
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When it does happen that the Negro looks fiercely at the 
white man, the white man tell him: "Brother, there is no 
difference between us. " And yet the Negro knows that there 
is a difference. He wants it. He wants the white man to turn 
on him and shout: "damn nigger". Then he would have that 
unique chance - to "show them ...... (Fanon, 1980: 221) 
Fanon here refers to the traditional humanist stance which, under 
the guise of defending equality for all human beings, emphasises 
the disparity between 'civilised' and -savage', masking 
discriminatory practices carried out against those who refuse to 
assimilate to western ways. Were the white man to reveal his 
contempt for the black man, the latter would have opportunity to 
engage in conflict and thereby achieve true self-consciousness, 
that is, the transformation of the subjective certainty of life 
existence into an objective truth. 
The former slave, who can find in his memory no trace of the 
struggle for liberty or of that anguish of liberty of which 
Kierkegaard speaks, sits unmoved before the young white 
man singing and dancing on the tightrope of existence. 
(Fanon, 1986: 221) 
Fanon argues that the black person does not understand freedom 
because he has not fought for it. Having enlisted as a French 
solider in World War 11, Fanon draws on his personal experience to 
argue that the Liberty and Justice that the black man has fought 
for are 'values secreted by his masters'. He argues that the white 
master of colonial society differs from Hegel's master, for while the 
latter's aim was to obtain recognition from the slave, the former 
only wants work from the black man. The black slave also varies 
from Hegel's slave to the extent that formative activity does not 
constitute the source of his will to freedom. Whereas for Koj6ve 
the path towards historical becoming resided in the slave's mastery 
of Nature through work, in Fanon the 'Negro wants to be like the 
master', turning towards the latter and distancing himself from the 
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object worked upon (1986: 221n): thus, while work is revolutionary 
for Kojbve's slave, it is violence that will allow Fanon's slave to 
negate the given world. 
Fanon's adaptation of the master-slave encounter constitutes a 
crucial moment in his work, for the Hegelian framework of this 
'dialectic' contains the major premises of his theoretical 
eclecticism. Indeed, the Fanonian exploration of existentialism, 
phenomenology, sociogenic psychopathology and 'third-worldist' 
violence fundamentally derive from the problematics of recognition 
inherent in the master-slave encounter. The black person affirms 
his humanity by desiring the Desire of the white man, that is, the 
former strives for recognition by the latter: the black person will 
only be recognised as an independent self-consciousness by 
placing his life at risk in a struggle to the death against the white 
man; because 'all Desire is a desire for value' (Koj6ve, 1980: 6), at 
the end of the struggle he will be able to substitute himself for the 
value desired by the Desire of the white man. Reciprocity will thus 
ensue from a trajectory that corresponds to the historical becoming 
of the black man. 
Ill. 'Lived Experience' as Being-in-the-World 
Although Fanon is often interpreted as positing an essence, or 
fact, of blackness, he attempts to escape any ontological definition 
of blackness by focusing on the situational experience of the black 
man. There is no fact of blackness that corresponds to a universal 
condition of the man of colour; instead, there are contextual 
specificities that call for different forms of action in order to obtain 
recognition. Fanon alludes to the fundamentally different situations 
lived by the 'French Negro' and the 'American Negro': while he 
considers the black American to be on the way to the full 
affirmation of independent self-consciousness, due to having had 
to battle for rights which have not been freely given, the 'French 
Negro' has not had to risk his life in conflict, for freedom was 
imposed on him from outside. (1986: 221) 
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The world is, in (Fanon's) view, experienced in particular 
ways by the 'black man', but that experience is defined in 
situational terms and not by some transhistorical 'fact'. 
(Macey, 2000: 26) 
Rather than present a universal and static black ontology, Fanon 
resorts to a phenomenological theory of experience to explain the 
'lived experience' (Pexpdrience vdcue) of the black man. 'Lived 
experience' or Erlebnis, in the technical terminology of Husserl, 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, refers not to just any experience, 
but to one that is profoundly felt and "lived through". (Macey, 
2000: 164) Merleau-Ponty describes Erlebnisse as 'acts of 
consciousness' through which a subject, immersed in an always 
already existing world, can mould the latter according to a project. 
Because the subject cannot be separated from the object, from the 
world of which it is a part, it cannot appropriate the latter 
'objectively'. 
To be a consciousness or rather to be an experience is to 
hold inner communication with the world, the body and other 
people, to be with them instead of being beside them. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2000: 96) 
For Fanon, the 'lived experience' or 'being in the world' of the 
black man is determined by his conflict-ridden relationship to 
whiteness. The 'negro' is a slave to an essence, a stereotype 
which must be contested by daily actions that disprove the latter. 
The first reaction of the black man is to combat these archetypes, 
which fix him to an appearance 'for which he is not responsible', by 
seeking to demonstrate his assimilation of European ways. Having 
grown in a world permeated by Western values, the colonised black 
will judge himself through white eyes. He will become conscious of 
his body as if it belonged to a third-person. Fanon describes this 
'corporeal malediction' in the following way: 
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A slow composition of my self as a body in the middle of a 
spatial and temporal world - such seems to be the schema. It 
does not impose itself on me; it is, rather, a definitive 
structuring of the self and of the world - definitive because it 
creates a real dialectic between my body and the world. 
(1986: 111 ) 
This corporeal schema is determined by ah isto rico- racial schema, 
consisting in the myriad of myths and anecdotes which have given 
rise to white stereotypes of blackness. "'Mama, see the Negro! I'm 
frightened! '" (Fanon, 1986: 112) In this episode recounted by 
Fanon, the child is frightened of corporeal blackness, due to the 
historico-racial schema that has traditionally connoted blackness 
with evil and danger. It is in this sense that race can be 
understood as a sliding signifier: 
It is not the status of racist discourse as 'scientific' but the 
fact that its elements function discursively which enables it 
to have 'real effects'. They can only carry meaning because 
they signify, through a process of displacement, further 
along the chain of equivalencies - metonymically ... their 
arrangement within a discursive chain enables physiological 
signs to function as signifiers, to stand for and be 'read' 
further up the chain; socially, psychically, cognitively, 
politically, culturally, civilisationally... (Hall, 1996: 23-4) 
Fanon says that he is no longer aware of his body in the third 
person, but as a triple person. It is no longer the 'negro' that is 
judging himself through white eyes, but rather a whole new person 
that is created through the stories that convey the white archetype 
of blackness. The man of colour is therefore determined from the 
outside and is left with no space for resistance from which to 
contest white definitions of blackness: 
Ontology - once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by 
the wayside - does not permit us to understand the being of 
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the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he 
must be black in relation to the white man. (Fanon, 1986: 
110) 
Denied recognition by the 'other', Fanon is tempted into affirming 
his blackness: 
I resolved, since it was impossible for me to get away from 
an inborn complex, to assert myself as a BLACK MAN. Since 
the other hesitated to recognise me, there remained only one 
solution: to make myself known. (1986: 115) 
Fanon had striven for invisibility. This, however, was denied him 
for blackness was all too visible. He was unable to escape being 
fixed by a white gaze, anxious to lay bare and make 
comprehensible through stereotyping a difference that confounded 
the white hierarchical structuring of the World. Although Fanon 
tends towards a humanist universalism, he nevertheless draws a 
distinction between the situations lived, in a white world, by Jews 
and blacks. For Fanon, Jewishness is not outwardly visible, for 
there is no distinctive feature that characterises a Jew as such. 
Jewishness is thus overdetermined from within, in the sense that 
Jews are slaves to the idea that others have of their actions. The 
black man, on the other hand, is wholly overdetermined from 
without, due to his appearance. 
Colour and race are not essences, but the product of an 
existence and a situation. (Macey, 2000: 165) 
IV. Ndgritude: Transcending the Particular 
The feeling of inferiority of the colonised is the correlative to 
the European's feeling of superiority. Let us have the 
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courage to say it outright: It is the racist who creates his 
inferior. (Fanon 1986: 93) 
In Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre had argued that because it is the 
anti-Semite who creates the Jew, by forcing the latter either to flee 
from himself or assert his Jewishness, the issue of a Jewish 
authenticity was inherently false. Similarly, for Fanon, the dilemma 
of 'negro' authenticity is a racist invention, for the h istorico- racial 
schema that prevails in the white world is fundamentally 
responsible for creating the 'negro'. 
Thus, although Fanon was tempted into affirming blackness as a 
positive value in reaction against the historico-racial schema which 
portrayed the latter as fundamentally negative, he nevertheless 
prefers to settle for an assertion of universal manhood, due to the 
realisation that black essentialism is simply perpetuating the racist 
logic which caused 'blackness' to be defined against 'whiteness' in 
the first place. Black Skin, White Masks represents Fanon's 
personal battle between the particular and the universal, that is, 
between the wish to desperately hold onto the belief in Negro 
values, and the attempt to establish a universal self, 'the world of 
the You', where each man is fundamentally responsible for the 
other's destiny. 
N6gritude, the intellectual movement composed of black 
intellectuals who tried to give voice to universal 'negro' values, 
had originally been warmly greeted by Fanon. This attempt 'to 
prove the existence of a black civilisation to the white world at all 
costs' was, Fanon felt, fully justified in writing back against white 
stereotypes of blackness as having no culture, no civilisation and 
no historical traditions. (1986: 34) 
My blackness is neither a tower nor a cathedral 
It thrusts into the red flesh of the sun 
It thrusts into the burning flesh of the sky 
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It hollows through the dense dismay of its own 
pillar of patience. (C6saire in Fanon, 1986: 124) 
This excerpt of the poem by Aim6 C6saire can be read as an 
example of what Henry Louis Gates' calls a 'signifying trope', 
repeating and reversing white stereotypes of blackness to write 
back at whiteness. 20 In the above extract, Cbsaire plays on white 
stereotypes of the physicality of the 'n eg ro', of the latter's 
proximity to Nature, to affirm the essence of blackness. 
Yes, we are - we Negroes - backward, simple, free in our 
behaviour. That is because for us the body is not something 
opposed to what you call the mind. We are in the world. And 
long live the couple, Man and Earth! (Fanon, 1986: 127) 
Fanon here identifies the 'negro' with being in the world, with the 
supersession of the mind-body dichotomy, and with the overcoming 
of the binarism between man and nature. It is in the world and 
through the world that the black man achieves recognition. 
However, he soon discovers that 'negro' coexistence with the world 
is regarded by whites as merely a provisional stage on the scale of 
development, through which the latter have already passed. 
... I wanted to be typically Negro - it was no longer possible. 
I wanted to be white - that was a joke. And, when I tried, on 
the level of ideas and intellectual activity , to reclaim my 
n6gritude, it was snatched away from me. Proof was 
presented that my effort was only a term in the dialectic. 
(Fanon, 1986: 132) 
Sartre's affirmation that n6gritude is only a phase in the Marxian 
dialectical progression culminating in a society without races has 
20 "Signifyin(g) is a uniquely black rhetorical concept, entirely textual or 
linguistic, by which a second statement or figure repeats, or tropes, or 
reverses the first-the very concept of Signifyin(g) can exist only in the 
realm of the intertextual relation. " (Gates, 1989: 49) 
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profound repercussions on Fanon. Because the goal inherent in 
this dialectics entails the destruction of n6gritude, Fanon must now 
redefine his conceptual framework: 
The dialectic that brings necessity into the foundation of my 
freedom drives me out of myself. It shatters my unreflected 
position. still in terms of consciousness, black 
consciousness is immanent in its own eyes. I am not a 
potentiality of something, I am wholly what I am. I do not 
have to look for the universal. (Fanon, 1986: 135) 
Wishing to lose himself in the 'night of the absolute' to attain self- 
consciousness, Fanon now discovers that the black consciousness 
originally thought to correspond to completeness, to that which 
pre-exists, had in fact been imbued with meaning by the 'negro'. 
Sartre had brought Fanon to the realisation that "Negro experience 
is not a whole, for there is not merely one Negro, there are 
Negroes". (Fanon, 1986: 136) 
However, because the relationship between white and black has 
traditionally been that of dominance on one side and subservience 
on the other, Fanon's 'lived experience' reveals the man of colour 
as suffering differently from the white man. The only way to 
liberate the man of colour from himself is thus to define him as an 
'absolute intensity of beginning', an existential becoming rather 
than an ontological being. (Fanon, 1986: 138) 
V) Existentialism as Historical Becoming 
When the Negro makes contact with the white world, a 
certain sensitising action takes place. If his psychic structure 
is weak, one observes a collapse of the ego. The black man 
stops behaving as an actional person. The goal of his 
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behaviour will be The Other (in the guise of the white man), 
for The Other alone can give him worth. (Fanon, 1986: 154) 
The dialectic established between the black man and the world, 
defined by whiteness, that he inhabits makes of him a being-for- 
others who is not recognised as an independent self- 
consciousness. Refraining from judging himself from the point of 
view of whiteness, he must take action to change social structures 
based on a historico-racial schema that create and perpetuate the 
notion of black inferiority. Universal humanity would then replace 
the will to affirm blackness, a term which mirrors whiteness in a 
racist dialectic. 
... To educate man to be actional, preserving 
in all his 
relations his respect for the basic values that constitute a 
human world, is the prime task of him who, having taken 
thought, prepares to act. (Fanon, 1986: 222) 
The black man must take action through conflict so as to gain 
recognition of his consciousness in-itself-for-itself in the 'here and 
now'. N6gritude represents a desire to remain locked in the past, 
within the coloniser's logic of superiority. Liberation from colour 
binarisms can only come about through a constant reworking of 
past and present, refusing to see either as definitive. 
am a man, and what I have to recapture is the whole past of 
the world 
In no way should I derive my basic purpose from the past of 
the peoples of colour. 
In no way should I dedicate myself to the revival of an 
unjustly unrecognised Negro civilisation ... I do not want to 
exalt the past at the expense of my present and of my future. 
(Fanon, 1986: 226) 
Fanon attempts to recapture the past, responsible for the cultural 
crystallisation of the 'negro'. Once the reality of blackness is 
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grasped as a historical becoming, the h istorico- racial schema that 
has created white stereotypes of blackness begins to fall apart. By 
focusing on the possibility of man recreating himself, Fanon 
introduces invention into existence. The black man can choose to 
recreate himself against the stereotypes of the past, for he is not a 
prisoner of History. Absolute existence demands that neither 
revenge nor reparations be sought for the past. 
The body of history does not determine a single one of my 
actions. 
I am my own foundation. 
And it is by going beyond the historical, instrumental 
hypothesis that I will initiate the cycle of my freedom. 
(Fanon, 1986: 231) 
Fanon follows in the wake of Sartrean humanist existentialism by 
arguing that because existence precedes essence, there cannot be 
a black essentialist 'nature', nor a determinism of any kind. 21 
Sartrean existentialism is born of the premise that because 'man is 
condemned to be free', that is, because there are no determinisms, 
everything is permitted. 
We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when 
I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, 
because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at 
liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world 
he is responsible for everything that he does. (Sartre, 1973: 
34) 
21 Curiously, Lewis Gordon reads Fanon's existential phenomenology as 
an assertion of blackness through which blacks can reclaim history. 
There is a contradiction in his argument: because identity is not fixed 
and immobile, the potential for human agency can overturn ontological 
definitions of blackness; however, because there is a universal black 
experience, blacks can be active agents of history. (Gordon, 1995) 
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However, not only is he responsible for himself but for 'man' in 
general. Because there are no narratives of necessity, man must 
assume responsibility for the future of humanity by committing 
himself to action thereby choosing the project that he will be. 
Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in 
so far as he realises himself, he is therefore nothing else but 
the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is. 
(Sartre, 1973: 41) 
At the root of Sartrean existentialism lies a dichotomy between 
subject and object: whereas for Merleau-Ponty the subject is 
inseparable from the world in which he is immersed, for Sartre the 
Cartesian cogito is the absolute truth of consciousness. Whereas 
materialist doctrines posit the subject as the result of 'pre- 
determined reactions', Sartrean humanism draws a distinction 
between animality and humanity due to the latter's immediate 
'sense of self'. 
Thus the man who discovers himself directly in the cogito 
also discovers all the others, and discovers them as the 
condition of his own existence. He recognises that he cannot 
be anything ... unless others recognise him as such. 
I cannot 
obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through the 
mediation of another. (Sartre; 1973: 45) 
Because knowledge of self derives from others, the discovery of 
oneself reveals the other as a rival freedom which is either 'for or 
against me'. It is therefore in this inter-subjective world that man 
must assume responsibility both for what he has chosen to be as 
well as for what others are. Subjectivity is thus inherently 
universal. 
Fanon's new humanism is an effort to achieve freedom through 
disalienation, which, in turn, is achieved by the attempt to 
recapture and scrutinise the self. Once the realisation sets in that 
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"the Negro is not. Any more than the white man"(Fanon, 1986: 
231), a possibility of authentic communication between men 
becomes viable. 
I find myself suddenly in the world and I recognise that I 
have one right alone: That of demanding human behaviour 
from the other. 
One duty alone: That of not renouncing my freedom through 
my choices. (Fanon, 1986: 229) 
V1. The Apprehension of Facticity 
For Sartre, the anguish of existentialism derives precisely from the 
realisation that any action is the concretisation of only one 
amongst a plurality of possibilities, and the reason why one 
particular path is taken, in detriment to another, lies in choice. 
(1973: 32) The refusal to accept man's situation as one of free 
choice and the espousal of deterministic outlooks ultimately lead 
to bad faith or self-deception, implying a concomitant negation of 
responsibility for oneself and others. 
The self-deception is evidently a falsehood, because it is a 
dissimulation of man's complete liberty of commitment. 
(Sartre, 1973: 51) 
Man becomes inauthentic through bad faith. Authenticity is brought 
about by apprehending the facticity of freedom, that is, 'my place, 
my body, my past, my position in so far as it is already determined 
by the indications of Others, finally my fundamental relation to the 
Other'. (Sartre, 2000: 489) In short, facticity refers to the 
situational categories that define my being-in-myself through my 
being-for-others. 
In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon analyses what he considers to 
be two psychopathological accounts of inauthenticity, the first 
arising from Mayotte Cap6cia's autobiography Je Suis 
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Martiniquaise, and the second taken from Abdoulaye Sadji's Nini. 
Mayotte Cap6cia wishes to 'bleach' her blackness by choosing a 
white lover. Nini, a 'mulatto' from Saint-Louis, considers it an 
insult to be courted by a Negro. 
I shall attempt to grasp the living reactions of the woman of 
colour to the European. First of all, there are two such 
women; the Negress and the mulatto. The first has only one 
possibility and one concern; to turn white. The second wants 
not only to turn white but also to avoid slipping back. (Fanon, 
1986: 55) 
These cases reveal, according to Fanon, a profoundly Manichean 
conception of the World, whereby white and black are rigidly 
compartmentalised and irreconcilable. The 'negress' and the 
'mulatto' attempt to attain full assimilation in the white world to 
overcompensate for an inferiority complex. (Fanon, 1986: 60) 
In the chapter entitled "The Man of Colour and the White Woman", 
Fanon analyses the case of Jean Veneuse, the main character of 
Ren6 Maran's Un Homme Pareil aux Autres. Jean Veneuse is an 
Antillean black who, due to having lived in Bordeaux since 
childhood, is culturally European. Having interiorised the values of 
the white World, he sees his blackness through white eyes. This 
gives rise to a neurotic dilemma, whereby because he is black, he 
cannot be fully European. However, although he is black, he does 
not understand his own race. 
Fanon considers that, contrary to Cap6cia and Nini, Veneuse 
problematises the traditional gendered relations between black and 
white. 22 This is due to the latter's realisation that the black man 
22 Stuart Hall considers that Fanon does not engage in a dialogue with 
gender, in the same way that he does with colonial psychiatry, 
existentialism, and N6gritude. Hall regards Fanon's passages on 
genclered relations as a "blind spot". Bell hooks, however, sees Fanon's 
"calculated refusal" to consider the specificity of either the homosexual 
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has traditionally wished for a white lover as a means to achieve 
acceptance by the white World, as well as his fear that by having a 
white lover, he will be spurning the women of his own race. 
According to Fanon, the 'negro' has traditionally been fixated at 
the genital level by the white gaze. He has also been regarded as 
a phobogenic object by the white World. Blackness arouses fear 
and disgust, both of which are intimately linked to white 
stereotypes of the 'negro' as synonymous with the biological. Only 
by restructuring the World, by promoting a new environment will 
the myths that inform the Manichean division between white and 
black be overthrown. 
Fanon critiqued the n6gritude movement for operating within the 
binary logic of white racism. However, he too falls within this trap 
by reducing negrophobia to fear of sexual contact with the black 
man. For if the h istorico- racial schema of white culture has fixated 
blacks at the biological level, then Fanon, by presenting the 
negrophobic man and woman as experiencing both desire and 
disavowal of sexual contact with the 'negro', is simply operating 
within the terms of white racism. He is affirming that the man of 
colour arouses emotions which do not surpass the biological. 
Although the resentment of facticity, of the objective conditions 
that construe a situation, can lead to the inauthenticity of a 
Cap6cia or a Nini, both of whom 'accidentalise' their blackness, 
the affirmation of an essentialist 'fact of blackness' also consists 
in an inauthentic mode of being. By positing a universal black soul, 
the native intellectuals adhering to the n6gritude movement are 
deceiving themselves about the possibility of achieving a 
harmonious African unity. According to Fanon, the native 
intellectual affirms African culture in continental and diasporic 
terms in an attempt to write back at the colonial power's 
systematic devaluation of precolonial history, only succeeding in 
or the black female in their demand for reciprocal recognition as, in 
itself, a dialogue with gender. (Hall et al, 1996: 40) 
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perpetuating manichaeistic forms of thought. The defence of black 
culture from the point of view of the whole continent mirrors the 
white coloniser's contempt and denial of the existence of African 
culture. 
Colonialism did not dream of wasting its time in denying the 
existence of one national culture after another. Therefore the 
reply of the colonised peoples will be straight away 
continental is its breadth ... The concept of Negro-ism, for 
example, was the emotional if not the logical antithesis of 
that insult which the white man flung at humanity. (Fanon, 
19 90: 171 ) 
The native intellectual turns to nativism in search for secure 
anchorage, but suffers disillusionment when he realises that his 
own culture is unable to compete with the 'prestige' of the 
coloniser's 'civilisation'. He tries to compensate for an inferiority 
complex by creating cultural forms which will articulate the 
customs and traditions of his own people, in what Fanon describes 
as a 'banal search for exoticism'. (1990: 177-8) 
Finding your fellow countrymen sometimes means in this 
phase to will to be a nigger, not a nigger like all other 
niggers but a real nigger, a Negro cur, just the sort of nigger 
that the white man wants you to be. (Fanon, 1990: 177-8) 
By attempting to attain authenticity in the form of a pure black 
culture, Negroism denies historical specificities which reveal each 
culture to be first and foremost national. 
The Negroes of Chicago only resemble the Nigerians or the 
Tanganyikans in so far as they were all defined in relation to 
the whites. But once the first comparisons had been made 
and subjective feelings were assuaged, the American 
Negroes realised that the objective problems were 
fundamentally heterogene ous. (Fanon, 1990: 173-4) 
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The authenticity of the colonised thus does not derive from an 
essentialist blackness, but rather from an apprehension of 
facticity, that is, of the situational factors defined in inter- 
subjectivity. This leads to the realisation of heterogeneity within a 
shared experience of colonial oppression, where there is 
nevertheless a commonality of destiny between nations with a 
similar past. 
There is no common destiny to be shared between the 
national cultures of Senegal and Guinea; but there is a 
common destiny between the Senegalese and Guinean 
nations which are both dominated by the same French 
colonialism. (Fanon, 1990: 188) 
Because the truths of a nation are first and foremost its realities, 
the native intellectual must turn his back on the past and realise 
that there is no such thing as a genuine national culture, 
untouched by foreign influence. A people's culture is always being 
renewed and is thus diametrically opposed to custom or tradition, 
both of which are inimical to action and reality. 
Culture has never the translucidity of custom; it abhors all 
simplification. In its essence it is opposed to custom, for 
custom is always the deterioration of culture. The desire to 
attach oneself to tradition or bring abandoned traditions to 
life again does not only mean going against the current of 
history but also opposing one's own people. (Fanon, 1990: 
180) 
In apocalyptic tones, Fanon argues that the past's value resides 
primarily as an impetus to action, for a national culture can only 
appear within the national liberation struggle. To will national 
freedom is simultaneously to will the freedom of all other 
subjugated nations on the African continent as a pre-condition to 
the existence of national cultures. 
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Vil. Sociogenic psychopathology 
Although Sartre resists the notion of an essentialist human nature, 
he nevertheless refers to a 'human universality of condition', that 
is, 'all the limitations which a priori define man's fundamental 
situation in the universe'. (1973: 46) Despite the contextual 
variations that man is subject to, the imperatives of being-in-the- 
world, of labour and death, remain constant in space and time. 
These limitations are neither subjective nor objective, or 
rather there is both a subjective and an objective aspect to 
them. Objective, because we meet with them everywhere and 
they are everywhere recognisable: and subjective because 
they are lived and are nothing if man does not live them - if 
... he does not freely determine himself and his existence 
in 
relation to them. (Sartre, 1973: 46) 
Human purpose, however diverse and individual it may be, reveals 
itself as universal, for every purpose consists in an attempt either 
to transcend, or to negate and accommodate itself to limitations. 
For Fanon, the psychopathology of the black person derives 
essentially from social alienation, that is, from the limitations that 
define his situation in a world that is racially structured. A 
sociogeny that seeks to explain black alienation as a socio- 
political phenomenon rather than in terms of individual history is 
the methodology that informs Fanon's psychiatric practice, both 
during his training at Saint-Alban in France and later at Blida- 
Joinville in Algeria. Although Fanon alludes to psychoanalysis with 
some frequency in his work, he nevertheless, as David Macey 
argues, had not studied its clinical application and his knowledge 
of the former was generalist in nature. 
Psychoanalysis does allow him to describe the transference 
of white fantasies on to the black man - but even here there 
is some uncertainty; strictly speaking, this is projection or 
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the externalisation of aspects of an inner psychical reality, 
and not transference. (2000; 187) 
Furthermore, where psychoanalysis pays heed to fantasy, Fanon 
alludes to trauma brought about by social alienation: on the one 
hand, mental illness derives from the attempt of the colonised 
subject to alienate himself from the limitations which condition his 
'lived experience' in a white world; on the other, psychosomatic 
disorders result from the body's attempt to accommodate itself, 
that is, to achieve a homeostasis, within the traumatic colonial 
situation. 
Greatly influenced by Frangois Tosquelles's innovative methods at 
Saint-Alban, Fanon favoured psychiatric treatments that allied 
drug, shock, and occupational therapies. Emphasis was placed on 
the necessity to overcome patients' social alienation by involving 
them in the collective life of the hospital, that is, 'in an 
environment that functioned as a whole or a Gestalt'. (Macey, 
2000: 201) The aim of institutional psychotherapy was to approach 
a sociogenic approach towards mental illness, whereby the latter 
could never be studied in separation from its social context. 
The underlying thesis was that psychotherapy dealt with 
individuals who were alidnds, meaning 'alienated' in both the 
clinical and the social sense. Their flight into psychosis or 
schizophrenia had led them to break the social contract, to 
become outsiders who were excluded from social life. 
Although the causes of their alienation were biopathological, 
and therefore to be treated as such, the club's existence was 
founded upon a gamble: the possibility of transfusing a 
social life into its patient-members, of reintegrating them into 
some form of symbolic exchange. (Macey, 2000: 150-1) 
The institutional psychotherapy associated with Tosquelles 
provides a link with Lacan, for placing emphasis on symbolic 
exchange in the attempt to bring about social disalienation. In fact, 
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Tosquelles had been influenced by Lacan's thesis on paranoia 
(1932), and due to Lacan's reluctance to having the latter 
reprinted, homemade copies of this work circulated amongst the 
staff of the Saint-Alban hospital. It is therefore through the Saint- 
Alban community that Fanon first becomes acquainted with Lacan's 
ideas, that is, with what he describes as a possible Lacanian 
'science of the personality'. 
The coherent development of the psychotic's delusions are 
consistent with both the lived history of the subject, and its 
conscious and unconscious manifestations, and it is 
determined by the psychic tensions specific to social 
relations. (Macey, 2000: 142) 
Fan on's notion 0f 'lived expe ri e nce', or Erlebnis, is thus 
substantiated through Lacanian theory. However, that Fanon was 
not a psychoanalyst emerges from his treatment of a nineteen- 
year-old woman at Saint-Yli6, suffering from various nervous 
problems since the age of ten. One of her recurrent hallucinations 
consisted in the expansion and contraction of concentric circles to 
the rhythm of a 'negro tom-tom', surrounded by half-naked blacks 
performing a frightening dance. This vision instils fear of parental 
loss in the patient. Having examined the young woman, Fanon 
concludes that her fear of blacks is connected to a youthful 
memory of her father who habitually listened to radio broadcasts of 
African music. As she heard the music, she would see terrifying 
images of dancing negroes; these visions would gradually be 
replaced by circles, which acted as a defence mechanism against 
the hallucinations. The circles appeared, in a subsequent phase, 
without the original determinant (the negroes), and this would be 
sufficient to provoke facial tics. Analysing this case from the point 
of view of the psychology of negrophobia, Fanon argues that her 
illness is the result of a fear of blacks. 
(Fanon) is clearly more interested in the effects of the 'Myth 
of the negro' than in how a neurosis originates in the 
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individual unconscious of the patient, and does not trace it 
back to unconscious sexual fantasies ... it is surely of more 
significance that he devotes so little of his discussion to the 
figure of the patient's father - not something that any 
Freudian psychoanalyst would overlook. (Macey, 2000: 137) 
Fanon's aim is to liberate the man of colour from himself by 
drawing attention to the historico-racial construction of blackness. 
For Fanon, European culture has sought to define itself against the 
'negro' archetype symbolising evil, barbarism, savagery: 
European civilisation is characterised by the presence, at the 
heart of what Jung calls the collective unconscious, of an 
archetype: an expression of the bad instincts, of the 
darkness inherent in every ego, of the uncivilised savage, 
the Negro who slumbers in every white man. (1986: 187) 
Because the collective unconscious is cultural and therefore 
acquired, the colonial 'negro' who has assimilated European 
behaviour will identify with a European collective unconscious 
which presupposes the inferiority of black to white. 
An Antillean is made white by the collective unconscious, by 
a large part of his individual unconscious, and by the virtual 
totality of his mechanism of individuation. The colour of his 
skin, of which there is no mention in Jung, is black. (Fanon, 
1986: 193) 
By absorbing the values of whiteness, the black man enslaves 
himself to the historico-racial schema that underlies the colonial 
collective unconscious. The 'negro' thus lives in a neurotic 
situation because he sees his blackness through Western eyes. He 
is bound up within the following dialectic: either he wants to be 
white, escaping into anonymity and invisibility, or he decides to 
affirm his blackness, the visibility of his colour. In order to escape 
this double bind, the man of colour must reject the two terms of the 
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dialectic and 'through one human being, (to) reach out for the 
universal'. (Fanon, 1986: 197) 
The Negro is not. Any more than the white man. (Fanon, 
1986: 231 ) 
But the fact that 'wherever he goes, the Negro remains a Negro' 
(Fanon, 1986: 173), determines that distinct 'n eg ro' socio- 
historical specificities are somehow united in the 'lived experience' 
of blackness. Fanon argues that the psychoanalytic models used to 
study the psychology of the white man cannot, therefore, be 
applied to the 'negro': because the racial drama is played out on 
the black rn a n's conscious plane, he does not have an 
unconscious. The 'affective amnesia' witnessed in neurosis is thus 
absent from the 'negro'. (Fanon, 1986: 150) By claiming that only 
three per cent of French West Indians could possibly suffer from 
Oedipal neurosis, Fanon rejects one of the fundamental tenets of 
psychoanalysis which holds that neurosis arises not from a real 
trauma, but from Oedipal incestuous fantasies. 
In his attempt not to lose sight of the real, Fanon may well 
be misrecognising an aspect of psychoanalysis, but he is 
also insisting that psychoanalysis itself may be projecting 
European cultural values. (Macey, 2000: 194) 
Neurosis in the Negro is a result of the environment, of social 
circumstance, of the internalised collective unconscious, rather 
than caused by an individual traurnatism. Adapting the loose 
concept of Freudian trauma to the black collective unconscious, 
Fanon argues that the white master has replaced the repressed 
African spirit in black consciousness. The repressed thought in the 
black collective unconscious, the trauma, is replaced in 
consciousness by its surrogate, a white authority symbol. In the 
man of colour, the traumatism lies in his constantly being called 
upon to live like a white man. Fanon cites the case of the 
Antillean, who thinks of himself as white due to his European 
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education. Only in Europe will he discover, in shock, that he too is 
a 'negro', synonymous to him with the negative values that western 
culture has ascribed to blackness. Thus, if he wishes for social 
mobility, the Antillean must reject his family, equated with 
blackness and barbarism, in favour of the positive, assimilative 
values of European society. 
Fanon characterises Antillean society as neurotic, due to its 
emphasis on comparison. The Antillean is forever comparing 
himself with his fellow compatriot, against the pattern of the white 
man. He does not compare himself with the white man. It is his 
fellow compatriot, the 'other', who corroborates him in his search 
for self -validation. This mechanism lies not in the individual per 
se, but arises rather from the neurotic social structure prevalent in 
the Antilles. Whereas Adler's psychology of the individual would 
interpret the Antillean neurosis as a superiority complex on the 
part of a person who has been regarded as historically inferior and 
now desires to overcompensate in relation to whiteness, Fanon 
posits a psychology of the social, where the environment is 
responsible for a fundamental delusion. (1986: 213-16) 
An individualistic pscyhological approach towards the colonised 
easily falls into the trap of encouraging the latter to accept the 
sub-human status that colonialism has meted out to its subjects: 
an individual acts in a certain manner because his 'soul' is tainted, 
or because his constitution is programmed to do so. According to 
Octave Mannoni's psychology of colonisation, the colonised suffer 
from a dependency complex on one hand, and an ingrained 
inferiority complex on the other. Thus, while colonised peoples 
such as the Malagasy, manifest an unconscious need for 
colonisation, patent in the transference of feelings of filial 
dependency by the colonised on the coloniser, they simultaneously 
reveal an inferiority complex deriving from the connotation of skin 
colour with negativity in a colonial context. According to Fanon, 
the 'Malagasy inferiority complex' cannot in reality be ingrained in 
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the Malagasy constitution but rather must be the outcome of 
specific socio-historical circumstances: 
What M. Mannoni has forgotten is that the Malagasy alone no 
longer exists; he has forgotten that the Malagasy exists with 
the European. (1986: 96-7) 
Moreover, Mannoni believed in the existence of a universal psychic 
structure shared by both coloniser and colonised, whereby the 
latter represented the unconscious of the European: 'The Negro is 
the white man's fear of himself'. (Macey, 2000: 192) Fanon, on the 
contrary, does not posit a universal psychic structure, arguing that 
it is the situational encounter with whiteness that leads to the 
black man's neurosis. 
As a psychiatrist, Fanon hopes to make his patients aware of the 
social structures that have both created the man of colour, and 
inspired in him the desire to be white: 
... the 
black man should no longer be confronted by the 
dilemma, turn white or disappear; but he should be able to 
take cognisance of a possibility of existence ... my objective, 
once his motivations have been brought into consciousness, 
will be to put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) 
with respect to the real source of the conflict - that is, toward 
the social structures. (1986: 100) 
By emphasising that diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill 
ought to take account of the 'lived experience' induced by 
colonialism, Fanon sought to reform the system of colonial 
psychiatry, the foundations of which were symptomatic of the 
inhumanity verified in everyday colonial practices that shaped the 
thought processes of both coloni ser and colonised. 
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... Who are they, in truth, those creatures, who 
hide, who are 
hidden by social truth beneath the attributes of bicot, 
bounioule, arabe, raton, sidi, mon z'ami? (Fanon, 1988: 4) 
In his clinical practice in colonial Algeria, Fanon observes the 
same effects he had previously witnessed in Lyons: the Algerian 
patient is labelled 'a simulator, a liar, a malingerer, a sluggard, a 
thief', for physicians cannot justify a pain felt which bears no 
outward signs of manifestation. The 'North African syndrome', 
which consists not in localised pain but rather in a general 
'malaise' distributed over the whole body, is more often than not 
denied by doctors as having any real foundation. (Fanon, 1988: 7) 
The North African takes his place in this asymptornatic 
syndrome and is automatically put down as undisciplined (cf. 
medical discipline), inconsequential (with reference to the 
law according to which every symptom implies a lesion), and 
insincere (he says he is suffering when we know there are no 
reasons for suffering). (Fanon, 1988: 9-10) 
Denying the specificity of the colonial situation, physicians assess 
their native patients according to a European medical framework. 
According to Fanon, a sound medical examination would instead 
require a 'situational diagnosis', taking into account the patient's 
'relations with his associates, his occupations and his 
preoccupations, his sexuality, his sense of security or of 
insecurity, the dangers that threaten him; and we may add also his 
evolution, the story of his life'. (1988: 10) The conditions in which 
the North African lives, be it at home or in the metropolis, 
depriving him of affectivity, social activity and participation in the 
community, necessarily make of him a sick man. 
In Algeria there is not simply the domination but the decision 
to the letter not to occupy anything more than the sum total 
of the land. The Algerians, the veiled women, the palm-trees 
and the camels make up the landscape, the natura) 
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background to the human presence of the French. (Fanon, 
1990: 201 ) 
Because colonialism is a negation of the native's humanity, he is 
constantly confronted with an existential question concerning his 
own identity. This may give rise to a mental pathology which is the 
direct consequence of colonial oppression. Obsessional 
personality disorders are, for example, a result of "'psychological 
action' used in the service of colonialism in Algeria". Thought may 
proceed by 'antithetic couplings', where 'everything that is affirmed 
can, at the same instant, be denied with the same force'. This 
symptomology obeys a manichaeistic frame of reference, where 
antithetical thoughts mirror each other inversely, cancelling each 
other out, leaving the patient unable to defend any given position. 
However, disorders can simultaneously be a symptom and a cure, 
for in the case of psycho-somatic disturbances, the organism 
attempts to confront the conflict directly by adapting itself to the 
situation. (Fanon, 1990: 200-1,233-4) 
Fanon depicts colonialism as 'a coherent system which leaves 
nothing intact', following a logic of sadism in its most developed 
stages. Thus, the depersonalisation of the individual reflects itself 
in the collective sphere, on the realm of social structures: the 
colonised people 'only finds cohesion in the presence of the 
colonising nation'. Colonial forms of thought influence not only the 
European minority but also the Algerians, who envisage 
themselves through the negative stereotypes that the coloniser has 
of the colonised. (Fanon, 1990: 217,237,250) 
One such stereotype is intimately linked to the ethnic psychology 
of the Algiers School which provided the doctrinal foundations for 
psychiatric practice both in Blida-Joinville, where Fanon worked, 
as well as in other hospitals of the colony. (Macey, 2000: 226) The 
Algiers School sought to deterministically prove the criminal nature 
of the Algerian, by resorting to sociological, functional and 
anatomical explanations. As such, melancholia in the Algerian was 
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regarded as taking hetero-destructive tendencies, rather than the 
normal auto-destructive forms: if melancholia is defined as a 
disease of the 'moral conscience', the Algerian develops pseudo- 
melancholia due to the 'precariousness of his conscience and the 
feebleness of his moral sense', that is, his irrationality. (Fanon, 
1990: 241 -2) 
Because the diencephalon, one of the most primitive parts of the 
brain, is considered to regulate the essentially vegetative and 
instinctive life of the native, the latter's superior and cortical 
activities are deemed to be only slightly developed. The native is 
regarded as being adapted to a life different from that of the 
European, due to embodying primitivism as 'a social condition 
which has reached the limit of its evolution'. The arrangement of 
the nervous system, its biological organisation, transcribes 
criminal impulses into the nature of the North African's behaviour: 
the criminal impulse is thus a reaction which is written into the 
nature of the things (the native Algerians) themselves. (Fanon, 
1990: 243,245) 
According to Fanon, criminality is a discourse constructed by 
colonialism. The regression in Algerian criminality during the 
liberation struggle shows that the native has managed to break 
with the hold of colonial ideas over the way he envisages himself. 
By channelling aggressivity towards the colonial power, the native 
refuses the judgement that the French judicial, administrative and 
medical systems have imposed on him. (1990: 247) 
Although the colonised seek to reject the action of the coloniser, a 
profound interdependence between colonised and coloniser has 
nevertheless been established in economic, technical and 
administrative terms. Caught between tradition on one hand and 
Western modernity on the other, the Algerian embodies a 
battleground of conflicting forces, reflecting the manichaeistic 
structure of colonialism, with its 'opposition of exclusive worlds, a 
contradictory interaction of different techniques, a vehement 
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confrontation of values'. (Fanon, 1970: 112) Faced with a violent 
imposition of the values of the dominant group upon his way of life, 
the native will react defensively, in a clandestine manner. Thus, 
while the native patient will introduce a rupture into the 'unifying 
circles of Western therapy' (Fanon, 1970: 112) either by practising 
the latter alongside traditional healing, or by freely adapting 
medical prescriptions to his own convenience, the Algerian woman 
will infuse the haik, considered to be a symbol of patriarchy by 
Europeans, with a nationalist meaning. Likewise, the shift from 
french Radio-Alger to the independentist 'Voice of Free Algeria' 
will correspond to the shift from a hysteric's auditory hallucinations 
of hostile dfinns (spirits) to that of the disalienation of the 
revolutionary subject through anti-colonial struggle. (Gibson, 1999: 
426) 
Vill. The Project of Violence 
Fanon regards decolonisation as the result of the redemptive force 
of violence, by way of which natives embody the historical process 
and recreate themselves as free beings. However, nowhere does 
he defend violence for violence's sake: as Macey argues, Fanon's 
violence is not urban vandalism (2000: 474); rather, it is an 
instrumental violence that seeks to respond to the violence of the 
colonial situation in general and to that of the Algerian case in 
particular. 
In Algeria, violence was not just the midwife of history. 
Violence was Algeria's father and mother. (Macey, 2000: 
477) 
It is through a turning of scales in the manichaeistic colonial 
relation between colonised and coloniser, through the absolute 
replacement of the latter by the former, that the native assumes 
his humanity, refusing the condition of animality that has been 
imposed upon him. 
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We only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated 
refusal of that which others have made of us. (Sartre, 1990: 
15) 
Sartre advocated the 'third-worldist' cause, arguing that as the 
native recreates himself through violence, the exclusive, minority- 
based European club realises that the old World order, founded on 
traditional humanist values, is disintegrating. Europe is 
shipwrecked, 'springing leaks everywhere' and whereas in the past 
history has been made by Europe, now it is the 'Third World' that is 
making Europe history by way of a 'new humanism' which reveals 
the hypocrisy of the old. 
... there is nothing more consistent than a racist 
humanism 
since the European has only been able to become a man 
through creating slaves and monsters. (Sartre, 1990: 22) 
Decolonisation is presented by Fanon as a virtual replacement of 
the coloniser by the colonised, of the first by the last. This 
manichaeistic frame inversely mirrors that which prevailed prior to 
independence as revealed by the geographical positioning of the 
settler and native zones: 
The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the 
zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, 
but not in the service of a higher unity. Obedient to the rules 
of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of 
reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is possible, for of the 
two terms, one is superfluous. (Fanon, 1990: 30) 
There can be no conciliation, no co-existence of settlers and 
colonised, for the manichaeistic logic is governed by an economy 
of violence, where violence must be fought back with violence: if 
the native was relegated to sub-human status through violence, 
then it is only by resorting to the means of violence that he may 
regain access to humanity. 
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The settler's work is to make even dreams of liberty 
impossible for the native. The native's work is to imagine all 
possible methods for destroying the settler. On the logical 
plane, the Manichaeism of the settler produces a 
Manichaeism of the native. To the theory of the 'absolute evil 
of the native' the theory of the 'absolute evil of the settler' 
replies. (Fanon, 1990: 73) 
The project of violence that Fanon adheres to in The Wretched of 
the Earth is supplied, according to Macey, by Sartre's Critique of 
Dialectical Reason. For Sartre, a project is inherently both 
negative and positive: while its negativity stems from its negation 
and destruction of the prevalent state of affairs, its positivity 
resides in its orientation towards the future, that is, towards that 
which has not yet been realised. Human action is fundamentally a 
project that 'traverses the world' and leads to transformation on 
the basis of certain conditions. 
The counter-violence of the colonised is a form of praxis, or 
purposeful human action determined by a project, that 
responds to and negates the primal and endemic violence of 
colonisation. At the same time, it negates the colonised 
created by colonisation and allows a 'new man' to emerge. 
(Macey, 2000: 478) 
Violence is thus a praxis through which the colonial manichaeism 
that reduces the colonised to the sub-human is negated: it consists 
in a cleansing force which restores human dignity. By joining each 
individual in a great chain of violence, action transcends the 
particular towards the collective in the form of mobilised armed 
struggle. 
... The practice of violence binds (the colonised) together as 
a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the 
great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which 
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has surged upwards in reaction to the settler's violence in 
the beginning. (Fanon, 1990: 73) 
Fanon's description of the struggle for national independence 
draws on the Sartrean concepts of the group-in-fusion and 
seriality. Despite the members of a serial sharing a common 
project, the latter can only be realised by a few: conflicting 
interests thus arise between each member of the serial who 
regards the other as a potential rival. Colonised Algeria 
corresponds to a serial, in which atomisation results from a 'divide 
and rule politics' that disintegrates an organised but feudalistic 
structure. (Macey, 2000: 484) 
The function of the violence of the colonised is to negate and 
transcend the seriality created by the violence of 
colonisation. In doing so, it creates a group-in-fusion with a 
common project and praxis. (Macey, 2000: 485) 
The 'call to arms' turns a series of atomised beings into a group, a 
fraternity, which is held together by a terror both inwardly and 
outwardly oriented, preventing the possibility of dissidence. There 
is almost a messianic tone in Fanon's espousal of a violence which 
would redeem the strayed who, by practising violent actions 
against the settlers, are once more integrated into the group. 
Because the colonised man finds freedom in and through violence, 
the latter becomes both a means and an end to awareness of self. 
It is a unifying force that embraces all under the aegis of the 
nation, thus opposing regionalist and tribal dissensions. Violence 
as a practice of action is the key to freedom of the masses in both 
a national and social sense: national due to colonial liberation and 
independence; social due to the overturning of colonial 
manichaeism and the realisation that within native society there 
are elements, namely the bourgeoisie, that seek to exploit the war 
effort so as to hang on to their material privileges. This 
apperception goes hand in hand with the consideration that native 
society is no longer a single, universalist, undivided mass, for 
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there are natives who choose not to participate in national 
construction. 
Se d6sagr6ger is the term Sartre uses to describe the group- 
in-fusion's seemingly inevitable lapse back into seriality. The 
fundamental ambiguity of Les Damn6s de la terre is that, 
whilst Fanon constantly prophesies the victory of the people, 
the theoretical model he adopts necessarily implies that the 
group unity on which that victory is based cannot be 
sustained. (Macey, 2000: 487) 
IX. 'Third-Worldist' Marxism 
Although Fanon has been interpreted as Marxist, his eclecticism 
impedes him from being labelled as such. Having agreed with 
Sartre that n6gritude was only a phase in the dialectical process 
culminating in proletarian revolution, he nevertheless is much more 
inclined to focus on the 'lived experience' of the colonised in a 
world defined by whiteness. A new humanism, resulting from the 
turning of scales in the manichaeistic world of colonialism, 
corresponds to a 'third-worldist' project geared towards the future, 
whereby colonial man is eradicated and reinvented through action. 
Fanon at first believes in the possibility of establishing a 
community of interests between the working classes of sovereign 
countries and the colonised of the African continent. For example, 
by refusing to provide the French army with human resources, the 
French proletariat could hinder the 'colonial reconquest' of Algeria. 
National independence would then lead to the humanisation of both 
the subjugated native and the colonial oppressor, for it is only 
when the colonised ceases to exist that the coloniser is free to 
access the realm of humanity. (Fanon, 1988: 144) However, any 
alleged commonality of interests between the working classes of 
the metropolis and the colonised reveals itself as non-existent: it 
is the French nation as a whole, regardless of class, that is 
involved in the domination of the Algerian people. Whereas non- 
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colonised nations reveal a sharp antagonism between working 
class and bourgeois capitalism, the colonial situation is 
distinguished by 't he undifferentiated character that foreign 
domination presents'. (1988: 81) Race is therefore the base, never 
a superstructural element, of a colonial society (1988: 36): the 
'lived experience' of the colonised imposes itself over and above 
the class relations inherent in a colonial situation. 
The specificity of colonialism underlies Fanon's free adaptations of 
marxian theory. First, the middle class in underdeveloped countries 
does not indulge in the creation of wealth, but rather seeks to 
appropriate the ex-colonisers' privileges. Thus, the bourgeois 
stage inherent in traditional marxism is not verified in the colonial 
context. The traditional role allocated by Marx to the proletariat is 
also disputed by Fanon, who argues that within a colonial society 
the latter constitute a privileged sector provoking the hostility of 
the peasant masses. Fanon maintains that it is indeed the 
peasantry, as well as elements of the Ium pen proletariat, who are 
the key to revolutionary struggle in the Third World. According to 
Macey, such claims are refuted by Marxists, who vehemently 
disagree with Fanon's assertion that the proletariat is the most 
favoured class in a colonial regime. (2000: 480) 
If there is a common element to Fanon's eclectic use of 
phenomenology, existentialism, social psychology, and marxism it 
is perhaps his emphasis on the reality of the colonial situation, 
that is, on the 'lived experience' of the colonised in a world that 
has been defined by the coloniser. Indeed, as Macey notes (2000: 
192), Fanon's emphasis on the real leads him to claim that the 
colonial master, unlike Hegel's lord, does not want recognition, but 
work, from his slave. While Hegel's slave masters nature by work, 
creating a subjective reality through which he finds his own worth, 
Fanon's slave, wanting to be like the master, mediates with himself 
through violence. It is through an act of will that he creates both 
himself and his nation, the latter which therefore has no strictly 
ethnic connotations. This act of will, of active choice that assumes 
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responsibility for itself and others, appears, however, to fall behind 
its objectives in a permanent 'mismatch between aim and 
achievement'. (Rose, 1997: 125) 
The dichotomies inherent in Fanon's thought are generated by the 
failure to produce a totalisation he desired and yet perhaps knew - 
due to his very eclecticism - impossible to attain. From 
existentialist individual responsibility to sociogenic psychiatry, 
from the desire for affirmation of particularity in the form of 
n6gritude to the assertion of universal man, from insurgence 
against universal psychic structures to the opposition against 
particularist ethnic psychology, Fanon went back and forth 
between his unresolved theses and antitheses, in a permanent 
dialectical process, revealing the aporias, the difficulties, inherent 
in any negotiation of the tension within the humanist tradition. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PLURALITY IN ARENDT: ON HUMANISM AS A SPACE OF 
FREEDOM 
1. Introduction 
Hannah Are nd Vs works reveal a thematically coherent 
preoccupation with the human condition, the latter consisting in the 
fact that 'new' human beings are constantly being born into an 'old' 
world, a world that existed before and will continue to subsist after 
their temporal life cycle. The fact of natality, of birth as a new 
beginning, reflects itself in the human capacity for action, whereby 
a new linear sequence is commenced, the outcome of which 
remains unforeseeable and unpredictable, within the cyclical 
organic processes that ceaselessly repeat themselves throughout 
the ages. Human beings alone among the species are considered 
to be unique individuals due to their capacity for action, for 
bringing novelty into a world that precedes them in the short life 
span of past, present and future. Whereas all other life forms are 
destined to repetitively fulfil their biological cycle, only human 
beings, due to the potentiality for beginning brought about by 
action, can break with the predictability of the cyclical life process 
and the eternity of the world's time continuum. 
For Arendt, the human condition distinguishes itself by the 
capacity to begin inherent in freedom. However, the inability to 
predict or control the outcome of an action reveals the burden of 
responsibility as appearing alongside freedom. Fear of the 
contingency inherent in freedom - that what is might as well not 
have been - has led human beings to constantly seek fatalistic 
explanations for the outcomes of action in processes that show 
that what is could not have been otherwise. According to Arendt, 
this tendency marks the birth of Modernity, termed the 'age of 
suspicion' by Nietzsche precisely because the Cartesian doubt, 
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with its emphasis on the unreliability of sense perception and on 
the necessity of submitting all evidence coming from the senses to 
scientific proof, became the symbolically inspiring philosophical 
moment of an epoch of uncertainty that sought refuge in progress, 
both scientific and historical. Narratives that stressed the primacy 
of necessity over freedom, explaining the outcome of events as not 
being able to occur otherwise, became prolific. 
... Progress became the project of Mankind, acting behind the 
backs of real men -a personified force that we find 
somewhat later in Adam Smith's "invisible hand, " in Kant's 
"ruse of nature, " Hegel's "cunning of Reason, " and Marx's 
"dialectical materialism. " (1978: 153) 
According to Arendt, such narratives are symptomatic of the most 
common 'metaphysical fallacy' in the Western tradition which 
posits a separation between the world of thought and that of sense 
experience, or action. 23 By privileging necessity over freedom, that 
is, thought over action, modern thinkers have followed in the 
tradition of the platonic vita contemplativa exercised in isolation 
and recoilment from the world, in detriment to the vita activa, thus 
producing theories that do not reflect the world as it is. Because 
the human condition is characterised by the fact of plurality, by 
the fact that we fit into a world of appearances by showing and 
23 Arendt was influenced by Heidegger's antipathy to the metaphysical 
tradition, the roots of which derive from the Platonic ideal of a 'true 
world' placed above a 'shadow world' of appearance. For Heidegger, the 
metaphysical fallacy consists in interpreting beings without considering 
the truth of Being. Because it does not think the difference between 
beings and Being, metaphysics reduces human essence to animalitas, 
even when the latter is posited as 'subject, person, or spirit'. While 
technical interpretation of thought in the service of poiesis (fabrication) 
abandons Being, pure thought brings the human being back to the 
'ecstatic inherence in the truth of Being', thus allowing the former to 
disclose 'ecstatic essence' or ek-sistence, as a clearing, or 'standing 
out' of Being. (Heidegger, 1998; Villa, 1996: 81) 
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displaying ourselves, that is, by seeking recognition from others, 
humans are foremost political beings who live in community and 
who act together. The political realm should serve the purpose of 
'providing men with a space of appearances where they could act, 
24 with a kind of theatre where freedom could appear' . (1961: 154) 
The fact that the responsibility inherent in freedom is linked to 
both the unpredictability of the outcome of our actions as well as 
their irreversibility leads Arendt to defend that freedom, the 
capacity to begin, pertains to the political, or public, realm, that of 
laws. 
To abolish the fences of laws between men - as tyranny does 
- means to take away man's liberties and destroy freedom as 
a living political reality; for the space between men as it is 
hedged in by laws, is the living space of freedom. (1979: 
466) 
Laws are essential in order to prevent the unpredictability of the 
result of our actions as well as their irreversibility from destroying 
the very capacity for freedom, for beginning, that is inherent in the 
human condition. 
It is due to Arendt's attempt to engage in the problematics of the 
human condition, and to her subsequent election of the political 
realm as offering the only possible solution to the issues of 
24 Heidegger can be read as dismantling the subject/object relation, for 
the human being is ek-sistent into the disclosedness of Being, into the 
openness within which stands out the relation between subject and 
object. (Heidegger, 1998,266) Arendt's theory of performativity, in turn, 
aims to overcome the distinction between 'actor and act, agent and 
"effect"', so as to restore value to appearance and action. The Platonic 
i nstru mental isation of praxis (action) as poiesis (fabrication), which 
reduces action to a means for attaining ends - allowing the agent to 
envisage the product he aims to create before acting - is thus countered 
by a performative model of action hostile to the category of means and 
ends. (Villa, 1996: 81,83) 
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freedom, plurality and difference, that she may be helpful in 
elucidating the lacunae inherent in Fanonian humanism. Whereas 
Fanon's attempt to articulate a 'new humanism' unfolds itself within 
a Hegelian tradition and thus reveals itself as indeed not too 'new', 
Arendt seeks to explore the possibility for a humanism in a context 
no longer subject to the Roman trinity of religion, tradition and 
authority, by blending Aristotelian praxis with Kantian reflective 
judgement. 25 By tracing the etymological roots of words back to 
their origins in Greek or Roman antiquity, she tries to show how 
their meaning has been adulterated, ceasing to bear any relation 
whatsoever to the original context of production. Due to her 
admiration for the Greek polis as a model to be followed, Arendt 
attempts to recuperate the original significance of certain terms 
which originated in an epoch when everything within the political 
realm 'was decided through words and persuasion and not through 
force and violence'. (1989: 27) However, by relying on the old to 
articulate the new, she does not intend to repeat history as it was. 
Instead, she would, in the manner of the founders of the American 
Republic who turned to the Roman political experience as a guide 
to establishing their own novus ordo seclorum -a new order for the 
ages -, like to found politics anew. 
The legendary hiatus between a no-more and not-yet clearly 
indicated that freedom would not be the automatic result of 
liberation, that the end of the old is not necessarily the 
beginning of the new, that the notion of an all-powerful time 
continuum is an illusion. (1978: 204) 
Lying between the colonial no-more and the not-yet of absolute 
freedom, the end of the imperialist age has not, in Arendt's view, 
25 Whereas Critical Theorists would focus on Arendt's distinction 
between acting and making, deriving from the Aristotelian concepts of 
praxis and poiesis, communitarian critiques of liberalism would 
emphasise Arendt's vision of community as a shared world of 
appearance, a common space of shared purpose rooted in a Kantian 
sensus communis. (Villa, 1996: 7-8) 
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necessarily led to the beginning of the new order. The notion of a 
time continuum has proved a fallacy, for time moves by ruptures, 
by gaps between the absences of what has ceased to be and what 
is yet to come. The realm of history is what is revealed in the 
space of appearance, in its errancy and haphazardness, obeying 
no force of destiny operating behind men's backs. Where Arendt 
opposes Hegelianism for favouring necessity over freedom - and 
thus falling prey to a violence that instrumental ises everything it 
comes across as a means to achieve a particular end -, she 
counters Existentialism for defending an inner freedom of man in 
detriment to the socio-political context in which he lives. What is 
constant in her work is the urge to constantly connect the faculties 
of the mind with the living reality of the world. This operation is 
mostly brought about by the faculty of judgement, which links the 
freedom inherent in the will and the search for meaning inherent in 
thought to the world which is common to all human beings. 
11. On Time as Rupture: A Gap between Absences 
To illustrate the concept of time as a gap between a no-more and a 
not-yet, Arendt recounts one of Kafka's parables as follows: man 
stands in the Now of the present, in the gap between past and 
future, simultaneously fighting both with a sword in each hand, 
trying to resist, on one side, the impetus of the no-more that spurs 
him forward, and on the other side, the force of the not-yet that 
drags him into history. According to Kafka's version, both past and 
future have infinite origins that stretch all the way back to an 
infinite beginning, but encounter a terminal ending in the clash in 
the present. 
... the time continuum, everlasting change, is broken up into 
the tenses past, present, future, whereby past and future are 
antagonistic to each other as the no-longer and the not-yet 
only because of the presence of man, who himself has an 
'origin, ' his birth, and an end, his death, and therefore 
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stands at any given moment between them; this in-between 
is called the present. (1978: 203) 
More than victory over either side, man's ultimate wish would be to 
step outside the fight between past and future, and act as arbiter 
between the two forces. Arendt argues that by presupposing that 
man wishes to transcend the fighting-line and act as arbiter from 
above, Kafka is advocating that man withdraw from the world of 
sense experience. This parable thus becomes representative of the 
thinking ego's time concept, to the extent to which the faculty of 
thought withdraws from the world into isolation, carrying on a 
reflexive dialogue with itself. 
... what is missing in Kafka's description of a thought-event 
is a spatial dimension where thinking could exert itself 
without being forced to jump out of human time altogether. 
(1961 : 11 ) 
Whereas in Kafka's parable, the antagonistic forces clash head-on 
against each other in the present, Arendt argues that the very 
insertion of man in the Now, in the gap between past and future, 
must necessarily provoke a deflection between these forces, thus 
causing them, rather than clashing head-on, to meet at an angle. 
This angle should give rise to a diagonal force, having as its origin 
the confrontation between opposing forces of past and future but 
bearing an infinite ending, due to being the result of the action of 
forces whose origin stretches into infinity. 
This diagonal force, whose origin is known, whose direction 
is determined by past and future, but which exerts its force 
toward an undetermined end as though it could reach out into 
infinity, seems to me a perfect metaphor for the activity of 
thought. (1978: 209) 
According to Arendt, gaps in time apply only to the realm of mental 
phenomena and not to that of historical or biographical time, for 
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man is ageless only insofar as he exercises the activity of thought. 
The gap in time is a rupture between past and future, a space of 
non-time, where man is free to abstract himself from his own 
spatial and temporal conditioning and reflect, in remembrance and 
anticipation, on whatever can be rescued from the destruction 
operated by the passage of historical and biographical time. 
This small non-time-space in the very heart of time, unlike 
the world and the culture into which we are born, can only be 
indicated, but cannot be inherited and handed down from the 
past; each new generation, indeed every new human being 
as he inserts himself between an infinite past and an infinite 
future, must discover and ploddingly pave it anew. (1961: 13) 
The indications of the non-time-space which Arendt alludes to are 
given by fragments which survive from the past. Thought must 
delve into these residues, which, as manifestations of world 
essences, subsist in the present under new forms. Arendt's 
interest in the Greco-Roman etymological roots of political and 
philosophical terms derives from her conviction that these provide 
clues to the past. 
Any period to which its own past has become as questionable 
as it has to us must eventually come up against the 
phenomenon of language, for in it the past is contained 
ineradicably, thwarting all attempts to get rid of it once and 
for all. The Greek polis will continue to exist at the bottom of 
our political existence - that is, at the bottom of the sea - for 
as long as we use the word "politics. " (1995: 204) 
Language is essential for the thought process to be activated. 26 
Because there is a gap, a gulf, between the invisibility of the realm 
26 For Heidegger, language is the home, the dwelling, of ecstatic 
essence, or Being. To stand in the clearing of Being is to think, for 'in 
thinking Being comes to language'. Thought discloses Being as that 
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of thought and the world of appearances, the latter which is 
transmitted to us by our senses, any insight into the invisible 
sphere of the human mind can only be conveyed through analogy 
with sense experience, that is, with the world human beings know 
and share in common. It is through metaphor that man transforms 
the invisible into an appearance, 'turning the mind back to the 
sensory world in order to illuminate the mind's non-sensory 
experiences for which there are no words in any language'. (1978: 
106) 
The irreversibility of the metaphor, which sheds light on the 
invisible by drawing on sense experience but which cannot explain 
sense experience by appealing to the invisible, demonstrates, 
according to Arendt, the primacy of the world of appearances in 
relation to that of thought, the latter which, because performed in 
isolation from the world, is 'always out of order'. (1978: 109) The 
danger in the metaphor, however, lies in the fact that because it 
relies solely on sense experience - which, being essentially 
cognitive, serves as a means towards an end - to convey the 
recesses of the human mind, it is at a loss to describe the activity 
of thought itself, that is, when 'something invisible within us deals 
with the invisibles of the world'. 
This ineffability to which Arendt refers is akin to Walter Benjamin's 
notion of a language of truth, similar to Mallarm6's , immortelle 
parole", which consists in a world essence, a '"tensionless and 
even silent depository of the ultimate secrets which all thought is 
concerned with"... whose existence we assume unthinkingly as soon 
as we translate from one language into another'. (1995: 204-5) 
Because Benjamin is committed to an understanding of language 
as a manifestation of a world essence rather than as a realisation 
of a communicative function, Arendt considers him fundamentally 
to be a poetic thinker. To think poetically is to inhabit the non- 
time-space within temporal linearity, the gap between past and 
which Being has disclosed to thought through language. (1998: 239, 
247) 
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future, so as to be able to distance oneself from the no-more and 
the not-yet and to reflect on their meaning by exercising the 
faculty of judgement on the realm of human affairs. 27 (11978: 209) 
And this thinking, fed by the present, works with the "thought 
fragments" it can wrest from the past and gather about itself. 
Like a pearl diver who descends to the bottom of the sea, not 
to excavate the bottom and bring it to light but to pry loose 
the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral in the 
depths and to carry them to the surface, this thinking delves 
into the depths of the past - but not in order to resuscitate it 
the way it was and to contribute to the renewal of extinct 
ages. (1995: 205-6) 
Ill. The Primacy of the Future: Willing as Freedom 
Benjamin's notion of linguistic fragments as consisting in remnants 
of a world essence brings to mind Arendt's interpretation of 
Heidegger's ontological difference, that is, 'the distinction between 
the Being of Being and the isness of beings, or entities' (1978: 
175), where Being would be the essence and beings the linguistic 
residues indicative of that which is no-more. Arendt considers 
Heidegger's essay on Anaximander, written after his involvement 
in the national -socialist movement, to inaugurate a new phase in 
his thought, one in which he repented for the errors of history, 
disavowing a law of necessity that operates behind men's backs in 
the realm of human affairs. To be in the present is to be caught in- 
27 Heidegger considers the thinker and the poet to be the 'guardians' of 
language, the home of Being. Both 'accomplish the manifestation of 
Being insofar as they bring this manifestation to language and preserve 
it in language through their saying'. To poetise is therefore to allow 
thinking to be claimed by Being. Because the destiny of thought is to 
disclose Being, its history is patent in the saying of thinkers, the latter 
who 'always say the Same' to the extent that they articulate being as 
advent, as that which arrives. (1998: 239,275) 
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between the passage of two absences, 
departure from the world of appearances. 
hidden during the periods of absence 
appearance, are unconcealed during their 
period during which they come to be and 
original state of concealment. 
that of arrival and 
Subjects, or beings, 
from the world of 
temporal life-span, a 
pass away into their 
... undoubtedly there is such a thing as becoming; everything 
we know has become, has emerged from some previous 
darkness into the light of day ... when, in passing-away, 
becoming ceases, it changes again into that Being from 
whose sheltering, concealing darkness it originally emerged. 
(1978: 191 ) 
As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws from their very 
brightness, seeking to remain concealed from the world of 
appearance. Because the history of Being is characterised by the 
oblivion of Being, by its permanent withdrawal from the realm 
where beings display themselves, the latter are free to roam in 
errancy within the space of unconcealment, thus providing the 
grounds for history to unfold. 
In that scheme, there is no place for a "History of Being"... 
enacted behind the backs of acting men; Being, sheltered in 
its concealment, has no history, and "every epoch of world 
history is an epoch of errancy. " However, the very fact that 
the time continuum in the historical realm is broken up into 
different eras indicates that the casting adrift of entities also 
occurs in epochs, and in Heidegger's scheme there seems to 
exist a privileged moment, the transitional moment from one 
epoch to the next, from destiny to destiny, when Being qua 
Truth breaks into the continuum of error... (11978: 192) 
These transitional periods are, according to Arendt, those in which 
an attempt at founding a novus ordo seclorum -a new order for the 
ages - is made, whereby men find themselves with the 
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responsibility of initiating a new course of action which, once 
commenced, has unpredictable and irreversible results. Because 
the end of the old, does not automatically lead to the beginning of 
the new, men should come to terms with the consequences 
inherent in the freedom to found a new beginning by searching for 
guidelines from the past so as to recreate the experience of 
foundation anew. 
With the modern demise of the Roman trinity of tradition, authority 
and religion, the gap between past and future originally pertaining 
to the faculty of thought extended itself to all spheres of life. It has 
become 'a fact of political relevance' by consisting in 'a tangible 
reality and a perplexity for all'. (1961: 14) In Heidegger's gap 
between absences, human existence (Dasein )28, lingering in the 
world of appearance - the realm of errancy in which history unfolds 
-, can join itself to Being, to the absent, through the activity of 
thought. Here, the absent has no history in the world of 
appearance. Furthermore, to think and to act are distinct activities 
in that by thought, one is joining oneself to that which is absent, 
whereas by acting, one is participating in the realm of errancy, the 
space in which history unfolds, characterised by the going astray 
that is the primary trait of human history. 29 (1978: 194) 
28 Although Arendt translates Dasein as human existence, Heidegger 
distinguishes existence from ek-sistence: where the metaphysical 
concepts of existentia and essentia correspond to actuality and 
possibility -a distinction which has dominated the Western tradition -, 
ek-sistence defies metaphysical determinations, referring to a 'Being 
there', a 'thownness' in the truth of Being, which implies a 'care for 
Being': 'As ek-sisting, the human being sustains Da-sein in that he 
takes the Da, the clearing of being, into "care". ' (1998: 248-9,250 260) 
29 In 'Letter on "Humanism"', Heidegger considers thought to consist in 
the 'simplest' and yet the 'highest' form of action due to positing the 
relation of beings to Being. Thought as Vengagement de Ittre thus 
distances itself from technical thought, a poiesis aiming at 'doing and 
making' rather than a praxis targeting action. (1998: 239-40) 
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Action derives from the faculty of the will, for it is only because we 
will that we can accomplish an act. The activity of willing always 
projects itself into the future, anticipating its own end, when what 
it wills will have been done. Whereas thought is an end in itself, 
having a circular motion whereby it recoils back into itself, in 
isolation from the outside world, the will, which is never 'done for 
its own sake' nor 'finds its fulfilment in the act itself', cannot take 
distance from the world of appearances. (1978: 37) The 
harmonious dialogue which occurs between me and myself - the 
two in one - which provides the basis for the activity of thought is 
transformed in the faculty of willing into a permanent conflict 
'between will and counter-will, between command and resistance'. 
(11978: 179) 
... the will's project presupposes an 
I-can that is by no 
means guaranteed. The will's worrying disquiet can be stilled 
only by the 1-can-and-l-do, that is, by a cessation of its own 
activity and release of the mind from its dominance. (1978: 
37) 
The radicality of the will stems from Nietzsche's discovery that we 
cannot will backwards. Once an action is accomplished, its 
consequences, which are a priori indeterminable, are irreversible. 
Arendt argues that in Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, the will is 
understood as a power that wills domination and control as its 
ultimate goal. Willing reveals a terror of the void, of emptiness, for 
nothingness means the very extinction of the will in not-willing. 
Rather than not will, the activity of willing would thus prefer to will 
nothingness, where the latter means to will the destruction of the 
past as well as of everything that is. 
From Nietzsche's discovery that the Will cannot "Will 
backwards, " there follow not only frustration and resentment, 
but also the positive, active will to annihilate what was. And 
since everything that is real has "become, " that is, 
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incorporates a past, this destructiveness ultimately relates to 
everything that is. (1978: 178) 
According to Arendt, Heidegger contrasts the purposiveness 
inherent in the will, leading ultimately to destruction, to thought as 
the letting-be that 'obeys the call of Being', seeking to join itself to 
the absent. (1978: 178) By advocating a will-not-to-will, Heidegger 
attempts to place primacy on the letting be of the thinking ego, a 
realm beyond the Will, in opposition to the category of causality 
inherent in the willing ego. He agrees with Nietzsche that the will's 
experience in causing effects - that is, free will - is an illusion of 
consciousness inherent in human nature. 
If we can no longer ascribe "the value of an action ... to the 
intention, the purpose for the sake of which one has acted or 
lived ......... the conclusion seems inevitable that "Nothing has 
any meaning" ... (1978: 167-8) 
The elimination of cause and effect abolish the temporal linearity 
of past, present and future, the past being the cause of the 
present, the present being the tense in which we build projects and 
goals for the future, and the future being the result of both past 
and present. (1978: 171) Eternal Recurrence, the will's affirmation 
of the world of appearance as the world it would will were it 
allowed to live again, is the only redemption from the omnipotence 
of the past in its transformation of the will's projects, always in the 
process of becoming, into regrets and resentments over what-will- 
have-been. This cyclical time concept, which is diametrically 
opposed to the will's temporal linearity projecting itself into a 
future which it attempts to master, consists in 'the thought that 
everything that passes returns', thus making 'Being swing within 
itself'. (1978: 171) The 'ubermansch' is the man who has been able 
to do away with beliefs in causes and effects, goals and intentions, 
as well as to overcome the 'all-devouring past' by recreating 'all "it 
was" into a "thus I willed it"'. Through constant reaffirmation of the 
present man must, in other words, transcend a nihilism which 
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"judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world 
as it ought to be that it does not exist... ". (1978: 169) Eternal 
Recurrence is thus a repudiation of the Will, of the latter's inability 
to 'will backwards' - that is, its impotence in relation to the past -, 
which prevents it from being able to undo an action whose outcome 
may be totally unexpected, in no way related to the will's original 
project. 
... the Will's impotence persuades men to prefer looking 
backward, remembering and thinking, because, to the 
backward glance, everything that is appears to be necessary. 
The repudiation of willing liberates man from a responsibility 
that would be unbearable if nothing that was done could be 
undone. (1978: 168) 
The contingency of the Will - the realisation that what is might as 
well not have been - is frightening to the extent to which we 
understand the full implications of the responsibility inherent in 
any act which, once started, escapes our control. Once the gap 
between past and future became apparent in the world of 
appearances due to Modernity's break with tradition, fatalistic 
narratives of necessity, claiming that what is or will be was meant 
to be, attempted to assuage the fear of the haphazard, a role 
which had formerly been attributed to Divine Providence. The iron 
law of scientific progress, the emblem of an age that had been 
inaugurated by the Cartesian doubt emphasising the necessity of 
submitting all sense evidence to scientific proof, was soon to be 
transposed to the realm of human affairs. The contingency inherent 
in human affairs would, from now on, be subject to explanations 
based on necessity. 
It is interesting to note, however, that whereas the emphasis 
placed on progress was clearly based on the future tense of the 
willing ego, there was nevertheless a concomitant search for 
meaning, on behalf of the thinking ego, in the haphazardness of 
events that occurred in the past. Hegel's articulation of a 
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phi I Oso ph y of History consists in precisely this attempt at 
conciliating the willing and the thinking egos, by combining the 
restlessness of a temporal movement that is onward driven with 
the backward glance of the historian who is able to detect a law of 
necessity that has determined the significance of events in the 
past. In Hegel, the mind produces time due to the willing activity, 
which simultaneously projects itself into the future and anticipates 
its past, by foreseeing a 'second future when the immediate I- 
shall-be will have become an I-shall-have-been'. (1978: 43) The 
future thus subsumes both present and past: by constantly 
assimilating the Now into the future, the present is negated by the 
Will which attempts to realise its projects in the absent not-yet; by 
anticipating the loss of its future, a time when it will be no more, 
the Will 'opens itself to the "tranquillity of the past" and thereby to 
inspection, reflection, and the backward glance of the thinking ego 
in its search for meaning'. According to this schema, the 
permanent impetus of the Will's thrusting itself into the future is 
only stalled by the anticipation of death, by the confrontation with 
its own end. This is the moment when the thinking ego takes the 
Will's projects as objects of reflection, transforming that which 
belonged to the future into the Now of thought's own enduring 
present. 
Hegel's attempt to conciliate the Will's rectilinear future tense with 
the thinking ego's enduring present that circles back into itself is 
patent in the dialectical movement. The latter ensures infinite 
progress, by moving from thesis to antithesis, resulting in a 
synthesis, which immediately establishes itself as a new thesis. 
(1978: 49) This movement, which conciliates the linearity of the 
willing ego with the circularity of the thinking ego by forming a 
spiral, corresponds, in Arendt's view, to the 'non-experienced 
movement of the World Spirit'. 
This World Spirit embodied in Mankind, as distinguished from 
individual men and particular nations, pursues a rectilinear 
movement inherent in the succession of the generations. 
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Each new generation forms a "new stage of existence, a new 
world" and thus has "to begin all over again, " but "it 
commences at a higher level" because, being human and 
endowed with mind, namely Recollection, it has "conserved 
(the earlier) experience. " (1978: 48) 
The problem is that by positing a World Spirit, Hegel has distanced 
himself from the living experience of both the thinking and willing 
egos, creating a hypothesis which bears no relation to reality. 
Arendt regards this attempt to conciliate the Will's future tense 
with the thinking ego's enduring present as doomed to failure. 
Whereas the Will 'demands that time shall never be terminated so 
long as men exist on earth', Hegelian philosophy requires not 
merely the suspension of time during the activity of thought, but 
'an arrest in real time'. 
In other words, Hegel's philosophy could claim objective 
truth only on condition that history were factually at an end, 
that mankind had no more future, that nothing could still 
occur that would bring anything new. (1978: 47) 
The power of negation inherent in the Will, conceived as the 
driving force of History, progresses infinitely forward by 
considering every goal as a means to establishing further goals. 
Because the Will "admits ends only as means to outwit itself", it 
can result either in infinite progress or in permanent annihilation 
depending on the starting point of the dialectical movement, Being 
or Not-Being. Arendt argues that Hegel took Being for granted as 
the beginning of the process, in its journey toward Not-Being and 
Becoming. If Hegel were to commence the process with Not-Being 
rather than Being, no Becoming would ever be possible. As such, 
Hegelian dialectics do not allow for the existence of 'sheer 
nothingness, that is, a negation that does not negate something 
specific and particular'. 
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All we can think is "a Nothing from which Something is to 
proceed; so that Being is already contained in the 
Beginning. " (1978: 51) 
Because narratives of necessity depict Being as already contained 
in the Beginning, men are unaccustomed to exercising the freedom 
inherent in action, a capacity which derives from the willing ego. 
This freedom cannot be separated from the responsibility inherent 
in the fact of contingency, that is, the realisation that there are no 
laws which can determine the effect of any particular action, and 
that what is could also not have been. Because the Will is, in 
Kant's words, our "faculty for beginning spontaneously a series in 
time", (1978: 110) Being cannot be contained in the Beginning, for 
this would deny the individuality of man, who is himself an 
absolute beginning (Augustine), not in time but in causality. Due to 
the fact that men are born into a world of appearances which 
precedes them in time and which continues to exist when they pass 
away, their willing faculty can have, in this context, only a relative 
first beginning; nevertheless, the freedom of spontaneity inherent 
in the willing faculty is absolute in the sense that each action will 
provoke a series of unpredictable and irreversible effects, over 
which, however appealing narratives of necessity may appear to 
be, no one has control. 
IV. On Inner Freedom in Fanon and Arendt: The Self- 
Production of Man 
According to Fanon, the liberation of the man of colour will only be 
accomplished when he defines himself as an 'absolute intensity of 
beginning', an existential becoming rather than an ontological 
being. In Arendt's Augustinian view, 'every man, created in the 
singular, is a new beginning by virtue of his birth'. (1978: 109) 
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Man's individuality demonstrates itself in the faculty of the Will, an 
organ which is directed towards the future and which spurs us to 
act. Arendt would regard Existentialism as rooted in the Hegelian 
time concept of the Will, which, by placing primacy on the future, 
cancels out the present: because man "says no to his Now", he 
'creates his own future'. (1978: 41) In this context, Fanon's 
definition of man as an existential becoming rather than an 
ontological being is profoundly Hegelian. 
If one turns back to Heidegger's distinction between the activities 
of thought and action, the former which indulges in joining itself 
with absent Being, and the latter - derived from the Will - occurring 
in the realm of errancy, the world of appearances in which actions 
performed by beings cause history to unfold, then it is clear that 
beings are in the constant process of becoming within their 
temporal existence. According to this schema, black consciousness 
as absolute is akin to the essence of Being, to which thought can 
join itself but which action is doomed to escape due to operating in 
a world of appearances. Black consciousness here would be 
ontological, pertaining to the realm of Being, were it not for the 
visibility of blackness, which can only occur in an existential world 
of appearance, always in the process of becoming. 
Arendt, as we saw, accused the Hegelian dialectical movement of 
positing a Beginning that already embodies Being, and of therefore 
being unable to think an absolute beginning, that which precedes 
every act of foundation. Fanon wishes, on one hand, to affirm the 
absolute beginning of man - that is, the sheer nothingness that 
should accompany such a beginning -, and, on the other, to assert 
the existential becoming of man in his incessant march toward the 
future. Arendt might find this problematic, if not only because the 
sheer nothingness inherent in an absolute beginning - which the 
dialectical movement does not allow for - results in the permanent 
annihilation of the whole process. It would thus be difficult to 
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Fanon argues that the man of colour can only achieve liberation by 
refusing to see either past or present as definitive. At the same 
time that he wishes to progress into a better world, Fanon casts, in 
true Hegelian fashion, a backward glance: the 'negro' can choose 
to recreate himself against the stereotypes of the past. By focusing 
on the possibility of man recreating himself, Fanon introduces 
invention into existence. 
Because both an absolute beginning, the "faculty for beginning 
spontaneously a series in time" (1978: 110), and an existential 
becoming belong to the willing ego and, as such, project 
themselves into the future, the willing faculty is predominant in 
Fanon. This Will, as in Nietzsche, presupposes a kind of power, for 
here the I-will anticipates an I-can. 
Says Fanon: '... man is a yes ... Yes to 
life ... ' (1986: 
222). If one 
compares this quote to Arendt's description of the Nietzschean Will 
as 'an unqualified Yes to Life' (1978: 163), the similarities between 
the Fanonian and the Nietzschean wills are obvious. However, 
whereas Nietzsche fought against the nihilism which "judges of the 
world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to 
be that it does not exist ... " 
(1978: 169), emphasising the 
importance of affirming the world we live in as the world we will, 
Fanon wants to take action to change social structures based on a 
historico- racial schema that create and perpetuate the notion of 
black inferiority. While Nietzsche found solace in an eternally 
recurring Becoming as the solution to the aimlessness of a world 
where, due to lack of intentions, everything has ceased to have 
meaning, Fanon believes in 'basic values that constitute a human 
world', the latter which should be defended by those who prepare 
to act. 
Fanon wished to attain consciousness of self by losing himself in 
the 'night of the absolute'. However, Sartre's affirmation that 
n6gritude was but a stage in the Marxian dialectical progression, 
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culminating in a society without races, destroyed Fanon's hope of 
finding the absolute in black consciousness. The final goal 
inherent in the Hegelian dialectical movement entails the 
destruction of n6gritude. 
Profoundly dialectical, Fanonian humanism consists in a permanent 
movement arising from the thesis of universal man and its 
antithesis of nativism or n6gritude - or from the thesis of the 
coloniser's inhumanity provoking the antithesis of the colonised 
subject's violence -, resulting in the liberation of both colonised 
and coloniser in the form of the new m an. 
The crux of Arendt's critique of Fanon might target the latter's 
recourse to a narrative of necessity which destroys the freedom of 
spontaneity inherent in action, considering that the freedom of the 
will which gives rise to existentialist thought coincides with an 
inner freedom - whereby an 'I will' is identified with an 'I can'. 
What in Hegel is identified as time produced by the willing faculty 
of the mind in its constant drive toward the future - without the 
realisation 'that he himself once was not and that one day he will 
be no more, ' man would be unable to comprehend the meaning of 
existence -, existentialist thought came to identify with the self- 
production of man's mind. (1978: 42-3) The Self thus coincides 
with the Will, ceasing to be when there is no future left. 
... the idea of man creating 
himself is strictly in the tradition 
of Hegelian and Marxian thinking; it is the very basis of all 
leftist humanism. But according to Hegel man "produces" 
himself through thought, whereas for Marx, who turned 
Hegel's "idealism" upside down, it was labour, the human 
form of metabolism with nature, that fulfilled this function. 
And though one may argue that all notions of man creating 
himself have in common a rebellion against the very 
factuality of the human condition - nothing is more obvious 
than that man, whether as member of the species or as an 
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individual, does not owe his existence to himself ... (1970: 
13) 
The predominant mood of the Will is restlessness and 
intranquillity, because although the Will may identify itself with an 
'I can' on an inner level, this 'I can' is by no means guaranteed in 
the world of appearance, in which the outcome of our actions is 
never predictable. This is why, according to Arendt, the 'soul' 
reacts to the future in fear and hope, carrying on a conflicting 
dialogue with itself, which can only be overcome by the 
extraordinary force of an inner voice of command. The very power 
of the affirmation of the Will lies, perhaps, in the knowledge of its 
own impotence, in relation to the past - the fact that it cannot Will 
backwards - and in relation to the outcome of concrete actions in 
the realm of human affairs. The strength of the inner voice of 
command derives from the attempt to overcome resistance, both in 
the external World, as well as in inner man. For unlike what occurs 
in the activity of thinking, the two-in-one of the Will are involved in 
a constant struggle against each other: the formation of every Will 
creates its counter-Will; every command creates its own 
resistance. 
This Paulinian discovery, which came hand-in-hand with the 
definition of Christian ethics, is concerned with the law: before a 
law was established, there was no knowledge of sin; hence it is the 
command of the law that originates sin. At the basis of this 
problematic lies the Apostle Paul's realisation of the impotence of 
the Will: "... For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I 
hate" (1978: 65). The 'I Will, ' in Fanon identified with the 'I Can', 
is in Paul an 'I Cannot'. The point is that the rift is not settled in 
favour of law or of sin, but rather, that it can only be healed by 
grace in Paul, and by love in Augustine. Both these concepts bring 
about a 'lastingness, a perdurance of which the mind otherwise 
seems incapable' in its ceaseless fluctuations. (1978: 103) For 
Duns Scotus, the Will's redemption comes from action itself, which 
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interrupts the struggle in which the Will addresses itself. The price 
of this redemption is freedom, however. 
I am ... entirely 
free, and I pay for this freedom by the 
curious fact that the Will always wills and nills at the same 
time; the mental activity in its case does not exclude its 
opposite. (1978: 102) 
Because we cannot act having regard simultaneously for that which 
we will and that which we nill, only by starting to act do we cease 
to will and redeem the conflict inherent in our Will. This action is 
different from Heidegger's will-not-to-will for, in this perspective, 
the latter would consist merely in another volition. 
On the basis of this short exposition of the Will, it may be 
concluded that political freedom is the price Fanon pays for his 
commitment to necessity. By acting he redeems the conflict 
inherent in the Will, but subsequently tries to control the outcome 
of his actions by seeking refuge in a narrative of necessity. This 
curtails the possibility of a genuinely new beginning patent in the 
very fact of natality or in every act of foundation. Fanon's 
emphasis on the primacy of necessity follows the Western 
philosophical tradition which equates freedom with the free will of 
'inner man'. However true it may be that the inner self is free, 
Arendt argues that such discussions are politically irrelevant. 
V. Freedom and Non-Sovereignty: A Reconciliation 
Arendt considers that the Western emphasis on deriving freedom 
from the will is dangerous because it can contribute to the 
accentuation of the divorce between the realm of thought and that 
of sense experience. She argues that when confronted with hostile 
environments, people have the tendency to seek refuge within 
themselves by appealing to an inner freedom which bears no link 
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to the world of appearances. This exploration of inner man is often 
used as a pretext to avoid confronting situations which threaten 
the potential for freedom in the real world. 
The experiences of inner freedom are derivative in that they 
always presuppose a retreat from the world, where freedom 
was denied, into an inwardness to which no other has 
access. The inward space where the self is sheltered against 
the world must not be mistaken for the heart or the mind, 
both of which exist and function only in interrelationship with 
the world. (1961: 146-47) 
For Arendt, freedom is first and foremost a political phenomenon. 
Because man consists in a new beginning, he always embodies the 
potential for freedom insofar as he is capable of action. However, 
man is free to the extent that he exercises action. Freedom only 
becomes a political reality when action is concretised, 'when action 
has created it own worldly space where it can come out of hiding 
... and make its appearance'. 
(1961: 169) 
Arendt argues that freedom is often regarded as a nonpolitical 
phenomenon due to its source being present even when action has 
lost the capacity to interrupt the automatism of political processes. 
Freedom, in such contexts, is no longer understood as a virtuosity, 
that is, as an accomplishment realised in the performance itself, 
but rather as a gift with which all human beings are endowed but 
which can only be fully realised when action creates a space of 
appearance enabling freedom to come out of its concealment. 
Because political freedom can only exist where the 'I will' 
coincides with the 'I can', an agent is no longer free when he 
cannot do, due to either exterior or interior circumstances. (1961: 
161) 
Arendt believes that action is free insofar as it is able to transcend 
both motives and predictable goals. This concept of free action 
differs from that of free will, where freedom of choice - liberum 
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arbitrium - concerns having to opt between two objects, on the 
basis of motive and the specificity of a predictable goal. Thus, by 
exercising the faculty of judgement, the intellect must first 
recognise the validity of a particular objective to be realised in the 
future, subsequently turning to the will to command the initiation of 
a course of action which will allow for the fulfilment of that goal. 
The recognition of the objective does not concern freedom, but 
rather the capacity to exercise right or wrong judgement. Although 
action needs both the intellect and the will to realise a particular 
objective, it exceeds both in that its source comes from principles, 
the latter which inspire action from without and become actualised 
in the performing act itself. 
Such principles are honour or glory, love of equality ... but 
also fear or distrust or hatred. Freedom or its opposite 
appears in the world whenever such principles are 
actualised; the appearance of freedom, like the manifestation 
of principles, coincides with the performing act. (1961: 153) 
This coincidence between freedom and the performing act was 
acknowledged, according to Arendt, by ancient Greek political 
thought, which defined freedom solely in terms of liberty of 
movement. Those who were free to move within the polis and 
within the frontiers of the city-states were property or slave owners 
who were liberated from the necessities of life and could dedicate 
themselves wholeheartedly to the caring for a common public 
space, in the company of other men of the same condition, by 
exercising the faculties of speech and action. 
... only ancient political communities were 
founded for the 
express purpose of serving the free - those who were neither 
slaves, subject to coercion by others, not labourers, driven 
and urged on by the necessities of life. If, then, we 
understand the political in the sense of the polis, its end or 
raison d'6tre would be to establish and keep in existence a 
space where freedom as virtuosity can appear. (1961: 154-5) 
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Because the Greek platonic tradition wished to abstain from 
politics - the vita activa - so as to dedicate itself to what was 
considered to be the 'highest and freest' way of life - the vita 
contemplativa -, the philosophers of antiquity did not articulate any 
concept of freedom, due to the latter's connotation of a tangible 
political reality inherent in human affairs. Freedom thus first 
surfaced in the Western philosophical tradition when the 
experience of religious conversion transposed a freedom that had 
had its origin in the realm of human affairs to that of the inner 
man, or the Will. This notion of free will attempted to articulate the 
idea that it was possible for man to be a slave and yet to be free. 
The identification of free will and sovereignty is, for Arendt, one of 
the most pernicious legacies of the Western philosophical 
tradition, because it can lead to either of the following 
conclusions: on one hand, it may legitimate the disavowal of 
human freedom, due to the realisation that men are never free as 
long as they cannot control the outcome of their actions; on the 
other hand, it can validate the affirmation of one's freedom - as an 
individual or as a group - at the price of sovereignty of all others. 
Whereas the first conclusion can be used to justify situations in 
which political freedom is threatened - such as the restriction of 
freedom in authoritarian regimes, the abolition of political freedom 
in tyrannies and dictatorships, and the total elimination of 
spontaneity in totalitarian regimes -, the second can excuse the 
use of non-political means, that is violence, against individuals or 
groups that are regarded as a menace to the establishment of 
one's sovereignty as an end. 
Where men wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as 
organised groups, they must submit to the oppression of the 
will, be this the individual will with which I force myself, or 
the "general will" of an organised group. If men wish to be 
free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce. (1961: 
165) 
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Arendt recognises, however, that it is extremely difficult to think 
freedom as coexistent with non-sovereignty within the conceptual 
framework of the Western philosophical tradition. The tact that 
man is free to act but cannot control the outcome of his actions 
demonstrates the absurdity of human existence. Although this 
dilemma was greatly elaborated on by existentialist thinkers, 
Arendt claims that the latter merely gave a 'rebellious' slant to 
traditional concepts. By placing emphasis on sovereignty as self- 
sufficiency or self -domination, these attempts share in common the 
denial of a plurality that characterises the human condition. This 
urge to overcome plurality results either in the self being asserted 
through domination of others, or in the denial of the existence of 
alterity by ignoring the real world in favour of an imaginary realm 
of inner man. 
Arendt argues that although the reality of the world of appearances 
destroys the illusion that identifies freedom with sovereignty, the 
capacity for action - which allows for the faculties of forgiving and 
making promises - carries within itself the potentialities enabling it 
to transcend the restrictions of non-sovereignty. While the 
predicament of irreversibility inherent in action - the fact that once 
a deed has been accomplished it cannot be undone, however much 
the agent may have been unaware of the consequences of his act 
before the latter was consummated - can only be redeemed by the 
faculty of forgiving, the predicament of unpredictability inherent in 
the outcome of action is assuaged by the faculty of making and 
keeping promises. (1989: 237) Without the faculty to forgive, 
human beings would be forever tied to the consequences of a 
single deed, from which they would never recover. The faculty of 
making promises, on the other hand, enables the confirmation of 
identity to take place between 'the one who promises and the one 
who fulfils' in the presence of others, that is, within the space of 
plurality which characterises the world of appearances. 
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Arendt argues that plurality is a necessary condition for 
forgiveness due to the latter consisting in an action where 'what 
was done is forgiven for the sake of who did it'. (1989: 241) 
Because identity in Arendt is always dependent on confirmation by 
others, and is thus a condition of plurality, one can never forgive 
oneself. The fact that the tangible reality of who a person is is only 
revealed by word or deed makes us incapable of perceiving 
ourselves with the distinctness that we appear to others in the 
world of appearances. 
Because automatism is inherent in all processes, historical 
processes are no less destructive than the biological ones that 
guide our life-span from birth to death. For Arendt, human affairs 
would bear the mark of the inexorable laws of automatic necessity 
that are characteristic of the natural sciences if it were not for the 
human capacity to undo, within certain limits, what has been done. 
Forgiving and making promises are, for Arendt, the only moral 
precepts which are not imposed on action from the outside, arising 
rather from the very condition of plurality, of sharing the world with 
others through word and deed. These capacities thus work as a 
'control mechanism' operating from within action, that is, the 
faculty enabling the initiation of new and unending processes. 
Action, with its constant challenge to the automatism inherent in 
laws of necessity, is akin to a miracle-working faculty in that it 
embodies the 'infinite improbability' which characterises the 
coming into the world of every new beginning. For Arendt, the 
infinitely improbable constitutes earthly reality, both natural and 
historical. However, because men cause political processes to 
occur through action, history is perhaps more open to the infinitely 
improbable - to the unforeseeable and the unpredictable - than 
natural processes. 
The decisive difference between the "infinite improbabilities" 
on which the reality of our earthly life rests and the 
miraculous character inherent in those events which 
238 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
establish historical reality is that, in the realm of human 
affairs, we know the author of the "miracles, " It is men who 
perform them - men who because they have received the 
twofold gift of freedom and action can establish a reality of 
their own. (1961: 171) 
V1. Political Freedom: Public Happiness or Civil Rights? 
Freedom alone is the reason why men live together in a political 
organisation and, as such, differs intrinsically from other 
phenomena of the public realm, namely justice, equality, or power. 
The latter are, indeed, possible only insofar as freedom exists, 
demonstrating the extent to which political life and action would be 
meaningless in a world without freedom. Freedom, however, only 
becomes the direct goal of political action in times of crisis or of 
revolution, when an old order has collapsed and an attempt at 
founding a new beginning is experienced. 
... only where change occurs 
in the sense of a new 
beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether 
different form of government, to bring about the formation of 
a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims 
at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of 
revolution. (1990: 35) 
Revolution, the urge to establish a new order, thus far transcends 
the reclamation of civil rights, the latter which consist in rights 
pertaining to the private realm - the sphere of necessity - such as 
life, property, and liberty. Arendt argues that had revolution aimed 
primarily at the establishment of civil rights, it would not have 
articulated freedom - participation in the public realm - as an 
objective, but would have contented itself merely with the 
successful liberation from governments 'which had over-stepped 
their powers and infringed upon old and well-established rights'. 
(1990: 32) 
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The fact is that although liberation and freedom may not coincide, 
the acts and deeds which liberation requires of the men who 
involve themselves in the process often throw them inadvertently 
into the public realm, where they begin 'to constitute that space of 
appearances where freedom can unfold its charms and become a 
visible, tangible reality'. Revolution thus aims for the foundation of 
freedom, that is, the formation of a republic which guarantees the 
space where freedom can appear. The emphasis on public 
happiness, as active participation in the public realm, in detriment 
to the habitually recognised citizens' rights to private well-being, 
has, according to Arendt, been historically distorted in the course 
of Revolutions: those who wish to attain liberation from the realm 
of Necessity rush to assist those who are attempting to found a 
new space for freedom, with the unfortunate result that all efforts 
are placed on liberation rather than on the framing of a 
constitution. 
And yet, was not Robespierre's profound unwillingness to put 
an end to the revolution also due to his conviction that 
"constitutional government is chiefly concerned with civil 
liberty, revolutionary government with public liberty? " Must 
he not have feared that the end of revolutionary power and 
the beginning of constitutional government would spell the 
end of "public liberty? " (1990: 133) 
Prior to both the American and French Revolutions, the end of 
government had been thought of in terms of public happiness and 
civil liberties. However, the course of the Revolutions brought to 
the fore a conflict between the public realm on one hand, and 
private interests on the other. 
For the American Revolution, it was a question of whether 
the new government was to constitute a realm of its own for 
the 'public happiness' of its citizens, or whether it had been 
devised solely to serve and ensure their pursuit of private 
happiness more effectively than had the old regime. For the 
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French Revolution, it was a question of whether the end of 
revolutionary government lay in the establishment of a 
'constitutional government' which would terminate the reign 
of public freedom through a guarantee of civil liberties and 
rights, or whether, for the sake of "public freedom, " the 
Revolution should be declared in permanence. (1990: 133- 
34) 
The question that Robespierre had posed was to haunt all 
subsequent attempts at founding new world orders: if the end of 
the Revolution would lead to the abolition of public happiness - or 
freedom - in name of the consolidation of civil liberties, then was it 
worth terminating revolutionary government? Although Robespierre 
defined the objective of Revolution as the establishment of public 
freedom, he simultaneously considered that constitutional 
government ought to protect citizens against the abuses of public 
power. According to Arendt, this is where the trouble begins. 
... power is still public and in the hands of government, but 
the individual has become powerless and must be protected 
against it. Freedom, on the other hand, has shifted places; it 
resides no longer in the public realm but in the private life of 
the citizens and so must be defended against the public and 
its power. Freedom and power have parted company, and the 
fateful equating of power with violence, of the political with 
government, and of government with a necessary evil has 
begun. (1990: 137) 
From this perspective, the citizen's political liberty is regarded as 
a potential freedom from politics. Political liberty here consists in 
security, a quality which should be provided for by the power of 
government, permitting 'an undisturbed development of the life 
process of society as a whole'. (1961: 150) According to Arendt, 
this rift between civil liberties and public freedom has survived 
down to our days, having even been accentuated during the 
periods of totalitarian rule of the twentieth century. Arendt, 
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however, also accuses liberalism of having contributed to 
abolishing the concept of liberty from the public realm, by 
defending that politics should primarily concern itself with fulfilling 
the necessities inherent in the private well-being of citizens. 
Now, where life is at stake all action is by definition under 
the sway of necessity, and the proper realm to take care of 
life's necessities is the gigantic and still increasing sphere of 
social and economic life whose administration has 
overshadowed the political realm ever since the beginning of 
the modern age. (1961: 155) 
The public realm, the world of appearances in which we live, 
transcends any possible concern for life, due to the very fact that 
it precedes and outlasts our coming into being. The private realm, 
on the contrary, is solely dedicated to ensuring the security of the 
life process at the hands of family and household. 30 
VII. Safeguarding Freedom: Political Equality and Social 
Discrimination 
In the ancient Greek city-states, political freedom - or participation 
in the public realm - was solely enjoyed by those citizens who had 
liberty of movement, and as such could move with ease from the 
private domain to the public realm, or between city-states. These 
citizens were property or slave owners who were liberated from the 
necessities of life, being the latter fulfilled in the private realm. 
Although equality of condition was a prerequisite for participation 
30 According to Seyla Benhabib, feminist theory has drawn attention to 
the distinction between private and public realms as complicitous with 
discourses of domination which legitimate womens' oppression in the 
private realm. Benhabib proposes a Habermasian 'discourse model of 
legitimacy', based on a communicative ethics aiming at the 
renegotiation of the boundaries between private and public as an 
alternative to Arendt's agonistic model. (1997: 82,110-11 
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in the polis, the men who participated in the public realm were 
regarded as equal insofar as they formed a body of peers in which 
there was no-rule, that is, no division between rulers and ruled. 
This idea of no-rule was expressed in the term isonomy. 
Isonomy guaranteed equality, but not because all men were 
born or created equal, but, on the contrary, because men 
were by nature not equal, and needed an artificial institution, 
the polis, which ... would make them equal ... (1990: 30-1 
) 
In ancient Greece, equality thus existed only in the public realm, 
where men lived together as citizens and not as private 
individual S. 3' The important point about isonomy is that it assumes 
that where there is rule, the ruler is not free. By exercising rule 
over others, he has set himself apart from his peers in the 
company of whom he would have been free. He has thus proceeded 
to annihilate the political space in which both he and others could 
partake of freedom. 
The reason for this insistence on the interconnection of 
freedom and equality in Greek political thought was that 
freedom was understood as being manifest in certain ... 
human activities, and that these activities could appear and 
be real only when others saw them, judged them, 
remembered them. (1990: 31) 
31 Seyla Benhabib notes that Arendt's idealisation of the agonistic 
political space of the polis minimises the fact that the latter was only 
possible due to the exclusion of 'women, slaves, labourers, non-citizen 
residents, and ... non-Greeks', all of whom were confined to the private 
realm, catering through their labour to the life necessities that permitted 
'leisure for politics'. Arendt's hostility to the intrusion of the social into 
the public realm in the modern age can be read as a 'critique of political 
universalism', whereby political participation is considered impossible 
when the public realm is reduced to administrative and economic 
functions. (1997: 82,91) 
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This idea of equality inherent in Greek political thought sponsored 
by Arendt differs greatly from our contemporary notion of equality, 
according to which all men are created equal and only become 
unequal due to the influence of social or political institutions. 
Arendt claims that equality is one of the most uncertain conditions 
of humankind. She is an apologist of the boundaries of the nation- 
state, arguing that the latter protect the individual in his 
distinctiveness as a political being appearing within the framework 
of the law: all citizens are therefore safeguarded in their equality 
as members of a particular nation-state, independently of class, 
ethnicity, or gender. Whereas the realm of the social is for Arendt 
composed of the differences inherent in the human condition, the 
political is, on the one hand, where these differences can be 
defended as equal to each other in value under the eyes of the 
law, and, on the other, where the individual can distinguish himself 
in the will to actively participate in a body politic, where he seeks 
recognition by the Other through excellence. " 
Arendt states that whenever groups are prevented from action and 
from attaining achievement, they tend to become inward looking. 
Great part of her work is devoted to describing the dangers 
entailed by the refusal to participate in a body politic. One 
example would concern the Jewish experience in Germany. In The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt states that European Jews 
became powerful in the seventeenth century, due to their links to 
European aristocracy who depended on the former as money- 
lenders. Rather than identifying themselves with a particular 
32 Because excellence is attained 'performatively' in the public realm, 
Habermas reads Arendt as presenting a communicative theory of 
political action in the form of a renewal of Aristotelian praxis, based on 
consensual and dialogic rationality, in detriment to instrumental action, 
corresponding to poiesis, whose technical rationality threatens the 
political sphere in the modern age. Villa argues that Arendt would 
regard a communicative politics with a consensual objective as 
instrumental, for action then no longer consists in an end in itself. 
(1996: 5,6,42) 
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people in terms of nationality, Jews considered themselves to be 
above the national, drawing security from their closeness to the 
State, the nobility. 
With the development of the modern nation-state in the eighteenth 
century, the bourgeoisie embarked on imperial expansionism thus 
paving the way for capitalistic enterprise to progress. The State, 
which had monopoly over the instruments of violence necessary to 
realise the imperialist project, became increasingly powerful, and 
ceased to rely on inter-European Jews. The sedimentation of the 
nation-state came alongside the protection of the rights of the 
citizen who found himself within the geographical boundaries of 
the nation-state, independently of nationality. Equality on the 
political realm among all groups belonging to a nation-state thus 
became a juridical reality. However, because Jews continued to be 
identified with the State by the masses in general - due to their 
historical links to the European aristocracy -, they were never 
accepted as equals in the social realm, despite being equal, on a 
juridical level, to any other national citizen. 
This leads Arendt to conclude that the power of Jews in Europe 
diminished inversely to their juridical recognition as equals. 
Critical of any discriminatory movement, Arendt nevertheless 
insinuates that discrimination was not a one-way process, blaming 
the isolation to which Jews voted themselves in Germany, for 
example, where rather than actively participate in the German body 
politic they continued to regard themselves as a diasporic, inter- 
European community. 
Arendt would use similar arguments concerning the failed attempt 
at school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957. At the 
time, the situation evolved into a conflict between the US Federal 
Government and the Arkansas State Government, with President 
Eisenhower ordering black children to be escorted by troops to 
school. In an article called 'Reflections on Little Rock', Arendt 
spoke out against the decision to integrate schools in the South. 
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What the desegregation policy meant, according to Arendt, was 
that adults were being deresponsibilised from attempting to resolve 
their problems in the political realm, placing instead the burden on 
children, who would be forced to confront hostility within the social 
realm, i. e. from white school children and teachers. Arendt 
opposed the pressure to integrate where the welcome was non- 
existent. Considered controversial today, her position can be read 
as drawing a parallel between the situation in Arkansas and that 
lived by Jews in Germany before World War 11. Her intention may 
have been to ward off a similarly explosive situation, where, on 
one hand, the Jews' status as a separate body paved the way for 
their being targeted as an 'objective enemy' by the National 
Socialist movement, and, on the other, the growing 'equality of 
condition' of Jews with other groups led to increasing social 
discrimination. 
Arendt regards the attempt of the US Federal Government to 
impose an education desegregation policy on the State 
Governments as a breach of the principle of the division of power 
inherent in the federalist structure, of the private rights of parents 
over their children to bring them up as they saw fit, and of the 
social right to free association. Her major preoccupation is to 
safeguard freedom within the public realm, in a context where the 
Federal Government was resorting to means of violence to enforce 
an education policy that, for Arendt, had more to do with the social 
right of free association than with the political rights deriving from 
citizenship. 
Arendt contends that the then prevailing inter-marriage laws of 29 
of the 49 states represented a much more serious offence and 
violation of the Constitution than segregation of schools. For these 
inter-marriage laws aimed directly at the private realm, the domain 
which is ruled neither by equality nor discrimination, but rather by 
the right to choose those with whom we wish to spend our lives. 
Unlike the social realm, which is guided by the likeness of 
characteristics shared in common by a group, our choice of 
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relationships in the private realm 'strikes, inexplicably and 
unerringly, at one person in his uniqueness, his unlikeness to all 
other people we know'. (1959: 53) 
The rules of uniqueness and exclusiveness are, and always 
will be, in conflict with the standards of society precisely 
because social discrimination violates the principle, and 
lacks validity for the conduct, of private life ... The scandal 
begins only when ... challenge to society and prevailing 
customs, to which every citizen has a right, is interpreted as 
a criminal offence ... Social standards are not legal 
standards and if legislature follows social prejudice, society 
has become tyrannical. (1959: 53) 
Because the right to 'home and marriage' is an elementary civil 
right pertaining to the sphere of 'life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness', the government has no right to enforce laws in this 
area. Arendt opposes government intervention against 
discriminatory practices inherent in the social realm, where the 
identifiability of groups depends on their differentiation from other 
groups. However, the government does have the duty of preventing 
the legal enforcement of socially discriminatory practices. 
Just as the government has to ensure that social 
discrimination never curtails political equality, it must also 
safeguard the rights of every person to do as he pleases 
within the four walls of his own hom e. The moment social 
discrimination is lega lly enforced, it becomes persecution ... 
The moment social discrimination is legally abolished, the 
freedom of society is violated ... 
The government can 
legitimately take no steps against social discrimination 
because government can act only in th e name of equality -a 
principle which does not obtain in the social sphere. (1959: 
53) 
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For Arendt, the ideal solution to ward off situations similar to those 
which occurred in Nazi Germany would be, on the one hand, to 
recognise that there is no such thing as equality in the social 
realm, and on the other, to have the law recognise, in the political 
realm, all citizens as equal in their differences. 
VIII. Universal Human Rights Vs. 'Rights of an Englishman' 
Arendt believed that equality is one of the most uncertain 
conditions of humankind; the only certainty inherent in human 
plurality are the differences that exist among people. She is highly 
critical of a notion of equality that often reduces the human to 
mere humanity. 
If a Negro in a white community is considered a Negro and 
nothing else, he loses along with this right to equality that 
freedom of action which is specifically human; all his deeds 
are now explained as 'necessary' consequences of some 
'Negro' qualities; he has become some specimen of an 
animal species, called man. Much the same thing happens to 
those who have lost all distinctive political qualities and have 
become human beings and nothing else. (1979: 302) 
In totalitarian regimes, she states, individuality, any trace that 
distinguishes a man from another, is not tolerated. 'As long as all 
men have not been made equally superfluous ... the ideal of 
totalitarian domination has not been achieved'. (11979: 457) 
According to Arendt, it is only within the body politic of citizenship 
that the human being can be protected as a legal persona, that is, 
as a 'rig ht-and-d uty-beari ng person' whose identity is created and 
confirmed within the framework of the law. 
The distinction between a private individual in Rome and a 
Roman citizen was that the latter had a persona, a legal 
personality ... Without his persona, there would be an 
individual without rights and duties, perhaps a 'natural man' - 
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that is, a human being or homo in the original meaning of the 
word, indicating someone outside the range of the law and 
the body politic of the citizens, as for instance a slave - but 
certainly a politically irrelevant being. (1990: 107) 
Arendt claims that where there is no conception of the legal 
persona, created and protected by the body politic, any attempt at 
equalisation of differences can be catastrophic, such as that which 
occurred subsequently to the French Revolution. 
... the men of the Revolution were no 
longer concerned ... 
with equality in the sense that everybody should be equally 
entitled to his legal personality ... They believed that they 
had ... liberated the natural man in all men, and given 
him 
the Rights of Man to which each was entitled, not by virtue of 
the body politic to which he belonged but by virtue of being 
born ... the 
Reign of Terror ... equalised because it left all 
inhabitants equally without the protecting mask of a legal 
personality. (1990: 109) 
Whereas the American Bill of Rights based itself on a division of 
power so as to control governmental omnipotence - thereby 
presupposing the rights to freedom and citizenship -, the French 
Rights of Man equated politics with nature, defining the primary 
rights inherent in man's nature, that is, his right to the necessities 
of life. Rather than being understood as prepolitical civil rights, 
pertaining to a private realm in which no public authority could 
interfere, they were to serve as the I ou nclation -stone' and ultimate 
end of the new body politic. 
Arendt opposes a universalist notion of the rights of man, insisting 
that history has taught us that once a people loses the right to 
citizenship there is no universal law of the rights of man capable of 
protecting it from being targeted as an enemy, due to visible 
differentiation. 
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The great danger arising from the existence of people forced 
to live outside the common world is that they are thrown 
back, in the midst of civilisation, on their natural givenness, 
on their mere differentiation ... The paradox involved in the 
loss of human rights is that such loss coincides with the 
instant when a person becomes a human being in general - 
without a profession, without a citizenship, without an 
opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify 
himself - and different in general, representing nothing but 
his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of 
expression within and action upon a common world, loses all 
significance. (1979: 302) 
Arendt emphasises the importance of Edmund Burke's 'rights of an 
Englishman', that is, his reliance on an '"entailed inheritance" of 
rights which one transmits to one's children like life itself' and 
which 'spring "from within the nation"', rather than from the French 
Revolution's Declaration of the Rights of Man. 
The pragmatic soundness of Burke's concept seems to be 
beyond doubt in the light of our manifold experiences. Not 
only did loss of national rights in all instances entail the loss 
of human rights; the restoration of human rights, as the 
recent example of the State of Israel proves, has been 
achieved so far only through the restoration or the 
establishment of national rights. (1979: 299) 
Although Arendt is suspicious of universalisms and defends 
national boundaries as a domain in which the citizen can be 
protected, she nevertheless supports, in Eichmann in Jerusalem, 
the post-1945 juridical concept of 'crimes against humanity', 
stating that a sharp distinction must be drawn between expulsion 
and genocide, the former being an 'offence against fellow-nations, 
whereas the latter is an attack upon human diversity as such, that 
is, upon a characteristic of the "human status" without which the 
very words "mankind" or "humanity" would be devoid of meaning'. 
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(1994: 269) For Arendt, genocide distinguishes itself from any 
other crime by the enormity of a deed that violates an 'altogether 
different order' and 'different community'. (1994: 272) 
Thus, although Arendt praises the trial of Eichmann for providing 
an opportunity where 'Jews were able to sit in judgement on crimes 
committed against their own people' and exercise their full 'rights 
of Englishmen' thereby avoiding falling back on a universalist 
language of the rights of man complicit with Nazi atrocities (1994: 
271), she nevertheless defends the need for an international 
criminal court to judge events the monstrousness of which 'is 
"minimised" before a tribunal that represents one nation only'. 
(1994: 270) 
IX. Equality in Arendt and Fanon: A Comparison 
Fanonian humanism predicates itself on universalism, intending to 
restore the unity of mankind, that is, a unity that has been torn 
apart by inhuman practices, such as colonialism. Thus, whereas 
Arendt opposes a universalist language of human rights which 
posits an equality of condition inherent in 'natural man', given at 
birth rather than constituted in the political realm, Fanon would 
adopt the messianic universalism of the French revolutionaries who 
defended the malheureux, the victims of misery and exploitation. 
Fanon's moving cry against all forms of oppression is rooted in the 
Romantic emotion of compassion, articulated by Rousseau, which 
gives rise to the sentiment of pity, predominant in the Christian 
tradition. The very concept of le peuple, which arose from the 
French Revolution, conveys the outrage of the "heart" against the 
hypocrisy and corruption of a society that ignored the poors' basic 
rights to life inherent in the realm of necessity. 
Where the breakdown of traditional authority set the poor of 
the earth on the march, where they left the obscurity of their 
misfortunes and streamed upon the market-place, their furor 
seemed as irresistible as the motion of the stars, a torrent 
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rushing forward with elemental force and engulfing a whole 
world. (Arendt, 1990: 113) 
This 'necessity in motion' is, for Arendt, the hallmark of the modern 
age. Although men have realised, since antiquity, that freedom 
requires liberation from life's necessity, only modernity witnessed 
their pitting themselves against necessity. The result was that the 
necessity, that which should concern the private realm, occupied 
the public realm, the domain in which men should be free as 
citizens within the framework of the law. 
Universal mankind was perhaps first articulated as a political 
concept in Rousseau's Social Contract, where the general will 
corresponds to the interest of the people or the nation as a whole, 
in contrast to the particular interests of each citizen. Thus, just as, 
in foreign affairs, the unity of a nation-state relies on the existence 
of a common national enemy, the unifying principle within the 
nation itself, in terms of domestic politics, was the common enemy 
that appeared in the form of the private interests of all citizens. 
Robespierre was to elect the passion of compassion for the 
malheureux as the nation's general will, that is, as the single force 
that could unite the distinct classes of society into one nation. This 
capacity for compassion in the presence of the suffering of others - 
as opposed to the faculty of reasoning which interferes with 
compassion - had been the basis upon which Rousseau defended 
the innate virtue of natural man. (1990: 81) 
Fanon's focus on the primacy of the interests of the nation over 
those of the individual as well as the compassion felt for the 
sufferings of the damnds de la terre are reminiscent of Rousseau's 
deliberations. Arendt, however, argues that compassion is 
politically irrelevant, for it eliminates the worldly space between 
men in which the public realm is to be found. 
As a rule, it is not compassion which sets out to change 
worldly conditions in order to ease human suffering, but if it 
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does, it will shun the drawn-out wearisome processes of 
persuasion, negotiation, and compromise, which are the 
processes of law and politics, and lend its voice to the 
suffering itself, which must claim for swift and direct action, 
that is, for action with the means of violence. (1990: 87) 
To the emotion of compassion corresponds the sentiment of pity, 
which is translated into action through the principle of solidarity. 
Compassion can only comprehend the particular, the suffering of 
one person in detriment to the general. However, because 
sentiments are boundless, pity can 'reach out to the multitude', no 
longer directed at specific suffering nor at particular persons. 
Since the days of the French Revolution, it has been the 
boundlessness of their sentiments that made revolutionaries 
so curiously insensitive to reality in general and to the reality 
of persons in particular, whom they felt no compunctions in 
sacrificing to their "principles, " or to the course of history, or 
to the cause of revolution as such. (1990: 90) 
The sentiment of pity that inspired the French revolutionaries led 
them to congregate all the oppressed into one mass, the toujours 
maiheureux. Le peuple as a mass drowned the infinite diversity 
inherent in plurality, and aimed for a unanimity of public opinion 
akin to a form of tyranny which destroyed the foundations of 
freedom. 
... no formation of opinion is ever possible where all opinions 
have become the same ... public opinion, by virtue of its 
unanimity, provokes a unanimous opposition and thus kills 
true opinions everywhere. (1990: 226) 
Democracy as the rule of the many is opposed to isonomy as the 
condition prevailing among a body of peers in which there is no 
division between rulers and the ruled. Because the American 
Revolution identified the people with the plurality of voices and 
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interests inherent in the human condition, the foundation of 
freedom consisted in a public realm in which there was an 
exchange - rather than an unanimity - of opinions between equals. 
The direction of the American Revolution remained 
committed to the foundation of freedom and the 
establishment of lasting institutions, and to those who acted 
in this direction nothing was permitted that would have been 
outside the range of civil law. The direction of the French 
Revolution was deflected almost from its beginning from this 
course of foundation through the immediacy of suffering; it 
was determined by the exigencies of liberation not from 
tyranny but from necessity ... (1990: 92) 
Arendt would have regarded the course of revolutionary struggle 
defended by Fanon to liberate European colonies and to found a 
new order as closer in spirit to the French than the American 
Revolution. Springing from the sentiments of the heart, the 
inspiration of Fanon's struggle lies in pity for the suffering of 
humankind, in the desire to liberate human beings from the realm 
of Necessity, and in the amalgamation of men into a single mass, 
who from the damnds become the puissance de la terre. As in the 
French Revolution, private class interests must be subjugated to 
the general will of the nation, whose unifying force after the defeat 
of the foreign occupier must combat the private interests of 
individuals or particular groups, such as the native bourgeoisie - 
who seeks to take over the position of the colonial bourgeoisie - or 
the native intellectual - who may refuse to assume responsibility 
for the totality of the nation rather than merely for national culture. 
Fanon's defence of the unity of humankind is predicated on the 
equality of condition inherent in human beings by birth. It is 
because all men are equal that, in his view, all men have the right 
to freedom. For Arendt, on the contrary, it is freedom that makes 
equality possible: the space of freedom between men is actualised 
by their action as a body of peers in the public realm in which 
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there is no division between rulers and ruled. Equality therefore is 
an artificial construct, deriving from a political organisation that is 
possible insofar as men are free to act. Fanon's view of freedom 
echoes Rousseau's aphorism, according to which "man is born 
free, but everywhere he is in chains". Defending that man should 
not relinquish freedom through his choices, Fanon believes that 
the realm of inner freedom, shared by all men in common, can be 
transposed into the outer world by action. Thus, man can choose 
to be free. By positing free choice, the ability to choose between 
objects on the basis of motive and the specificity of goal, Fanon 
relies on the Will as the source of freedom. His arguments thus 
operate within the framework of the Western philosophical tradition 
that assumes the equation between sovereignty and freedom. 
Fanon incurs the risk of believing that the affirmation of the 
colonial subject's freedom - as an individual or a group - must 
occur at all price, that is, at the expense of others. However, once 
the decolonisation process is completed, both colonised and 
coloniser are free to access the realm of humanity. According to 
the narrative of Necessity that guides Fanon's course of action, the 
stage is set for the progression towards the final stage of 
revolution and the restoration of the unity of man. 
Fanon's concept of equality is a product of the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man, which presupposes a human essence that 
pervades natural man. However, he simultaneously wishes to draw 
attention to the visibility of blackness, to that which gives rise to a 
historico- racial schema that underlies the lived experience of 
blackness. The equality of condition presupposed by Fanon 
contradicts his emphasis on the visibility of blackness. In fact, 
throughout Fanon's work, one witnesses a 'double-bind' between a 
desire to emphasise the universality of the human condition and 
the desire to affirm blackness. In the end, he settles for reaching 
out to the universal, to one human being, subsuming the visibility 
of blackness within a narrative of Necessity that will lead to the 
unity of man. 
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By positing equality as one of the most uncertain conditions of 
humankind, Arendt introduces the visibility of the body into 
discourse. Because we live in a world of appearances, our 
identities are constructed by the way we appear in the public 
realm. It is on the basis of how we are seen, heard, and judged by 
others that our identity is confirmed. 
The disclosure of "who" in contradistinction to "what" 
somebody is - his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, 
which he may display or hide - is implicit in everything 
somebody says and does ... it is more than likely that the 
"who, " which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, 
remain hidden from the person himself ... (1989: 179- 80) 
Because the basic tenet of the American Bill of Rights is the 
principle of equality, that is, of equalising that which by nature and 
origin is distinct, Arendt voices concern, in Reflections on Little 
Rock, that the contradictions inherent in equality may threaten the 
'American way of life'. She argues that one cannot ignore the 
lessons of history that have taught us that 'the more equal people 
have become, and the more equality permeates the whole texture 
of society, the more will differences be resented, the more 
conspicuous will those become who are visibly and by nature 
unlike the others'. (1959: 48) 
Just as social discrimination against Jews erupted full-blast after 
1808, when the Prussian government issued emancipation decrees 
giving full civic rights to Jews, Arendt fears that the enforcement 
of 'social, economic, and educational equality' of African 
Americans might accentuate the race problem in the US. 
... the Negroes' visibility is unalterable and permanent. 
This 
is not a trivial matter. In the public realm, where nothing 
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counts that cannot make itself seen and heard, visibility and 
audibility are of prime importance. (1959: 47 )33 
Arendt argues that whether we like it or not, social discrimination 
will always exist. The Government has no right to abolish social 
discrimination, for any attempt to do so will infringe upon the right 
of free association. However, it has the absolute duty of ensuring 
that social discrimination is not legally enforced, preventing the 
latter from entering the public realm in which political equality 
34 protects all citizens . 
Arendt firmly believes that only citizenship can protect the rights of 
human beings. Once an individual is reduced to mere humanity, to 
'natural givenness', he loses contact with a common world in which 
we appear to others through word and deed. Slavery thus strikes 
Arendt as a lesser evil than the loss of citizenship: although the 
tragedy of the slave condition resides in the incapacity to make 
oneself heard by others in the public realm, the slave nevertheless 
belongs to a human community, having a place in society, whereas 
a group that has lost citizenship, that is, its community, has 
nothing to fall back upon except its own naked humanity. (1979: 
297) 
33 According to Vikki Bell, in 'Reflections on Little Rock' Arendt argues 
for an ideal of 'disembodied participation' in the public realm, where life 
issues such as bodily distinctions are not contemplated. This gives rise 
to a dichotomy between a space of appearances - or public realm - 
where one appears through word and deed on one hand, and the 
visibility of bodily distinctions on the other. Thus, while action is linked 
to 'appearance' of the personality through 'debate and deliberation', 
bodily visibility is relegated to non-action. (1999: 69-71,75) 
34 Bell insists that Arendt's distinction between public and social realms 
reveals a utopian vision of an 'ideal political world', for forms of free 
association often influence discriminatory political practices. (1999: 76) 
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X. Nation and Race: Territory or Tribe? 
According to Arendt, the State, as supreme legal institution, has a 
structure that derives from the tradition of monarchy and 
enlightened despotism, aiming primordially at the protection of the 
rights of all its inhabitants. Consciousness of nationality is a much 
more recent phenomenon, colliding with the function of the State. 
In the name of the will of the people the state was forced to 
recognise only "nationals" as citizens, to grant full civil and 
political rights only to those who belonged to the national 
community by right of origin and fact of birth. This meant that 
the state was partly transformed from an instrument of the 
law into an instrument of the nation. (1979: 230) 
Arendt traces the development of nationalism back to the demise 
of absolute monarchy and the subsequent development of class 
interests. Whereas under absolutism, the monarch was supposed 
to serve the interests of the nation as a whole, the abolition of the 
king led to the disintegration of these common interests into a 
myriad of private class interests and into a constant struggle for 
control of the State. 
The only remaining bond between the citizens of a nation- 
state without a monarch to symbolise their essential 
community, seemed to be national, that is, common origin. 
So that in a century when every class and section in the 
population was dominated by class or group interest, the 
interest of the nation as a whole was supposedly guaranteed 
in a common origin, which sentimentally expressed itself in 
nationalism. (1979: 230) 
The State became heavily centralised, monopolising means of 
violence so as to prevent centrifugal tendencies inherent in a class 
society from tearing the nation apart. Nationalism thus became the 
factor which brought together a centralised State and an atomised 
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so ci ety, serving the function that absolutism once had in 
connecting the members of a nation-state. 
The modern nation-state was born when the French Revolution 
joined its demands for national sovereignty to the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man. According to Arendt, this combination 
demonstrates precisely the conflict between State and nation that 
accompanied the birth of the nation-state. 
The same essential rights were at once claimed as the 
inalienable heritage of all human beings and as the specific 
heritage of specific nations, the same nation was at once 
declared to be subject to laws, which supposedly would flow 
from the Rights of Man, and sovereign, that is, bound by no 
universal law and acknowledging nothing superior to itself. 
(1979: 230) 
The result of these contradictions was that, in practice, human 
rights were to be applied merely as national rights, and that the 
very mechanism of the State, whose legal function was to 'protect 
and guarantee man his rights as man, as citizen, and as national', 
became the symbol of a national essence, or a "national soul", the 
existence of which was regarded as above the law. 
For Arendt, 'nationalism is essentially the expression of this 
perversion of the state into an instrument of the nation and the 
identification of the citizen with the member of the nation'. 
However, nationalism in this form did not yet present a threat, on 
the one hand because it was limited within defined boundaries, due 
to the identification of nationals with their territory, and on the 
other, because the very institution of the State provided a legal 
framework which controlled it. The true danger lay in the 'tribal 
nationalism' that prevailed amongst the rootless peoples of 
Austria-Hungary and of Czarist Russia, both of whom had no 
specific territory of their own and who felt at 'home' wherever there 
were other members of their community. (1979: 232) 
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Pan-movements, such as Pan-Germanism or Pan-Slavism, claimed 
the divine origin of their own people and thus distanced 
themselves from the Judaeo-Christian concept of the divine origin 
of man, which had served as the metaphysical basis for defending 
the political equality of human purpose on earth. This principle of 
equality was perverted by nineteenth century positivism, in its 
belief that men are equal in nature, and made unequal due to 
social and political institutions. The concept of mankind as a family 
of nations was, in turn, distorted by nationalism, which classified 
nations according to a hierarchical structure where social and 
historical differences were transposed into innate differences in 
man. By electing themselves as the chosen people - the people of 
divine origin -, the pan-movements advocated a racist theory which 
denied the common purpose of establishing humanity, the sharing 
of responsibility for a common world, and which shrouded their 
socio-historicai reality in a 'pseudomystical cloud of divine eternity 
and finality'. 
Politically, it is not important whether God or nature is 
thought to be the origin of a people; in both cases, no matter 
how exalted the claim for one's own people, peoples are 
transformed into animal species so that a Russian appears 
as different from a German as a wolf is from a fox. (1979: 
234-5) 
The common origin of mankind, presupposed by the political and 
moral standards of nation-states that boasted a strong Judaeo- 
Christian tradition, was put to test with the "Scramble for Africa". 
As a justification for its deeds, imperialism resorted to racism, to 
the idea that there were superior and inferior races within the 
scale of Darwinian evolution. However, Arendt argues that had 
there not been a tradition of race-thinking prior to the imperialist 
experience, European nations might have had difficulty in 
camouflaging the inhumanity of a new doctrine incompatible with 
the ideal of a natural equality inherent in mankind. 
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Racism became the ideological instrument of imperialistic politics, 
assimilating race opinions that prevailed in the nineteenth century, 
the roots of which extended to the eighteenth century. Arendt 
claims that race-thinking was born as an opposing force to the 
establishment of the nation-state, and that it is a serious error to 
equate nationalism with racism. (1979: 161) Arendt traces the birth 
of racialism back to the French aristocracy's effort to establish 
itself not as a representative of its own people but rather as a 
separate ruling caste, sharing more in common with other foreign 
aristocrats than with French nationals. 
Count Gobineau's 'discovery' of a secret law that guided the rise 
and fall of civilisations consisted in an attempt to convert race 
opinion, concerning the superiority of the aristocrats in relation to 
French nationals, into a 'scientific' doctrine. According to 
Gobineau, the fail of the aristocracy - which led to the fall of 
France, of Western civilisation, and of the whole of mankind - had 
two immediate contradictory consequences: that of the formation of 
a new natural aristocracy, as well as the degeneration of the 
human race due to miscegenation. Arendt claims that this 
contradiction was resolved when the 'new race-aristocracy' decided 
to accelerate the "inevitable" process of the decay of mankind, a 
process that was doomed to follow the irresistible violence 
inherent in the law of necessity. 
XI. Violence as a Means Towards an End 
Arendt opposes violence on the grounds that the latter consists in 
force - and not power -, which instrumentalises everything it comes 
across as a means to achieve a particular end: the final objective 
excuses all actions on the grounds of nece SSi ty. 35 For Arendt, the 
35 The inseparability of violence from instrumentalisation in Arendt 
mirrors her hostility to an instrumentalist view of politics, where the 
latter serves as a means to attain a particular end, be it 'power, truth, 
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concept of necessity is detrimental to thought. One can see 
necessity working in the logic of the theoretical foundations of both 
Nazi Germany as well as Stalinist Bolshevism. Arendt defends that 
thought and ideology are antagonistic to each other, for ideology is 
always based on an axiomatic premise which gives rise to a train 
of thought, through deductive reasoning, that refuses any idea that 
might oppose its original premise. The racist ideology of Nazi 
Germany, for instance, based itself on the axiomatic premise of 
Social Darwinism according to which there were inferior and 
superior races; the necessity of evolution would determine the 
survival of the superior races in detriment to that of the inferior. 
The National Socialist Party attempted to take necessity into its 
own hands, speeding up a process that would, in light of Social 
Darwinism, occur anyway. Stalinist Bolshevism, on the other hand, 
was predicated on the axiomatic premise of class struggle, 
according to which the dying bourgeois classes would be 
eliminated by the process of historical necessity, leading to victory 
of the proletariat. Stalin, like the National Socialist Party, 
attempted to take the process of historical necessity into his own 
hands, purging any class deemed to be bourgeois in any particular 
moment. To truly think, according to Arendt, means to dispense 
with logical reasoning that helps make sense of the chaos and__, 
_ 
unpredictability of everyday life, and to realise that the only 
certainty one can have is that of common-sense, a perception that 
we share with others regarding the reality of a common world in 
which we live. 
For Arendt, remembrance is the key to the thought experience by 
way of which we conjure up in o ur minds images of sense-objects 
that are physically absent. The faculty of memory, however, only 
makes the absent present by ' de-sensing' these objects in the 
imagination, converting them into images. 
or... justice'. According to Villa, Arendt regards action, or praxis, as 
autonomous within the public realm: political action is self-contained in 
that it is undertaken for its own sake, consisting in an end in itself. 
(19 9 6: 21 , 43) 
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This operation precedes all thought processes, cognitive 
thought as well as thought about meaning, and only sheer 
logical reasoning - where the mind in strict consistency with 
its own laws produces a deductive chain from a given 
premise - has definitely cut all strings to living experience ... 
(1978: 87) 
Critiquing the metaphysical fallacy inherent in the Western 
tradition that draws a clear separation between the worlds of 
thought and that of sense-experience, Arendt emphasises their 
inter-relationship by focusing on the commonality of the world in 
which we live and on plurality as one of the basic existential 
conditions of human life on earth. 
The whole history of philosophy ... is shot through with an 
intramural warfare between man's common sense, this sixth 
sense that fits our five senses into a common world, and 
rn a n's faculty of thought and need of reason, which 
determine him to remove himself for considerable periods 
from it. (1978: 81) 
Man embodies plurality even in his relationship with himself, for 
the mental activity of thought is in itself a reflexive, albeit 
harmonious, dialogue, 'the actualisation of the original duality or 
the split between me and myself which is inherent in all 
consciousness' (1978: 75). The split subject can regain a sense of 
unity only through contact with others, in the activities of speech 
and action. Thus, we are foremost political beings because our 
identities are confirmed in the presence of others, that is, in a 
world of appearances which relies on 'words and persuasion' rather 
than 'force and violence' to preserve the space of freedom between 
men. Whenever the law of a community is violated, criminal 
proceedings - such as those carried out against Nazi criminals - 
ought to occur to repair the body politic and to restore public 
order. (1994: 261) 
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For just as a murderer is prosecuted because he has violated 
the law of the community, and not because he has deprived 
the Smith family of its husband, father, and breadwinner, so 
these modern, state-employed mass murderers must be 
prosecuted because they violated the order of mankind, and 
not because they killed millions of people. (1994: 272) 
XII. Nation, Race, and Violence: Arendt and Fanon 
While Arendt is critical of a nationalism that transforms the State 
into an instrument of the nation, and the citizen into an ethnic 
member of a nation, Fanon advocates a nationalism that places the 
nation above all else on his political and social agenda. In fact, 
there is little mention in Fanon's works of either the State or the 
nation-state, leading one to believe that his discourse on the 
nation subsumes the latter. The contradiction that Arendt points 
out as having appeared with the emergence of the nation-state, 
namely the combination of the Rights of Man with the desire for a 
sovereignty bound by no universal law is again patent in Fanon. 
For while he is eager to affirm an equality inherent in the universal 
condition of man, he simultaneously wishes to emphasise that the 
universal can only be constructed on the basis of the particular. 
(Fanon, 1990: 199) 
Fanon's emphasis on the 'moving consciousness of the people' as 
a single mass responsible for the 'nation in the making', in an 
onward march towards the future, brings to mind Arendt's depiction 
of the pan-movements' mystical focus on 'a time to come', as well 
as their reduction of private class interests - represented by 
political parties - to a single mass interest. However, while pan- 
movements have traditionally forsaken national emancipation in 
favour of a territorial expansionism that would permit to establish a 
'folk community', Fanon's emphasis is clearly national. 
Furthermore, he believes in universal man, rather than in the pan- 
movements' divine origin of a particular people. According to 
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Arendt, movements have traditionally led to the disintegration of 
the nation-state, in their urge to place themselves above classes, 
above parties, representing the nation as a whole. For the truth is 
that these movements wish 'to promote one particular interest until 
it had devoured all others, and to make one particular group the 
master of the state machine'. (1979: 257) 
The nation-state which, according to Arendt, should protect all 
inhabitants within its territory, regardless of nationality, has been 
overpowered, in Fanon, by a nationalism which defends the 
primacy of the nation and of national consciousness. Although 
Fanon defends the decentralisation of politics, by making the 
'totality of the nation a reality to each citizen', (Fanon, 1990: 161) 
the collective destiny of the nation is obviously at the hands of a 
hugely centralised system that holds the means of violence with 
which to prevent centrifugal tendencies inherent in class or 
ethnicity from tearing the nation apart. Fanon's national 
consciousness thus served as a cement that connected the 
members of a nation-state. However, when the period of euphoria 
was over and the cement no longer operational, there was no 
longer any incentive, other than the forces of violence, to maintain 
the nation's integrity. 
Because the colonised man finds freedom in and through violence, 
the latter becomes both a means and an end to awareness of self. 
Arendt opposes violence precisely on the grounds that it 
i nstru mental ises whatever comes its way as a means to achieve a 
particular goal. The final end, in Fanon's case recognition of the 
black man by the white, would justify all actions on the basis of 
necessity. In Fanon, violence consists in a unifying force that 
embraces all under the aegis of the nation, thus opposing 
regionalist and tribal dissensions. Here, Arendt would argue that 
violence is a destructive, and not a unifying force. Despite 
acknowledging that collective violence can provide the illusion of a 
new foundation, Arendt claims that this sentiment of fraternity is 
destined to be shortlived, due to its reliance on conditions of 
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danger. It is only in the proximity of death, that the group is unified 
in vitality. Here, the loss of one's own life is compensated by the 
possible immortality of the group. 
It is as though life itself, the immortal life of the species, 
nourished, as it were, by the sempiternal dying of its 
individual members, is "surging upward, " is actualised in the 
practice of violence. (1970: 68) 
Because power springs up whenever men come together for the 
purpose of action, violence, based on force, is antagonistic to the 
processes of persuasion, negotiation, and promising which 
preserve the space of freedom between men. This space of 
freedom is assured as a living political reality by the existence of 
laws, which keep intact the power that arises in the course of 
action, thus contributing to the foundation of a stable world order. 
Arendt would consider that violence and the nation are opposed to 
each other. The nation, for Arendt, serves the purpose of 
protecting its citizens, and should, as nation-state, defend 
everyone who finds themselves within its boundaries, regardless of 
nationality. It is only within the public realm that citizens can be 
protected in their differences under a legislative framework. Lastly, 
violence in Arendt corresponds to force and not power. Whereas 
power is based on the very condition of human plurality, occurring 
whenever men act together, force implies the destruction of 
plurality by one or a few men who have the monopoly over the 
means of violence. (1989: 202) For Arendt, violence is inevitable in 
activities of fabrication, where man acts on nature in his attempt to 
build an artifice. However, in activities such as speech and action, 
which are destined to be heard, seen and judged by human beings 
inhabiting a world of appearance, violence is destructive of the 
plurality and diversity inherent in the human condition. (1961: 
111 )36 
36 According to Joan Cocks, the central issue concerning Arendt's 
discussion on violence is whether she is right or wrong in claiming that 
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Arendt considers racism to be an ideological weapon of 
imperialism that consists in violence. For Fanon, racism is inherent 
in any nation that boasts an imperialist tradition: racism is thus the 
base, never a superstructural element, of a colonial society. Both 
Arendt and Fanon defend a non-ethnic nationalism: where Arendt 
considers racism to be opposed to nationalism, for cutting 'across 
all national boundaries' and disavowing the national principles of 
equality and solidarity, Fanon posits participation in national 
construction as the basis for national citizenship, independent of 
ethnic provenance. 
Having settled for the affirmation of universal man subsequently to 
his n6gritude phase, Fanon nevertheless stresses the importance 
of the development of national consciousness, for it is on the basis 
of the particular that the universal is built. Thus, in Arendt's view, 
he would have asserted the priority of nation over race. 
At the same time, however, he identifies French racism, which 
permeates the nation as a whole and thus reveals the non- 
existence of an alleged commonality of interests between the 
working classes in the metropolis and the colonies, with an 
exacerbated French nationalism that has defined itself through the 
Algerian war. Fanon argues that the French left opposes 
colonialism for nationalist reasons, on the grounds that its 
inhumanity sullies the 'French soul'. (Fanon, 1988: 83) For Arendt, 
this romantic ideal of a "national soul" situated above or beyond 
'violence is antipolitical and yet part of the political, not biological 
realm'. In On Violence, Arendt had argued that violence derived from 
rage, sparked by injustice, rather than instinct. Cocks claims that 
Arendt's position is fuelled by an antipathy to the body in the public 
realm, rather than by an opposition to the 'political infliction of bodily 
pain'. Arendt's antagonism to violence thus arises from its 
speechlessness and unreason, that is, from its physicality, all of which 
do not fit in a public realm that gives primacy to the verbal. (1995: 226, 
229) 
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the law, is precisely the outcome of wanting to combine both 
sovereignty and the Declaration of the Rights of Man within the 
nation-state, thus leading to the loss of power of the State, whose 
duty it was to protect and enforce the protection of man's rights as 
'man, citizen, and nation'. By appealing to national consciousness 
in the ex-colonies, Fanon wishes to distance himself from the 
concept of a "national soul", an authenticity that reveals itself 
through a return to nativism, for he sees the nation as being 
recreated in its onward march. However, he nevertheless attempts 
to combine sovereignty and universal rights. Arendt would claim 
that the consequences would be twofold: on one hand, human 
rights would only be enforceable as national rights; on the other, 
the State would lose its legal power to protect all its inhabitants 
rather than its nationals, and thus become increasingly identified 
with a symbol of the nation. Thus, although Fanon attempts to 
distance himself from a "national soul", his politics in fact bring 
him dangerously close to the very authenticity he opposes. 
Fanon argues that because natives make up 'the landscape, the 
natural background to the human presence' (Fanon, 1990: 201) of 
the coloniser, the colonised subject's humanity is reduced, in 
Arendtian terminology, to natural man. When describing the 
confrontation between European colonialists and African tribes, 
Arendt draws an affinity between the surrounding natural 
environment and the natives: 
... races ... were 
found ... in regions where nature was 
particularly hostile. What made them different from other 
human beings was not at all the colour of their skin but the 
fact that they behaved like a part of nature ... They were ... 
"natural" human beings who lacked the specifically human 
character, the specifically human reality, so that when 
European men massacred them they somehow were not 
aware that they had committed murder. (1979: 192) 
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Failing back on a 'natural' identity, innate qualities that are 
inherent in human beings, is for Arendt extremely dangerous, for 
history has shown that whenever one resorts to no more than a 
universalist language of rights inherent in natural man, a 
catastrophe may ensue. This is because when dealing with natural 
man, 'civiiised' man is sometimes not aware he is committing 
murder. Only the public realm, the domain of law inherent in the 
nation-state, can protect the identity of man as citizen living within 
specific national boundaries. 
Although in varying degrees, both Arendt and Fanon place greater 
emphasis on social and historical, rather than psychic, factors in 
determining identity. Whereas for Fanon 'man is human to the 
extent to which he tries to impose his existence on another' in 
order to obtain recognition, Arendt claims that identity is confirmed 
through our appearance in the presence of others. She argues that 
because man's inner motivations will always remain hidden from 
himself, as well as from others, any attempt to bring them out into 
the open will only result in hypocrisy. (1990: 98) There can be no 
authentic appearance of an inside self underneath a so-called 
deceptive surface, for the inner realm is, according to Arendt, 
constituted of a flux of incessantly passing sensations which are 
not lasting nor identifiable in any form perceptible by intuition. 
(1978: 39) Fanon, for his part, does not believe that 
psychoanalytic models used to study the psychology of the white 
man can be applied to the 'negro'. Neurosis in the colonised is the 
result of environmental circumstances, that is, of the specificity of 
the colonial situation, rather than of individual traurnatism. Arendt, 
who is hostile to the 'pseudoscience' of psychology for reducing 
the immense variety of human conduct to specific models (1978: 
35), would also place emphasis on social circumstance, rather than 
individual psychology, as productive of certain aspects of human 
be haviou r. 
Both Arendt and Fanon agree that racism contributes to the 
creation of a stereotype. In an effort to escape that stereotype, the 
269 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
marginalised element of society will often seek recognition by 
excelling in a particular field. Thus, Fanon blames the environment 
for the fundamental delusion that leads the Antillean to believe 
that, because he belongs to an inferior race, he must 
overcompensate in relation to the white man. Arendt, in turn, 
traces the effort of educated German Jews to become 'exception 
Jews' back to eighteenth century humanism, which sought to prove 
that all men are human. Enlightened Berlin found the "new 
specimens of humanity" in its age-old oppressed neighbours, the 
Jews, and elected them as the living example that they too were 
capable of becoming 'intensely human individuals' through 
education and mastery of the arts. Thus, the social status of 
Westernised, educated Jews was based on their being exceptions 
to a mass of backward, impoverished Jews. However, when Prussia 
passed emancipation decrees in 1808, subsequently to her defeat 
by Napoleon, giving Jews full civic rights, anti-semitism became 
rampant in the social realm. From then on, because all Jews were 
emancipated, Prussian Jews of wealth and privilege had lost the 
native background of poverty and backwardness against which they 
had stood out. (1979: 61) 
In short, before 1808 there had existed 'exception Jews' who 
represented universal humanity; after 1808, the Jew with 
outstanding characteristics was an exception to his race. Having 
ceased to be civil outcasts, the Jews became social pariahs, and 
sought to compensate for the condition of their race by seeking 
parvenu status, that is, by social climbing and reneging their 
background. 37 In their effort to escape stereotypes through social 
recognition, assimilated Jews found that another stereotype, the 
quality of Jewishness, was to haunt them in times to come. (1979: 
66) 
37 Bell argues that terms such as pariah and parvenu reveal Arendt's 
ideal of authenticity. While Arendt insinuates that desegregation was 
being sought for by parvenu black Americans, she simultaneously 
denies the possibility that black Americans appear in the public realm 
without being reduced to their 'group identity'. (1999: 76) 
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X111. The Relativism of Plurality: Judgement as Humanism 
Thoughtlessness is, for Arendt, the root of evil, for when men 
cease to think, to reflect on the world in which they live, they lose 
the capacity to judge right from wrong. Arendt is not interested in 
problematising the social construction of ethical modes of action. 
Instead, she clearly presumes the existence of right and wrong 
forms of human conduct, which have consequences on our 
surroundings. Neither does she aim to understand the potentiality 
of good and evil inherent in human beings, for only our actions, not 
our inner intentions which lurk in darkness of 'heart and mind', are 
visible to the eye. It is insofar that actions occur in a world of 
appearance and have immediate repercussions on the latter that 
they are of political relevance. The function of the law is to keep 
alive the space of freedom between men, within which they are 
capable of beginning, of giving rise to a new sequence of events 
by acting. 
Arendt claims that, with the modern demise of the Roman trinity of 
religion, authority, and tradition, the 'platonic' theological belief in 
eternal damnation for wrongdoing on earth ceased to have 
compelling force on human action. God, as the absolute standard 
against which theology measured all sins, was a political device in 
that he ordered the enforcement of his law, even in cases which 
escaped human justice, such as those which were not brought to 
light, or those for which there was no adequate punishment. 
Without God and with the loss of the belief in future states, there 
were no longer any absolute standards to regulate human conduct. 
... the 
fact is that the most significant consequence of the 
secularisation of the modern age may well be the elimination 
from public life, along with religion, of the only political 
element in traditional religion, the fear of hell. We who had 
to witness how, during the Hitler and Stalin era, an entirely 
new and unprecedented criminality, almost unchallenged in 
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the respective countries, was to invade the realm of politics 
should be the last to underestimate its "persuasive" influence 
upon the functioning of conscience. (1961: 133) 
Arendt's concern is twofold: on one hand she questions how it is 
possible to distinguish right from wrong with the loss of an 
absolute; on the other, she denounces Kant's belief in the 
absolute, in the duty of the categorical imperative which 
transcends humanity and orders man to always act in such a way 
that he would will to be a universal law, for its inhumanity. The 
realm of human affairs, she argues, is composed of the relativism 
that arises from the confrontation of different opinions between 
people. 
... truth can exist only where it is humanised by 
discourse ... 
such speech is virtually impossible in solitude; it belongs to 
an area in which there are many voices and where the 
announcement of what each "deems truth" both links and 
separates men, establishing in fact those distances between 
men which together comprise the world. Every truth outside 
this area ... is inhuman in the literal sense of the word ... 
because it might have the result that all men would suddenly 
unite in a single opinion ... (1995: 30-1) 
Arendt wishes to find a solution to the following problem: how can 
relativism be conciliated with ethical human conduct? This 
question is inspired by the Jewish experience in Nazi Germany, 
where, because evil was embodied in the law, behaving in an 
ethically correct manner implied challenging the law. Arendt is 
critical of the common equation of the law with the voice of 
conscience. This parallelism arises due to the jurisprudence of 
most nation-states presupposing that the law symbolises 
goodness, and as such, the lawfulness inherent in the voice of 
conscience of each citizen cannot oppose it. Arendt cites the 
example of the 'soldier, who, acting in a normal legal framework, 
refuses to carry out orders that run counter to his ordinary 
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experience of lawfulness and hence can be recognised by him as 
criminal'. (1994: 148) For this disobedience to be lawful, the 
orders disobeyed must have been "manifestly unlawful", that is, a 
"black flag" signifying "Prohibited" must appear when such orders 
are given. In the Nazi regime, however, the situation was inverted: 
... in a criminal regime this "black flag" with its "warning 
sign" flies as "manifestly" above what normally is a lawful 
order - for instance, not to kill innocent people just because 
they happen to be Jews - as it flies above a criminal order 
under normal circumstances. (1994: 148) 
Arendt claims that because the voice of conscience in Nazi 
Germany was equated with the force of the law laid down by Hitler, 
evil became the norm, and thus lost the characteristic which makes 
it recognisable, that is, the 'quality of temptation'. This 
predominance of evil as a normalcy of conduct is described by 
Arendt as the surprising 'banality of evil'. 
The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were 
like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor 
sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly 
normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of 
our moral standards of judgement, this normality was much 
more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it 
implied ... that this new type of criminal, who is 
in actual fact 
hostis generis humani, commits his crimes under 
circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to 
know or to feel that he is doing wrong. (1994: 276) 
Eichmann personified normalcy. His only outstanding 
characteristics were professional ambition, as well as a will to 
obey the law. In any 'non-criminal' regime, these traits would 
hardly be considered evil. In 'normal' circumstances, Eichmann 
would probably have led a 'normal' life. However, in a context in 
which good and evil were inverted, and where evil became law, his 
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will to obey led him to commit evil acts. Should he therefore be 
held responsible for the evil inherent in a system in which he 
played only a part? Moreover, the 'intent to do wrong', on the basis 
of which modern jurisprudence convicts a wrongdoer, is 
conspicuously absent from his actions. Eichmann merely tried to 
obey the law and to put into practice the orders of his superiors. 
He firmly believed that he had lived his life according to Kantian 
moral principles, having distorted the categorical imperative - act 
in such a way that you would will to be a universal law - to read - 
'Act as if the principle of your actions were the same as that of the 
legislator or of the law of the land'. (1994: 136) Arendt claims that 
this 'household use of Kant' demands that the citizen go beyond 
the law, identifying himself with the legislator. Thus, the primacy of 
the law was affirmed, and there could be no exceptions from the 
absolute. 
Arendt argues that Eichmann should have been convicted on the 
basis of his obedience and support for a politics that violated the 
order of the community of mankind, rather than on the grounds of 
the sufferings of the Jewish people at the hands of the Nazis. 
Because the crime against Jews was a crime against the plurality 
and diversity inherent in the order of humankind, Eichmann could 
rightly have been judged in an international criminal court of 
justice, representing all mankind. (1994: 269-70) 
The main success of the Eichmann trial, according to Arendt, was 
that, unlike the Nuremberg trial, it brought to the forefront the Nazi 
extermination of Jews, refusing to allow the latter to be 
overshadowed by the category of war crimes. 
It was the great advantage of a trial centred on the crime 
against the Jewish people that not only did the difference 
between war crimes, such as shooting of partisans and 
killing hostages, and "inhuman acts, " such as "expulsion and 
annihilation" of native populations to permit colonisation by 
an invader, emerge with sufficient clarity to become part of a 
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future international penal code, but also that the difference 
between "inhuman acts" (which were undertaken for some 
known, though criminal, purpose, such as expansion through 
colonisation) and the "crime against humanity, " whose intent 
and purpose were unprecedented, was clarified. (1994: 275) 
Faced with the unprecedented genocide of a people for non- 
utilitarian reasons in times of peace, the Nuremberg Charter of 
1945 had introduced the rather ambiguous category of crimes 
against humanity. According to the Charter, this new crime 
consisted in "inhuman acts", as if 'the Nazis had been lacking in 
human kindness'. (1994: 275) The Eichmann trial was therefore 
important in coming to a closer definition of the difference between 
genocide and annihilation of populations. For whereas the 
annihilation of peoples was not an original occurrence, basing 
itself on the utilitarian purpose of territorial expansionism and 
colonisation, the genocide of Jews was not explicable according to 
utilitarian intents. Arendt argues for the replacement of the term 
genocide for that of administrative massacres; while the former is 
not unprecedented in that whole peoples have been exterminated 
since antiquity, the latter implies the 'automated economy' of 
efficiency that manages the systematic elimination of a given 
group. However, Arendt emphasises that the decisive criterion in 
distinguishing a crime against humanity from any other is the 
violation of the order inherent in the plurality of human status. As 
such, the fact that Jews, Gypsies, and Poles were exterminated 
amounted to more than a crime against the Jewish, Gypsy, or 
Polish peoples, consisting rather in a crime against the 
international order on the basis of which the whole of mankind is 
composed. (1994: 275-6) 
According to Arendt, both the Nuremberg as well as the Eichmann 
trials have drawn attention to the faculty of judgement as one of 
the crucial moral issues of our time. 
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What we have demanded in these trials, where the 
defendants had committed "legal" crimes, is that human 
beings be capable of telling right from wrong even when all 
they have to guide them is their own judgement, which, 
moreover, happens to be completely at odds with what they 
must regard as the unanimous opinion of all those around 
them. (1994: 295) 
Judgement concerns the capacity to distinguish between what 
would be, in 'normal' circumstances, adhered to as a rule, and, in 
an extraordinary context, an exception to that rule. For Arendt, it is 
this capacity for discernment, rather than a voice of conscience, 
that leads man to distinguish between right and wrong. Judgement 
is therefore the most precious of faculties, for it connects us to the 
world in which we live. Both thoughtlessness as well as 
'remoteness from reality' were at the root of Eichmann's evil 
conduct. 'He merely ... never realised what 
he was doing', (1994: 
287) and wished to act according to the absolute standard of the 
law. 38 
While the categorical imperative is guided by absolutes, that is, by 
the necessity for rational thought to agree with itself - for example 
the thief would enter in contradiction with himself by willing that 
theft be a universal law, due to the latter depriving him of his 
property -, judgement is guided by relativism rather than the 
imperative of absolutes. This relativism implies Kant's "enlarged 
mentality", 'the ability to see things not only from one's point of 
38 Bell notes that Arendt sought to understand Heidegger's support for 
National Socialism in light of his philosophy. Heidegger's status as 
thinker had collided with his attempt to enter the public world, causing 
him once again to retreat into a seclusion appropriate for thinking 
Being, whereby he restored his faculty for judgement. Contrary to 
Eichmann, he thus acknowledged his error. (1999: 82) 
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view but in the perspective of all those who happen to be present'. 
(1961 : 220 -1 )39 
The power of judgement rests on a potential agreement with 
others, and the thinking process which is active in judging 
something is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, 
a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always 
and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, 
in an anticipated communication with others with whom I 
know I must finally come to some agreement. (1961: 220) 
Thus, the individual who judges must transcend any privately held 
subjective opinions which are irrelevant to the public realm, in 
favour of the plurality of perspectives with which he is confronted 
in the world of appearance. 
Hence, judgement is endowed with a certain specific validity 
but is never universally valid. Its claims to validity can never 
extend further than the others in whose place the judging 
person has put himself for his considerations. (1961: 221) 
The faculty of judgement is a political ability, for it links us to the 
common world which we share with others, a world of plurality 
which assumes inter-human relativity. Judgement, in contrast to 
speculative thought, is rooted in a common sense, which adjusts 
the subjective perceptions of our private five senses to the reality 
of an objective world that we inhabit with others. 40 
39 According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's recourse to the 'enlarged 
mentality' inherent in Kant's aesthetic theory derives from her antipathy 
to the role of judgement in his practical philosophy, where, as 
determinant, it subsumes the particular under the universal. In Kantian 
aesthetics, judgement is reflective for the universal has to be found for 
a given particular. (1997: 132) 
40 For Kant, the sensus communis corresponds to a 'public sense' 
deriving from reflective judgement. Benhabib argues that Arendt adopts 
Kant's aesthetic model to ascertain intersubjective validity in the public 
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Aesthetic judgements, which are based on the most private of the 
five senses - that of taste -, are similar to political judgements in 
that they both presume consent by persuasion and discussion, 
rather than by the coercion of logic or truth. Judgement, either 
aesthetic or political, is not overwhelmed by truth, but seeks to 
establish limits to an immoderate worship of any absolute, be it 
truth, beauty or goodness. Through judgement, the absolute is 
humanised by the introduction of the personal factor of taste. 
... for the true humanist neither the verities of the scientist 
nor the truth of the philosopher nor the beauty of the artist 
can be absolutes; the humanist, because he is not a 
specialist, exerts a faculty of judgement and taste which is 
beyond the coercion which each speciality imposes upon us. 
(1961 : 225) 
Humanism, as a consequence of an "enlarged mentality" according 
to which the individual exercises the faculty of judgement by 
thinking in the place of others, can be read as an outlook which is 
antagonistic to the inhumanity inherent in the categorical 
imperative. Moreover, as a political outlook which is beyond 
coercion by absolutes, it presupposes that the public realm be the 
space of freedom between men. 
XIV. New Humanism: Between Ideology and Natality 
realm. She thus manages to escape from Kant's distaste for the vita 
activa, patent in his two-world metaphysics, the nournenal and the 
phenomenal, whereby, paradoxically, the law of the morally good, which 
escapes sensuous intuition, must be applied to actions pertaining to the 
world of sense. Benhabib considers that Arendt thus divorces politics 
from morality, a move that is erroneous to the extent that any political 
system incarnates principles of justice. (1997: 130-1,133,139) 
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Fanonian humanism differs from Arendt's version of humanism, for 
the former presumes absolutes whereas the latter seeks to 
distance itself from the categorical imperative. While Fanon 
believes in universal man as an absolute, Arendt argues for an 
"enlarged mentality" based on relativism. Fanon's humanism is 
geared towards the future, the temporal sense of the will, 
foreseeing the realisation of the universal equality of man in the 
last stage of the Marxian dialectic. The freedom inherent in 
thought and in the public realm that Arendt anxiously defends is 
thus, in Fanon, threatened by his adoption of a narrative of 
Necessity which dictates the outcome of the future. Just as Arendt 
opposes the view according to which the Nazis were the 'innocent 
executors of some mysteriously foreordained destiny' (1994: 19), 
she might counter Fanon's attempts to incorporate the liberation of 
ex-colonies into Marxian dialectics. To believe in narratives 
according to which we must blaze the trail of destiny is, for Arendt, 
a form of escaping the responsibility inherent in our actions. The 
thinking activity inherent in judgement is open to experience, 
unlike the deductive logic of ideological thought, which aims to 
explain the world on the basis of an axiomatic premise that cannot 
be contradicted. Ideological thought is violent, due to its 
i nstru mental isation of means towards an end. 
From Arendt's perspective, Fanonian humanism can be read as 
ideological. Because Fanon places emphasis on the black man 
obtaining recognition through conflict, Arendt might oppose new 
humanism on the grounds that the end justifies whatever means 
available, acting as an axiomatic premise that induces a train of 
logical coherence independent of ethical consequences. When 
Fanon affirms the universality of man, thus subsuming blackness 
within the discourse of the oppressed, he continues to sponsor 
conflict as a means of liberation of both oppressed and oppressor 
in the name of universality. He thus continues to justify a 
utilitarian approach which defends the i nstru mental isation of 
means to achieve a particular end. 
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Fanon's humanism is profoundly dialectical, consisting in a 
permanent movement between thesis and antithesis. Arendt 
considers dialectical thought to be ideological, in that the first 
thesis serves as a premise which will give rise to one 'identical, 
consistent movement' conducive to the annihilation of factual 
contradictions. (1979: 469) By relying on a logical process to guide 
thought, man is, according to Arendt, surrendering his inner 
freedom to tyranny. 
Freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the 
capacity to begin, just as freedom as a political reality is 
identical with a space of movement between men. Over the 
beginning, no logic, no cogent deduction can have any 
power, because its chain presupposes, in the form of a 
premise, the beginning. (1979: 473 )41 
The question is whether Fanonian humanism consists in a 
beginning, in a space of freedom which no logical reasoning can 
assimilate due to the former's premise being a constant beginning. 
A reading of Fanon's attempt to negotiate the tension within the 
humanist tradition through Arendt's vision of natality might serve to 
emphasise the ruptures inherent in his dichotomies, thus revealing 
41 Gillian Rose argues that although in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
Arendt attributes the decline of the modern nation-state to its incapacity 
to accept the agon between state and civil society, she herself in her 
later work fails to 'abide' with diremption and thus perpetuates the 
'equivocation of the ethical' in place of its suspension as well as the 
elimination of the 'anxiety of beginning'. Contradictions between state 
and society, between universality and sovereignty are thus substituted 
by a totalising opposition between public and private on one hand and 
the birth of the new on the other, thus masking the 'historical 
"equivocal ities" of emancipation', namely the historical emancipation of 
persons from the collective interest. In Arendt, the public realm 
becomes an Augustinian City of God while the City of Man is relegated 
to the social. By seeking refuge in Greek political thought against 
aporetic difference, Arendt allegedly founds a sociality of saints. (1992: 
216,240.228-9,235) 
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his inability to attain the absolute, caught in a permanent 
'mismatch between aim and achievement'. (Rose, 1997: 125) 
Fanonian humanism would then draw closer to Roman relativism, 
with its avoidance of absolutes on the grounds that the latter are 
detrimental to human freedom. Fanon believed that the realisation 
of the universal equality of condition inherent in mankind would 
enable freedom to ensue for all. Arendt would have urged him to 
elect freedom above all else, because only political freedom, as 
preserved by laws in the public realm, can protect the diversity and 
plurality inherent in the human condition. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LEVINAS AND THE OTHER: HUMANISM AS AN EXCLUDED 
MIDDLE 
1. Introduction 
Humanism has to be denounced only because it is not 
sufficiently human. (1999: 128 )42 
Levinas's attempt to establish a philosophy of peace based on a 
metaphysical transcendence that would lie beyond the realm of 
ontology, or being, can be read as an attempt to transcend both 
the anti-humanist and traditional humanist outlooks regarding 
subjectivity. While sympathetic to the anti-humanist proposal to 
deconstruct humanism's transcendental apperception of 
subjectivity whereby self-consciousness is present to itself in a 
united I think", Levinas simultaneously accuses anti-humanism of 
still operating within the ontological realm by reducing man to a 
reflection of the truth of being. Nevertheless, anti-humanism 
remains valuable 'over and beyond the reasons it gives itself', that 
is, beyond its own critiques of humanism, namely due to negating 
the importance of individual freedom for the signification of being. 
(1998a: 131) 
Its inspired intuition is to have abandoned the idea of 
person, goal and origin of itself, in which the ego is still a 
42 For Heidegger, 'humanism is opposed because it does not set the 
humanitas of the human being high enough' (1998: 251). Both Levinas 
and Heidegger argue for a reconceptualisation of the human: where 
Heidegger seeks to resist a metaphysical humanism that by reducing 
man to a being amongst beings refuses to think the difference between 
Being and being, Levinas presents a humanism that transcends the 
realm of ontology in which traditional metaphysics has moved. 
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thing because it is still a being. Strictly speaking, the Other 
is the end; I am a hostage, a responsibility and a substitution 
supporting the world in the passivity of assignation, even in 
an accusing persecution, which is undeclinable. (1999: 127- 
8) 
A humanism that transcends ontology is thus, for Levinas, a 
signifyingness that precedes all signification, a pre-origin anterior 
to any origin or commencement, the latter which unfold within the 
realm of being, ruled by a historically linear temporality where the 
past is always re-presented from the point of view of the present. 
In the sphere of the 'otherwise than bein g', there isan 
inordinateness in terms of temporality, an anarchy more ancient 
than any past occurring within the ontological realm. Because this 
anarchy exceeds representation, it cannot be grasped; however, it 
leaves a trace of this primordial affectation by the Other 
undergone in the subjectivity of the self, of the 'I is an Other' in 
the very face offered in exposure to me. 
Beyond the ontological category of being and essence, the unified 
ego is broken apart by the realisation of the idea of Infinity in a 
finite me. This very idea of infinity (the cogitatum) transcends the 
thought that would think it (the cogitatio), thus leading to the 
overflow of the finite by the infinite, the latter which cannot be 
contained, which cannot be grasped but only perceived in its trace. 
This trace is patent in the desire for infinity, a desire that cannot 
be satiated unlike that of need, which takes place within the 
ontological domain, but rather a desire increasing in the measure 
that I approach the Other while simultaneously providing an 
impetus for my turning away from myself towards exteriority. 
The Infinite transcends itself in the finite, it passes the 
finite, in that it directs the neighbour to me without exposing 
itself to me. (1998a: 171) 
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Humanity is thus the proximity between myself and my neighbour, 
a relationship that is always based on separation, for my debt to 
the Other increases the more I approach him. It is to the extent 
that subjectivity consists in this infinity in the self, in the I that is 
an other, that the subject substitutes himself for and is a hostage 
to his neighbour. Being hostage means to obey a command that 
precedes my own free will, a command of responsibility for the 
Other's freedom, as well as a command to respond for the Other's 
guilt. Identity, the ontological subjectivity of inwardness that posits 
a personal history occurring within a temporal linearity always 
represented from the viewpoint of the present, thus gives way, in 
the field of beyond being, to the figure of 'no identity' - not a non- 
identity defined in terms of a negation of identity, but an identity 
that is an Other, and is thus transcended in its sameness towards 
exteriority. This transcendence of the same by way of the Other is 
ethics, the 'excluded middle', in between ontological being and 
non-being, that is, on the hither side of binary oppositions that 
form a whole. (1999: 86) 
Preoccupied with defining a philosophy of alterity, or exteriority, 
where same and Other would preserve their absoluteness while 
engaging in relationship - that is, would not be absorbed into a 
totality -, Levinas considers that ethics, or a non-theological 
religiosity, precedes any politics. For while politics pertains to the 
ontological realm due to its emphasis on closure, assimilating the 
Other into the same through universal law, the ethical dimension - 
that of infinity - permits one to transcend the tyranny of totality, 
going beyond polarities that are defined in relation to one another. 
Levinas thus offers a different reading of alterity from that of 
Hannah Arendt's, whose emphasis on the primacy of the political 
realm in solving problems relating to freedom, plurality and 
difference in the 'world of appearance' would here be contested as 
operating within the ontological domain, and thus, unable to 
escape the binary oppositional logic inherent in being, where, on 
one hand, identity is always defined against an Other, and where, 
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on the other, both terms would be absorbed into a totality, 
synonymous, from Levinas's perspective, with violence. 
Arendt's vision of humanism as an 'enlarged mentality' where the 
faculty of judgement is practised by thinking in the place of others 
-a faculty which she considers to underpin both aesthetics and 
politics, both of which presuppose consent on the basis of 
persuasion and discussion rather than coercion of logic or truth - 
would be regarded by Levinas as an ethics: as such, he would 
argue that in the attempt to think in the place of others, one is 
replacing oneself for the Other; this movement, ethical by nature, 
would prove that politics is built upon ethics. Furthermore, Arendt's 
claim that the relativism inherent in political judgement guards 
itself against the immoderate worship of any absolute, the latter 
which relies on coercion, would be disputed by Levinas's 
preoccupation in preserving the absoluteness of terms that engage 
in relationship, or the sociality of the face-to-face. The latter is 
possible only because the terms involved do not participate in 
totality, are not fused with one another, but rather preserve their 
integrity in separation. It is only because one is produced as a 
separate being in subjectivity that one can transcend oneself in a 
relationship of exteriority. 43 
Both Arendt and Levinas can be read as agreeing that the human 
condition consists in the transcendence of oneself: where for 
Arendt the human condition would be defined as that of the 
capacity for action - thus creating a new series in time, irreversible 
and unpredictable in consequences -, Levinas regards any attempt 
to define the ego as coinciding with itself as doomed to failure due 
to identity's constant confrontation with alterity. However, whereas 
Arendt would choose to 'tame' this transcendence through the 
43 Derrida argues that a pure alterity, absolute in itself, is unattainable 
because the Other is always defined in relation to the same, a fact 
which is patent in language. Accordingly, Greek thought has protected 
itself against destruction precisely due to its recognition that alterity 
circulates at the origin of meaning. (1990: 151) 
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grounding of a space of freedom preserved by laws in the political 
realm, Levinas sees this transcendence of the self as a 
fundamentally positive ethical movement geared towards 
exteriority, one which should provide the basis for any politics or 
theory realised in the domain of onto logy. 44 
11. Western Philosophy and Being 
By arguing for metaphysical transcendence, Levinas is defending 
the idea of Good beyond being, that is of a concept of Good that 
transcends the axiology of good and evil patent in ontological 
thought. Subjectivity, as the 'theatre' of transcendence, would be 
synonymous with goodness or the one-for-the-Other. 
This idea guarantees the philosophical dignity of an 
undertaking in which signifyingness of meaning is separated 
from the manifestation or the presence of being. (1998a: 
171) 
Western Philosophy has been guided by the search for knowledge, 
revealed in clarity and light, a space within which being unfolds, 
manifesting itself to the gaze of the beholder. Here, the coinciding 
of historical time with the present assimilates alterity into the 
same, re-presenting the Other as if it were present in identity. The 
ontological realm, characterised by immanence, defines terms in 
negation to each other, thus presupposing their fusion into a 
whole, rather than allowing them to signify in themselves, 
transcendentally. 
44 Levinas considers Zionism to be an original political idea based on an 
ethical justification, aiming at the foundation of a monotheistic State 
which would incorporate the universalistic values inherent in the 
Western tradition, and yet transcend them, in the realisation of a 'surfeit 
of responsibility towards humanity'. The fact that Judaism can go 
beyond universalism preserves it from the dangers of totalitarianism. 
(1 998b: 286-87) 
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(Western Philosophy) discovered intelligibility in terms in 
conjunction, posited by relation with one another, signifying 
one another; for Western philosophy being, thematised in its 
presence, is illuminated in this way. (1998a: 171) 
The relation between contraries, uniting into a whole, derives, 
according to Levinas, from the Parmenidean Eleatic notion of 
Being, that is, the idea of Being as One, a totality, emanating into 
essence by a descent or a fall. The Philosophy of Unity that has 
characterised the West, from Parmenides to Hegel (1996: 102), 
would thus endeavour to unite, fuse, that which has allegedly been 
made separate due to a fall from the totality; the 'fallen' Other is 
thus incorporated into the same. Traditional metaphysics is 
inspired by the attempt to heal the gap between totality and its 
ruptured parts. This desire to assimilate the Other into the Whole 
reveals a need based on lack, that is, the urgency of an incomplete 
being to regain full possession of itself. Thus, the 'fallen' Other is 
not in reality separate from the totality, for it is only defined 
against the Whole from whence it came. 
As a stage the separated being traverses on the way of its 
return to its metaphysical source, a moment of a history that 
will be concluded by union, metaphysics would be an 
Odyssey, and its disquietude nostalgia. (1996: 102) 
The movement of Odyssey - 'where the adventure pursued in the 
world is but the accident of a return' (1996: 176-7) -, characterises 
Western metaphysics, in its incessant search for the 
imperturbability of a sojourn in the home, in the totality. Hegelian 
thought, with its emphasis both on the logic of contradiction - 
where to A (thesis) corresponds a non-A (antithesis) - and on the 
logic of dialectics, according to which both A and non-A are 
conciliated with each other within the totality of a system 
(synthesis) (1996: 150), is a classical paradigm of Parmenidean 
monism. The conjunction of opposite terms united in a system 
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provides the ontological site where consciousness is to unfold, 
giving rise to the transcendental subject that is 'origin, initiative, 
freedom, present'. (1999: 78) 
To move oneself or have self-consciousness is in effect to 
refer oneself to oneself, to be an origin. (1999: 78) 
This 'consciousness-subject' as origin, or arche, assimilates that 
which it encounters into the same, into itself. Its tense is the 
present, synchronising time into thematised reminiscences by this 
very act of re-presenting the past in the light of the present. 
Thematised experience, the identical, the 'said', creates the notion 
of a linear temporal sequence, a progression or biography, by 
referring its 'other' in time to itself. Consciousness is thus a 
'diastasis' -a rift - of identity where rather than encountering a 
true Other, the same finds itself modified. 
This modification by which the same comes unstuck or parts 
with itself, undoes itself into this and that, no longer covers 
over itself and thus is disclosed .... becomes a phenomenon - 
is the esse of every being. Being's essence designates 
nothing that could be a nameable content, a thing, event or 
action; it names this mobility of the immobile, this 
multiplication of the identical, this diastasis of the punctual, 
this lapse. (1999: 30) 
The movement of sameness unto its modified self, dictated by an 
impersonal reason which reduces its being to a role in history, 
consists in placing consciousness outside 'me' and in my thus 
evading responsibility. (1996: 252) Subjectivity is thus reduced to 
a remnant of essence, to that which is only a term assembled in 
the unity of the system, and which plays its historical role in the 
disclosure or manifestation of being to itself, culminating in truth, 
exposition, and knowledge, that is, in the elimination of opacity. 
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The reduction of subjectivity to consciousness dominates 
philosophical thought, which since Hegel has been trying to 
overcome the duality of being and thought, by identifying, 
under different figures, substance and subject. (1996: 103) 
This substantiality of the subject is based on the unity of 
apperception of the I think. The ego is posited as a for-itself, 
whereby the identity of the I consists in the reversion of essence 
back into itself. 
Time, essence, essence as time, would be the absolute itself 
in the return to self. The multiplicity of unique subjects, 
entities immediately, empirically, encountered, would 
proceed from this universal self-consciousness of the Mind ... 
They would be forgettable moments of which what counts is 
only their identities due to their positions in the system, 
which are reabsorbed into the whole of the system. (1999: 
103-4) 
The elimination of the meaning inherent in the distinction between 
subject and being is also patent in Heideggerian thought. Drawing 
attention to the difference between beings as entities, or existents, 
and Being as expression of the verb to be, Heidegger places man, 
or singularity, under a 'neuter' term that clarifies and orders 
thought. (1998a: 51) In this manner, he attempts to 'destroy the 
history of ontology', which since Socrates is allegedly guilty of 
forgetting Being, that is, of forgetting the priority of Being over 
existents. Whereas traditional ontology sought to comprehend the 
Being of existents so as to know an existent (1996: 45), 
Heideggerian ontology would not defend that Being expresses the 
inwardness of subjectivity but rather that 'man tells Being'(1998a: 
144). 
For Heidegger the very process of Being, Being's essence, is 
the unfolding of a certain meaning, a certain light, a certain 
peace that borrow nothing from a subject, express nothing 
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that would be inside a soul. The process of Being, or Being's 
essence, is from the first manifestation, that is, expansion 
into a site, a world, hospitality. But the manifestation thus 
requires man, for it entrusts itself to man as a secret and as 
a task. Confidant, but also sayer, herald, messenger of 
Being, man expresses no inward forum. (1998a: 144) 
Heidegger's attempt to destroy traditional ontology corresponds to 
the attempt to destroy the primacy of One, which does not allow for 
a transcendent Being. Becoming is thus replaced for Being, and its 
temporality is a projection towards the future. 
Existing is freed from the unity of the existent. To substitute 
Becoming for Being is above all to envisage being outside of 
the existent. (1996: 275) 
Dasein, the Heideggerian 'being there' defined by the care and 
doing characteristic of being-in-the-world which reflects anxiety 
due to the consciousness of finitude, that is, of being-towards- 
death, consists in an attempt to express an existing that escapes 
the primacy of unity. However, the possibility of being annihilated 
that constitutes Dasein, its mortality, retains, according to Levinas, 
the structure of the same, that is, the coinciding of identity with 
itself. 
This nothingness is a death, is my death, my possibility (of 
impossibility), my power. (1998a: 51) 
In the novelty that arises from the possible, the ego recaptures, 
masters itself. The possible thus becomes synonymous with 'power 
and domination', with the subject writing a 'history which is one' 
and harbouring projects that correspond to a destiny. Heideggerian 
ontology, which places Being over the existent, thus mirrors 
classical Hegelian idealism, unable to evade the logic of unity. 
(1996: 216,275) 
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Kantian idealism, that of the transcendental subject founded on the 
unity, the synthetic ability of the 'I think', provides the basis of 
ontological philosophy, where the same determines the Other 
without being determined by the Other (119 96: 125). By 
presupposing that the reality of phenomena lies in perception 
rather than in the reality of the things themselves, Kant 
emphasises that the modality through which pure reason knows 
phenomena is that of representation. Because one can only know 
that which presents itself to experience, the latter constitutes the 
limits of theoretical reason, capturing phenomena rather than the 
reality of the thing-in-itself. Sensible intuition of objects is 
conditioned by space and time, both of which consist in a priori, or 
anterior, forms of representation, taking place within experience, 
and making possible this very intuition. Representation of entities, 
or objects, is thus conditioned by these a priori conditions of 
intuition, implying a subjectivity inherent in the perception of 
entities. 
It is remarkable that the entity qua entity, essence, is not 
first realised in itself, and then occasionally show itself 
afterward. Essence carries on as presence, exhibition, 
phenomenality or appearing, and as such requires a subject 
in the form of consciousness, and invests it as devoted to 
representation. (1999: 179) 
The objectivity of essence thus consists in requiring the subject's 
perception of its presence. Space as a transparent void, as clarity, 
as light, as that which provides the distance between subject and 
object within which disclosure occurs, is necessary for essence to 
appear, to arise in phenomenality. Although Kant introduces a 
distinction between thought and knowledge, that is, between 
reason and understanding - thereby discovering meanings which do 
not refer to being -, his transcendental idealism nevertheless 
measures thought against the being it lacks: thought is a void, an 
empty space stripped of the things in themselves it aims at. 
(1998a: 175) This lack, which originates from the notion of the 
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sensible as 'an apparition without there being anything that 
appears' (1996: 136), will lead Kant to declare the failure of pure 
reason - due to the impossibility of obtaining objective knowledge 
outside the limits of experience - in comparison with practical, or 
moral, reason, to the extent that in the exercise of his autonomy 
man can distance himself from sensible or empirical factors in an 
attempt to identify himself with the supreme ideal of God. Because 
the ideas of practical reason - Soul, World and God - do not 
correspond to sensible or experiential categories, they do not 
further the search for knowledge, that is of speculative or 
theoretical reason, but rather contribute to understanding or 
thinking the totality of reality, leading to the realisation that man 
only experiences himself, finds the thing-in-itself as a moral 
being. 45 Thus, although Kant draws a separation between thought 
and knowledge, paving the way for the realisation that there are 
meanings independent of being, he ultimately reestablishes the 
relationship with ontology, both in pure reason, where thought is 
measured against the being that it lacks, and in practical reason, 
where the existence of God, the supreme being, is prioritised over 
the freedom of man. 
Unlike Berkeley's idealism, which argued for the coincidence 
between thought and existent within lived experience, Kantian 
idealism is rooted in the non-coincidence between subject and 
object, where the latter's intelligibility proceeds from the 
'openness' of Being, the space of transparency within which 
disclosure occurs. 
An existent is comprehended in the measure that thought 
transcends it, measuring it against the horizon whereupon it 
is profiled. (1996: 44) 
45 Practical reason, in the form of the good will that derives from a 
freedom situated above being, seems at first to escape the unity of the 
One; however, the ideas or postulates of pure reason are once again 
integrated into ontology by rejoining being in the existence of God. 
(1998a: 176) 
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Husserlian phenomenology would develop the idea of horizon, 
whereby 'an existent arises upon a ground that extends beyond 
it i. 46 (1996: 45) Guided by light, Husserl's method of 'radical 
experience' posits consciousness as surrounded by a sphere of 
potentialities - horizons in the margin of the central phenomenon -, 
waiting to become actualised by the possibility of being perceived 
and illuminated by thought. (1987: 54; 1998b: 14) 
We may let our sight wander around these horizons, 
illuminating certain aspects of them and letting others fall 
into darkness. The property of the world of things of being 'in 
itself' means nothing else than this possibility of going back 
to the same thing and reidentifying it. (1 998b: 14) 
The possibility of reidentifying an object derives from the fact that 
the intentionality of consciousness - consciousness being always 
consciousness of something - is incapable of grasping the totality 
of an object. The act of representation is thus inadequate to the 
existent, the object of representation. 
The aspects which we see at any given moment always 
indicate further aspects, and so on. (1998b: 15) 
Transcendent perception is dubitable due to existence being 
dependent on the degree of completion of a sequence of 
phenomena, which may conflict with or neg ate one another. 
Existence thus refers not to the existence of material things in 
themselves, but once again, to the existen ce of consciousness. 
(1998b: 15,18-9) 
46 Derrida considers the Husserlian concept of horizon to be similar to 
that of infinity, as 'overflowing wellspring' of every object, which cannot 
be actualised either in the object itself, nor in the intuition of the object. 
(19 9 0: 1 18) 
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The specific mode of existence of consciousness - its 
absoluteness and its independence from reflection - consists 
in its existing for itself, prior to being taken in any way as an 
object by reflection. Consciousness exists in such a way 
that it is constantly present to itself. (1998b: 21) 
This does not mean that only consciousness exists and that the 
external world does not - the standpoint of Berkeleian idealism -, 
but rather that both exist according to different modalities. For 
Husserlian phenomenology, consciousness cannot be reduced to 
subjective phenomena that do not reveal anything about being; 
instead, it is argued that only consciousness can reveal the 
meaning of being in the world, by disclosing the mode in which 
things appear to it. Because every intentionality - every 
consciousness of... - is founded on representation, the subject is 
linked up with its object. 
This specific existence lets us surmise that we are not in the 
presence here of a subject opposed to an object, of a being 
which is antithetical to objects and, for that reason, is 
precisely on the same level as them. For Husserl, 
consciousness is a primary domain which alone renders 
possible and comprehensible an 'object' and a 'subject', 
terms that are already derivative. (1998b: 25) 
External reality is thus assimilated by the same, by the thought 
that thinks it, and any given from the temporal past gains meaning 
in light of the present instant. 
To represent is not only to render present 'anew'; it is to 
reduce to the present an actual perception which flows on ... 
The value of the transcendental method and its share of 
eternal truth lies in the universal possibility of reducing the 
represented to its meaning, the existent to the noema, the 
294 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
most astonishing possibility of reducing to a noema the very 
being of the existent. (1996: 127 )47 
Thus while the transcendental method involved in representation 
presupposes the rationality of a unified I think, a cogito arising 
from consciousness where the subject loses its opposition to its 
object, Levinas, who aims to introduce exteriority into this model, 
will attempt to recuperate the Cartesian cogito, where sensible 
intuition is to be doubted. In Descartes, the channels through 
which the subject gains knowledge of being in the World are to be 
mistrusted (1998b: 22); therefore, rather than presenting a theory 
of being, he introduces a theory of knowledge. Husserl, on the 
contrary, does not separate knowledge of an object - or its mode of 
appearing - from its being, thus subsuming subject and object 
within consciousness (1998b: 23). In a first movement, Descartes 
posits the only attainable certitude as that of the cogito: I exist to 
the extent that I am a thinking being. Thus human rationality can 
be considered to precede the existence of the body, or the 
existence of God. However, in a second movement, Descartes 
admits conditions for this certitude: 
This certitude is due to the clarity and distinctness of the 
cogito, but certitude itself is sought because of the presence 
of infinity in this finite thought, which without this presence 
would be ignorant of its own finitude ... (119 9 6: 2 10) 
Because I am aware of lack, of the imperfections inherent in my 
sensible intuition, I must have, according to Descartes, the idea of 
a more perfect being in me. Thus, my consciousness of God, of the 
infinite must be anterior to that of the finite me. (1996: 211) 
Whereas in Descartes the finite is determined by its relation with 
the infinite, in the moderns, finitude proceeds from the subject's 
mortality. Infinity leads the Cartesian subject to apprehend itself 
from a viewpoint of absolute exteriority, a total alterity that cannot 
be reduced to the same, that is, to interiority. Because the idea of 
47 Noema corresponds to 'thought meaning' in Husserlian terminology. 
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God (cogitatum) cannot be contained by the thought that thinks it 
(cogitatio), it breaks down the cogito, a unified consciousness 
'indubitable of itself by itself'. (1996: 210) 
This perhaps overturns, in advance, the universal validity 
and primordial character of intentionality. We will say that 
the idea of God breaks up the thought which is an 
investment, a synopsis and a synthesis, and can only 
enclose in a presence, re-present, reduce to presence or let 
be. (1998a: 160) 
Levinas resorts to the Cartesian tradition to attempt to transcend 
the ontological category of being, in which traditional metaphysics 
has moved. Whereas ontology has been subordinated to the 
primacy of the One, of Unity - presupposing the reintegration of 
fallen 'parts' into the wholeness of Being -, Levinas aims to 
establish a transcendental metaphysics that would truly be 
metaphysical by transcending essence, that is, by operating in a 
sphere that would be otherwise than being. Transcendental 
metaphysics would envisage the welcoming of the Other by the 
same, the critique of egoist spontaneity, thus breaking with the 
determination of the Other by the same prevalent in ontology. 
(1996: 43). 
Totality and the embrace of being, or ontology, do not 
contain the final secret of being. Religion, where relationship 
subsists between the same and the Other despite the 
impossibility of the Whole - the idea of Infinity - is the 
ultimate structure. (1996: 80) 
For Levinas, religion is not the theological contemplation of God, 
which still operates within the ontological realm of knowledge, 
vision, transparency and disclosure - where the ultimate question 
is whether or not God exists -, but rather consists in the ethical 
relationship with the Other. Religion as metaphysics, substantiated 
in ethics, concerns the relationship between human beings: 
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There can be no "knowledge" of God separated from the 
relationship with men. The Other is the very locus of 
metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my relation with 
God. He does not play the role of a mediator. The Other is 
not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in 
which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in 
which God is revealed. (1996: 78-9) 
The question, therefore, is not 'to be or not to be' (1999: 3), but to 
move beyond essence, beyond being, by awakening t0 
responsibility for the Other. Desire for infinity, for absolute alterity, 
cannot be satiated like ontological desire, based on need. On the 
contrary, it is fed by a constant hunger that increases the more I 
approach the Other. Because the idea of infinity in me overflows 
thought, I will never be able to grasp it in its entirety as the 
theological God in the ontological realm. Rather, it is only through 
the face of the Other that my sensibility, anterior to being, will be 
touched in passivity by signification. The infinite, which is never 
present, is only accessible in its trace: 
It signifies with a signifyingness from the first older than its 
exhibition, not exhausting itself in exhibiting itself, not 
drawing its meaning from its manifestation, and thus 
breaking with the coinciding of being with appearance in 
which, for Western philosophy, meaning or rationality lie, 
breaking with synopsis. (1998a: 161) 
Because alterity cannot be contained within any comprehension of 
Being, but will transcend it infinitely, it is the relationship with the 
Other that commands ontology. Ethics, the exercise through which 
the same is called into question by the Other, precedes ontology, 
or being, thus constituting a 'first philosophy'. 48 
48 For Derrida, it does not make sense to speak of the subordination of 
ontology to the ethical relation. This is because Being could never 
precede being, as it is nothing outside the existent. Therefore, an ethics 
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I cannot disentangle myself from society with the Other, even 
when I consider the Being of the existent he is. Already the 
comprehension of Being is said to the existent, who again 
arises behind the theme in which he is presented. This 
"saying to the Other" - this relationship with the Other as 
interlocutor, this relation with an existent - precedes all 
ontology; it is the ultimate relation in Being. Ontology 
presupposes metaphysics. (1996: 48) 
The history of Western philosophy has been, for Levinas, a 
destruction of transcendence. Due to the emphasis on the return to 
Being, to the One, any ontological attempt to think transcendence 
becomes an immanence. (1 998a: 154,158) The unity of 
philosophical discourse has, according to Levinas, to be unsaid, to 
be reduced t o the primordial saying, the one-for-the-Other, that 
precedes the crystallised said. 
An alternating rhythm of the said and the unsaid, and the 
unsaid being unsaid in its turn, will have to be substituted for 
the unity of discourse. There is here a break-up of the 
omnipotence of the logos, that of system and simultaneity. 
(1 998a: 173 )49 
Scepticism is that which places an interval between saying and the 
said, preventing that the saying be exhausted in the said. The 
unity of philosophical discourse camouflages discontinuities, 
which presupposes the absoluteness of separate existents engaged in 
an asymmetrical relationship must necessarily open with the thought of 
Being, without which the essence of the existents could not exist. (1990: 
134) 
49 Derrida takes up Levinas's critique of logocentrism. However, he 
claims that language is unable to escape violence, without which it 
would be reduced to silence. Because metaphysics consists in economy, 
violence combats violence, and light struggles against light. As such, 
speech must resort to speech to combat its own violence. (1990: 117) 
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interruptions and ruptures, which remain like knots in the 
'immanence of the said', traces of a past that never became 
present. (1999: 168,170) 
The permanent return of scepticism does not so much signify 
the possible break-up of structures as the fact that they are 
not the ultimate framework of meaning, that for their accord 
repression can already be necessary. It reminds us of the, in 
a very broad sense, political character of all logical 
rationalism, the alliance of logic with politics. (1999: 171) 
Western philosophy, where the saying is crystallised in the said, is 
therefore eminently of a political nature, in comparison with the 
transcendental metaphysics, enacted in ethics, which Levinas is 
attempting to introduce. While ontology would be the realm of 
violence, of war 50 , Levinas aims to establish a philosophy of peace, 
not by writing back against the violence of ontology - an act which 
would still presuppose the comprehension within a totality 
composed of binary opposites -, but precisely by moving beyond 
being: 
The true problem for us Westerners is not so much to refuse 
violence as to question ourselves about a struggle against 
violence which, without blanching in non-resistance to evil, 
could avoid the institution of violence out of this very 
struggle ... (11999: 177) 
50 For Levinas, war already presupposes discourse, the primordial 
signification inherent in the asymmetrical face-to-face relation. It is the 
distance between separate terms engaging in a relationship not uniting 
into a totality that allows for both war and peace: the latter are 
predicated on a pluralism of wills which must remain absolute in 
themselves. 'Totality absorbs the multiplicity of beings, which peace 
implies. Only beings capable of war can rise to peace. ' (1996: 222) 
299 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
111. "There is": The Inability to Escape Consciousness 
Within the realm of ontology, being and non-being compose a 
totality: to affirm non-being would correspond to a being otherwise, 
rather than nothingness. The void, a total absence, is impossible 
to attain, for non-being still operates as the negative term within 
the Whole comprehended by Being. 
Being and not-being illuminate one another, and unfold a 
speculative dialectic which is a determination of being. Or 
else the negativity which attempts to repel being is 
immediately submerged by being. The void that hollows out 
is immediately filled with the mute and anonymous rustling of 
the there is. (1999: 3) 
Every negation thus leads to an assimilation into the same, a 
reentry into the totality, characterised, in Western philosophy, by 
an anxiety over finitude and a care for existence. Western 
spirituality, dominated by the possibility of the subject's death, 
seeks to escape mortality by two alternatives, both of which take 
place within essence: on one hand, refuge is found in resignation 
to and sublimation of the laws of immanence; on the other, an 
emphasis is placed on ecstasy, on living the instant to the full in 
intoxicating inebriation so as to create the illusion of an extension 
of time. (1999: 176) 
Contrary to the prevalent mode of Western spirituality, Levinas 
argues that rather than consisting in a being-toward-death, the 
there is, the impossibility to escape Being, is distinguished by the 
realisation of the impossibility of death. To describe the there is, 
Levinas urges one to imagine total destruction. What then remains 
is not a nothingness, nor yet a something, but simply 'the 
impersonal "field of forces" of existing' (1987: 46), the anonymity 
of Being and the impossibility of ceasing to exist, without 
beginning or end in time. 
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The fact of existing imposes itself when there is no longer 
anything. And it is anonymous: there is neither anyone nor 
anything that takes this existence upon itself. It is 
impersonal like 'it is raining' or 'it is hot. ' Existing returns no 
matter with what negation one dismisses it. There is, as the 
irremissibility of pure existing. (1987: 47) 
Levinas refers to insomnia or insanity as situations in which the 
there is reveals itself in acuity. Here, consciousness cannot 
withdraw from the vigilance to which it is held, becoming an object 
of itself. Unable to seek refuge in the private domain of 
unconsciousness, or sleep, consciousness must confront the 
unbearable irremissibility of Being. The self risks losing its identity 
in the midst of an all-pervasive there is, the possibility that 
existence exert total mastery over the existent. 
A rupture in the anonymity of Being refers to a situation where the 
same masters the Other in its entirety by a process characterised 
by the departure from self and the return to self. It is due to this 
movement of hypostasis, constitutive of identity or subjectification, 
that 'consciousness is the power to sleep', the 'power to leave the 
situation of impersonal vigilance' (1987: 51), only to confront it 
once again when fully awake. 
The present is the event of hypostasis. The present leaves 
itself - better still, it is the departure from self. It is a rip in 
the infinite beginningless and endless fabric of existing. The 
present rips apart and joins together again; it begins; it is 
beginning itself. It has a past, but in the form of 
remembrance. It has a history, but it is not history. (1987: 
52) 
The event of the present, where the existent masters existence by 
the capacity to begin, thus ruptures the impersonal infinity of 
Being, only to join up with it once again. In introducing the present 
as the mastery of the existent over existing, but at the same time 
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seeking in the present the passage from existing to the existent, 
Levinas is going beyond phenomenology, founded on experience, 
on thematic exhibition, on the gathering of presence unto itself, on 
the reduction of meaning to a 'said' that manifests itself. (1987: 
54; 1998a: 158) 
Our presentation of notions proceeds neither by their logical 
decomposition, nor by their dialectical description. It remains 
faithful to intentional analysis, insofar as it signifies the 
locating of notions in the horizon of their appearing, a 
horizon unrecognised, forgotten or displaced in the exhibition 
of an object ... The said in which everything 
is thematised, in 
which everything shows itself in a theme, has to be reduced 
to its signification as saying. (1999: 183) 
Because the present as event where the existent takes up 
existence is marked by both departure from and return to self, 
identity is forever enchained to itself. This impossibility of 
escaping oneself leads paradoxically to the curtailing of freedom 
inherent in the subject's capacity to begin: the fact that the 
existent is responsible for himself means that in truth the existent 
is no longer free. For Levinas, the unity of the existent with 
existence is tragic to the extent that identity is captive to itself, to 
materiality. He thus aims to shatter the 'enchainment to matter', 
the unity between existent and existence, the event of the present, 
by being in time. (1987: 55,57) 
To shatter the enchainment of matter is to shatter the finality 
of hypostasis. It is to be in time. (1987: 57) 
Time will suggest another relationship between existent and 
existence, surpassing the monist hypostasis of the present, where 
consciousness ceaselessly reverts back unto itself. To being in 
time corresponds a relationship with the Other, allowing for the 
transcendence of identity in its welcoming of alterity and paving 
the way for a pluralist model of existence. (1987: 54) 
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IV. Time as Diachrony 
According to Levinas, Western thought has based itself on the 
coincidence between being and appearance; the ego is posited as 
coinciding with itself in self-identity, and its inwardness is 
comprehended by a totality without secrets. However, the very 
failure of rational projects of humanity, based on the belief in the 
coincidence of identity with itself, reveal identity to be a non- 
identity, not coinciding with itself, forever oriented towards 
exteriority: 
That an action could be obstructed by the technology 
destined to render it efficacious and easy, that a science, 
born to embrace the world, delivers it over to disintegration, 
that a politics and an administration guided by the humanist 
ideal maintain the exploitation of man by man and war - 
these are singular inversions of rationalist projects, 
disqualifying human causality, and thus transcendental 
subjectivity understood as spontaneity and act also. 
Everything comes to pass as though the ego, the identity par 
excellence from which every identifiable identity would 
derive, were wanting with regard to itself, did not succeed in 
coinciding with itself. (1998a: 142) 
For Levinas, the non-identity of the subjective derives precisely 
from being in time, the latter which signifies a relationship with the 
future. No longer akin to anticipation, the future does not derive 
from a temporal sequence of linearity, spanning past and present; 
rather, it consists in the unknowable, the ungraspable, a mystery 
'foreign to all light' (1987: 71), an absence that is transcendent. 
The future is thus radi-cal alterity, that which cannot be made 
present, only accessible in its trace. 
The otherwise than being cannot be situated outside of time, within 
which being and nothingness, life and death take place, as if it 
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belonged to an eternal order. It must, however, signify a difference 
from the binary opposites being and nothingness. 
Time is essence and monstration of essence. In the 
temporalisation of time the light comes about by the instant 
falling out of phase with itself - which is the temporal flow, 
the differing of the identical. (1999: 9) 
Within temporal isation, founded on 'retention, memory and history', 
divergencies are camouflaged due to reinscription into a unified 
discourse of re-presentation. This synchronisation into the present 
cannot, however, embrace the entirety of the past: that which 
resists totalisation, containment into the Whole, is an infinite 
diachrony, 'a past more ancient that every representable origin, a 
pre-original and anarchical passed' (1999: 9). 
... there must be signalled a lapse of time that 
does not 
return, a diachrony refractory to all synch ron isation, a 
transcending diachrony. (1999: 9) 
If time is to reveal this ambiguity between essence and beyond 
being - the 'amphibology' between said and saying -, then its 
temporalisation should be conceived as diachrony rather than 
synchrony. 
Essence fills the said, or the epos, of the saying, but the 
saying, in its power of equivocation, that is, in the enigma 
whose secret it keeps, escapes the epos of essence that 
includes it and signifies beyond in a signification that 
hesitates between this beyond and the return to the epos of 
essence. (1999: 9-10) 
This space of equivocation, or ambiguity, corresponds to that of 
transcendence, or infinity, the excluded middle that hovers beyond 
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essence and non-essence, beyond ontology, where subjectivity is 
51 
accomplished as an unravelling of identity towards the Other. 
In what concrete case is the singular relationship with a past 
produced, which does not reduce this past to the immanence 
in which it is signalled and leaves it be past, not returning as 
a present nor a representation, leaves it be past without 
reference to some present it would have 'modified', leaves it 
be a past, then, which can not have been an origin, a pre- 
original past, anarchical past? (1999: 10) 
In other words, in which situations does the time of the said, or 
essence, allow diachrony to be revealed, the anarchical saying to 
be heard? For Levinas, circumstances which involve the encounter 
of the same with radical alterity, with the future, with that which 
cannot be made present, are those in which subject constitution as 
a non-identity, as fundamentally geared towards exteriority, can be 
perceived. Death, suffering, sexuality, and, most importantly, the 
encounter with the face of the Other, constitute paradigms of 
radical alterity, moments of transcendence in which the inwardness 
of a traditional ontological subject is destroyed. 
51 Gillian Rose argues that Levinas's excluded middle becomes a holy 
middle, whereby the agon of representation is refused: any attempt to 
grasp the forever elusive Other is equated with the violence of the said, 
of the law. By 'elevating' ethics to 'the heavenly state', divine law and 
positive law are divorced from each other; the equivocation between law 
- halacha - and ethics is thus ignored in favour of the transition of the 
non-ethical - the ontological - to the ethical, in a move corresponding to 
an ecclesiology, a violent love that must respond to a violent State, to 
the 'twin terrors' of the il ya and the ille, the third party. The 
diremptions that Levinas seeks to mend by transcending Being are 
therefore perpetuated. According to Rose, 'there can be no love where 
there is demonstrably so little faith', for faith, learnt through failure, is 
neither prey to the threat of the il ya nor to the permanent presence of 
the 'beloved'. (1992: 255,260,264,296) 
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V. Levinas and Arendt: On Metaphysics, Time and 
Dialectics 
Levinas and Arendt are both critical of Western metaphysics. 
However, whereas Levinas critiques the closure of a metaphysical 
discourse that is immanent, operating within the ontological realm 
and based on the ideal of a return to eternal Being, Arendt 
accuses metaphysics of positing a separation between mind and 
body, which gave rise to the dichotomy between vita contemplativa 
- the life devoted to thought - and vita activa - life dedicated to 
action in a 'world of appearance'. Arendt considers that this 
duality, responsible for the illusion that one must go beyond 
appearances to attain the 'essence' of something, consists in one 
of the greatest fallacies of Western thought, inspiring the birth of 
modernity with the Cartesian mistrust of that which is given to the 
senses. (1978: 153) 
For Arendt, appearances are of primordial importance, there being 
no essence that they might camouflage. In a world of appearances, 
one must 'appear' in the public realm through collective action, so 
as to ensure a space in which freedom may manifest itself. (1961: 
154) From a Heideggerian perspective, Arendt would argue that by 
acting in a world of appearances one participates in the realm of 
errancy in which history discloses itself; however, through thought, 
human existence can unite itself with peaceful and eternal Being, 
that which is concealed, or absent, from the world in which beings, 
or existents, display themselves. (1978: 194) 
In his attempt to go beyond ontological discourse, Levinas is 
highly critical of any amalgamation of being and appearance, a 
movement which he considers to consist in self -coincidence and 
thus, to be tautological, violent, assimilating the Other into the 
same. A transcendental metaphysics is aimed precisely at going 
beyond being, or essence, at rupturing a transcendental subject 
that reverts back unto itself, at dismantling the notion of the One 
or Unity that had hitherto presided over Western metaphysics, 
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devoted to healing a wound which separated a 'fallen' being from 
its home, that is, from totality. Unlike Arendt, Levinas considers 
that appearances are not to be trusted. In fact, they are compared 
to an 'evil genius' (1996: 90): relying on phenomenology, Levinas 
claims that appearances consist in a reality that is not a reality, for 
consciousness of the world is always consciousness through a 
particular world; that is, the intentionality of consciousness - the 
fact that consciousness is always consciousness of something - 
determines that which I see, the perception that the subject has of 
an object, there being a myriad of other perspectives or potential 
re-presentations that remain in the horizon of that very object. 
Thus, appearances are not to be taken literally; akin to a 
threatening there is, a world of inclecipherability or of complete 
silence, the veil that shrouds appearances can only be cast aside 
by speech. Arendt, on the contrary would consider speech as part 
of the theatricality of appearance in the public realm. 
Levinas espouses the Cartesian methodical doubt, whereby a 
distance is drawn between being and appearance: sensible 
intuition is to be doubted. The awareness that my senses are not 
to be trusted derives from the idea of infinity, or perfection, or God 
in me, a finite being. Infinity will overflow or transcend the thought 
that thinks it, breaking the illusion of the existence of 
transcendental consciousness, for now the subject perceives itself 
from the outside. Thus, where Arendt accuses Descartes of giving 
rise to the universal suspicion that characterises modernity, and 
which would inspire determinism, or narratives of necessity, 
Levinas reads the Cartesian doubt as paving the way for the 
overthrow of the transcendental, unified subject of ontology, where 
the ego ceaselessly coincides with itself. In fact, Levinas might 
critique Arendt for aiming precisely at this self -coincidence in her 
defence of Heidegger's vision of an existent who can link himself 
to absent Being by the faculty of thought. According to Levinas, 
man would be then simply reflecting Being, consisting in a medium 
for the latter's disclosure. 
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For Arendt, when man joins himself with Being by exercising the 
activity of thought, he is in a space of non-time, an enduring 
present, a rupture or gap between past and future, where he can 
abstract himself from his own context and reflect - remembering or 
anticipating - on the remnants rescued from the ravage of time. 
(1961: 13; 1978: 203) Levinas would consider this 'backward 
glance of the historian' to be a re-presentation, that is, an attempt 
by identity to assimilate its Other - time - into itself, thus giving 
rise to a temporal sequence of progression. In fact, this rectilinear 
temporality, driven forward by the impetus of the will, would be 
akin to the Hegelian dialectical movement, which absorbs what it 
encounters into itself. Time, for Levinas, consists in that which 
ruptures the hypostasis of identity, whereby the ego reverts back 
unto itself in the present: upon confrontation with a transcendental 
Other, the future, identity can no longer master existence for it 
knows that it will ultimately die. Thus, time which is defined as 
postponement of death allows identity to be for-the-Other rather 
than a Heideggerian being-towards-death; it reveals the absurdity 
inherent in the care for the self, that is, the attempt to seek self- 
coincidence when one is ultimately confronted with the absolute 
Other. Time, for Levinas, is the Other, in the sense that it allows 
me to transcend myself towards exteriority. 
The Hegelian dialectic, according to Arendt, conjugates both the 
future tense of the will, in its linear drive forward, and the enduring 
present of thought, based on circular motions inherent in the 
exercise of remembrance. Because every objective is considered 
as a means to achieving further objectives, the will can either 
result in infinite progress or total annihilation, depending on the 
commencing term of the dialectical movement - Being or Not- 
Being. Arendt argues that Hegel took Being for granted as a 
starting point of his process towards Becoming. If he were to have 
commenced with Not-Being instead, then Becoming would be an 
impossibility. Arendt's criticism of Hegel is that his dialectics do 
not allow for nothingness, that is, a negation that does not negate 
a concrete something. (1978: 51) According to Levinas, however, 
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because non-being functions as a negative term within the 
wholeness of Being, it cannot consist in pure nothingness, or 
absence. In fact, not-being is the there is, the impossibility of 
withdrawing from eternal Being. Thus, from this perspective, even 
if the Hegelian dialectic were to have taken not-being as a starting 
point, it would have nevertheless resulted in the same process of 
the unfolding of Being, that is, of a Becoming based on the 
absorption of successive negations into a new totality. The there 
is, corresponding to the impossibility of evading oneself, that is, 
the enchainment of identity to itself, can only be ruptured by 'being 
in time', where time is not a present that assimilates that which it 
comes across into identity, but rather a relationship with the Other, 
allowing for transcendence of identity in its confrontation with 
alterity. 
V1. Encounters with Radical Alterity: Duality in Existence 
It is impossible to describe in experiential terms, that is, in terms 
of light or visibility, the limits of pain and suffering. The structure 
of pain transcends the movement whereby the ego reverts back to 
itself, the coincidence of identity with itself that characterises 
thernatised experience. Suffering is directly exposed to the 
irremissibility of being, that is, it is unable to withdraw from the 
there is, to retreat into a state of unconsciousness, or 
nothingness. In physical pain, the Other is present, touches me, 
grasps my will. (1996: 238) Yet suffering simultaneously heeds a 
call towards death, the proximity of the threat of nothingness, 'as if 
despite the entire absence of a dimension of withdrawal that 
constitutes suffering, it still had some free space for an event'. 
(1987: 69) Suffering is therefore characterised by ambiguity, 
caught in between the witnessing of oneself as a thing, and at the 
same time at a distance from this reification. 
Suffering ... is already the present of the pain acting on 
the 
for itself of the will, but, as consciousness, the pain is 
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always yet to come. In suffering the free being ceases to be 
free, but, while non-free, is yet free. (1996: 238) 
By maintaining a distance from the present, consciousness, 
deprived of f reedom, becomes patience, 'the passivity of 
undergoing, and yet mastery itself'. (1996: 238) 
The being that does violence to me and has a hold on me is 
not yet upon me; it continues to threaten from the future, is 
not yet upon me, is only conscious. But in this extreme 
consciousness, where the will reaches mastery in a new 
sense, where death no longer touches it, extreme passivity 
becomes extreme mastery. (1996: 239) 
InH eidegge r, being towards death corresponds to Dasein's 
possibility of authentic existence, the supreme event of lucidity or 
virility upon which hinge all other possibilities. Death thus 
becomes an 'event of freedom' and the basis of activity, enabling 
the 'very feat of grasping a possibility'. (1987: 70) Levinas, on the 
contrary, regards suffering as the limit of the possible, where the 
subject remains enchained to itself but simultaneously finds itself 
on the edge of an event beyond physical pain. 
The now is the fact that I am master, master of the possible, 
master of grasping the possible. Death is never now. When 
death is here, I am no longer here, not just because I am 
nothingness, but because I am unable to grasp. My mastery, 
my virility, my heroism as a subject can be neither virility nor 
heroism in relation to death. (1987: 72) 
Death brings the realisation that the subject's ability to 'be able' is 
finite; the subject no longer exerts mastery over himself in the 
present, for he exists according to a modality whereby an 
unassumable event can befall him, regardless of the will's projects. 
Death, the unknown, the absolute Other, disturbs identity at peace 
with itself: 
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Death is the impossibility of having a project. This approach 
of death indicates that we are in relation with something that 
is absolutely Other, something bearing alterity not as a 
provisional determination we can assimilate through 
enjoyment, but as something whose very existence is made 
of alterity. My solitude is thus not confirmed by death but 
broken by it. (1987: 74) 
The time of the will is the future: however, in its projection 
upstream, it is suddenly confronted and 'overturned' by the threat 
of an absolute alterity, an otherness which I cannot assimilate into 
myself unlike the objects of need, but which strikes me as a 
mystery, alienating my will in its exteriority. 
In the being for death of fear I am not faced with 
nothingness, but faced with what is against me, as though 
murder, rather than being one of the occasions of dying, 
were inseparable from the essence of death ... (1996: 234) 
Death proceeds unto me as though it were a foreign will. Its 
urgency, which consists in unforeseeability, makes reference to an 
interpersonal order, where the I gives in, is subjugated by the 
unknowable. 
Mortality is the concrete and primary phenomenon. It forbids 
the positing of a for itself that would not be already delivered 
over to the Other and consequently be a thing. The for itself, 
essentially mortal, does not only represent things to itself, 
but is subject to them. (1996: 235) 
Subjection to alterity comes as both menace and postponement. 
The hypostasis of the I in the time of the present, whereby the ego 
coincides with itself, is shattered by the approach of an instant 
that is forever future for the one who awaits death. The moment of 
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death is eternally 'out of reach', due to my inability to apprehend 
the moment in which death strikes me. 
... it approaches without being able to be assumed, such that 
the time that separates me from my death dwindles and 
dwindles without end, involves a sort of last interval which 
my consciousness cannot traverse, and where a leap will 
somehow be produced from death to me... (1996: 235) 
Thus if death is urgency, pressing forward, it simultaneously 
allows for time. Temporality consists precisely in this being-for- 
death, while retaining time, that is, being against death. (1996: 
235) It is because I die that the instants of my life that extend from 
birth to death can be remembered or anticipated (1996: 234); the 
possibility of impossibility is the reason why temporality, reaching 
from past to future, makes sense. Life consists in the 
postponement of the violence of alterity, the violence of death, 
which tears identity away from illusions of being at rest with itself. 
Levinas thus argues that ultimately death is the cause for meaning 
in life, due to its reference to a structure of exteriority the 
signifyingness of which it does not eliminate. 
Murder, at the origin of death, reveals a cruel world, but one 
to the scale of human relations. The will, already betrayal 
and alienation of itself but postponing this betrayal, on the 
way to death but a death ever future, exposed to death but 
not immediately, has time to be for the Other, and thus to 
recover meaning despite death. (1996: 236) 
Eros, 'strong as death 152 (1987: 76), is another encounter with 
radical alterity that cannot be described in terms of light. Like 
death, it exemplifies a relationship with alterity as mystery, as the 
impossibility of grasping the Other and containing it within the 
52 Levinas draws on Franz Rosenzweig's statement that 'love is as 
strong as death', inspired, in turn, by the biblical Song of Songs. (1985: 
156) 
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same. Eros is the contact with the future, where the future is the 
Other. The present of the future occurs as anticipation or 
projection, but the absolute future, as exteriority, is that which 
surprises us, striking us unexpectedly, evading representation. 
Revealing an interpersonal structure at the root of signification, 
the future tears the subject away from the time of the present, from 
personal duration. (1987: 77) 
Levinas argues that love is characterised by ambiguity, situating 
itself at the limit of immanence and transcendence. The fact that 
the Other appears as an object of need while retaining his 
'separateness' characterises a relationship that is simultaneously 
constituted by enjoyment in the time of the present and a 
movement of transcendence that goes beyond the beloved, toward 
the not yet of a future that can never become present. The caress, 
that which is composed of sensibility but at the same time 
transcends the senses, is an example of the originality of erotic 
ambiguity. 
The caress consists in seizing upon nothing, in soliciting 
what ceaselessly escapes its form toward a future never 
future enough, in soliciting what slips away as though it were 
not yet. It searches, it forages. It is not an intentionality of 
disclosure but of search: a movement unto the invisible. 
(1996: 257-8) 
The subject loses its position, its identity, by its encounter with an 
absolute future, where the ego no longer coincides with itself. This 
disturbance of the I by the Other, this transformation from a state 
of peaceful slumber into one of restlessness, corresponds to being 
moved by the 'beloved', to 'a pity that is complacent, a pleasure, a 
suffering transformed into happiness - voluptuosity'. (1996: 259) 
Whereas the relationship with the Other is generally understood as 
fusion, Levinas draws attention to the 'pathos of voluptuousness' 
which lies in a duality of beings whose proximity maintains 
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distance (1987: 94), preserving rather than neutralising alterity. 
Being moved, or compassion, derives precisely from this alterity, 
whereby my voluptuousity delights in the Other's voluptuousity. 
... the relation between me and the Other commences in the 
inequality of terms, transcendent to one another, where 
alterity does not determine the Other in a formal sense, as 
where the alterity of B with respect to A results simply from 
the identity of B, distinct from the identity of A. Here the 
alterity of the Other does not result from its identity, but 
constitutes it: the Other is the Other. (1996: 251) 
The Other bears alterity as its essence. Because the Other is only 
accessible as mystery, any contact with the former occurs as a 
profanation of modesty, a violation of boundaries. Eros hovers 
between presence and the not yet: it feeds on the simultaneity of 
exposure and clandestinity, that is, on profanation. (1996: 257) 
Voluptuosity profanes; it does not see. An intentionality 
without vision, discovery does not shed light: what it 
discovers does not present itself as signification and 
illuminates no horizon. (1996: 260) 
The Other thus retains mystery in voluptuousity, in profanation. It 
remains clandestine, hidden, while uncovered, modest in 
immodesty, in a 'no man's land between being and not-yet-being' 
(1996: 259). For Levinas, femininity is the metaphor of alterity that 
ideally expresses carnal tenderness, a combination of, on one 
hand, ultramateriality, the weight of non-signifyingness, and, on 
the other hand, evanescent frailty, no longer an existent (1996: 
257-8). The feminine thus abides in a situation 'simultaneously 
uncovered by Eros and refusing Eros'(1996: 259). 53 
53 Luce Irigaray critiques Levinas's metaphor of femininity for suggesting 
a 'she' who does not manifest her own will to love. By occupying the site 
of the nonwill, the feminine is absorbed by the ethical will of the 
masculine. Caught between God and son, she is annihilated as other. 
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The feminine presents a face that goes beyond the face. The 
face of the beloved does not express the secret that Eros 
profanes; it ceases to express, o r, if one p refers, it 
expresses only this refusal to express, this end of discourse 
and of decency, this abrupt interruption of the order of 
presences. (1996: 260) 
The signifyingness of the face, the primordial signification prior to 
any ontology, is revealed in the erotic relationship, for the non- 
signifyingness of erotic nudity only makes sense due to the 
'frankness' of a face that precedes it. 
... disrespect presupposes the 
face. Elements and things 
remain outside of respect and disrespect. It is necessary that 
the face have been apperceived for nudity to be able to 
acquire the non-signifyingness of the lustful. (1996: 262) 
Renouncing meaning, eros is exhibition; the face gives way to 
animality, to the 'irresponsibility of play'. Eros goes beyond the 
face, marking a not yet, a 'less than nothing', where nothing is the 
negation of something, and thus still operates as a term within the 
totality of Being; by being less than Being, it is beyond Being, a 
less that is infinitely more because it cannot be embraced by 
ontological categories. Forever future and ungraspable, the object 
of voluptuousness is not posited as another existent, or a freedom 
identical to and struggling with the ego; instead, it is a freedom 
desired not in the transparency of the Other's face, but rather in a 
future that remains hidden although uncovered. I do not wish to 
possess the Other, for possession is reminiscent of fusion, where 
the alterity between lovers is neutralised. Rather than aiming at 
the Other, voluptuousity thus aims at the Other's voluptuousity: 'it 
is voluptuousity of voluptuousity, love of the love of the Other. ' 
Voluptuousness thus remains, for Irigaray, a relation which assimilates 
the Other into the same, for after his jouissance the male lover is free 
to continue his 'ethical journey' by relying on the son. (1986: 241,247) 
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(1996: 266) However, 'If to love is to love the love the Beloved 
bears me, to love is also to love oneself in love, and thus to return 
to oneself'. (1996: 266) 
This return of the ego unto itself is interrupted, however, by the 
event of fecundity, the 'relationship of the ego with a myself who is 
nonetheless a stranger to me'. (1987: 91) It is through fecundity, 
and through the horizon of the future introduced by eros, that the 
enchainment of identity to itself is loosened, leading to the 
accomplishment of time between human beings, where the present 
in which the existent masters existence advances upon the future 
which is the Other. 
I transcend myself, my personal duration, through the event of 
fecundity. Thus, although in eros the same and the Other are not 
united, by the act of trans-substantiation the same becomes an 
Other through the child. Paternity defies formal logic for it 
embraces both self -identification and difference within 
identification. (1996: 267) 
Whereas projections into the future derive from a solitary will that 
illuminates and comprehends, transforming external objects into 
personal ideas - the very definition of power for Levinas -, the 
child, produced in voluptuousity, cannot be reduced to my power. 
This is because the possibility of the future of a child hinges on my 
encounter with the Other. 
This relationship resembles that which was described for the 
idea of infinity; I cannot account for it by myself, as I do 
account for the luminous world by myself. (1996: 267) 
Fecundity is characterised by a duality, both in terms of its origin 
in the erotic relationship as well as in the split identity it produces 
in the form of the child, who, as absolute future, evades the 
parents' possibilities, introducing a discontinuity between same 
and Other, and yet remains part of the parents' journey in time. It 
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is through the child that the parents will establish a relationship 
with infinite time. 
In fecundity the I transcends the world of light - not to 
dissolve into the anonymity of the there is, but in order to go 
further than the light, to go elsewhere. To stand in the light, 
to see - to grasp before grasping - is not yet 'to be infinitely'; 
it is to return to oneself older, that is, encumbered with 
oneself. To be infinitely means to be produced in the mode of 
an I that is always at the origin, but that meets with no 
trammels to the renewal of its substance, not even from its 
very identity. Youth as a philosophical concept is defined 
thus. (1996: 268) 
The dissolution of the hypostasis of the I as the time of the present 
striving towards the future in fecundity does not find a term in the 
Other. Rather, there is a repetition of this process in the Other, 
such that 'transcendence transcends toward him who transcends' 
(1996: 269). Fecundity thus accomplishes a desire that is not 
based on lack or need, but which is fed on the impossibility of 
satisfaction, going beyond the possible by transcending itself in 
the infinite production of desire. 
The ultimate structure of duality inherent in Being that eros and 
fecundity lay bare indicate that the former is engendered as 
multiple, as fissured into same and other. To be corresponds to 
being in society and in time. Although beginning with Plato, 
influenced by the Eleatic notion of Being, the social ideal has been 
one of fusion, where the subject in relationship with alterity is part 
of a totality a collective representation gathered around a 
common term in Levinas being in society corresponds to a face- 
to-face without a common term, based on a proximity that 
maintains distance, in time. Time no longer constitutes a 'fallen' 
mode of Being, anticipating a recuperation within a non-temporal, 
eternal totality; rather, it is the very event of being, accomplished 
and making sense only through my relationship with alterity. The 
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unity of the Eleatic notion of Being, dominant in Western 
philosophy, thus gives way in Levinas to the notion of duality, 
patent in each subject's existing through the situations of 
sexuality, fecundity, suffering and death. (1987: 92-94) 
We thus leave the philosophy of Parmenidean being. 
Philosophy itself constitutes a moment of this temporal 
accomplishment, a discourse always addressed to another. 
What we are now exposing is addressed to those who shall 
wish to read it. (1996: 269) 
Vil. The Face of the Other 
The face is that which signifies by itself, requiring no relation to 
another term in order to acquire signification. Levinas uses the 
face as a metaphor for the Other, who by presenting himself to me 
transcends any idea I could have had of him. The Other, the 
Cartesian cogitatio, cannot be contained within the idea of the 
Other - the cogitaturn - in me. The face therefore cannot be 
reduced to a plastic form, a combination of characteristics forming 
an image. It is forever inadequate to any idea one can have of it. 
The face of the Other at each moment destroys and 
overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to 
my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum - the 
adequate idea. (1996: 51) 
Because it cannot be thematised under my gaze, that is, reduced 
to a set of qualities, such as colour of hair, eyes, shape of 
features, the face can only be approached by welcoming its 
expression. The distinction between form and content is thus 
eliminated, for the totality of its content - expression - is spread 
out in its form. The face is therefore vulnerable in its capacity for 
expression, in the nakedness with which it presents itself to my 
gaze; it is this very vulnerability that leads Levinas to choose the 
face as a metaphor for the infinite Other. 
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This gaze that supplicates and demands, that can supplicate 
only because it demands, deprived of everything because 
entitled to everything, and which one recognises in giving ... 
- this gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face as a face ... 
To recognise the Other is to give. But it is to give to the 
master, to the lord, to him whom one approaches as "You" in 
a dimension of height. (1996: 75) 
The relationship with alterity is not reciprocal but asymmetrical, 
where the ego responds, in passivity, to the call of the Other from 
a dimension of height, in an encounter that is face-to-face. The 
Other, taking the form of whatever I myself am not - 'the weak, the 
poor, the widow, and the orphan' (1987: 83) - is transcendental, for 
the subject cannot assume the event of alterity, is overwhelmed by 
the fact that it is ungraspable. The more I attempt to approach the 
Other, the wider the gap between myself and the Other. I am 
permanently in debt to the Other, and it is in this sense that the 
'Other is deprived of everything, because entitled to everything'. 54 
in the eyes of the Other is issued the command "Thou shalt not 
kill", an interdiction that is predicated on the very possibility of 
this impossibility. Murder, laying claim to a total negation of the 
Other, is the attempt to exercise power over that which transcends 
power: the Other can be killed but not assimilated. Unlike labour or 
54 Couze Venn argues for a non-prescriptive ethics of time, in which 
time, as time of the Other and time of historicity, is the 'primary value', 
the incalculability of which derives from its association with 
indebtedness. Responsibility for alterity implies condemnation of the 
'instituted theft of the time of the other', that is, the delegitimation of 
time as property, as an ideal guiding standards of justice in contextually 
specific situations without resorting to transcendentalisms. To welcome 
the Other, that which cannot be made present, corresponds to the giving 
of the gift of time, an economy of desire which seeks to transcend 'the 
gap between myself and the Other' by establishing community or 
friendship. (2000: 230-2,235) 
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representation which negate an object by appropriation and 
comprehension, murder aims not at domination but at annihilation, 
that is, at the renunciation of comprehension of the Other by the 
same. (1996: 198) However, because the face partakes of the 
sensible whilst infinitely exceeding its form, it will on one hand be 
susceptible to the violence of murder, but on the other hand, will 
infinitely resist obliteration by the unforeseeability of its own 
reaction, the very transcendence of expression inherent in the 
struggle that the face threatens against this possibility of 
impossibility. 
Infinity presents itself as a face in the ethical resistance that 
paralyses my powers and from the depths of defenceless 
eyes rises firm and absolute in its nudity and destitution. The 
comprehension of this destitution and this hunger establishes 
the very proximity of the Other. But thus the epiphany of 
infinity is expression and discourse. (1996: 199-200) 
VIII. The Atheism of the I 
For Levinas, expression and discourse do not serve the purpose of 
revealing information concerning the inward domain of the human 
spirit. Rather, they are the mode through which beings present or 
manifest themselves, attending their own manifestation and 
appealing to the Other in the process. 
To manifest oneself in attending one's own manifestation is 
to invoke the interlocutor and expose oneself to his response 
and questioning. (1996: 200) 
To speak to the Other is to transcend the strictly phenomenal form 
of representation, that is, the 'plastic in manifestation'. By 
manifesting oneself as a face, one moves beyond representation - 
the sphere of ontology -, into the face-to-face, where one presents 
oneself to the Other in one's 'nudity', 'destitution and hunger', 
without resorting to any image for mediation. Judgement is 
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pronounced upon me to the extent that I must submit myself to the 
Other's questioning; due to my constantly being called to justify my 
own freedom before the Other, truth is produced in apology - my 
defence under judgement - before the Other. Judgement thus gives 
rise to an infinite responsibility of the will, unique and 
irreplaceable in its apology, vis A vis the Other. 
To utter 'I, ' to affirm the irreducible singularity in which the 
apology is pursued, means to possess a privileged place with 
regard to responsibilities for which no one can replace me 
and from which no one can release me. To be unable to 
shirk: this is the 1. (1996: 245) 
The Other shames me in my arbitrary freedom, which is apologetic 
in that it appeals from itself to judgement by the Other. However, 
for the I to manifest itself while attending its manifestation, it must 
have first been produced as separate, in the hypostasis of the 
present, through the subjectivities of need and will. The movement 
of the ego reverting back unto itself is that of the egoism inherent 
in enjoyment, from which the will arises. The subject loses himself 
within the element - that which he lives from - in enjoyment; 
however, due to the future of the element as insecurity and 
indeterminacy, the subject falls back upon his own time - the 
present -, through possession and labour, separating himself from 
the uncertainty of the elemental. 
Enjoyment does not refer to an infinity beyond what 
nourishes it, but to the virtual vanishing of what presents 
itself, to the instability of happiness. (1996: 141) 
Need and happiness are closely tied, for I enjoy that which I live 
from, absorbing the non-me into the same through nourishment. 
The happiness derived from the elements I nourish myself from is 
always a 'first happiness', an absolute beginning, a creation ex 
nihilo, since it breaks with the continuity of an anonymous Being, a 
totality for all eternity, where commencement and end have no 
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meaning. Enjoyment thus corresponds to the existent's aspiration 
to a transcendence beyond eternal Being. As a condition for 
activity, happiness is independent from Being, for it does not 
consist in 'my bearing in being', but rather in my 'exceeding of 
being'. (1996: 113) 
Enjoyment is made of the memory of its thirst; it is a 
quenching. It is the act that remembers its 'potency'. (1996: 
113) 
Enjoyment, the movement of egoism, consists in the 
accomplishment of the 'ipseity' of the 1, that is the coinciding of 
the ego with itself in the fulfilment of its needs. This satiation of 
need - happiness - is realised in the fact that the ego gains its own 
identity by dwelling in the 'other' - the elemental -, rather than by 
opposition to it. (1996: 115) Thus, it is through enjoyment that the 
I achieves 'atheist separation' from the totality of Being, whereby it 
is at home with itself and ready to embark on the apology which is 
a constant justification of itself with regard to the Other. 
In order that a pluralism in itself be realised there must be 
produced in depth the movement from me to the Other... 
Pluralism implies a radical alterity of the Other, whom I do 
not simply conceive by relation to myself, but confront out of 
my egoism. (1996: 121) 
The atheist separation of an I who dwells in the 'other' reveals the 
body to be 'a separated existence that affirms its independence in 
the happy dependence of need'. (1996: 164-5) However, because 
the source of the elements upon which the independent I is 
dependent to satisfy its needs forever escapes my possession - 
implying a permanent care for a future which might not bring me 
the elemental from which I live -, the ego will attempt to guard 
itself against the insecurity of the 'morrow' through labour, and as 
such master the World. 
322 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
In order that this future arise in its signification as a 
postponement and a delay in which labour, by mastering the 
uncertainty of the future and its insecurity and by 
establishing possession, delineates separation in the form of 
economic independence, the separated being must be able to 
recollect itself and have representations. Recollection and 
representation are produced concretely as habitation in a 
dwelling or a Home. (1996: 150) 
My dwelling will condition representation, for 'consciousness of a 
world is already consciousness through that world' (1996: 153). 
Thus, although representation absorbs that which it comes across 
into itself, it nevertheless presupposes an a priori dwelling, the 
possibility of recollection in the intimacy of the home. It is 
therefore through separation, through the possibility of recollection 
in itself that the I crystallises; labour and possession are part and 
parcel of identity's effectuation of separation. 
The movement by which a being builds its home, opens and 
ensures interiority to itself, is constituted in a movement by 
which the separated being recollects itself. With the dwelling 
the latent birth of the world is produced. (1996: 157) 
Labour will discover the world by transforming elements into 
things. The independence of the element - its being - is thus 
suspended by labour's possession, an immanent movement that 
reverts back to the subject and which therefore presupposes a 
dwelling. 
A fathomless depth divined by enjoyment in the element 
yields to labour, which masters the future and stills the 
anonymous rustling of the there is, the uncontrollable stirring 
of the elemental, disquieting even within enjoyment itself. 
(19 96: 160) 
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Possession protects against the uncertainty of the future, in which 
elements change over time. The outcome of labour is characterised 
by durability and permanence, corresponding to substances that 
dominate time rather than elements, uncontrollable in their source. 
The indetermination of the element, its future, becomes 
consciousness, the possibility of making use of time. Labour 
characterises not a freedom that has detached itself from 
being, but a will: a being that is threatened, but has time at 
its disposal to ward off the threat. (1996: 166) 
Through the will, one protects oneself against danger, and 
ultimately against death; to will is to postpone corporeal finitude. 
However, the exercise of the will runs up against unforeseeability, 
resulting in outcomes that were not part of my project. 
The worker does not hold in his hands all the threads of his 
own action. He is exteriorised by acts that are already in a 
sense abortive. If his works deliver signs, they have to be 
deciphered without his assistance. If he participates in this 
deciphering, he speaks. Thus the product of labour is not an 
inalienable possession, and it can be usurped by the Other. 
(11996: 176) 
The worker is not expressed in his activity, but rather is simply 
signified by a sign in a system of signs; absent from his 
manifestation, reduced to a phenomenon, the author of works will 
be subject to interpretation on the basis of his labour. 
The symbolism of life and labour symbolises in that very 
particular sense Freud discovered in all our conscious 
manifestations and in our dreams, and which is the essence 
of every sign, its primordial definition: it reveals only in 
concealing. (1996: 176) 
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History presents man on the basis of his works, rather than as a 
face. To attend his own manifestation, the existent would have to 
be able to speak, to address an apology, a justification of his 
actions, to the Other. Through historiography, the subjective will, 
already dead, is assimilated into the designs of a foreign will. 
(1996: 228 )55 
The verdict of history is pronounced by the survivor who no 
longer speaks to the being he judges, and to whom the will 
appears and offers itself as a result and as a work. Thus the 
will seeks judgement in order to be confirmed against death, 
whereas judgement taken as the judgement of history kills 
the will qua will. (1996: 241) 
The will is always absent from the judgement of history, equivalent 
to universal and impersonal laws that reduce the subjective to the 
third person, to 'objective signification'. Thus, although the 
universal as proclaimed by institutions serves the purpose of 
protecting the will against death, unforeseeability and its own 
'perfidy', this very universality results in an inhuman order 
characterised by the tyranny of the totality which submerges 
individual singularity into itself. For Levinas, this totality 
corresponds to the political realm, in contrast to the religious 
domain which allegedly privileges the singularity of the individual 
by allowing the latter to reveal himself through speech. 56 
55 Derrida critiques Levinas for presupposing that History is a finite 
totality, rather than a movement of transcendence which enables the 
appearance of this very totality. The philosopher cannot escape History 
because, according to Derrida, History is the history of the departures 
from totality. Neither a finite totality nor a perfect infinity, History 
consists in the difference between the two. (1990: 117) 
56 Howard Caygill draws attention to the mutual implication of the ethical 
and the political in Levinas's Esprit articles, which reveal the link 
between his critique of ontology and the National-Socialist political, the 
Cold War political, as well as the 'prophetic political' of Israel. Having 
first sought to set a universal monotheistic philosophy of freedom 
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... speech in the first person, direct discourse ... consists 
precisely in incessantly supplying a datum to be added to 
what, being object of universal wisdom, admits of no further 
adjunction ... It presents the will at its trial; it is produced as 
its defence. (1996: 242) 
By submitting itself to judgement by the Other whilst attending its 
own manifestation, that is, in apology, the will no longer is 
submerged by the totality of a universalist discourse. The apology 
ruptures the totality by introducing into the latter the present of a 
subjectivity which will confront the visible evidence of history. 
The invisible is the offence that inevitably results from the 
judgement of visible history, even if history unfolds 
rationally. The virile judgement of history ... is cruel. The 
universal norms of this judgement silence the unicity in 
which the apology is contained and from which it draws its 
arguments. (1996: 243) 
Because the judgement of history is always a judgement on the 
visible, it transforms every apology into a visible argument so that 
the latter can have a place within the total it y. 57 As such, an 
against the universalism of Nazi racism, Levinas subsequently argues 
for a political that transcends the universal: the universal struggle 
against socialism and capitalism is reduced to 'hollow rhetoric' by the 
unleashing of inhuman forces that escape human control. This ushers in 
the end of the human political and the introduction of the prophetic 
moment of ethical responsibility for the Other. However, the tension 
between the ontological and religious dimensions of the political surface 
in the difficult negotiation between the State of Israel as an event in 
'universal history' and the mission of Israel in 'sacred history'. (2000: 8- 
11,13-14) 
57 According to Scott Lash, Levinas relegates history to the realm of the 
il y a, whereas temporality, consisting fundamentally in the time of the 
Other, opens up with illeity, beyond Being, resulting in an eschatology 
that culminates with redemption. History is thus rejected for the ancient, 
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'invisible offence' is committed against singularity, against that 
which inspires apology; the face of the Other, the 
unencompassable and uncontainable nudity of the Other's gaze - 
where I can read the offence suffered due to his status as 
I stranger, widow, and orphan' -, shame me in their judgement of my 
freedom. (1996: 244) The Other accuses me, giving rise to an 
infinite responsibility inherent in the will to respond to this 
accusation. I am persecuted by the Other to the extent that I must 
substitute myself for him, transcending myself in the process, 
moving beyond being, answering to the call of responsibility which 
summons me, in my singularity, to 'goodness': subjectivity is thus 
accomplished in the movement towards the good, which transcends 
ontology, in the realisation that I am the Other. 
The 1, which we have seen arise in enjoyment as a separated 
being having apart, in itself, the centre around which its 
existence gravitates, is confirmed in its singularity by 
purging itself of this gravitation ... interminably ... 
This is 
termed goodness. Perhaps the possibility of a point of the 
universe where such an overflow of responsibility is 
produced ultimately defines the 1. (1996: 244-5) 
IX. On Freedom and Justice 
Levinas argues that the concept of free will, whereby identity 
moulds itself by controlling 'all the strings that operate its being' 
(1996: 226) is illusory due to the ultimate exposure to alterity: if on 
one hand, the will's labours consist in a postponement of death, on 
the other, they are, subsequent to death, reappropriated by a 
foreign will and integrated into a totality from which subjectivity is 
eliminated. Thus any care that the ego might have concerning 
pre-traditional time of the Other; however, to what extent is Levinas's 
eschatological time pre-modern? 'Are we ... not back in the abstract 
ungrounded ethics ... that have made Marxism and--liberalism so out of 
touch with the turn of the twenty-first centuryT (1996: 270-1) 
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being-in-the-WOrld is rendered tragicomical due to the inability to 
escape the condition of mortality, try as one might to postpone it. 
In opposition to the tradition of Western thought which regards the 
limitation of the spontaneity of freedom to be an ultimate tragedy - 
giving rise to a notion of justice within political theory that bases 
itself on the ideal of an absolute exercise of spontaneity, where my 
freedom ought to be reconciled with others' freedom -, Levinas 
posits the notion of finite freedom. Because the I does not 
participate in a totality, but rather is accomplished in subjectivity 
as a separation that constantly reverts back unto itself, any 
relation established with the Other cannot be comprehended by the 
same: the same and the Other are separate beings who confront 
each other in the face-to-face relation. The atheism of the I is thus 
a prerequisite both for the Other to reveal himself in his 
transcendence through speech, as well as for my justification of 
my freedom to him. This reveals that the face-to-face encounter 
between separate beings requires that the existents be 
simultaneously independent from and in relation with each other. 
(1996: 223) 
... the atheism of the I marks the break with participation and 
consequently the possibility of seeking a justification for 
oneself, that is, a dependence upon an exteriority without 
this dependence absorbing the dependent being, held in 
invisible meshes. This dependence, consequently, at the 
same time maintains independence; such is the face to face 
relation. (1996: 88) 
By contrast, in the ontological tradition of Western philosophy, 
every relation between same and Other corresponds either to the 
imperialism of the same, where identity determines its other, or to 
the impersonal manifestation of a universal order, where identity 
sees itself as part of a Whole and eliminates the opposition 
between I and non-1. (1996: 44,87) 
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It was to escape the arbitrariness of f reedom, its 
disappearance into the Neuter, that we have approached the 
I as atheist and created - free, but capable of tracing back 
beneath its condition - before the Other, who does not 
deliver himself in the 'thematisation' or 'conceptualisation' of 
the Other. (1996: 88) 
Knowledge is ontological freedom, exercised in light, proceeding to 
neutralise alterity by grasping the latter as a theme or object of 
experience, thereby reducing it to the same. However, because 
knowledge is based on justification, one must constantly 
interrogate that which is given as an accomplished and irrevocable 
fact. (1996: 82-3) 
Thus, knowing which is open to critique, to putting itself in 
question, cannot be reduced to 'objective cognition', 
representation and evidence (1996: 85), all of which are inherent 
in freedom. Rather, knowing surpasses ontology giving way to 
metaphysics, beyond essence, geared towards exteriority. 
Metaphysical desire puts freedom into question by welcoming the 
Other. (1996: 42,85) 
... critique does not reduce the Other to the same as does 
ontology, but calls into question the exercise of the same. A 
calling into question of the same ... is brought about by the 
Other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity 
by the presence of the Other ethics. (1996: 43) 
In the eyes of the Other I can read a judgement pertaining to my 
actions; shamed by the arbitrariness of my freedom, I become 
conscious of my own injustice. Thus, morality commences once 
one understands the violence inherent in freedom. 
This flawless identity freed from all participation, 
independent in the 1, can nonetheless lose its tranquillity if 
the Other, rather than countering it by upsurging on the same 
329 
HUMANISM AFTER COLONIALISM 
plane as it, speaks to it, that is shows himself in expression, 
in the face, and comes from on high. Freedom then is 
inhibited, not as countered by a resistance, but as arbitrary, 
guilty, and timid; but in its guilt it rises to responsibility. 
(1996: 203-4) 
An inhibited and finite freedom is primordially non-violence, or 
peace, for it seeks to preserve the plurality of a separated same 
and Other. Where freedom was defined as having the time to 
postpone one's mortality, that is, the menace of violence (1996: 
237), finite freedom dreads its own power to murder more than it 
does death. 
The 'You shall not commit murder' which delineates the face 
in which the Other is produced submits my freedom to 
judgement. (1996: 303) 
The ethical impossibility of annihilating the Other, derives from the 
latter's condition of transcendence; I cannot have power over him 
who reveals himself in speech. (1996: 84) Because the Other is 
infinite and cannot be encompassed by the same, his freedom 
cannot be posited as a freedom equal to but Other than my own: 
the coexistence of a multiplicity of freedoms would integrate a 
totality where the affirmation of one freedom would forcibly lead to 
the negation of other freedoms. (1987: 92,171) 
The Other is not transcendent because he would be free as I 
am; on the contrary his freedom is a superiority that comes 
from his very transcendence. (1996: 87) 
Due to an arbitrariness that requires justification before the Other, 
my freedom cannot be self-justified. (1996: 303) The shame felt 
when I am confronted by the Other in my freedom proves that the 
latter is already founded on truth - where truth is understood to be 
a 'respect for being', for what is (1996: 302). 
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Reason and freedom seem to us to be founded on prior 
structures of being whose first articulations are delineated by 
the metaphysical movement, or respect, or justice - identical 
to truth. The terms of the conception making truth rest on 
freedom must be inverted. (1996: 303) 
Where truth pertains to a moral order, freedom is of a political 
nature, taking place within social and political institutions that 
ensure its survival through the establishment of laws. Exposed to 
contingency, namely violence and death, freedom is protected from 
its own 'perfidy' by the law. 
Freedom is engraved on the stone of the tables on which 
laws are inscribed - it exists by virtue of this incrustation of 
an institutional existence. Freedom depends on a written 
text, destructible to be sure, but durable, on which freedom 
is conserved for man outside of man. (1996: 241) 
However, as we have seen, Levinas critiques rational institutions 
for subjugating the subjective will to the tyrannical imperatives of 
objective signification inherent in universal law. Due to this 
integration of the particular into the impersonal order of the 
totality, man will only be able to affirm his singularity through the 
religious, that is, the ethical, in a metaphysical movement geared 
towards exteriority. (1996: 242) The latter is patent in the apology, 
whereby I am in the obligation to respond to the Other's 
judgement, justifying the arbitrariness of my freedom before him. 
(1996: 244) 
To be judged thus does not consist in hearing a verdict set 
forth impersonally and implacably out of universal principles. 
Such a voice would interrupt the direct discourse of the 
being subject to judgement, would silence the apology, 
whereas the adjudication in which the defence makes itself 
heard should confirm in truth the singularity of the will it 
judges. (1996: 244) 
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Judgement gives rise to an infinite responsibility of the will, due to 
my inability to ignore a duty to respond to the Other. Rather than 
absorbing the singularity of the subjective within the totality of the 
universal, justice summons me to go beyond itself, beyond the 
boundary of the law. My responsibility thus transcends institutional 
justice, by the exercise of inward and subjective morality that 'tells 
truth' in apology. 
Concretely to be an I presenting itself at a trial - which 
requires all the resources of subjectivity - means for it to be 
able to see, beyond the universal judgements of history, that 
offence of the offended which is inevitably produced in the 
very judgement issued from universal principles. What is 
above all invisible is the offence universal history inflicts on 
particulars. To be I and not only an incarnation of a reason is 
precisely to be capable of seeing the offence of the 
offended, or the face. (1996: 247) 
The notion of human rights - as a priori natural rights that are 
inherent in every human person regardless both of actions that 
might have been taken to merit these rights as well as of physical, 
mental, or social differences inherent in human beings -, has, 
according to Levinas, been framed as the right to free will, that is, 
as independence from an absolute. (1999b: 145-6) However, the 
rights of man already presupposes an absolute, a totality, by 
attempting to reconcile a multiplicity of freedoms that are 
potentially hostile towards each other. 
The war of each against all, based on the Rights of Man! 
Unless we attribute to the essence of free will a propensity 
for the rational, and, thus, a respect for the universal, thanks 
to which the imperative and the normative of the intelligible 
would impose themselves on the free will of each, consenting 
to limit itself in such a way as not to limit others. (1999b: 
147-8) 
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Kant attempted to reconcile a multiplicity of wills bent on limiting 
each other by introducing the notion of 'good will', or practical 
reason', where the will is attentive to reason. The will, in its 
attempt to treat the Other always as an end and never as a means, 
adheres to the categorical imperative, that stipulates that one 
should always act in such a way that one would will to be a 
universal law. However, asks Levinas, does not the fact that the 
will obeys a maxim of action mean that it is not free? Furthermore, 
the objective of practical reason to attend to the right of the Other 
puts at risk the very right to freedom of free will. (1999b: 148-9) 
Unless a pre-eminent excellence were granted to the Other 
out of goodness: unless good will were will, not just out of 
respect for the universality of a maxim of action, but out of 
the feeling of goodness. (1999b: 149) 
The I is submitted to judgement by the Other, thus transcending 
the laws of universal justice because it is good. Goodness consists 
in giving priority to the Other over oneself; therefore, it enables 
the I to go beyond death, that which definitely alienates my 
powers, by not being for death. (1996: 247) In short, goodness 
signifies 'the human rupture with a pre-human ontology' where 
being was enclosed within itself. (1999b: 149) 
That the Rights of Man are originally the rights of the other 
man, and that they express, beyond the burgeoning of 
identities in their own identity and their instinct for free 
perseverance, the for-the-Other of the social, of the for-the- 
stranger - such appears to me to be the meaning of their 
novelty. (1999b: 149) 
The I substitutes itself for the Other, becoming a hostage. In this 
responsibility fora neighbour arises the subjectivity and 
uniqueness of the subject geared towards exteriority, for the 
infinitely Other is in me, or I am the Other. (1999: 123) 
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Substitution frees the subject from ipseity, that is, from 
enchainment to itself; it is irreplaceable in the election - the 
traumatic assignation - to be for the Other. 58 
This finite freedom is not primary, is not initial; but it lies in 
an infinite responsibility where the Other is not Other 
because he strikes up against and limits my freedom, but 
where he can accuse me to the point of persecution, because 
the Other, absolutely other, is another one. That is why finite 
freedom is not simply an infinite freedom operating in a 
limited field. The will which it animates wills in a passivity it 
does not assume. And the proximity of the neighbour in its 
trauma does not only strike up against me, but exalts and 
elevates me, and, in the literal sense of the term, inspires 
me. (1999: 124 )59 
X. Levinas and Arendt: On Freedom, Violence and the 
Good 
58 Simon Critchley reads Levinas against the I atte r's alleged 
psychoanalytic resistances and denials: containing within itself a 
disposition towards alterity, the subject is effected by the trauma of 
persecution, doomed to never coincide with itself, to a self-relation 
consisting in lack. A 'sentient subject and not a conscious ego', the 
ethical subject aims to compulsively repeat the origin of the trauma, 
passively reliving 'a lost time that can never be', a subjection to the 
other that is 'open to death'. 'It is only because the subject is 
unconsciously constituted through the trauma of contact with the real 
that we might have the audacity to speak of goodness, transcendence, 
compassion ... ' (1999: 185,188,190,194-5) 
59 The metaphors of inspiration, breathing, or lung are used by Levinas 
to describe the movement whereby the ego is undone, transcending 
itself towards the Other in the assignation to respond (1999: 141); these 
metaphors contrast with those of light and visibility patent in the 
Western ontological tradition. 
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Perhaps due to having experienced National Socialism, Levinas 
and Arendt are highly critical of traditional Western philosophical 
conceptions of individual freedom, albeit from different 
perspectives. While Levinas would critique Arendt for presenting a 
political theory of freedom where each freedom has to be 
defended, within the realm of the law, from the potential limitation 
exercised by other freedoms - thus presupposing an ideal totality 
into which a multiplicity of 'fallen' freedoms would be able to 
reintegrate -, Arendt might contest Levinas on the grounds that he 
is working within a Western tradition of thought that equates 
freedom with sovereignty, or free will. According to Arendt, the 
concept of free will is dangerous because it bears no links to the 
world in which we live, that is, the world of appearance. (1961: 
146-7,165) Thus, she resorts to upholding the primacy of a legal 
framework within the political realm, to assure a space in which 
freedom can appear. For Levinas, institutional law is tyrannical in 
that it absorbs the subjective will, human particularity, into the 
realm of objective signification or impersonal order, preventing the 
singularity of the apology - in which one justifies one's own 
arbitrary freedom to the Other - from occurring. Although he 
recognises that the survival of freedom is dependent on social and 
political institutions, Levinas would insist that freedom preserved 
by the law - that which would correspond to the ontological domain 
- already presupposes the ethical realm manifested in an infinite 
responsibility of the will seeking to justify its own freedom before 
the Other in apology. 
For Levinas, the very fact that the will is always exposed to the 
Other, be it through death, the apology, or the reappropriation of 
labour by a foreign will, means that one can only aspire to a finite 
freedom. Arendt however, sees the spontaneity of freedom as 
absolute in terms of causality, for as long as man can act he is 
capable of constituting a new beginning, a Kantian 'new series in 
time', patent in the very fact of natality as well as in every act of 
foundation. (1978: 109-10; 1979: 473) It is, however, this very 
capacity for action that can lead to the danger inherent in the 
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human condition, for each action can unleash unpredictable and 
irreversible effects over which, try as we might to resort to 
narratives of necessity, no one has control. 
Levinas considers the human condition to consist primarily in the 
ethical relation where each term preserves its absoluteness, that 
is, the spontaneity of freedom, while engaging in a relationship 
that cannot unite into a totality. Creation ex nihilo, the absolute 
beginning of each term in the relationship, is thus conjugated with 
the capacity of freedom to put itself in question by the 
confrontation with the Other. 
The unity of spontaneous freedom, working on straight 
ahead, and critique, where freedom is capable of being 
called in question and thus preceding itself, is what is 
termed a creature. The marvel of creation does not only 
consist in being a creation ex nihilo, but in that it results in a 
being capable of receiving a revelation, learning that it is 
created, and putting itself in question. The miracle of 
creation lies in creating a moral being. And this implies 
precisely atheism, but at the same time, beyond atheism, 
shame for the arbitrariness of the freedom that constitutes it. 
(19 96: 89) 
Creation ex nihilo, the atheism of the 1, posits a being exterior to 
any totality or system, maintaining an independence which makes 
its freedom possible in the 'confrontation' with the transcendental 
Other. (1996: 104-5) The distance between identity and alterity 
derives from the fact of creation, where the heterogeneity of 
beings created from nothingness is affirmed in contrast to the 
traditional ontological perspective which upheld a prior community 
of all beings in eternity. (1996: 293) Because a common foundation 
is lacking in creation, there is an anarchical multiplicity, 'a free 
play of wills' oblivious to narratives of necessity. However, this 
'free play', enjoyed in separation, is arrested by the confrontation 
with the face, in judgement, the latter which appeals to an infinite 
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responsibility of the will, giving rise to the fact of fraternity. (1996: 
294,214) Not based on resemblance or on the unity of a genus, 
fraternity requires that same and Other be separate so that identity 
can welcome an unencompassable alterity. Equality is thus 
produced in fraternity, in the welcoming of the face, where the 
Other commands identity and appeals to my responsibility. (1996: 
214) 
Levinas's notion of equality can be read as sharing points in 
common with Arendt's notion of equality in the political realm - 
individuals as national citizens being equal in their differences 
within the framework of the law -, although once again he might 
accuse Arendt of attempting to integrate, within a political totality, 
a myriad of differences, thus running the risk of subsuming the 
subjectivity inherent in these differences under the impersonal 
tyrannical order of the political. Both authors are suspicious of a 
notion of equality that presupposes the unity of humankind as one: 
Levinas considers equality to be founded on non-coincidence, or 
distance, between same and Other - one unicity presupposing 
other unicities facing me; Arendt claims that equality - as a natural 
right promoted by the French Revolution according to which all 
men were born equal but due to social conditions were made 
unequal - is the most uncertain of conditions to be found in the 
world in which we live. (1979: 302) Because we inhabit a world of 
appearance, Arendt claims that it is important to take into account 
the inequalities deriving from differences in appearance, such as 
the visuality of race. (1959: 47) It is precisely this emphasis on the 
world of appearance in Arendt that would anatagonise Levinas, for 
in the latter, the face is a metaphor for expression, content spread 
out in its form, rather than a plastic image reduced to visual 
attributes. To thematise an image would be equivalent to 
attempting to grasp the Other, containing it within the same, 
assimilating what I see to a prior representation, or idea, in me. 
The face is thus made adequate to my idea of it. This, for Levinas, 
is violence. 
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Arendt argues that the only solution for problems deriving from 
inequalities is for the State to recognise that in the social realm 
individuals are unequal in their differences, and have a right to 
remain so. In the public realm, however, all citizens are equal in 
their difference by law, enjoying the right to engage in public 
happiness, or participation in a body politic. (1959: 53) Levinas's 
argument that equality is based on separation between terms 
rather than their integration within the unity of a genus could thus 
uphold or condemn Arendt's view on equality on two grounds. On 
one hand, if Levinas claims that politics should be built on ethics, 
then one can consider Arendt's defence of the law as grounded on 
an ethics that seeks to preserve difference in the social realm, 
without infringing upon individual liberties; on the other hand, as 
stated previously, he could critique this emphasis on the political 
as an attempt to subjugate the singularity of individuality under the 
impersonal order of a totality, which, under the guise of 
conciliating a plurality of differences, nevertheless prevents the 
apology of the personal from taking place. 
According to Arendt, narratives of necessity claiming that what is 
could not have been otherwise are violent, for they instrumentalise 
whatever it is they come across as a means towards an end. (1978: 
87) Levinas would agree with Arendt that logic, based on the 
principle of non-contradiction where A excludes any non-A, 
consists in an attempt to assimilate the Other into the same, and is 
thus synonymous with violence. However, where Arendt defends 
thought for its openness to experience, Levinas considers 
thematised experience to belong to the ontological domain, where 
identity, in the time of the present, assimilates, through re- 
presentation, that which is 'invisible' into the visibility of the 'now', 
thus giving rise to linear narratives of temporality. Thematic 
experience synchronises the past, obscure diachrony, into the 
light, clarity, transparency of the present. In this way, identity 
absorbs its Other - time - into itself. As such, would not experience 
consist in a violence which, in the manner of logical deduction, 
inst ru mental ises that which it comes across in reminiscence as a 
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means towards an end, the latter being a narrative told from the 
viewpoint of the present? 
Levinas and Arendt are wary of the absolutism inherent in the 
Kantian categorical imperative, which for both consists in a 
violence that threatens individual freedom. While Levinas wishes 
to preserve the absoluteness of terms engaging in a non-reciprocal 
relationship, he wishes to rupture a unified totality, an absolute 
that would absorb same and Other into itself. Arendt, on the other 
hand, considers that absolutism - the necessity of rational thought 
to agree with itself - prevents the activity of judgement from being 
exercised, that is, arrests the exercise of seeing things from a 
point of view other than one's own. This Kantian 'enlarged 
mentality' is inspired by relativism, rather than the imperative of 
absolutes. (1961: 220-1) Levinas, however, would consider that it 
is precisely the ethical movement of replacing oneself for the 
Other that requires the existence of separate terms, independent 
and absolute in themselves, engaging in an asymmetrical 
relationship rather than participating in a Whole. Absolutism for 
Arendt is synonymous with totality, Unity, One or Being for 
Levinas. 
Clearly adhering to the notion of right and wrong forms of human 
conduct, Arendt posits thoughtlessness as being the most common 
cause for evil, for when men cease to reflect on the world of 
appearance, they lose capacity to judge the repercussions of their 
actions. (1961: 133; 1994: 287,295) Levinas would accuse Arendt 
of operating within dichotomies which characterise ontological 
thought, where to good corresponds evil, both of which can be 
reabsorbed into a totality. For Levinas, the Good is that which 
transcends any totality composed of good and evil, lying beyond 
being. To be Good is to be for the Other, for it permits me to 
transcend myself, rupturing the hypostasis of the present whereby 
identity ceaselessly reverts back to itself. Goodness, or 
transcendence of self, characterises the duality inherent in the 
structure of the human condition, where the subject is self- 
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sufficient and yet geared towards exte rio rity. Ultimately, for 
Levinas, it is because identity transcends itself that life has 
meaning; thus, Goodness permits this being for the Other which is 
already a being in time. 
However, is transcendence of self necessarily Good? Levinas 
could be critiqued for equating transcendence of self with 
Goodness. Could not evil be transcendent too, could it also not lie 
beyond being? Why does Levinas equate infinity with the Good, 
being that the concept of the Good already, according to Western 
ontology, presupposes evil? 
Evil as anxiety, evil as excess, as that which breaks with the norm, 
synthesis and totality is also a transcendence. Its intentionality 
seeks out the subject, aims at him in persecution. (1998a: 179-81) 
And yet this very malignancy that obsesses identity awakens the 
ego to the Good behind evil. 
A first saying, a first question, first lamentation or first 
prayer. In any case, it is an 'intentionality' of transcendence: 
someone is seeking me out. A God that does evil, but God as 
a you. And, through the evil in me, my awakening to myself. 
(1998a: 181) 
Thus, the ego is torn away from self -coincidence in this act of 
questioning the Other on the evil that befalls itself. Identity is 
wrenched away from being-in-the-World and geared towards 
exteriority, transcending itself in the process. 
The first metaphysical question is no longer Leibniz's 
question 'why is there something rather than nothing? ' but 
'why is there evil rather than good? ' It is the de- 
neutralisation of being, or the beyond being. The ontological 
difference is preceded by the difference between good and 
evil. (1998a: 182) 
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The difference between Good and evil, the ethical difference par 
excellence, is the origin of meaning; the ego is awakened to the 
Good through evil. Thus, ethics precedes ontology, transcending 
the world and guiding it. Preceding all other differences that are to 
be found in the realm of ontology, Good and evil are the original 
transcendence the signification of which is patent in the face. 
Goodness does not spring from universal principles inherent in a 
collectivity or the State, but rather from the separate 1, a 
singularity which alone can respond to the accusation of the face. 
(1996: 305) It is the very movement of separation whereby identity 
is accomplished and free to engage in relationship with another 
independent term that is threatened by the categorical imperative. 
For by presupposing that the individual ought to obey a maxim of 
action, moral law is actually subjugating the subjective will to a 
totality, depriving, in this process, the singularity of the exercise of 
freedom. Arendt also critiques the categorical imperative for 
grounding itself on a logic obedient to the principle of non- 
contradiction, and of thus corresponding to a form of coercion. 
(1961: 220-1; 1979: 469) 
Both Levinas and Arendt attempt to rupture narratives of necessity, 
based on the premises of deductive logic, that try to reduce man to 
a puppet in a play masterminded by a force over which no one has 
control. Instead, they draw attention to the idea of subjective 
responsibi I it y60: while Arendt elects the political as the sphere of 
responsibility in safeguarding the plurality inherent in the world of 
appearance, Levinas chooses the ethical as the realm in which the 
subject's infinite responsibility for his neighbour allows him to 
respond to judgement by the Other. 
60 According to Josh Cohen, while Arendt adheres to a voluntaristic 
ethics, the Levinasian notion of responsibility is non-voluntaristic, 
consisting in an assumption that has occurred before I assume it. 
Responsibility in Levinas thus cannot be reduced to a faculty for action 
that is intentionally assumed by the will. 
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When i maintain an ethical relation I refuse to recognise the 
role I would play in a drama of which I would not be the 
author or whose outcome another would know before me ... 
This ... does not exclude obedience. But obedience precisely 
is to be distinguished from an involuntary participation in 
mysterious designs in which one figures or which one 
prefigures. Everything that cannot be reduced to an 
interhuman relation represents not the superior form but the 
forever primitive form of religion. (1996: 79) 
While the concept of human rights is critiqued by Arendt for 
presupposing a universalism inherent in natural man which is 
completely divorced from the world of appearance and, as such, 
fails miserably in any attempt to defend a people who has lost the 
right to citizenship (1979: 297,299,302), Levinas is an apologist 
for the rights of man, due to their expressing the for-the-Other, the 
transcendence of self, or Goodness which characterises the human 
condition. 
X1. Communication as Welcome 
Justice is born because I can speak. By granting the possibility of 
expression, the non-reciprocal face-to-face relation allows one to 
manifest oneself - 'while attending one's own manifestation' - in 
singularity. Language is inherent in the face-to-face, where the two 
terms, same and Other, preserve their independence in 
relationship. Because both terms are separate, or atheist, they 
reveal themselves to each other through language, which serves 
the purpose of thematising a world that is 'mine', enabling me to 
offer it to the Other. (1996: 173) 
The 'general isation' or 'universalisation' accomplished by language 
establishes a common world that can be spoken to the Other, 
constituting primordially an ethical event. Thus, by naming objects 
and inserting them into a world that is common to the Other, 
language permits beings to exist for an Other, thus transcending 
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the purely phenomenal condition of interiority. The Levinasian view 
of language is opposed to that of Husserl's - and Heidegger's -, for 
whom language reflected thought, consisting in a window to 
reason . 
6' For Levinas, reason is founded on signification, that is, 
the face-to-face relation where the Other, in his transcendence, 
strikes me in his destitution, putting into question the spontaneity 
of my freedom, that is, giving rise to conscience. In 
communication, I welcome the Other - who reveals himself by 
teaching, by offering me a surplus, an excess relative to that which 
I contain - from the exterior . 
62 (1996: 204-5) 
Teaching gives rise to signification, deriving from a surplus 
inherent in the face of the Other which overflows the same, who 
desires the former and welcomes his offering of signs. 63 (1996: 97) 
The signifier - he who delivers signs - attends his own 
manifestation, that is, never distances himself from the sign given. 
Because the latter never signifies the signified as a complete 
presence, speech consists in a ceaseless commitment to decipher 
and clarify any misunderstanding that may arise. 
To have meaning is to be situated relative to an absolute, 
that is, to come from that alterity that is not absorbed in its 
being perceived. Such an alterity is possible only as a 
6' For Heidegger, language reflects thought to the extent that thinking, 
as a deed that 'surpasses all praxis', brings its saying of Being to 
language, the abode of eksistence. (1998: 274) 
62 Here Levinas is making a comparison between teaching as an ethical 
relation deriving from exteriority, which brings the student more than he 
contains, and the Socratic method of maieutics, based on eliciting pre- 
existent ideas latent in the mind of the student. (1996: 51) 
63 Judaism, for Levinas, is a religion that bases itself more on teaching, 
the constant interpretation and discussion of Talmudic texts, than on 
received dogma; subjective opinions on the Jewish Revelation must, 
however, always refer back to the tradition of commentaries proffered in 
the past. In this way, Judaism guards itself against 'direct inspiration 
from the text', sudden disclosure of the signifier in the sign. (1998b: 
196) 
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miraculous abundance, an inexhaustible surplus of attention 
arising in the ever recommenced effort of language to clarify 
its own manifestation. To have meaning is to teach or to be 
taught, to speak or to be able to be stated. (1996: 97) 
Because language consists in a proposition that delivers the world 
between two terms that do not form a totality, it is the origin of all 
signification. The world as said, as that which is thernatised and 
proposed, is, however, founded on a saying, on a primordial 
signification, on the face-to-face relation. 
Language is not one modality of symbolism; every symbolism 
refers already to language. (1996: 98) 
However, because the signifier is presented in the sign but is not 
signified by the latter 64 , for the sign to be comprehended as sign 
it 
will have had to be previously accepted as such by a community of 
signifiers. Thus, the signifier precedes every sign, revealing 
himself as a face. By speaking, that is, by attending to my own 
manifestation in expression, I become an incessant source of 
reinterpretation: I am present to my words by ceaselessly 
recapturing the temporal instants that flow on. In this sense, 
saying, or signification, constantly puts into question the 
crystallised said that pertains to the ontological realm. (1996: 69, 
182) 
It is as though the presence of him who speaks inverted the 
inevitable movement that bears the spoken word to the past 
state of the written word ... The unique actuality of speech 
64 If the signifier were signified in the sign, then Levinas would be 
regurgitating the Western theological tradition which attempts to grasp 
the presence of God by deciphering signs. For Levinas, the signifier 
does not disclose himself in the sign; rather, he attends his own 
manifestation in the sign, revealing himself in his infinity. Revelation, in 
opposition to disclosure, indicates that the signifier is always 
transcendent in the face-to-face relation. 
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tears it from the situation in which it appears ... It brings 
what the written word is already deprived of: mastery. (1996: 
69) 
The said, that which is thematised and proposed, is already 
founded on teaching, on the presentation of ideas deriving from 
the master, the interlocutor, who masters the 'anarchy of facts'. 
(1996: 69-70) Thus it is due to signification that the sign function 
appears as such. Because the face founds the primordial 
signification, language cannot be subordinate to reason, but rather 
is reason itself. The essence of language consists not in the act of 
disclosure which constructs a thought by resorting to language, but 
in the revelation of meaning. 
Meaning is the face of the Other, and all recourse to words 
takes place already within the primordial face to face of 
language. Every recourse to words presupposes the 
comprehension of the primary signification, but this 
comprehension, before being interpreted as a 'consciousness 
of, ' is society and obligation. (1996: 206-7) 
The 'ethical exigency' of the Other as manifested in sociality puts 
into question the freedom of transcendental consciousness. The 
same is torn away from its centre of gravitation, and flung towards 
the Other. As such, the German idealist depiction of reason as a 
coherent internal order of being - where consciousness would 
sacrifice its singularity, retreating either into a 'noumenal sphere', 
a moral realm of the spirit, thus exercising its role as 
transcendental subject in the I think, or be subsumed by the 
universality of the State - is overturned. (1996: 208) 
If... reason lives in language, if the first rationality gleams 
forth in the opposition of the face to face, if the first 
intelligible, the first signification, is the infinity of the 
intelligence that presents itself ... in the face, if reason is 
defined by signification rather than signification being 
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defined by the impersonal structures of reason, if society 
precedes the apparition of these impersonal structures, if 
universality reigns as the presence of humanity in the eyes 
that look at me, if ... this look appeals to my responsibility 
and consecrates my freedom as responsibility and gift of self 
- then the pluralism of society could not disappear in the 
elevation to reason, but would be its condition. (1996: 208) 
A reason that is founded on the face-to-face would no longer be 
impersonal, establishing a subject that is capable of association 
(1996: 100), that is, of society, maintaining its independence while 
engaged in a relation with the Other through language. Separation, 
ipseity, is thus necessary for infinity to be accomplished in the act 
of 'facing', a confrontation where the Other faces me from a 
dimension of height, striking me in his transcendence, rather than 
a 'side by side'. 
The conjuncture of the same and the Other, in which even 
their verbal proximity is maintained, is the direct and full 
face welcome of the Other by me. This conjuncture is 
irreducible to totality; the 'face to face' position is not a 
modification of the 'along side of.... ' Even when I shall have 
linked the Other to myself with the conjunction 'and' the 
Other continues to face me, to reveal himself in his face. 
Religion subtends this formal totality. (1996: 80-1) 
Thus, the face-to-face relation is not based on reciprocity, on 
mutual recognition of the two terms. In this it differs from Martin 
Buber's exposition of the I-Thou relationship, where the self only 
exists to the extent that it addresses the Other: the 1, in Buber, is 
thus relation par excellence, reuniting itself with the totality of 
being through its communion with the Other. Because being is 
realised in the meeting between I and Thou, that is, in an interval 
between the two terms, both terms are allegedly preserved in their 
integrity: the Thou is not reduced to the anonymity of an It, 
escaping assimilation into the same. (1998b: 64,66) Levinas 
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critiques Buber's concept of intersubjectivity for forgetting to 
ascribe an ethical meaning to the I-Thou relationship; as it stands, 
Buber's structure can only account for a relationship of friendship 
based on reciprocity, where response is obtained within an 
amicable dialogue. (1996: 68-9,1998b: 59,72) Because Buber 
only considers the individual as integrated within a totality, on one 
hand he places both same and Other on an equal level, and, on the 
other hand, he fails to account for the process of separation in 
which subjectivity arises; a sense of justice, founded upon the 
transcendence of the face, in thus missing from his theory. (1998b: 
60,72) 
... in the case of ethical relations, where the 
Other is at the 
same time higher than I and yet poorer than 1, the I is 
distinguished from the Thou not by the presence of specific 
attributes, but by the dimension of height, thus implying a 
break with Buber's formalism. (1998b: 72) 
The 'epiphany' of the face, wounding me in its destitution from 
above, is, according to Levinas, a 'You' of majesty rather than a 
'Thou' of intimacy. (1996: 75) The face-to-face relation cannot 
restrict itself to a private sphere between two people, but must 
concern everyone within the 'public order'. Because language is 
justice, the whole of humanity looks at me in the eyes of the Other: 
the face in its destituteness presents the 'third party'. 
The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal. 
His equality within this essential poverty consists in referring 
to the third party, thus present at the encounter, whom in the 
midst of his destitution the Other already serves. He comes 
to join me. But he joins me to himself for service; he 
commands me as a Master. This command can concern me 
only inasmuch as I am master myself; consequently this 
command commands me to command. (1996: 213 )65 
65 According to Jean-Frangois Lyotard, Levinas's ethics aim to place 
expressions of obligation above the ontological, or the tautological. As 
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For Levinas, the 'We' inherent in society precedes the 'Thou' of 
friendship or love. The face-to-face bears the dimension of 
transcendence, of the absoluteness of terms that engage in 
relationship but that do not participate in a totality. This non- 
reciprocity, this asymmetry inherent in direct confrontation is 
opposed to communication as an 'ideal speech situation', where 
certainty is attained through the coincidence of the ego with itself. 
(1999: 118) 
... communication would be impossible 
if it should have to 
begin in the ego, a free subject, to whom every Other would 
be only a limitation that invites war, domination, precaution 
and information. To communicate is indeed to open oneself, 
but the openness is not complete if it is on the watch for 
recognition. It is complete not in opening to the spectacle of 
or the recognition of the other, but in becoming a 
responsibility for him. (1999: 119) 
Communication, as a 'sign of the giving of signs' is a saying, 
beyond the crystallised said of ontology, and is thus based on 
uncertainty rather than the clarity inherent in the openness of 
disclosure; due to responsibility for the Other in this non-reciprocal 
relation, one must resign oneself to the risks of misunderstanding, 
paucity or refusal of communication. As such, transcending 
phenomenal or inward existence does not correspond to obtaining 
recognition from the Other; rather, it consists in offering him a 
world, hitherto mine, through language. By thematic generalisation, 
that is, objectivity, I can propose that which is subjective to the 
Other. Thus, to express oneself consists in being-for-the-Other. 
such, Levinas wishes to liberate the prescriptive from justification. By 
positing an obligation presupposing a complete receptivity to an order 
which does not have criteria of validity, Levinas interrupts the Western 
system of knowledge founded on an 'infatuation with the enunciation'. 
(1986: 129,152-3) 
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Because transcendence of the same implies Goodness, to express 
oneself is already to provide the ground for the Good. 
XII. Levinas and Arendt: On Community and Recognition 
Both Levinas and Arendt place emphasis on the 'we' inherent in 
sociality or community in detriment to inward subjectivity. 
However, whereas Arendt regards identity as primarily political, to 
the extent that it is through word and deed performed in the public 
realm that one achieves recognition and thus confirmation of 
identity from others (1989: 179-80), Levinas considers identity to 
be an absoluteness in itself, a necessarily separate term that 
engages in a non-reciprocal relationship with an Other. It is due to 
this distance between terms that do not participate in a totality that 
the face-to-face relation is one of transcendence, whereby the 
unencompassable Other reveals himself to me through expression. 
Nevertheless, because the face-to-face relation consists in a 
primordial signification that precedes all others, reason, or 
thought, is founded upon it. Thus, language, the instrument 
through which I can convert my personal subjective world into an 
objective offering to the Other, is reason, enabling identity to 
transcend itself in the for-the-Other in which expression consists 
of. 
Subjectivity in Levinas is constituted through a movement of 
separation of identity, a dualistic structure in which the ego is self- 
sufficient and yet geared towards exteriority, giving rise to what 
can be termed a 'split identity'. Arendt considers that the split 
subject - the division between 'me and myself' patent in the 
thinking faculty - regains unity through contact with the Other in 
speech and action. (1978: 75) Where Martin Buber sees the self as 
pure relation, reuniting itself with the totality of being by 
addressing the Other, Arendt's emphasis is, likewise, on a world of 
appearance - which for Levinas might consist in a totality seeking 
to integrate a plurality of differences into One -, in which 
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individuality is concretised by way of expression within and action 
upon this common world. 
The notion of community in Levinas consists in the asymmetrical 
face-to-face relation in which I am confronted with the Other from a 
dimension of height. In the eyes of the Other is presented the 
whole public order, the whole of humanity, or the 'third party'. For 
Levinas, the primacy of judgement and accusation are extremely 
important in the formation of subjectivity: identity transcends itself 
by feeling ashamed of the offence caused to the Other by its own 
arbitrary freedom; this gives rise to the infinite responsibility of the 
will that seeks to respond to the Other's judgement of my freedom. 
Because identity is in its structure already constructed upon a for- 
the-Other, be it through the situations of mortality, suffering, 
sexuality, or fecundity, it is already assigned to be 'obsessed', 
'persecuted' by the primordial signification which commands the 
ego to replace itself for the Other. This replacement could be read, 
from Arendt's perspective, as a modality of the Kantian 'enlarged 
mentality', the realm of relativism whereby through the activity of 
judgement, operating on the basis of common sense, one attempts, 
to think in the place of others. (1961: 220-1) Although Levinas 
might agree with Arendt that the realm of human affairs should be 
composed of the confrontation of different views between people 
so as to prevent any particular opinion from assimilating all others 
into a totality, he nevertheless would take issue with her view that 
identity is confirmed on the basis of recognition by others in the 
public realm. For, in Levinas, a search for recognition implies a 
presumed equality in relationship, where both terms partaking of a 
totality legitimate each other in reciprocity. This, as in Buber's 
case, does not account for ethical relations, for justice. 66 
66 Scott Lash argues that the Levinasian deconstruction of ontology 
denies the possibility for solidarity and recognition due to its lack of 
tradition, that is, due to its 'groundlessness' or negation of the fact that 
subjects are enracinated in some form of 'given'. Difference, as a space 
open to absolute alterity, does not allow for intersubjectivity, for a 
shared tradition and shared understandings. Infinite as in the Kantian 
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Arendt argues that because 'genocide', or 'administrative 
massacres', consist in a violation of the community of humankind 
through the attack on human diversity, criminal proceedings must 
occur to restore the public order. (1994: 261) Levinas, in turn, 
places emphasis not on punishment, but rather on an ubiquitous 
guilt that incriminates not only the Other but myself as well, for, 
due to the split nature of identity, I am responsible for the Other, 
or, I am the Other. 
'Each of us is guilty before everyone for everyone, and I 
more than the others' writes Dostoyevsky in Brothers 
Karamazov. The subjectivity of the subject is persecution 
and martyrdom. It is a recurrence which is not self- 
consciousness, in which the subject ... would still remain 
somehow in itself and be able to veil its face. This 
recurrence is not self-coinciding ... It is a substitution for 
another. (1999: 146) 
Levinas's notion of an obsessive command that compels me to 
respond to the Other could, in an Arendtian view, have the counter 
effect of resistance. This, according to Levinas, would correspond 
to ontological thought, where will and counterwill complement each 
other: when one finds oneself in the excluded middle beyond being 
and non-being, one is moving in the realm of metaphysical 
transcendence, that of ethics, where identity is transcended in its 
condition of being constantly confronted with alterity. 
noumena which cannot be known, Levinas's Other points towards a 
proximal, rather than universal, humanism: 'our humanity is ... in that 
left-over part, our own part maudite that exits from Being's 
neutralisation'. (1996: 252-3,267-8,272) 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis does not intend to trace the humanist outlook in 
philosophical or historical terms. Neither does it focus on the links 
between humanism and the specificity of colonial situations. 
Rather, it aims to hint at the extent to which the contemporary 
subject is still immersed in modernity. The pervasive influence of 
the modern is witnessed in the current tension between anti- 
humanist and humanist outlooks within post-colonial theory. While 
the celebration of utopian differences relies on the clecentring of 
the subject, the affirmation of 'otherness' only makes sense in light 
of the aspiration to an identity freed from social constraints. The 
socially constituted and ideologically produced subject ultimately 
relies on a moral autonomy that enables it to question its 
environmental conditioning. The conception of the Enlightenment 
subject thus looms over the attempt to escape from modernity's 
binary oppositions, where thesis corresponds to antithesis united 
in a synthesis. 
The Hegelian dialectic, connoted with the structure of modern 
thought, is referred to as the origin of the West's totalising will to 
power, whereby the other is assimilated into the same. The 
postmodern aim is to let the other be truly other. However, by 
setting up a clear dichotomy between modernity and 
postmodernity, this type of thought not only perpetuates the 
binaries attributed to Hegelianism, but also participates in the 
logic of violence it seeks to overturn. In White Mythologies, Robert 
Young counters modernity's totalising logic with the impossibility of 
coincidence between signifier and signified, where the former 
evades any attempt at containment by the latter. This 
transcendence, however, is not open, for it ultimately refers back 
to itself in a tautological manner. By emphasising the singular 
without its contraries - the universal and the particular - 
postmodernism would mend diremptions, founding, in Gillian 
Rose's terms, a 'new ecclesiology', a 'sociality of saints', a 
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I sociology of control'. Freed of tensions between opposites, the 
singular manifests itself as 'unconceptualised aporia'. (1992: xiii) 
I want to argue that the equation 0f modernity with a 
straightforward binary logic based on coincidence and totalisation 
is in itself problematic. Hegel's description of the consolidation of 
self-consciousness, whereby the latter transcends itself by 
dwelling in its opposite only to return back from whence it came 
but no longer coinciding with itself, reveals a permanent fissure, or 
gap, at the heart of his thinking. If Hegelianism is considered as 
determinant for modernity, then modern discourse is characterised 
by a permanent diremption, or lack, which cannot be mended. The 
postmodern emphasis on fragmentation and disunity thus can 
ultimately be read as deriving from within modernity itself. 
The ambivalence that characterises modernity is patent in the non- 
linearity of its project, where humanism and universalism reside 
side by side with oppression and exploitation. Alongside the 
violence of colonisation that characterised the birth of modernity 
lies the counter-discourse of domination. The telling of the 
'suppressed tale' of European confrontation with alterity in the New 
World and the subsequent development of racial slavery in the 
Americas maps the terrain in which the demise of old certainties 
led to the consolidation of the racialised, autonomous, and rational 
modern subject defined against its 'others'. However, the debates 
that sought to justify slavery and the status of the natives reveal 
the extent to which 'totalisation' was not a pacific, simple process: 
from within the tradition that paved the way for conquest came 
voices that problematised the terms of this very conquest. 
Having inaugurated modernity, the European encounter with the 
Americas articulates a tension between two conflicting forms of 
government, that of a centralised State, the revenue of which 
derived from concessions, and that of decentralisation, whereby 
the State levied excise and duties on cash crops, allowing private 
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initiative to flourish. Blackburn argues that although centralised 
government is often equated with attempts at totalisation, civil 
society is nevertheless pregnant with disaster and mayhem, as 
shown in the workings of plantation slavery in the New World. The 
connivance between civil society and the rise of capitalism charts 
the break down of a generalised, abstract Other into a multiplicity 
of others, taxonomically categorised into units. 
Blackburn's critique can be read as sponsoring a subsumption of 
the particular by the universal, that is, of the individual interests 
that compose civil society by the State. However, in light of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, civil society is considered to act as 
mediator between the particular and universality, thus enabling 
individual freedom to be actualised through the rational system of 
social institutions. Civil society thus promotes the harmonisation 
between the collective interests embodied in the State and the 
objective good of the individual: freedom is concretised when the 
individual is in harmony with the social, that is, when individuals 
identify themselves with the institutions of their community due to 
regarding the latter as rational. (Hegel, 1991: 220-1; Wood, 1991: 
xii-xiii) 
Blackburn forecloses the possibility of mediation between State 
and individual through the rational institutions of civil society, due 
to opposing a rational State, in the form of a non-divisive whole, to 
the ravages of civil society. By ignoring the concept of mediation 
between universal and particular, Blackburn's argument would 
appear to perpetuate a rigid dichotomy between centralisation and 
decentralisation. This binary opposition does not allow for the 
articulation of the aporias inherent in finding a path from the 
universal concept to the particularity of each instance. (Rose, 
19 97: 1 15) 
Blackburn implies that the relation to a generalised Other that 
characterises centralisation provides for greater awareness of the 
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ethical issues involved in slavery than the capitalist implosion of 
alterity into units distinctive of decentralised government, the 
latter which allowed for the reduction of the slave to chattel. This 
position can again be interpreted as representative of dichotornical 
thought, whereby the generalised Other corresponds to a 
universalist concept and the implosion of alterity is associated with 
the particular. Blackburn depicts universality in an essentially 
positive light, be it under the guise of State centralisation or an 
abstract alterity. Simultaneously, particularity is portrayed as 
inherently negative, as embodied in decentralisation as well as in 
the disintegration of alterity into a myriad of capitalist 'units' 
representative of plantation slavery. The opposition between 
universal and particular in the form of State and civil society, or 
generalised Other and 'units' of alterity, thus appear as warring 
factions, whereby universalism triumphs by assimilating the 
particular. 
The discussion revolving around the possibility for mediation 
between universal and particular is pertinent to attempts to 
salvage a modern project inextricably complicit with colonialism. 
One such attempt resides in the release, or suspension, of the 
'broken middle', the site of diremptions which are not united into a 
totality. (Rose: 1992) Modernity can be viewed as a stage of 
apprenticeship in an 'ethics of responsibility' (Venn, 2000: 235) by 
paying heed to the tension between humanism and oppression 
within the modern tradition. 
Robert Young attenuates the degree to which Spivak and Bhabha 
attempt to mediate between universality and particularity. By 
reading these authors as post-structuralists, Young forecloses the 
possibility that they may be operating strategically on this terrain. 
The strategic recourse to post-structuralism as a form of 
negotiating between humanism and anti-humanism can be regarded 
as a 'broken middle', a site in which aporias are kept alive. Instead 
of conveying the post-structuralism of Spivak and Bhabha as 
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diremptive, Young attempts to present it as a singularity. The 
singular, that which unites contraries, camouflages the process of 
mediation between universal and particular. 
The modern trilogy of eq u al ity, liberty, and fraternity is 
represented, in this thesis, by Fanon, Arendt, and Levinas, 
respectively. The complicity of modernity with oppression brings 
each of these authors to privilege a specific term within the trilogy 
as a form of mediating between universality and the particular. 
Fanon's emphasis falls on equality: it is the desire for recognition 
of black as equal to white that provides the impetus for Fanon's 
strategic use of violence. In a colonised society, in which the 
native is deprived of agency, the external violence that victimises 
him often resurfaces in a myriad of psychosomatic symptoms. 
These serve as a means of achieving homeostasis with the 
environment. The cathartic power of violence will therefore break 
the chain whereby the colonised attains equilibrium with his social 
surroundings through body and mind. By becoming conscious of 
the sociogenic roots of his psychopathologies, the colonised 
realises that by changing the social he will also change himself. 
Fighting violence with violence, the native seeks to set the scales 
right, achieving a new synthesis whereby both colonised and 
coloniser can relate to each other as equals. Whereas it is through 
work that Hegel's slave objectifies himself and becomes conscious 
of his own self-worth, Fanon's 'slave' objectifies himself through 
violence. Kojbve's emphasis on the desire for recognition almost 
becomes a desire against misrecognition in Fanon. Violence thus 
provides the basis for a refiguration of identity, a recasting of a 
misrecognised identity in a novel frame. N6gritude had sought to 
write back against whiteness by infusing white stereotypes of 
blackness with a positive meaning. Fanon, however, realises that 
this attempt at refiguration is only a particular subsumed within the 
universal concept of a liberated mankind. Violence is cathartic in 
that it allows for identity to refigure itself by mediating between 
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colonised and coloniser: the particular is no longer subsumed 
within the universal in singularity for violence marks the site of 
diremption between opposite poles. Moreover, by rupturing the 
process through which human beings achieve homeostasis with the 
environment, fanonian violence consists in fundamentally ethical 
action through which the individual refuses any logic of necessity, 
taking life into his own hands. Violence thus becomes an aporetic 
site mediating between the individual and the environment. 
Contrary to Fanon, Arendt's focus within the trilogy of modernity is 
on freedom. Her major preoccupation is the preservation of 
individual freedom in a context divorced from the absolutisms of 
tradition, authority, and religion. The public realm, destined to 
defend all citizens as equal in their differences, provides the space 
of freedom, hedged in by laws, within which men act. Whereas man 
is distinguished by the capacity to begin, to initiate a new series in 
time, he is inherently unequal to his fellow man. The public realm 
is thus the domain in which both equality and freedom to act are 
preserved. This may then be considered to be a site of diremption 
between the freedom of the individual on one hand, and the 
equality of citizens on the other. 
Arendt's position regarding desegregation in schools in Arkansas 
illustrates the aporias kept alive within the public realm. She 
opposes desegregation on the grounds that to force an non- 
existent welcome on children would be akin to allowing the latter to 
suffer for the sins of their parents: adults are exempting 
themselves from solving issues of racial inequality in the public 
realm by delegating these problems to the educational sphere, part 
of the social realm, where the innocence of childhood should be 
preserved. Underlying Arendt's stance is her portrayal of the social 
realm as that of preference, where individuals choose with whom to 
associate, often abiding by the norm according to which 'like 
attracts like'. Arendt considers the social realm to be that of 
inequalities, for human beings are inherently unequal to each 
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other. The public realm, on the contrary, is that in which equality 
reigns, due to protection of the right to difference under the eyes 
of the law. State intervention in the social realm would, however, 
consist in a violation of individual rights to freedom. 
Arendt thus articulates the aporia inherent in thinking the 
collective and the individual, the universal concept and the 
particular. All individuals in the public realm are equally free to act 
within the space provided by law; however, these freedoms will run 
counter to each other in the social realm, the domain of 
antagonisms and difference. The major problem here lies in 
thinking the extent to which public and social can be divorced from 
each other: as long as the law affects each individual in both his 
political, social, and private life, the public and social realms must 
be mediated with each other. In Arendt, this mediation occurs 
through the faculty of judgement, which links man to the world he 
shares with others. The difficult path from the universal concept to 
the particular instance, from law to ethics, from the public to the 
social, is articulated through the attempt to assume shared 
responsibility for a common world. 
In opposition to both Fanon and Arendt, Levinas privileges 
fraternity within the trilogy representative of modernity. Levinas's 
humanism derives precisely from his considering fraternity as the 
weak or problematic link in the chain. The latter concept mediates 
between identity and alterity, two separate totalities engaged in an 
asymmetric relationship that does not form a whole. Organised 
around the Other, fraternity allows for a generalised, abstract 
relationship with alterity, in which the latter takes the form of 'the 
third party'. The Other, defined as absolutely Other, bears alterity 
as essence and is thus not defined as Other in relation to identity. 
'The third party', entitled to everything because deprived of 
everything, persecutes me in his forlornness and destitution. 
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Striking me from a dimension of height in absolute infinity, the 
Other's transcendence, forever evading my grasp, will rupture the 
process whereby I coincide with myself. To be in time is to be for 
the Other, for the human condition is characterised by a perpetual 
movement of self transcendence towards absolute exteriority. 
Unlike the Hegelian system, which bears infinity within itself 
(Rosenzweig, 1985: 255), Levinas posits an infinite alterity, 
completely beyond ontology. This movement whereby I transcend 
myself towards the Other is fraternal. It commands me to justify my 
freedom to the Other in guilt and responsibility. Ultimately, I am 
judged by the Other; to be fraternal is to respond to judgement 
concerning the arbitrariness of my freedom. Fraternity thus allows 
for mediation between the universal and the particular, in the form 
of an abstract alterity and a specific identity. 
Levinas, however, can also be read as positing an excluded 
middle, beyond being and not-being, as a singularity that 
camouflages the diremptions inherent in ontology. Gillian Rose 
implies that the excluded middle cannot be a broken middle, for 
where the latter seeks to release, or suspend, aporias, the former 
masks the complexities involved in mediating between the 
universal and the particular. (Rose, 1992) The excluded middle, as 
singular, would be akin to the postmodern singular that mends 
diremptions between contraries. 
Nevertheless, the excluded middle can be interpreted, on one 
hand, as the universal concept in the form of a generalised, 
abstract, infinite Other which, as transcendent to me, can never 
partake of a totality with me, as well as, on the other hand, the 
fraternal mediator between identity and alterity. In the latter case, 
the excluded middle would enable a fraternal relationship to occur 
in which each part, the universal and the particular, preserves its 
separateness and yet engages with one another. Fundamentally 
asymmetric, this relationship would not be one of equality: 
because I am in permanent debt to the Other in terms of my having 
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to justify my freedom to him, he, as 'third party', is the centre 
around which fraternity is organised. 
The Levinasian notion of fraternity would thus consist in a face to 
face in which identity and alterity do not gather around a common 
term. Based on a proximity that maintains distance, fraternity 
escapes from the social ideal of fusion, of the One, hitherto 
predominant in Western philosophy. As such, Levinas presents a 
proximal, rather than universal, humanism (Lash, 1996), where 
freedom reveals itself as finite or inhibited by seeking to maintain 
plurality between same and Other. 
This thesis does not intend to resolve the tensions inherent in 
thinking the complicity between oppression and the modern trilogy 
of equality, liberty, and fraternity. Rather, it would aim to open and 
reveal gaps, pointing, in the process, to ways of positing 
humanism that provide a break with the common reduction of the 
latter to a totalising outlook. Thus, while Fanon's concept of lived 
experience articulates the perplexities, or aporias, inherent in 
finding a path from the universal to the particular, Arendt and 
Levinas indicate two paths - one political and the other ethical - to 
this problematisation. Arendt recognises diremptions but seeks to 
work beyond them through a Kantian 'enlarged mentality' and 
sensus communis, which, in assuming inter-human relativity and 
shared responsibility for a common world, escapes the habitual 
association between humanism and Hegelianism. Levinas keeps 
open a diremption between same and Other that does not consist 
in lack: while lack can be satiated, the fissure between myself and 
Other corresponds to a Desire that increases the more I approach 
alterity. This is because the Other is elusive to ontology. 
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